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Cal. CodesPenal CodePart 1. Of Crimes and PunishmentsTitle 9. Of Crimes Against the Person Involving Sexual Assault, And Crimes Against Public Decency and Good MoralsChapter 1. Rape, Abduction, Carnal Abuse of Children, and Seduction

Cal. Penal Code § 261 (2026)

Edition and currency
leginfo export of Sept. 26, 2026 (applied Oct. 1, 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTleginfo export of Sept. 26, 2026 (applied Oct. 1, 2026) cited 1933–2026 1,187citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 1,187 opinions since 1933, 268 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (a)(2) (43 cases).

(a)Rape is an act of sexual intercourse accomplished under any of the following circumstances:

(1)(A)If a person is at the time incapable, because of a mental disorder or developmental or physical disability, of giving legal consent, and this is known or reasonably should be known to the person committing the act. A person with a mental disorder or developmental or physical disability shall not be presumed to be unable to give legal consent to sexual intercourse due to that disability. Notwithstanding the existence of a conservatorship pursuant to the provisions of the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (Part 1 (commencing with Section 5000) of Division 5 of the Welfare and Institutions Code) or the absence of voluntary supports as described in Division 11.5 (commencing with Section 21000) of the Welfare and Institutions Code, except subdivisions (a) and (b) of Section 21000, the prosecuting attorney shall prove, as an element of the crime, that a mental disorder or developmental or physical disability rendered the alleged victim incapable of giving consent. This paragraph does not preclude the prosecution of the person committing the act under any other paragraph of this subdivision or any other law.

(B)In determining whether the person is at the time incapable, because of a mental disorder or developmental or physical disability, of giving legal consent, both of the following shall be considered, as applicable:

(i)Any mitigating measure in place, as defined in subdivision (n) of Section 11065 of Title 2 of the California Code of Regulations, as that regulation existed on January 1, 2025.

(ii)Any voluntary supports in place, as described in Division 11.5 (commencing with Section 21000) of the Welfare and Institutions Code, except subdivisions (a) and (b) of Section 21000.

(2)If it is accomplished against a person’s will by means of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the person or another.

(3)If a person is prevented from resisting by an intoxicating or anesthetic substance or a controlled substance, and this condition was known, or reasonably should have been known by the accused.

(4)If a person is at the time unconscious of the nature of the act, and this is known to the accused. As used in this paragraph, “unconscious of the nature of the act” means incapable of resisting because the victim meets any one of the following conditions:

(A)Was unconscious or asleep.

(B)Was not aware, knowing, perceiving, or cognizant that the act occurred.

(C)Was not aware, knowing, perceiving, or cognizant of the essential characteristics of the act due to the perpetrator’s fraud in fact.

(D)Was not aware, knowing, perceiving, or cognizant of the essential characteristics of the act due to the perpetrator’s fraudulent representation that the sexual penetration served a professional purpose when it served no professional purpose.

(5)If a person submits under the belief that the person committing the act is someone known to the victim other than the accused, and this belief is induced by artifice, pretense, or concealment practiced by the accused, with intent to induce the belief.

(6)If the act is accomplished against the victim’s will by threatening to retaliate in the future against the victim or any other person, and there is a reasonable possibility that the perpetrator will execute the threat. As used in this paragraph, “threatening to retaliate” means a threat to kidnap or falsely imprison, or to inflict extreme pain, serious bodily injury, or death.

(7)If the act is accomplished against the victim’s will by threatening to use the authority of a public official to incarcerate, arrest, or deport the victim or another, and the victim has a reasonable belief that the perpetrator is a public official. As used in this paragraph, “public official” means a person employed by a governmental agency who has the authority, as part of that position, to incarcerate, arrest, or deport another. The perpetrator does not actually have to be a public official.

(b)For purposes of this section, the following definitions apply:

(1)“Duress” means a direct or implied threat of force, violence, danger, or retribution sufficient to coerce a reasonable person of ordinary susceptibilities to perform an act which otherwise would not have been performed, or acquiesce in an act to which one otherwise would not have submitted. The total circumstances, including the age of the victim, and the victim’s relationship to the defendant, are factors to consider in appraising the existence of duress.

