Oklahoma Nat. Gas Co. v. Russell, 261 U.S. 290 (1923). · Go Syfert
Oklahoma Nat. Gas Co. v. Russell, 261 U.S. 290 (1923). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
421 citation events (12 in the last 25 years) across 69 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Metropolitan Edison Co. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (ca3, 2014-09-16)
Treatment trajectory · 1923 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1923 1974 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 20 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Metropolitan Edison Co. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (4×) also: Cited as authority (quoted)
3rd Cir. · 2014 · quote attribution · 4 verbatim quotes · confidence high
the constitution of oklahoma ... gives an appeal to the supreme court of the state, acting in a legislative capacity ... , with power to substitute a different order and to grant a supersedeas in the meantime.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Bogley v. Barber
Md. · 1993 · confidence medium
Ed. 150 ; Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Russell, 261 U. S. 290, 293, 43 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Alabama Public Service Commission v. Southern Railway Co. (2×)
SCOTUS · 1951 · confidence medium
American Federation of Labor v. Watson, 327 U. S. 582, 591-593 (1946); Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Russell, 261 U. S. 290, 292 (1923). [4] Appellants contend for the first time in this Court that a suit to restrain state officials from enforcing unconstitutional state laws is, in effect, a suit against the state prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) City of North Muskegon v. Miller
Mich. · 1929 · confidence medium
Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Russell, 261 U. S. 290, 292 (43 Sup. Ct. 353).” Village of Terrace Park v. Errett, supra. “An inspection of the plat of the city upon which the zoning districts are outlined, taken in connection with the master’s findings, shows with reasonable certainty that the inclusion of the locus in question is not indispensable to the general plan.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Peet Stock Remedy Co. v. McMullen
8th Cir. · 1929 · confidence medium
Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Russell, 261 U. S. 290, 292 [ 43 S. Ct. 353 , 67 L.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Colorado Power Co. v. Halderman
D. Colo. · 1924 · confidence medium
The court held they were properly in the federal court because, as stated ( 261 U. S. 293 , 43 Sup. Ct. 354, 67 L.
cited Cited "see" Appeal of Pennichuck Water Works
N.H. · 1980 · signal: see · confidence high
See Oklahoma Gas Co. v. Russel, 261 U.S. 290, 293 (1922).
examined Cited "see" Wisconsin State Employees Ass'n, Council 24 v. Wisconsin Natural Resources Board (3×)
W.D. Wis. · 1969 · signal: see · confidence high
See Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Russell, 261 U.S. 290, 292 , 43 S.Ct. 353 , 67 L.Ed. 659 (1922) ; Gilmore v. Lynch, 400 F.2d 228, 230 (9th Cir. 1968) ; cf. Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F. 2d 632, 635 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 368 U.S. 862 , 82 S.Ct. 105 , 7 L.Ed.2d 59 (1961). 2 .
examined Cited "see" Kelly v. Wyman (3×)
S.D.N.Y. · 1968 · signal: see · confidence high
See Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Russell, 261 U.S. 290 , 43 S.Ct. 353 , 67 L.Ed. 659 (1923); Note, Federal Review of State Welfare Practices, 67 Colum.L.Rev. 84,106-08 (1967); compare McWood Corp. v. State Corporate Comm’n, 237 F.Supp. 963 (D.N.M. 1965).
examined Cited "see" Mora v. Mejias (3×)
1st Cir. · 1953 · signal: see · confidence high
See Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Russel, 1923, 261 U.S. 290, 292 , 43 S.Ct. 353 , 67 L.Ed. 659 ; Ex parte Williams, 1928, 277 U.S. 267, 271 , 48 S.Ct. 523 , 72 L.Ed. 877 ; Phillips v. United States, 1941, 312 U.S. 246, 251 , 61 S.Ct. 480 , 85 L.Ed. 800 ; Alabama Public Service Commission v. Southern Ry.
cited Cited "see" Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Public Service Commission
SCOTUS · 1923 · signal: see · confidence high
See Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. *684 Russell, 261 U. S. 290 , and cases cited; also Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287 . 2.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Michigan Bell Telephone Company, D/B/A Ameritech Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant/cross-Appellee v. John Engler, in His Official Capacity as Governor of the State of Michigan David A. Svanda, in His Official Capacity as Commissioner of the Michigan Public Service Commission Robert B. Nelson, in His Official Capacity as Commissioner of the Michigan Public Service Commission John G. Strand, in His Official Capacity as Chairman of the Michigan Public Service Commission, Defendants-Appellees/cross-Appellants. Verizon North Incorporated and Contel of the South, Incorporated, D/B/A Gte Systems of Michigan, Plaintiffs-Appellants/cross-Appellees v. John Engler, in His Official Capacity as Governor of the State of Michigan David A. Svanda, in His Official Capacity as Commissioner of the Michigan Public Service Commission Robert B. Nelson, in His Official Capacity as Commissioner of the Michigan Public Service Commission John G. Strand, in His Official Capacity as Chairman of the Michigan Public Service Commission Jennifer M. Granholm, in Her Official Capacity as Attorney General of the State of Michigan (00-2174), Defendants-Appellees/cross-Appellants
