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Quoted verbatim 1×
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cited 2× by 1 distinct case, last quoted 1998 ·
…f congress uses a common-law term in a federal criminal statute without defining it, we must presume that congress adopted the common-law definition of that term.
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Treatment trajectory · 1996 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1996
2011
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 31 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
examined
Cited as authority (quoted)
United States v. Jane Doe (r.s.w.)
(2×)
f congress uses a common-law term in a federal criminal statute without defining it, we must presume that congress adopted the common-law definition of that term.
discussed
Cited "see"
Scott v. Fisher
See United States v. Giraldo, 80 F.3d 667, 673 (2d Cir.) (“The weight of the evidence is a matter for argument to the jury, not a ground for reversal on appeal.”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 847 , 117 S.Ct. 135 , 136 L.Ed.2d 83 (1996).
discussed
Cited "see"
Pratt v. Upstate Correctional Facility
See United States v. Giraldo, 80 F.3d 667, 673 (2d Cir.) (“The weight of the evidence is a matter for argument to the jury, not a ground for reversal on appeal.”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 847 , 117 S.Ct. 135 , 136 L.Ed.2d 83 (1996).
discussed
Cited "see"
Knott v. Sullivan
See United States v. Riascos-Suarez, 73 F.3d 616, 625 (6th Cir.) (“A search may be conducted without a warrant if a person with a privacy interest in the item to be searched gives free and voluntary consent.”) (citing Schneckcloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 222 (1973)), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 848 (1996).
discussed
Cited "see"
Diane Knott v. Mark Sullivan
See United States v. Riascos-Suarez, 73 F.3d 616, 625 (6th Cir.) ("A search may be conducted without a warrant if a person with a privacy interest in the item to be searched gives free and voluntary consent.") (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 222, 93 S.Ct. 2041 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973)), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 848 , 117 S.Ct. 136 , 136 L.Ed.2d 84 (1996). 4 .
discussed
Cited "see"
Williams v. Prunty
(2×)
See United States v. Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d 1344, 1348 (9th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 848 , 117 S.Ct. 135 , 136 L.Ed.2d 83 (1996).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. D'Armond
See United States v. Westbrook, 125 F.3d 996, 1009 (7th Cir.) (‘We join the other circuits that uniformly have held, after [United States v.] Lopez, [ 514 U.S. 549 (1995) ] that it was within the authority of the Congress under the Commerce Clause to create drug laws criminalizing narcotics transactions such as those found under 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841.”), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 643 (1997); see United States v. Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453, 1475 (10th Cir.1995) (“21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) is constitutional.”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 848 , 117 S.Ct. 136 , 136 L.Ed.2d 84 (1996).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. ANTHONY GIBBS
See J.A. at 1731-34. 41 To be during and in relation to the drug trafficking crime, "the Government must prove that the firearm furthered the purpose or effect of the crime and that its presence or involvement was not the result of coincidence." United States v. Riascos-Suarez, 73 F.3d 616, 623 (6th Cir.) (citing Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993)), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 848 (1996).
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. Lipp
See United States v. Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453 (10th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 848 , 117 S.Ct. 136 , 136 L.Ed.2d 84 (1996).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Gibbs
See J.A. at 1731-34. 41 To be during and in relation to the drug trafficking crime, "the Government must prove that the firearm furthered the purpose or effect of the crime and that its presence or involvement was not the result of coincidence." United States v. Riascos-Suarez, 73 F.3d 616, 623 (6th Cir.) (citing Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 , 113 S.Ct. 2050 , 124 L.Ed.2d 138 (1993)), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 848 , 117 S.Ct. 136 , 136 L.Ed.2d 84 (1996).
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. Brown
See United States v. Gullett, 75 F.3d 941, 947 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 847 , 117 S.Ct. 134 , 136 L.Ed.2d 83 (1996).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States of America, Appellee-Cross-Appellant v. James Payton, AKA James Perkins, Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee
See United States v. Giraldo, 80 F.3d 667, 673 (2d Cir.) (“The weight of the evidence is a matter for argument to the jury, not a ground for reversal on appeal.”), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 117 S.Ct. 135 , 136 L.Ed.2d 83 (1996).
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. George Dean Martin
See United States v. Giraldo, 80 F.3d 667, 679 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 117 S.Ct. 135 , 136 L.Ed.2d 83 (1996).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Juan R. Munoz, A/K/A John Doe 1
(2×)
See United States v. Giraldo, 80 F.3d 667, 678 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 117 S.Ct. 135 , 136 L.Ed.2d 83 (1996).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Sanchez
See United States v. Giraldo, 80 F.3d 667, 676-78 , cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 135 , 136 L.Ed.2d 83 (1996); United States v. Riascos-Suarez, 73 F.3d 616, 623-24 (6th Cir.); cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 136 , 136 L.Ed.2d 84 (1996); United States v. Staples, 85 F.3d 461, 464 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 318 , 136 L.Ed.2d 233 (1996).
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. Nguyen
See United States v. Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d 1344, 1348 (9th Cir.1995), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 135 , 136 L.Ed.2d 83 (1996).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Thomas Tocco, Mario Ferranti Jack Ferranti
See United States v. Gullett, 75 F.3d 941, 951 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 134 , 136 L.Ed.2d 83 (1996); see also United States v. Prevatte, 66 F.3d 840, 848 (7th Cir.1995) (Posner, C.J., concurring) (“I do think the maximum good-time credits should be subtracted.