(2)“Incapable, because of a mental disorder or developmental or physical disability, of giving legal consent” means that a person is at the time of the intercourse either of the following:

(A)Unable to understand the nature of the act or transaction involved due to a mental disorder or developmental or physical disability.

(B)Unable to act freely and voluntarily due to a mental disorder or developmental or physical disability.

(3)“Menace” means any threat, declaration, or act that shows an intention to inflict an injury upon another.

The 20 cases that cite Cal. Penal Code § 261 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENUnited States v. Ruiz-Apolonio, 657 F.3d 907 (9th Cir. 2011).
cites § 261 13×subsections: (a)(2) 13×cited by 49 cases
Where it cites § 261
“Because we agree with the district court that a conviction for forcible rape under California Penal Code § 261(a)(2) is categorically a “crime of violence” as defined by the Sentencing Guidelines, we hold that the district court correctly imposed a 16-level sentencing…”
Holding on this section
A conviction under California Penal Code section 261(a)(2) for forcible rape is categorically a crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines, regardless of the underlying facts.
Later courts cite it for
“the district court is not required to provide a detailed explanation as to each of its reasons for rejecting every argument made by counsel.” · 5 citing courts
2
GREENPeople v. Butler, 68 Cal. App. 4th 421 (Ct. App. 1998).
cites § 261 26×cited by 28 cases
Where it cites § 261
“Defendant was convicted of rape (former Pen. Code, § 261, subd. 3) and placed on probation for 60 months.”
The case’s holding
A trial court's failure to conduct a full evidentiary hearing at a probable cause stage does not require reversal if the defendant is not otherwise prejudiced at trial.
3
GREENPeople v. Martinez, 125 Cal. App. 4th 1035 (Ct. App. 2005).
cites § 261 14×subsections: (a)(2) 12×cited by 29 cases
Where it cites § 261
“61(b)(e)(4), as to KENNETH LEE MARTINEZ, that in the commission of the crime of FORCIBLE RAPE as defined in PENAL CODE SECTION 261(A)(2), the Defendant personally used a dangerous or deadly weapon or firearm in the commission of the present offense in violation of Section 12022,…”
4
GREENPeople v. Jennings, 53 Cal. 3d 334 (1991).
cites § 261 6×cited by 393 cases
Where it cites § 261
“I dissent, however, as to the affirmance of defendant's conviction for the rape of Olga Cannon (Pen. Code, § 261) and the sustaining of the related felony-murder-rape special-circumstance finding ( id.”
The case’s holding
A court reviewing the sufficiency of evidence must examine the record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine if substantial evidence exists for guilt.
Later courts cite it for
“when the prosecution's proof establishes the offense occurred on a particular day to the exclusion of other dates, and when the defense is alibi (or lack of opportunity), it is improper to give the jury an instruction using the 'on or about' language.” · 4 citing courts
5
GREENPeople v. Williams, 4 Cal. 4th 354 (1992).
cites § 261 8×cited by 125 cases
Where it cites § 261
“And to the depth it does go, it is unsound. I As pertinent here, "Rape is an act of sexual intercourse .”
The case’s holding
A jury instruction regarding a mistaken belief in consent is required only when substantial evidence of equivocal conduct exists that could reasonably lead to such a mistake.
Later courts cite it for
“a trier of fact is permitted to credit some portions of a witness's testimony, and not credit others” · 8 citing courts
6
GREENPeople v. White, 2 Cal. 5th 349 (2017).
cites § 261 4×cited by 57 cases
Where it cites § 261
“*351 We must decide whether a jury properly convicted defendant Billy Charles White of both rape of an intoxicated person under Penal Code section 261, subdivision (a)(3), and rape of an unconscious person under Penal Code section 261, subdivision (a)(4)(A), when the *352…”
The case’s holding
A single act of sexual intercourse can support convictions for multiple distinct offenses under different subdivisions of the rape statute.
Later courts cite it for
“a statute violates the prohibition against ex post facto laws if it punishes as a crime an act that was innocent when done or increases the punishment for a crime after it is committed.” · 5 citing courts
7
GREENPeople v. John Z., 29 Cal. 4th 756 (2003).
cites § 261 8×cited by 32 cases
Where it cites § 261
“Landau and Alison Beck, Boston, MA, for the Victim Advocacy and Research Group, the National Crime Victim Law Institute, the California Coalition Against Sexual Assault and the National Sexual Violence Resource Center as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent.”
