HAMPSON, Judge.

Factual and Procedural Background

Florian Halili (Plaintiff) appeals from (1) an Order granting a Motion to Dismiss (Dismissal Order) filed by Denada Ramnishta (Defendant) on the basis the trial court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over this child-custody action under the Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA)1 and (2) an Order denying Plaintiff’s Motion for a New Trial brought under Rule 59 of the In the Dismissal Order, the trial court made Findings of Fact that Plaintiff does not challenge on appeal. These Findings of Fact are thus binding on appeal. See Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97, 408 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1991) (holding unchallenged findings of fact are presumed to be supported by competent evidence and are binding on appeal (citations omitted)). Therefore, these Findings form the operative facts of this case, including:

1. [Plaintiff] currently resides in Mecklenburg County, North Carolina, and [Defendant] currently resides in New York County, New York.

[Plaintiff] intended at one point in time that the move to North Carolina would be approximately five (5) years.

7. As evidence of intent to move from New York to North Carolina, the parties listed their New York coop apartment for sale in June 2017. However, any sale would not occur earlier than three (3) months later due to the building application and approval process for the coop.

8. As evidence of intent to move from New York to North Carolina, in April 2017, the parties purchased a home in Charlotte, North Carolina, in addition to the existing condominium they own in Charlotte. The parties executed loan documents for this new home indicating that they would occupy the home within sixty (60) days following the purchase. However, the parties did not occupy the home within this time period.

9. As evidence of intent to move from New York to North Carolina, [Defendant] searched for, and accepted, a job offer on April 1, 2017 in Charlotte, but the record is clear that the parties did not move to Charlotte at this time.

10. As evidence of intent to move from New York to North Carolina, in January 2017, [Defendant] applied for a school in Charlotte for [Opal] to attend beginning August 2017.

11. The parties moved to North Carolina from New York, with the intent to move, on August 17, 2017. This date is supported by many facts, including:

a. The parties’ actions to make the New York apartment unhabitable by returning the cable television box on August 17, 2017, and forwarding the New York mail to Charlotte on September 1, 2017.

b. Text communications from [Defendant] to an individual on August 21, 2017, indicating she moved to Charlotte, North Carolina, the preceding weekend.

c. The parties and [Opal] ([Riley] having not yet been born) packing up their New York registered car with items necessary to live in North Carolina and driving to Charlotte and arriving on August 18, 2017. These items included [Plaintiff’s] wine collection and the parties’ safe that contained numerous important documents. d. Numerous pictures of [Opal] in the New York apartment on August 17, 2017, saying goodbye to the New York home.

e. The Charlotte home was professionally cleaned immediately prior to the parties and [Opal] arriving in Charlotte on August 18, 2017. Additionally, a washer and dryer had been installed and available for use in the Charlotte home prior to the family[’s] arrival.

12. The parties and [Opal] ([Riley] having not yet been born), visited Charlotte, North Carolina for a vacation from June 28, 2017 until July 9, 2017, when they flew via airplane roundtrip from New York. During this vacation, the parties stayed in a hotel for the first three (3) nights of their trip and then stayed for the remainder at their unfurnished home in Charlotte. The hotel had Internet access for [Defendant] to work and a pool for [Opal] to swim, which was part of the reason for choosing this hotel. The decision to vacate the hotel was made by [Plaintiff] and not [Defendant], who was approximately six (6) month’s pregnant at the time. [Defendant’s] testimony was more credible as to why the parties and the minor children spent the remainder of this visit at their unfurnished home. The Charlotte home was not habitable at this time. This home was dirty from construction, did not have necessary living items, including, but not limited to, utensils, furniture, washer and dryer, cable or Internet service.

13. During the visit to Charlotte, North Carolina from June 28, 2017 until July 9, 2017, [Defendant] met with potential doctors to assist in the delivery of [Riley] in September 2017. On June 29, 2017, [Defendant] sent a text message to a friend stating that, “. . . We are in clt till 7/8. I am working out of here so I can meet with some doctors and visit the two hospitals.”

14. [Opal] resided in North Carolina from August 18, 2017 until January 11, 2018. [Opal] did not reside in North Carolina for six (6) months preceding the filing of [Plaintiff’s] Complaint.

15. Between January 8th, 2018 and January 19th, 2018, the parties were in substantial marital conflict such that [Defendant] chose to move back to their New York apartment with the minor children on January 11th, 2018. The subject and actions of the parties during this marital conflict is before the New York County Family Court for permanent adjudication[.]

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21. There is also a pending New York Supreme Court action, filed by [Defendant] . . . for the following relief: absolute divorce, child custody, child support, maintenance, an equitable distribution of marital property . . . and related relief.