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Jim Choe
See United States v. Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d 1344, 1348 (9th Cir.1995), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 135 , 136 L.Ed.2d 83 (1996). 4 Counsel was not ineffective when he made his opening statement about the health and ownership of Super Workstation, when he did not attack the authenticity of the cellular phone tape, or when he failed to call character and secondary market witnesses.
discussed
Cited "see"
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Coley QUINN, Defendant-Appellant
See United States v. Giraldo, 80 F.3d 667, 676-77 (2d Cir.1996) (“a person cannot be said to ‘carry’ a firearm without at least a showing that the gun is within reach during the commission of the drug offense” (internal citation omitted)), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 135 , 136 L.Ed.2d 83 (1996); United States v. Hernandez, 80 F.3d 1253, 1258 (9th Cir.1996) (“the firearm must have been immediately available for use by the defendant”); United States v. Riascos-Suarez, 73 F.3d 616, 623 (6th Cir.) (“the firearm must be immediately available for use — on the defendant, or wi…
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Quinn
See United States v. Giraldo, 80 F.3d 667, 676-77 (2d Cir.1996) ("a person cannot be said to "carry' a firearm without at least a showing that the gun is within reach during the commission of the drug offense" (internal citation omitted)), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 135 , 136 L.Ed.2d 83 (1996); United States v. Hernandez, 80 F.3d 1253, 1258 (9th Cir.1996) ("the firearm must have been immediately available for use by the defendant"); United States v. Riascos- Suarez, 73 F.3d 616, 623 (6th Cir.) ("the firearm must be immediately available for use—on the defendant, or within his or …
discussed
Cited "see"
Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.
See United States v. Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d 1344, 1350 (9th Cir.1995) (court "must pay due respect for the oath taken by [a juror] given the absence of any stated intention to disregard it."), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 135 , 136 L.Ed.2d 83 (1996). 125 Kodak argues that Bushong's initial bias takes on greater weight in light of the prolonged and contentious jury deliberations.
discussed
Cited "see"
Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.
See United States v. Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d 1344, 1350 (9th Cir.1995) (court “must pay due respect for the oath taken by [a juror] given the absence of any stated intention to disregard it.”), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 117 S.Ct. 135 , 136 L.Ed.2d 83 (1996).
cited
Cited "see"
Dennis L. Barrett v. United States
See United States v. Giraldo, 80 F.3d 667, 676-77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 135 , 136 L.Ed.2d 83 (1996).
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. Desimone
See United States v. Giraldo, 80 F.3d 667, 680 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 135 , 136 L.Ed.2d 83 (1996).
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. Desimone
See United States v. Giraldo, 80 F.3d 667, 680 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 135 , 136 L.Ed.2d 83 (1996).
cited
Cited "see"
Harney v. United States
See United States v. Giraldo, 80 F.3d 667 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, -, 117 S.Ct. 135 , 136, 136 L.Ed.2d 83 (1996); Cruz-Rojas, 101 F.3d at 285.
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. Salvador Soto Mendoza
See United States v. Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d 1344, 1347-48 (9th Cir.1995), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 135 , 136 L.Ed.2d 83 (1996).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
United States v. Conley
However, as Judge Wier astutely noted, a subsequent legal clarification as to an element of the crime does not, without more, render an otherwise intelligent guilty plea involuntary or invalid. [R. 159 at 23]; see also United States v. Riascos-Suarez , 73 F.3d 616 , 622-24 (6th Cir.), cert. denied , 519 U.S. 848 , 117 S.Ct. 136 , 136 L.Ed.2d 84 (1996), superseded by statute , An Act to Throttle Criminal Use of Guns, Pub.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Mickens v. United States
If any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, the conviction must be upheld.” United States v. Keats, 937 F.2d 58, 62 (2d Cir.1991) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Giraldo, 80 F.3d 667, 673 (2d Cir.). cert. denied, 519 U.S. 847 , 117 S.Ct. 135 , 136 L.Ed.2d 83 (1996) (explaining that evidence must be viewed “in the light most favorable to the government,” drawing all inferences and deciding all issues of credibility in the government’s favor) (citations omitted).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
United States v. McVeigh
One acts maliciously if he or she acts “intentionally or with willful disregard of the likelihood that damage or injury will result.” McFadden, 814 F.2d at 146 ; see also United States v. Gullett, 75 F.3d 941, 947-48 (4th Cir.1996) (same, construing 18 U.S.C. § 844 (i)), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 134 , 136 L.Ed.2d 83 (1996); United States v. Corona, 108 F.3d 565, 571 (5th Cir.1997) (same).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
United States v. Mixon
See, e.g., United States v. Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d 1344, 1351 (9th Cir.1995) (“[Knowledge may be reasonably inferred where the defendant drives a car ‘laden’ with illegal substances.”), cert, denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 135 , 136 L.Ed.2d 83 (1996).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Quintero-Barraza
v.
United States
v.
United States
No. 95-9280.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Oct 7, 1996.
Cited by 64 opinions | Published
Citer courts: Ninth Circuit (2)
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.