California Codes

Cal. Penal Code § 646.9 (2026)

✓ current as of May 2026
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(a)Any person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or willfully and maliciously harasses another person and who makes a credible threat with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear for their safety, or the safety of their immediate family, is guilty of the crime of stalking, punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year, or by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by both that fine and imprisonment, or by imprisonment in the state prison.

(b)Any person who violates subdivision (a) when there is a temporary restraining order, injunction, or any other court order in effect prohibiting the behavior described in subdivision (a) against the same party, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for two, three, or four years.

(c)(1)Every person who, after having been convicted of a felony under Section 273.5, 273.6, or 422, commits a violation of subdivision (a) shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year, or by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by both that fine and imprisonment, or by imprisonment in the state prison for two, three, or five years.

(2)Every person who, after having been convicted of a felony under subdivision (a), commits a violation of this section shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for two, three, or five years.

(d)In addition to the penalties provided in this section, the sentencing court may order a person convicted of a felony under this section to register as a sex offender pursuant to Section 290.006.

(e)For the purposes of this section, “harass” means engages in a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, torments, or terrorizes the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose.

(f)For the purposes of this section, “course of conduct” means two or more acts occurring over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose. Constitutionally protected activity is not included within the meaning of “course of conduct.”

(g)For the purposes of this section, “credible threat” means a verbal or written threat, including a threat performed through the use of an electronic communication device, or a threat implied by a pattern of conduct or a combination of verbal, written, or electronically communicated statements and conduct, including threats to a person’s pet, service animal, emotional support animal, or horse, made with the intent to place the person that is the target of the threat in reasonable fear for their safety, or the safety of their family, and made with the apparent ability to carry out the threat so as to cause the person who is the target of the threat to reasonably fear for their safety or the safety of their family. It is not necessary to prove that the defendant had the intent to actually carry out the threat. The present incarceration of a person making the threat shall not be a bar to prosecution under this section. Constitutionally protected activity is not included within the meaning of “credible threat.”

(h)For purposes of this section, the term “electronic communication device” includes, but is not limited to, telephones, cellular phones, computers, video recorders, fax machines, or pagers. “Electronic communication” has the same meaning as the term defined in Subsection 12 of Section 2510 of Title 18 of the United States Code.

(i)This section shall not apply to conduct that occurs during labor picketing.

(j)If probation is granted, or the execution or imposition of a sentence is suspended, for any person convicted under this section, it shall be a condition of probation that the person participate in counseling, as designated by the court. However, the court, upon a showing of good cause, may find that the counseling requirement shall not be imposed.

(k)(1)The sentencing court also shall consider issuing an order restraining the defendant from any contact with the victim, that may be valid for up to 10 years, as determined by the court. It is the intent of the Legislature that the length of any restraining order be based upon the seriousness of the facts before the court, the probability of future violations, the safety of the victim and their immediate family, and the information provided to the court pursuant to Section 273.75.

(2)This protective order may be issued by the court whether the defendant is sentenced to state prison, county jail, or if imposition of sentence is suspended and the defendant is placed on probation.

(l)For purposes of this section, “immediate family” means any spouse, parent, child, any person related by consanguinity or affinity within the second degree, or any other person who regularly resides in the household, or who, within the prior six months, regularly resided in the household.