In its Dismissal Order, the trial court concluded it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA to make an initial custody decision regarding Opal because North Carolina was not Opal’s home state. The trial court concluded North Carolina was Riley’s home state, but North Carolina was an inconvenient forum and New York was a more convenient forum, thereby relinquishing its jurisdiction over Riley. Having made these Conclusions, the trial court finally concluded it “lacks subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the issue of child custody regarding the minor children.”

On 20 August 2018, Plaintiff filed a Motion for a New Trial requesting the trial court grant Plaintiff a new trial. The trial court held a hearing on Plaintiff’s Rule 59 Motion on 22 October 2018. On 28 November 2018, the trial court entered its Rule 59 Order denying Plaintiff’s Motion for a New Trial. Plaintiff filed Notice of Appeal from both the Dismissal Order and Rule 59 Order on 2 January 2019.

Appellate Jurisdiction

Before addressing subject-matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA, we must resolve an issue of appellate jurisdiction. Defendant has filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal and Motion for Appellate Sanctions contending Plaintiff’s Notice of Appeal was untimely filed five days late—thereby depriving this Court of jurisdiction over the appeal under N.C.R. App. P. 3(c)(1). Plaintiff counters Defendant’s delayed and/or defective service of the trial court’s Rule 59 Order tolled the time for filing Notice of Appeal and, as such, his appeal was timely noticed.^[4]

We acknowledge the parties appear to have spared no effort in their vigorous litigation (and re-litigation) of this issue both in the trial court and in this Court (both in motions and in briefs). We, however, decline to wade into the factual and credibility determinations necessary to conclusively vindicate either party on this particular procedural dispute. Rather, Plaintiff has also filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari with our Court, seeking review of the trial court’s Orders in the event we conclude Plaintiff’s Notice of Appeal was untimely. Presuming arguendo Plaintiff’s Notice of Appeal was untimely having been filed more than thirty days after entry of

4 On 6 January 2020, Plaintiff filed with this Court a Motion to Tax Costs and Have Other Penalties Imposed Against Appellee (Motion to Tax Costs). Both parties’ Motions seek to impose either sanctions or tax costs against the other party. In our discretion, we deny both Plaintiff’s Motion to Tax Costs and Defendant’s Motion for Appellate Sanctions. See N.C.R. App. P. 25(b); 34(b).

the trial court’s Rule 59 Order, in our discretion, we grant Plaintiff’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari. N.C.R. App. P. 21(a)(1); see also Anderson v. Hollifield, 345 N.C. 480, 482, 480 S.E.2d 661, 663 (1997) (“Rule 21(a)(1) gives an appellate court the authority to review the merits of an appeal by certiorari even if the party has failed to file notice of appeal in a timely manner.”). Because we grant Plaintiff’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari, we dismiss as moot Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Appeal.

Issues

The dispositive issues in this case are whether (I) the trial court erred by concluding North Carolina was not Opal’s home state under the UCCJEA; (II) the trial court erred by declining to exercise jurisdiction over Riley after concluding North Carolina was an inconvenient forum; and (III) the trial court acted under a misapprehension of the law in concluding it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the issue of child custody regarding the minor children.

Analysis

I. Home-State Determination

Plaintiff first contends the trial court erred by concluding it lacked subject- matter jurisdiction over Opal pursuant to the UCCJEA on the basis North Carolina was not Opal’s home state.

A. Standard of Review As noted above, Plaintiff does not challenge the trial court’s Findings of Fact, rather narrowing his focus on the question of whether those Findings support the trial court’s Conclusion it had no jurisdiction under the UCCJEA as it related to Opal. “Whether the trial court has jurisdiction under the UCCJEA is a question of law[.]” In re J.H., 244 N.C. App. 255, 260, 780 S.E.2d 228, 233 (2015) (citation omitted). Accordingly, we review the trial court’s conclusions de novo. See Gerhauser v. Van Bourgondien, 238 N.C. App. 275, 281, 767 S.E.2d 378, 383 (2014) (citations omitted).

B. Discussion

A North Carolina court has jurisdiction to make an initial child-custody determination under the UCCJEA if North Carolina was the home state of the child on the date of the commencement of the proceeding, or was the home state of the child within six months before the commencement of the proceeding, and the child is absent from this State but a parent or person acting as a parent continues to live in this State[.]

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A-201(a)(1) (2019) (emphasis added). A child’s “home state” is the state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child-custody proceeding. In the case of a child less than six months of age, the term means the state in which the child lived from birth with any of the persons mentioned. A period of temporary absence of any of the mentioned persons is part of the period. Id. § 50A-102(7) (2019). Section 50A-102(5) defines “commencement” for UCCJEA purposes as “the filing of the first pleading in a proceeding.” Id. § 50A-102(5).

Here, the trial court found: