Brown v. Texas, 541 U.S. 938 (2004). · Go Syfert
Search
Brown v. Texas, 541 U.S. 938 (2004). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
G Cite
cited 8× by 7 distinct cases · "The jury may infer the intent to kill from the use of a deadly weapon unless it would not be reasonable to infer that death or serious bodily injury could result from the use of the weapon."
57 citation events (57 in the last 25 years) across 4 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Frederick Jones v. State (texapp, 2013-11-27)
Treatment trajectory · 2004 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2004 2015 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 6 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Frederick Jones v. State
Tex. App. · 2013 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
the jury may infer the intent to kill from the use of a deadly weapon unless it would not be reasonable to infer that death or serious bodily injury could result from the use of the weapon.
discussed Cited "see" Worthington v. Jetsmarter, Inc.
S.D.N.Y. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See Henry Schein, 139 S. Ct. at 528 (“This Court has consistently held that parties may delegate threshold arbitrability questions to the arbitrator, so long as the parties’ agreement does so by ‘clear and unmistakable’ evidence.” (quoting First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 541 U.S. 938 , 944 (1995))).
cited Cited "see" Kody William Farmer v. State
Tex. App. · 2012 · signal: see · confidence high
See 2011 WL 1601311 , at *5. 7 presumptions, that an instruction should be permissive rather than mandatory), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 938 (2004).
cited Cited "see" In the Matter of I.L., a Juvenile
Tex. App. · 2012 · signal: see · confidence high
See Brown v. State, 122 S.W.3d 794, 800 (Tex.Crim.App.2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 938 , 124 S.Ct. 1678 , 158 L.Ed.2d 359 (2004); Wolfe v. State, 917 S.W.2d 270, 275 (Tex.Crim.App.1996).
discussed Cited "see" In Re JG
Tex. App. · 2006 · signal: accord · confidence high
The court of appeals held that the trial court's comment violated article 38.05 of the Code of Criminal Procedure because the "only reasonable interpretation which can be placed on the judge's statement is that, at least in his mind, the guilt of the appellant had already been firmly established and that very little time would be tolerated in assessing punishment." Id. at 836 ; accord Brown v. State, 122 S.W.3d 794 , 798 & n. 9 (Tex.Crim.App.2003) (giving the facts in Jones as an "obvious example" of statements by a trial court that would violate article 38.05), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 938 , 12…
discussed Cited "see" In re J.G.
Tex. App. · 2006 · signal: accord · confidence high
The court of appeals held that the trial court’s comment violated article 38.05 of the Code of Criminal Procedure because the “only reasonable interpretation which can be placed on the judge’s statement is that, at least in his mind, the guilt of the appellant had already been firmly established and that very little time would be tolerated in assessing punishment.” Id. at 836 ; accord Brown v. State, 122 S.W.3d 794 , 798 & n. 9 (Tex.Crim.App.2003) (giving the facts in Jones as an “obvious example” of statements by a trial court that would violate article 38.05), cert. denied, 541 U…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Brown
v.
Texas
03-1078.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Mar 22, 2004.
541 U.S. 938
Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 83%
Citer courts: Court of Appeals of Texas (1)

541 U.S. 938

BROWN
v.
TEXAS.

No. 03-1078.

Supreme Court of United States.

March 22, 2004.

1

Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 122 S. W. 3d 794.