The case’s holding
Forcible rape occurs when a defendant continues sexual intercourse by force after a victim expresses an objection and attempts to stop the act.
Later courts cite it for
“the offense of forcible rape occurs when, during apparently consensual intercourse, the victim expresses an objection and attempts to stop the act and the defendant forcibly continues despite the objection.” · 7 citing courts
8
GREENPeople v. Mayberry, 15 Cal. 3d 143 (1975).
cites § 261 9×cited by 307 cases
Where it cites § 261
“Code, § 207), rape by means of force and threat (Pen. Code, § 261, subds. 2 & 3), assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen.”
The case’s holding
A reasonable and good faith mistake of fact regarding a person's consent to sexual intercourse is a defense to rape.
Later courts cite it for
“if a defendant entertains a reasonable and bona fide belief that a prosecutrix voluntarily consented to accompany him and to engage in sexual intercourse, it is apparent he does not possess the wrongful intent that is a prerequisite under penal code section 20 to a conviction of . . . rape by means of force or threat. . . .” · 7 citing courts
9
GREENPeople v. Story, 45 Cal. 4th 1282 (2009).
cites § 261 4×cited by 157 cases
Where it cites § 261
“As relevant here, the statute defines sexual offense as a crime or attempted crime that “involve[s]” “[a]ny conduct proscribed by” various other penal provisions, including Penal Code section 261, which defines the crime of rape.”
The case’s holding
A reviewing court must consider all evidence presented at trial, including evidence that should not have been admitted, when determining the sufficiency of evidence for retrial purposes.
Later courts cite it for
“the court of appeal erred in focusing on evidence that did not exist rather than on the evidence that did exist.” · 10 citing courts
10
GREENPeople v. Perez, 23 Cal. 3d 545 (1979).
cites § 261 4×cited by 519 cases
Where it cites § 261
“Both the People and defendant appeal from a judgment imposing consecutive sentences entered on verdicts of guilty of forcible rape (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. 3), first degree robbery (Pen.”
The case’s holding
A defendant may be punished for multiple distinct sex offenses committed during a single encounter even if the acts were driven by a single broad intent of sexual gratification.
Later courts cite it for
“it is well settled that section 654 applies not only where there was but one act in the ordinary sense, but also where there was a course of conduct which violated more than one statute but nevertheless constituted an indivisible transaction. whether a course of conduct is indivisible depends upon the intent and objective of the actor.” · 19 citing courts
11
GREENPeople v. Franklin, 105 Cal. App. 4th 532 (Ct. App. 2003).
cites § 261 16×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 261
“” After accepting the plea, the trial court found Franklin guilty of a violation of former Penal Code section 261, subdivision 2.”
12
GREENPeople v. Lewis, 46 Cal. 4th 1255 (2009).
cites § 261 3×cited by 302 cases
Where it cites § 261
“” The instruction then defined “sexual offense” as “[a]ny conduct made criminal by Penal Code section 261, subdivision (2),” and continued: “In weighing evidence of a prior offense, you must make several decisions.”
The case’s holding
A prosecutor's comments regarding the absence of evidence supporting representations made in an opening statement do not improperly shift the burden of proof to the defendant.
Later courts cite it for
“is indicative of a reasoned decision to kill” · 6 citing courts
13
GREENPeople v. Dancy, 102 Cal. App. 4th 21 (Ct. App. 2002).
cites § 261 7×cited by 29 cases
Where it cites § 261
“Defendant was convicted by jury trial of two counts of rape of an unconscious person (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (a)(4)), one count of inflicting corporal injury on a cohabitant (Pen.”
The case’s holding
Rape of an unconscious person requires both knowledge of the victim's unconsciousness and the wrongful intent to engage in sexual intercourse.
Later courts cite it for
“a defendant may be convicted of rape of an unconscious person only if he had both knowledge of the person's unconsciousness and the wrongful intent to engage in an act of sexual intercourse with an unconscious person.” · 2 citing courts
14
GREENIvan Valdez Amador v. Merrick Garland, 28 F.4th 72 (9th Cir. 2022).
cites § 261 12×subsections: (a)(4) 7×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 261