6th Cir. · 2001 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Therefore, "the Constitution protects utilities from being limited to a charge for their property serving the public which is so 'unjust' as to be confiscatory." Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299 (1989) (citing Covington & Lexington Turnpike Road Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 597 (1896); Federal Power Commission v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 585 (1942); Federal Power Commission v. Texaco, Inc., 417 U.S. 380, 391-92 (1974)); see also Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Russell, 261 U.S. 290, 293 (1923) (holding that the plaintiff utility company deserved a remedy for confiscator…
examined Cited "see, e.g." Michigan Bell Telephone Co. v. Engler (3×)
6th Cir. · 2001 · signal: see also · confidence low
Therefore, “the Constitution protects utilities from being limited to a charge for their property serving the public which is so ‘unjust’ as to be confiscatory.” Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299 , 109 S.Ct. 609 , 102 L.Ed.2d 646 (1989) (citing Covington & L Turnpike Road Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 597 , 17 S.Ct. 198 , 41 L.Ed. 560 (1896); Federal Power Commission v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 585 , 62 S.Ct. 736 , 86 L.Ed. 1037 (1942); Federal Power Commission v. Texaco, Inc., 417 U.S. 380, 391-92 , 94 S.Ct. 2315 , 41 L.Ed.2d 141 (1974)); see also Oklahoma Na…
examined Cited "see, e.g." Public Utility Commission v. Pedernales Electric Cooperative, Inc. (3×)
Tex. App. · 1984 · signal: see also · confidence low
Co., supra; see also Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Russell, 261 U.S. 290 , 43 S.Ct. 353 , 67 L.Ed. 659 (1923).
examined Cited "see, e.g." PUC of Texas v. Pedernales Elec. Co-Op. (3×)
Tex. App. · 1984 · signal: see also · confidence low
Co., supra ; see also Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Russell, 261 U.S. 290 , 43 S.Ct. 353 , 67 L.Ed. 659 (1923).
examined Cited "see, e.g." Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Arizona Corp. Commission (3×)
Ariz. Ct. App. · 1979 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e. g., Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Russell, 261 U.S. 290 , 43 S.Ct. 353 , 67 L.Ed. 659 (1923); Arizona Corporation Commission v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel.
examined Cited "see, e.g." MOUNTAIN STATES, ETC. v. Ariz. Corp. Com'n (3×)
Ariz. Ct. App. · 1979 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Russell, 261 U.S. 290 , 43 S.Ct. 353 , 67 L.Ed. 659 (1923); Arizona Corporation Commission v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel.
examined Cited "see, e.g." United States v. STATE TAX COM'N OF STATE OF MISSISSIPPI (3×)
S.D. Miss. · 1974 · signal: see also · confidence low
Although it is arguable that this declaratory and injunctive action would not fall within the ambit of 28 U.S.C. § 2281 if the sole basis of relief advanced by the government was premised on the repugnance of Regulation 25 to federal procurement policy and regulations, see, e. g., Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111 , 86 S.Ct. 258 , 15 L.Ed.2d 194 (1965) ; see also Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Russell, 261 U.S. 290 , 43 S.Ct. 353 , 67 L.Ed. 659 (1923), the substantial constitutional question raised by the government’s assertion of state tax immunity renders this cause appropriate for dispos…
examined Cited "see, e.g." Davis v. Caldwell (3×)
N.D. Ga. · 1971 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also, Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Russell, 261 U.S. 290 , 43 S.Ct. 353 , 67 L.Ed. 659 (1923); Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F.Supp. 887 (S.D.N.Y.1968), aff’d, Goldberg v. Kelly, supra. Defendants also urge that this is a proper case for abstention to allow the state court to rule on the question presented here.
cited Cited "see, e.g." Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Slattery
SCOTUS · 1937 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Russell, 261 U. S. 290, 293 , with Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line, 211 U. S. 210 ; Ex parte Young, supra, 156.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Oklahoma Natural Gas Company
v.
Russell Et Al., Constituting the Corporation Commission of the State of Oklahoma, Et Al.; Oklahoma Gas & Electric Company Et Al. v. Corporation Commission of the State of Oklahoma, Et Al.
406 and 419.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Mar 5, 1923.
261 U.S. 290
1923 U.S. LEXIS 2554
Mr. David A. Richardson, with whom Mr. C. B. Arms, Mr. T. G. Chambers, Mr. Russell G. Lowe and Mr. B. A. Ames were on the briefs, for appellant in No. 406., Mr. Robert M. Rainey and Mr. Streeter B. Flynn, with whom Mr. Dennis T. Flynn and Mr. John H. Roemer were on the brief, for appellants in No. 419., ' Mr. Henry G. Snyder and Mr. E. S. Ratliff, with whom Mr. I. J. Underwood, Mr. F. E. Murrell and Mr. Cliff V. Perry were on the briefs, for appellees.
Holmes.
Cited by 166 opinions  |  Published
1 passages pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 60%
Citer courts: Third Circuit (3)
Me. Justice Holmes