(m)The court shall consider whether the defendant would benefit from treatment pursuant to Section 2684. If it is determined to be appropriate, the court shall recommend that the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation make a certification as provided in Section 2684. Upon the certification, the defendant shall be evaluated and transferred to the appropriate hospital for treatment pursuant to Section 2684.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 224 cases (81 in the last 5 years), 1993–2026 · leading case: Miguel Orellana v. William Barr, 967 F.3d 927 (9th Cir. 2020).
Miguel Orellana v. William Barr, 967 F.3d 927 (9th Cir. 2020). · cites it 19× “]” Cal. Penal Code § 646.9 (a). 5 The offense has been distilled into three elements.”
People v. Shelton, 125 P.3d 290 (Cal. 2006). · cites it 6× “I On February 4, 2003, the District Attorney of Sacramento County filed a complaint charging defendant Jonathan Joseph Shelton with six felony counts: one count of stalking in violation of a protective order (Pen.Code, § 646.9, subd. (b)), two counts of making a criminal threat…”
Fernando Malta-Espinoza v. Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney Gen., 478 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2007). · cites it 5× “DISCUSSION Malta-Espinoza is removable if stalking, as defined by California Penal Code § 646.9, qualifies as an aggravated felony by reason of being a “crime of violence.”
People v. Ogle, 185 Cal. App. 4th 1138 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010). · cites it 4× “(d)) and stalking (Pen. Code, § 646.9, subd. (b)). Appellant admitted that he had served a prior prison term.”
Ewing v. Superior Court, 90 F. Supp. 3d 1067 (S.D. Cal. 2015). · cites it 7× “) Plaintiff is clearly asking this Court to declare California Penal Code, section 646.9 (otherwise known as the stalking statute) 2 to be unconstitutional.”
Javier Vanegas v. City of Pasadena, 46 F.4th 1159 (9th Cir. 2022). · cites it 2× “CITY OF PASADENA ( Cal. Pen. Code § 646.9 ) or maliciously disturbing another by loud noise ( Cal.”
People v. Chandler, 332 P.3d 538 (Cal. 2014). · cites it 2× “3 An amended information filed on June 3, 2011 charged defendant in count one with stalking Lopez (Pen. Code, § 646.9, subd. (a)) and in counts two and three with criminal threats against Lopez and Alva, respectively (id.”
People v. Riccardi, 281 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2012). “2d 61, 64 [―The state-of-mind exception to the hearsay rule calls for admission of evidence 30 We also note that California‘s statutory definition of stalking specifically requires the People to prove that a defendant stalked his victim ―with the intent to place that person in…”
Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cnty. Sheriff Dep't, 533 F.3d 780 (9th Cir. 2008). “Similarly, Penal Code § 646.9(f)-(g) provides that "[c]onstitutionally protected activity is not included within the meaning of” certain terms in the statutory definition of the crime.”
In Re Brittany K., 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 487 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005). “[18] Penal Code section 646.9 provides in pertinent part: "(a) Any person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or willfully and maliciously harasses another person and who makes a credible threat with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear for his or…”
United States v. Luis Enrique Insaulgarat, 378 F.3d 456 (5th Cir. 2004). “CaLPenal Code § 646.9(a). In that ease, the appellant argued that the element of “threat to safety” did not necessarily involve a threat of physical force as is required under section 4B1.”
State v. Orsello, 554 N.W.2d 70 (Minn. 1996). · cites it 2× “[5] Sohn, Anti-Stalking Statutes, supra, at 207, 210; see also Cal.Penal Code § 646.9(a) (West 1995). [1] One need go no further than the statute preceding Minn.”
— Cal. Penal Code § 646.9(B) — 1 case
— Cal. Penal Code § 646.9(a) — 12 cases
Miguel Orellana v. William Barr, 967 F.3d 927 (9th Cir. 2020). “]” Cal. Penal Code § 646.9 (a). 5 The offense has been distilled into three elements.”
Fernando Malta-Espinoza v. Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney Gen., 478 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2007). “DISCUSSION Malta-Espinoza is removable if stalking, as defined by California Penal Code § 646.9, qualifies as an aggravated felony by reason of being a “crime of violence.”
United States v. Luis Enrique Insaulgarat, 378 F.3d 456 (5th Cir. 2004). “CaLPenal Code § 646.9(a). In that ease, the appellant argued that the element of “threat to safety” did not necessarily involve a threat of physical force as is required under section 4B1.”
State v. Orsello, 554 N.W.2d 70 (Minn. 1996). “[5] Sohn, Anti-Stalking Statutes, supra, at 207, 210; see also Cal.Penal Code § 646.9(a) (West 1995). [1] One need go no further than the statute preceding Minn.”
Ewing v. Superior Court, 90 F. Supp. 3d 1067 (S.D. Cal. 2015). “) Plaintiff is clearly asking this Court to declare California Penal Code, section 646.9 (otherwise known as the stalking statute) 2 to be unconstitutional.”
— Cal. Penal Code § 646.9(b) — 1 case
Fernando Malta-Espinoza v. Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney Gen., 478 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2007). “DISCUSSION Malta-Espinoza is removable if stalking, as defined by California Penal Code § 646.9, qualifies as an aggravated felony by reason of being a “crime of violence.”
— Cal. Penal Code § 646.9(e) — 1 case
Gene Atkins v. Debra Herndon, 380 F. App'x 726 (9th Cir. 2010).
— Cal. Penal Code § 646.9(f) — 2 cases
Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cnty. Sheriff Dep't, 533 F.3d 780 (9th Cir. 2008). “Similarly, Penal Code § 646.9(f)-(g) provides that "[c]onstitutionally protected activity is not included within the meaning of” certain terms in the statutory definition of the crime.”
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