“2243 (2016), California Penal Code section 261(a)(4) is not “divisible.” We therefore may not look to the specifics of Petitioner’s conviction, no matter how clear it is that he did not commit rape by fraud in the inducement.”
15
GREENPeople v. Albillar, 51 Cal. 4th 47 (2010).
cites § 261 2×cited by 837 cases
Where it cites § 261
“Defendants Albert Andrew Albillar, Alex Albillar, and John Madrigal stand convicted by a jury of forcible rape while acting in concert (Pen. Code, §§ 261, subd. (a)(2), 264.1), forcible sexual penetration while acting in concert ( id.”
The case’s holding
A jury may infer specific intent to benefit a gang if substantial evidence shows a defendant committed a felony with known gang members to promote their criminal conduct.
Later courts cite it for
“expert opinion that particular criminal conduct benefited a gang by enhancing its reputation for viciousness can be sufficient to raise the inference that the conduct was 'committed for the benefit of . . . a criminal street gang' within the meaning of section 186.22(b)(1).” · 58 citing courts
16
GREENPeople v. Rowland, 4 Cal. 4th 238 (1992).
cites § 261 4×cited by 350 cases
Where it cites § 261
“) It was alleged for death eligibility that defendant committed the offense under the special circumstance of felony murder in the course of rape (Pen. Code, § 261). (Id., § 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(iii).”
The case’s holding
To review sufficiency under the due process clause, a court must determine whether any rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
Later courts cite it for
“in reviewing the sufficiency of evidence under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the united states constitution, the question we ask is 'whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” · 17 citing courts
17
GREENIn re Hess, 45 Cal. 2d 171 (1955).
cites § 261 8×cited by 228 cases
Where it cites § 261
“) [4] Forcible rape (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. 3), can be committed without contributing to the delinquency of a minor, e.”
The case’s holding
A person cannot be convicted of an offense not charged in the indictment or information unless that offense is necessarily included in the charged offense.
Later courts cite it for
“due process of law requires that an accused be advised of the charges against him in order that he may have a reasonable opportunity to prepare and present his defense and not be taken by surprise by evidence offered at his trial.” · 19 citing courts
18
GREENPeople v. Salazar, 144 Cal. App. 3d 799 (Ct. App. 1983).
cites § 261 8×cited by 46 cases
Where it cites § 261
“Code, § 236), and one count of rape (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (2)). He contends that: (1) the trial court erred by failing to instruct that resistance by the victim was an element of rape; (2) evidence of prior offenses was erroneously held to be admissible; (3) the trial court…”
The case’s holding
The 1980 amendment to the rape statute deleted the requirement of victim resistance, making it unnecessary to instruct the jury that resistance is an element of the crime.
19
GREENPeople v. Elam, 91 Cal. App. 4th 298 (Ct. App. 2001).
cites § 261 6×cited by 32 cases
Where it cites § 261
“We need not decide whether the definitions of "duress" and "menace" found in Penal Code section 261, subdivisions (b) and (c), apply to other sexual offenses.”
The case’s holding
An insufficient command of the English language that prevents full understanding of instructions and participation in deliberations renders a juror unable to perform their duty under Penal Code section 1089.
Later courts cite it for
“insufficient command of the english language to allow full understanding of the words employed in instructions and full participation in deliberations clearly . . . renders a juror 'unable to perform his duty' within the meaning of penal code section 1089.” · 2 citing courts
20
GREENUnited States v. Candelario Silvestre Beltran-Munguia, 489 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2007).
cites § 261 5×subsections: (a)(3) 5×cited by 46 cases
Where it cites § 261
“There, we were asked to decide whether a defendant's prior rape conviction under California Penal Code section 261(a)(3) qualified as an "aggravated felony" within the meaning of 101(a)(43)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.”
The case’s holding
A state sex offense requiring only lack of consent rather than force does not constitute a crime of violence under the sentencing guidelines.
Later courts cite it for
“to constitute an element of a crime, the particular factor in question needs to be a constituent part of the offense that must be proved by the prosecution in every case to sustain a conviction under a given statute.” · 9 citing courts

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
193219792026

One bar per 2 years. Tallest: 107 cases in 2014–2015. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Cal. Ct. App.962Cal.1069th Cir.36E.D. Cal.24N.D. Cal.17S.D. Cal.65th Cir.5C.D. Cal.4

The 8 courts with the most citing cases, of 31 courts in all.

By subsection
(a)5 cases
People v. Gomez-Garcia, No. C084227 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2021).
People v. Flores, No. D078725 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2022).
People v. Boles, No. B315675 (Cal. Ct. App. June 20, 2024).
Kistler v. Atchley, No. 3:21-cv-02002 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2023).
People v. Pacheco, No. H052374 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2026).
(a)(1)6 cases
Castro-Baez v. Reno, 217 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2000).
Juan Albino v. Lee Baca, 747 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2014).
Drew v. Scribner, 252 F. App'x 815 (9th Cir. 2007).
In re J.L. Ca6, No. H047290 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2020).
(HC) Johnson v. Kernan, No. 2:17-cv-02525 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2024).
Showing the top 5 of 6. More in the list view →
(a)(2)43 cases
United States v. Ruiz-Apolonio, 657 F.3d 907 (9th Cir. 2011).“Because we agree with the district court that a conviction for forcible rape under California Penal Code § 261(a)(2) is categorically a “crime of violence” as defined by the Sentencing Guidelines, we hold that the district court correctly imposed a 16-level sentencing…”
People v. Martinez, 125 Cal. App. 4th 1035 (Ct. App. 2005).“61(b)(e)(4), as to KENNETH LEE MARTINEZ, that in the commission of the crime of FORCIBLE RAPE as defined in PENAL CODE SECTION 261(A)(2), the Defendant personally used a dangerous or deadly weapon or firearm in the commission of the present offense in violation of Section 12022,…”
Larry David Davis v. Jeanne S. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628 (9th Cir. 2004).
Larry David Davis v. Jeanne S. Woodford, 333 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2003).
United States v. Bolanos-Hernandez, 492 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 2007).
Showing the top 5 of 43. More in the list view →
(a)(3)7 cases
United States v. Candelario Silvestre Beltran-Munguia, 489 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2007).“There, we were asked to decide whether a defendant's prior rape conviction under California Penal Code section 261(a)(3) qualified as an "aggravated felony" within the meaning of 101(a)(43)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.”
Castro-Baez v. Reno, 217 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2000).
(HC) Mendoza v. Cate, No. 2:09-cv-01710 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2021).
United States v. Bertan-Manguia, No. 06-30118 (9th Cir. June 6, 2007).
Samson Dubria v. G.A. Smith, 197 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1999).
Showing the top 5 of 7. More in the list view →
(a)(4)6 cases
Ivan Valdez Amador v. Merrick Garland, 28 F.4th 72 (9th Cir. 2022).“2243 (2016), California Penal Code section 261(a)(4) is not “divisible.” We therefore may not look to the specifics of Petitioner’s conviction, no matter how clear it is that he did not commit rape by fraud in the inducement.”
United States v. James Bruguier, 735 F.3d 754 (8th Cir. 2013).
People v. Morales, 212 Cal. App. 4th 583 (Ct. App. 2013).
Rogers v. Giurbino, 619 F. Supp. 2d 1006 (S.D. Cal. 2007).
Showing the top 5 of 6. More in the list view →
(a)(6)1 case
(b)4 cases
United States v. Gomez-Gomez, 493 F.3d 562 (5th Cir. 2007).
United States v. Herrera, 647 F.3d 172 (5th Cir. 2011).
United States v. Gomez-Gomez, 547 F.3d 242 (5th Cir. 2008).
United States v. Gomez-Gomez, 493 F.3d 562 (5th Cir. 2008).

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Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: leginfo export of Sept. 26, 2026 (applied Oct. 1, 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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