delivered the opinion of the Court.

These two cases were argued separately, but they turn on the same point, were decided in a single opinion by the Court below' and do not require a separate consideration here. The.plaintiffs are corporations organized under the laws of Oklahoma and furnish natural gas to consumers in that State, at rates established by the Corporation Commission. They applied to the Commission for higher rates but were denied an advance. The Constitution of Oklahoma, admitted to be like that of Virginia dealt with in Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U. S. 210, gives an appeal to the Supreme Court of the State, acting in a legislative capacity as explained in the case cited, with power to substitute a different order and to grant a super-sedeas in the meantime. Appeals were taken to the Supreme Court and supersedeas was applied for but refused. The appeals are still not decided. After the plaintiffs had been denied a supersedeas by the Supreme Court, they filed these bills alleging that the present rates are confiscatory, setting up their constitutional rights and asking preliminary injunctions, and permanent injunctions unless the Supreme Court should allow adequate rates. Applications fqp temporary injunctions supported by evi[*292] dence were heard by three judges but were denied by the majority on the authority of the Prentis Case. Appeals were taken directly to this Court.

A doubt has been suggested whether these eases are within § 266 of the Judicial Code, Act of March 3, 1911, c. 231, 36 Stat. 1087, 1162; as amended by the Act of March 4, 1913, c. 160, 37 Stat. 1013. The section originally forbade interlocutory injunctions restraining the action of state officers in the enforcement or execution of any statute of a State, upon the ground of its unconstitutionality, without a hearing by three judges. The amendment inserted after the words “ enforcement or execution of such statute ” the words “ or in the enforcement or execution of an order made by an administrative board or commission acting under and pursuant to the statutes of such State ” but did not change the statement of the ground, which still reads “ the unconstitutionality of such statute.” So if the section is construed with narrow precision it may be argued that the unconstitutionality of the order is not enough. But this Court has assumed repeatedly that the section was to be taken more broadly. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Finn, 235 U. S. 601, 604. Phoenix Ry. Co. v. Geary, 239 U. S. 277, 280, 281. Cumberland Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Louisiana Public Service Commission, 260 U. S. 212. Western & Atlantic R. R. v. Railroad Commission of Georgia, ante, 264. The amendment seems to have been introduced to prevent any question that such orders were within the section: It was superfluous as the original statute covered them. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Garrett, 231 U. S. 298, 301, 318. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co. v. Goldsboro, 232 U. S. 548, 555. Grand Trunk Western Ry. Co. v. Railroad Commission of Indiana, 221 U. S 400, 403. But it plainly was intended to enlarge riot to restrict the law. We mention' the matter, simply to put doubts to rest.

[*293] Coming to the principal question, if the plaintiffs respectively can make out their case, as must be assumed for present purposes, they are suffering daily from confiscation under the rate to which they now are limited. They have done all that they can under the state law to get relief and cannot get it. If the Supreme Court of the State hereafter shall change the rate, even nunc pro tunc, the plaintiffs will have no adequate remedy for what they may have lost before the Court shall have acted. Springfield Gas & Electric Co. v. Barker, 231 Fed. 331, 335. In such a state of facts Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co. has no application. See Love v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 185 Fed. 321, 324, 325. Rules of comity or convenience must give way to constitutional rights. In the case cited there was no doubt as to the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court but simply a decision that the bills should be retained to await the result of appeals if the companies saw fit to take them. 211 U. S. 232. The companies had made no effort to secure a revision and there had been no present invasion upon their rights, but only the taking of preliminary steps toward cutting them down. In such circumstances it was thought to be.more reasonable and proper to await further action on the part of the State. ■

As in our opinion the District Court had jurisdiction and a duty .to try the question whether preliminary injunctions should issue, and as that question has not yet been considered, the cases should be remanded to that Court with directions to proceed to the trial. Generally it is not desirable that we should pass upon such matters until they have been dealt with below. Lutcher & Moore Lumber Co. v. Knight, 217 U. S. 257, 267, 268. Brown v. Fletcher, 237 U. S. 583, 587, 588.

'■ Decrees reversed and cases remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.