Anderson v. Corall, 263 U.S. 193 (1923). · Go Syfert
Anderson v. Corall, 263 U.S. 193 (1923). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
Quick Summary

Parole is an amelioration of punishment that remains in legal effect imprisonment, and a mere lapse of time without legal restraint does not constitute service of a sentence.

A prisoner convicted of a crime and sentenced to a term of imprisonment was released on parole but subsequently violated the terms of his parole by committing another crime and being confined in a state penitentiary. The prisoner argued that his sentence had expired due to good conduct credits and the passage of time while he was out on parole. The court holds that parole is an amelioration of punishment that remains in legal effect as imprisonment, and a mere lapse of time without imprisonment or other legal restraint does not constitute service of a sentence. Because the parole violation interrupted the service of the sentence, the parole board acted within its authority to revoke the parole.

841 citation events (97 in the last 25 years) across 82 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Joao Neves v. State of Rhode Island Keith Nunes v. State of Rhode Island Pablo Ortega v. State of Rhode Island Mario Monteiro v. State of Rhode Island
Treatment trajectory · 1923 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1923 1974 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Joao Neves v. State of Rhode Island Keith Nunes v. State of Rhode Island Pablo Ortega v. State of Rhode Island Mario Monteiro v. State of Rhode Island
unknown court · 2024 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
the parole authorized by the statute does not suspend service or operate to shorten the term. while on parole the convict is bound to remain in the legal custody and under the control of the warden until the expiration of the term .
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Jones v. Cunningham
SCOTUS · 1963 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
while parole is an amelioration of punishment, it is in legal effect imprisonment
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Anderson v. Sentinel Offender Services, LLC (5×) also: Cited "see"
Ga. · 2016 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
mere lapse of time without imprisonment or other restraint contemplated by the law does not constitute service of sentence. escape from prison interrupts service, and the time elapsing between escape and retaking will not be taken into account or allowed as a part of the term.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Hudson v. State (3×)
Kan. · 2002 · signal: see also · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence low
mere lapse of time without imprisonment . . . does not constitute service of sentence.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) United States v. Gregory Williams (3×)
6th Cir. · 1994 · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence low
while on parole the convict is bound to remain in the legal custody and under the control of the warden until the expiration of the term.... while this is an amelioration of punishment, it is in legal effect imprisonment.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) United States v. Cooper (3×)
6th Cir. · 1978 · signal: see · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence high
while parole is an amelioration of punishment, it is in legal effect imprisonment
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Milburn Weatherington v. Richard N. Moore and United States Department of Justice, United States Parole Commission, J. Robert Cooper, Commissioner (3×) also: Cited "see"
6th Cir. · 1978 · signal: see · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence high
while (parole) is an amelioration of punishment, it is in legal effect imprisonment
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Swick
5th Cir. · 2025 · confidence medium
E.g., Corall, 263 U.S. at 196 (first citing Dolan’s Case, 101 Mass. 219, 222 (1869); 10 Case: 24-10172 Document: 76-1 Page: 11 Date Filed: 05/15/2025 No. 24-10172 and then citing In re Moebus, 62 A. 170, 171 (N.H. 1905)).
examined Cited as authority (rule) United States v. James Reginald Talley (3×) also: Cited "see"
11th Cir. · 2023 · confidence medium
Courts apply the doctrine of fugitive tolling to sentences of impris- onment and the like based on the commonsense proposition that “[m]ere lapse of time without imprisonment or other restraint con- templated by the law does not constitute service of sentence.” An- derson v. Corall, 263 U.S. 193, 196 (1923).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Com. v. Simmons, D.
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2021 · confidence medium
Id. (quoting Anderson v. Corall, 263 U.S. 193, 196 (1923) (some punctuation omitted)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Paulino Njango (084286) (Essex County & Statewide)
N.J. · 2021 · confidence medium
Riley v. State Parole Bd., 219 N.J. 270, 288 (2014) (quoting Anderson v. Corall, 263 U.S. 193, 196 (1923)); see also State v. Rosado, 131 N.J. 423, 428 (1993) (“[P]arole is the legal equivalent of imprisonment . . . .”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Alex Cartagena-Lopez
5th Cir. · 2020 · confidence medium
Inc., 536 U.S. at 80 (“The rule is fine when it applies, but this case joins some others in showing when it does not.”). 25 Anderson v. Corral, 263 U.S. 193, 196 (1923) (citing Dolan’s Case, 101 Mass. 219, 222 (1869) and In re Moebus, 62 A. 170 (N.H. 1905)). 26 Phillips, 378 F.2d at 898. 27 Scalia & Garner, supra note 20; Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC, 576 U.S. 121, 126 (2015) (“Statutes which invade the common law are to be read with a presumption favoring the retention of long-established and familiar legal principles.” (cleaned up)). 28 Scalia & Garner, supra note 20. 8 Case: 2…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Neilsen v. McElderry
D. Colo. · 2019 · confidence medium
Anderson v. Corall, 263 U.S. 193, 196 (1923).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) L. Ruffin v. PA BPP
Pa. Commw. Ct. · 2017 · confidence medium
As the Court explained in Young, the argument that the denial of credit for time at liberty on parole amounts to an extension of the maximum date imposed by the sentencing judge is predicated on the “fallacy of...equat[ing] time served on parole with time served in an institution. ‘Mere lapse of time without imprisonment...does not constitute service of sentence....’” Young, 409 A.2d at 846 (quoting Anderson v. Corall, 263 U.S. 193, 196 (1923)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) D. Moore v. PA BPP
Pa. Commw. Ct. · 2017 · confidence medium
The Court further stated that “mere lapse of time without imprisonment . . . does not constitute service of sentence . . . .” Id. (quoting Anderson v. Corall, 263 U.S. 193, 196 (1923)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) R.S. Riede v. PA BPP
Pa. Commw. Ct. · 2017 · confidence medium
As the Court explained in Young, the argument that the denial of credit for time at liberty on parole amounts to an extension of the maximum date imposed by the sentencing judge is predicated on the “fallacy of...equat[ing] time served on parole with time served in an institution. 15 ‘Mere lapse of time without imprisonment...does not constitute service of sentence....’” Young, 409 A.2d at 846 (quoting Anderson v. Corall, 263 U.S. 193, 196 (1923)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State of Tennessee v. Christopher Lindsey
Tenn. Crim. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
App. 1995) (citing Anderson v. Corall, 263 U.S. 193, 196 (1923)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sherman v. U.S. Parole Commission
9th Cir. · 2007 · confidence medium
In 1923, the Supreme Court characterized the nature of parole by stating that “[w]hile this is an amelio- 11272 SHERMAN v. U.S. PAROLE COMMISSION ration of punishment, it is in legal effect imprisonment” and that a parole violator’s “status and rights were analogous to those of an escaped convict.” Anderson v. Corall, 263 U.S. 193, 196 (1923).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Costa v. Commissioner of Correction
Mass. App. Ct. · 2002 · confidence medium
We rejected Kinney’s reasoning and his reliance on the rule of Henschel v. Commissioner of Correction, supra. Citing Zerbst v. Kidwell, 304 U.S. 359, 361 (1938), and Harding v. State Bd. of Parole, 307 Mass. 217, 220 (1940), we held that “the prisoner was not ‘serving’ one sentence at the time he was sentenced for other crimes [because] his escape had suspended the running of the original sentence until such time as he should be returned to Walpole.” Kinney, petitioner, supra. Zerbst and Harding involved new offenses the prisoner committed while on parole, but Zerbst described the ri…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Mercadante
N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. · 1997 · confidence medium
While this is an amelioration of punishment, it is in legal effeett ] imprisonment. [Anderson v. Corall, 263 U.S. 193, 196 , 44 S.CL 43, 44, 68 L.Ed. 247, 254 (1923).] [Id. at 428, 621 A.2d 12 .] The court noted the lack of clarity in this area and stated that, without a statutory amendment by the Legislature, it would “construe against the State the ambiguity inherent in these penal enactments, and conclude that Rosado is entitled to credit for time served on parole.” Id. at 430 , 621 A.2d 12 (citation omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Breeden v. New Jersey Department of Corrections
N.J. · 1993 · confidence medium
Justice Butler explained long ago that “[ejscape from prison interrupts service, and the time elapsing between escape and retaking will not be taken into account or allowed as a part of the term.” Anderson v. Corall, 263 U.S. 193, 196 , 44 S.Ct. 43, 44 , 68 L.Ed. 247, 254 (1923).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Patrick v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole (2×)
Pa. Commw. Ct. · 1987 · confidence medium
Banks v. Cain, 345 Pa. 581, 588-89 , 28 A.2d 897, 901 (1942) (quoting Anderson v. Corall, 263 U.S. 193, 196 (1923)) (emphasis in original).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Howie v. Byrd
W.D.N.C. · 1975 · confidence medium
Parole is not ‘a suspension of sentence’, Jenkins v. Madigan (7th Cir. 1954) 211 F.2d 904, 906 , cert, denied 348 U.S. 842 [ 75 S.Ct. 63 , 99 L.Ed. 664 ]; it does not remove or make invalid the sentence imposed, Marrero v. Warden, [3 Cir., 483 F.2d 656 ] supra; it is still ‘a form of custody’, Padilla v. Lynch (9th Cir. 1968) 398 F.2d 481 , 482, and ‘is in legal effect imprisonment’, Anderson v. Corall (1923) 263 U.S. 193, 196 [ 44 S.Ct. 43 , 68 L.Ed. 247 ]; in summary, it ‘is not a release of the prisoner from all disciplinary restraint but is rather merely “an extension of th…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Oliver v. Alldredge
E.D. Tenn. · 1972 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf. Anderson v. Corall (1923), 263 U.S. 193, 197 , 44 S.Ct. 43, 45 , 68 L.Ed. 247, 254 (headnote 4).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hidalgo v. Purcell
Or. Ct. App. · 1971 · confidence medium
The court said: “* * * The plaintiff insisted * * * that having been convicted of * * * the crime of burglary, he could not be said now to be ‘charged with that crime;’ * * *. ÍÍ# * # # # “An offender against the justice of one State can acquire no rights by defrauding that justice. *515 * * * The expression ‘charged with,’ * * * includes * * * the responsibility for the crime. * * * It is in this * * * sense that the expression is used in [Art IV, § 2 of] the Constitution. * # * A person can be said to be charged with crime as well after conviction as before. * * *” In Anders…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) C. H. Looney, Warden, United States Penitentiary, Leavenworth, Kansas v. Elmer S. Lenz
10th Cir. · 1955 · confidence medium
Anderson v. Corall, 263 U.S. 193, 196, 197 , 44 S.Ct. 43 , 68 L.Ed. 247 ; Rogoway v. Warden, 9 Cir., 122 F.2d 967, 969 ; Platek v. Aderhold, 5 Cir., 73 F.2d 173, 175 ; Zerbst v. Kidwell, 304 U.S. 359, 362 , 58 S.Ct. 872 , 82 L.Ed. 1399 . 3 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Zerbst v. Kidwell
SCOTUS · 1938 · confidence medium
Respondents filed separate petitions for habeas corpus raising substantially identical' issues, which will be treated together here, and the respondents will be dealt with as one. 3 92 F. 2d 756 . 4 303 U. S. 632 . 5 Anderson v. Corall, 263 U. S. 193, 196, 197 . 6 18 U. S. C., c. 22, § 723 (c). 6 18 U. S. C., c. 22, § 723 (c). 7 The parole system was intended to make,parole discretionary “and revocable at any time . . . [the parole authority] may elect to revoke it,” Cong.
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States ex rel. Anderson v. Anderson
D. Minnesota · 1934 · confidence medium
The Supreme Court, in Anderson v. Corall, 263 U. S. 193, 196, 197 , 44 S. Ct. 43, 44 , 68 L.
examined Cited "see" United States v. Haymond (3×)
unknown court · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
Escoe v. Zerbst , 295 U.S. 490 , 492, 55 S.Ct. 818 , 79 L.Ed. 1566 (1935) ; see Anderson v. Corall , 263 U.S. 193 , 196-197, 44 S.Ct. 43 , 68 L.Ed. 247 (1923).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Barinas (2×)
2d Cir. · 2017 · signal: see · confidence high
See generally Corall, 263 U.S. at 196 , 44 S.Ct. 43 (an “[e]seape from prison interrupts service, and the time elapsing between escape and retaking will not be taken into account....” (emphasis added)).
examined Cited "see" George C. Riley v. New Jersey State Parole Board (069327) (3×)
N.J. · 2014 · signal: see · confidence high
See Anderson v. Corall, 263 U.S. 193, 196 , 44 S. Ct. 43, 44 , 68 L.
examined Cited "see" George C. Riley v. New Jersey State Parole Board (069327) (3×)
N.J. · 2014 · signal: see · confidence high
See Anderson v. Corall, 263 U.S. 193, 196 , 44 S.Ct. 43, 44 , 68 L.Ed. 247, 254 (1923) (stating that although parole is “an amelioration of punishment, it is in legal effect imprisonment”); see also United States ex rel.
examined Cited "see" Fisher v. Carroll (3×)
D. Del. · 2005 · signal: see · confidence high
See Anderson v. Corall, 263 U.S. 193, 196 , 44 S.Ct. 43 , 68 L.Ed. 247 (1923)("While [parole] is an amelioration of punishment, it is in legal effect imprisonment”); U.S. ex rel.
examined Cited "see" State v. Malone (3×)
Tenn. Crim. App. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See Anderson v. Corall, 263 U.S. 193, 196 , 44 S.Ct. 43, 44 , 68 L.Ed. 247 (1923) (holding “[w]hile on parole the convict is bound to remain in the legal custody and under the control of the warden until the expiration of the term....
examined Cited "see" Patton v. Fenton (3×)
M.D. Penn. · 1979 · signal: see · confidence high
See Anderson v. Corail, 263 U.S. 193, 196 , 44 S.Ct. 43, 44 , 68 L.Ed. 247 (1923); Graves v. Olgiati, 550 F.2d 1327, 1329 (2d Cir. 1977).
examined Cited "see" Robert Ogg v. Frank X. Klein, United States Marshal, Northern District of California (3×)
9th Cir. · 1978 · signal: see · confidence high
See Anderson v. Corall, 263 U.S. 193,196 , 44 S.Ct. 43 , 68 L.Ed. 247 (1923).
examined Cited "see" United States v. George Gordon Liddy (12×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
D.C. Cir. · 1975 · signal: see · confidence high
See generally Anderson v. Corall, 263 U.S. 193, 196 , 44 S.Ct. 43 , 68 L.Ed. 247 (1923); Pinkerton v. Steele, 181 F.2d 536 (8th Cir. 1950); Woods v. Steiner, 207 F.Supp. 945, 953 (D.Md.1962); United States ex rel.
discussed Cited "see" Smouse v. Perini
Ohio · 1968 · signal: see · confidence high
See Anderson, Warden, v. Corall, 263 U. S., 193 ; and 24B Corpus Juris Secundum, 673, Criminal Law, Section 1996(5).” Accordingly, we find that relator’s petition fails to state facts which constitute a cause of action upon which relief may be granted.
examined Cited "see" United States Ex Rel. Randazzo v. Follette (3×)
S.D.N.Y. · 1968 · signal: see · confidence high
The federal statute is in substance the same. 18 U.S.C. § 4203 ; see Anderson v. Corall, 263 U.S. 193 , 44 S.Ct. 43 , 68 L.Ed. 247 (1923).
examined Cited "see" Johnny Young, Alias Johnnie Clyde Simmons v. United States (3×)
5th Cir. · 1964 · signal: see · confidence high
See Anderson v. Corall, 1923, 263 U.S. 193, 196 , 44 S.Ct. 43 , 68 L.Ed. 247 .
examined Cited "see" Mason v. Warden Fitzpatrick of the Federal Detention House (3×)
S.D.N.Y. · 1964 · signal: see · confidence high
See Anderson v. Corall, 263 U.S. 193 , 44 S.Ct. 43 , 68 L.Ed. 247 (1923); Singleton v. Looney, 218 F.2d 526 (10th Cir. 1955).
cited Cited "see" Bush v. Maxwell
Ohio · 1963 · signal: see · confidence high
See Anderson, Warden, v. Corall, 263 U. S., 193 ; and 24B Corpus Juris Secundum, 673, Criminal Law, Section 1996(5).
examined Cited "see" Lockwood v. Rhodes (3×)
Del. Super. Ct. · 1957 · signal: see · confidence high
See Anderson v. Corall, 263 U. S. 193 , 44 S. Ct. 43 , 68 L.
examined Cited "see" Charles Schiffman v. Fred T. Wilkinson, Warden, United States Penitentiary, McNeil Island, Washington (3×)
9th Cir. · 1954 · signal: see · confidence high
See Anderson v. Corall, 263 U.S. 193, 196 , 44 S.Ct. 43 , 68 L.Ed. 247 ; Zerbst v. Kidwell, 304 U.S. 359, 361 , 58 S.Ct. 872 , 82 L.Ed. 1399 .
examined Cited "see" Hiatt, Warden v. Compagna (6×)
5th Cir. · 1949 · signal: see · confidence high
See Anderson v. Corall, 263 U.S. 193, 196 , 44 S.Ct. 43 , 68 L.Ed. 247 , is a legislative grace and not a thing of right.
examined Cited "see" Patterson v. Jones (3×)
9th Cir. · 1944 · signal: see · confidence high
See Anderson v. Corall, 263 U.S. 193 , 44 S.Ct. 43 , 68 L.Ed. 247 ; United States v. Greenhaus, 2 Cir., 89 F.2d 634 ; In re Collins, 8 Cal.App. 367 , 97 P. 188 ; Ex parte Vance, 90 Cal. 208 , 27 P. 209 , 13 L.R.A. 574 ; Dolan’s Case, 101 Mass. 219, 222 ; State of Minnesota v. Jorgensen, 176 Minn. 572 , 224 N.W. 156 , 62 A.L.R. 244 .
discussed Cited "see" Morgan v. Aderhold (2×)
5th Cir. · 1934 · signal: see · confidence high
See Anderson v. Corall, 263 U. S. at page 196, 44 S. Ct. 43 , 68 L.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Buchanan (2×)
4th Cir. · 2011 · signal: see also · confidence low
Our holding in Workman is consistent with the general rule that “when the service of a sentence is interrupted by conduct of the defendant the time spent out of custody on his sentence is not counted as time served thereon.” United States v. Luck, 664 F.2d 311, 312 (D.C.Cir.1981); see also Theriault v. Peek, 406 F.2d 117, 117 (5th Cir.1968) (“Escape from prison interrupts service, and the *453 time elapsing between escape and retaking contribute^] nothing to the service of the sentence.”). 3 The Supreme Court applied this general rule in the parole context in Anderson v. Corall, 268 U.…
cited Cited "see, e.g." People v. Perryman
Mich. · 1989 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Anderson v Corall, 263 US 193 ; 44 S Ct 43 ; 68 L Ed 247 (1923). 11 This case does not require us to consider whether the statute’s purpose might extend beyond judicial proceedings.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." In Re the Personal Restraint of Little (2×)
Wash. · 1981 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Anderson v. Corall, 263 U.S. 193, 196 , 68 L.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Anderson, Warden, United States Penitentiary, Leavenworth, Kansas,
v.
Corall
44.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Nov 12, 1923.
263 U.S. 193
1923 U.S. LEXIS 2735
Mr. Alfred A. Wheat, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, with whom Mr. Solicitor General Beck was on the brief, for petitioner., Mr. Lee Bond, for respondent, submitted.
Butler.
Cited by 274 opinions  |  Published
5 passages pin-cited by 5 cases
Pinpoint authority: #15,329 of 633,719
Citer courts: Sixth Circuit (8) · Supreme Court of Kansas (3) · Supreme Court of Georgia (1)
Mr. Justice Butler

delivered the opinion of the Court.

On November. 25, 1914, Corail was convicted of the crime of breaking into a postoffice and- was sentenced to[*194] be confined in the Leavenworth penitentiary ■ for three years from that date. He served in prison until February 24, 1916, when he was allowed to go out on parole under the Act of June 25, 1910, c. 387, 36 Stat. 819, as amended by the Act of January 23,1913, c. 9, 37 Stat. 650, portions of which are printed in the margin. [1] On June 28, 1916, the warden in accordance with § 4 issued a warrant for the retaking of Corail as a parole violator. Before he was retaken, and in October, 1916, he was convicted at Chicago of another crime and sentenced therefor to the Illinois state penitentiary at Joilet, where he was confined until some time in December, 1919. After his release from that prison he was retaken, December 17,[*195] 1919, on the warden’s warrant to the Leavenworth penitentiary. In January, 1920, the parole board, pursuant to § 6, took action appropriate to revoke and terminate the parole. The validity of that action is the only question involved.

Corall claims that, allowing deductions for good conduct (Act of June 21, 1902, c. 1140, 32 Stat. 397); the term of his sentence actually ended before the expiration of three years from the date it began and on or about March 17, 1917. ■ The warden contends that the time elapsing between February 24, 191G, when he was paroled, and December 17, 1919, when he was retaken, can not be taken into account; that' when the board acted to revoke his[*196] parole, the sentence had not been served, and he was bound to serve that part of it which remained unexpired when parole was granted. February 4, 192.1, Corail.made application for a writ of habeas corpus to the District Court for the District of Kansas. That court decided he was illegally held and ordered his discharge. The warden appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals where the judgment was affirmed.

Mere lapse of time without imprisonment or other restraint contemplated by the law does not constitute service of sentence. Escape from prison interrupts service, and the time elapsing between escape and retaking will not be taken into account or allowed as a part of the term. Dolan’s Case, 101 Mass. 219, 222; Petition of Moebus, 73 N. H. 350, 352. The parole authorized by the statute does not suspend service or operate to shorten the term. While on parole the convict is bound to remain in the legal custody and under the control of the warden until the expiration of the term, less allowance, if any, for good conduct. While this is an amelioration of punishment, it is in legal effect imprisonment. The sentence and service are subject to the provision of § 6 that if the parole be terminated the prisoner shall serve the remainder of the sentence originally imposed without deduction for the time he was-out on parole.

Corall’s violation of the parole, evidenced by. the warden’s warrant and his conviction, sentence to and confinement in the Joliet penitentiary, interrupted his service under the sentence here in question, and was in legal effect on the same plane, as an escape from the custody and control of the warden. His status .and rights were analogous to those of an escaped convict. Drinkall v. Spiegel, Sheriff, 68 Conn. 441, 449, 450. The term of his sentence had not expired in October, 1916, when, at Chicago, he was'convicted of another crime and sentenced to the Joliet penitentiaiy. Then — if not earlier — he ceased to be in[*197] the legal custody and under the control of the warden of the Leavenworth penitentiary, as required by § 3 of "the act and the terms of the parole authorized thereby. His-claim that his term expired in 1917 before he was retaken and while he was serving sentence at Joliet cannot be sustained, and we hold that it had not expired in January, 1920, at the time of the action of the board. Under § 6, the board was authorized at any time during his term of sentence in its discretion to revoke the order and terminate the parole,- and to require him to serve, the remainder of the sentence originally imposed without any allowance for the time he was out on parole.

The judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to the District Court with directions that the respondent, Arthur Corail, be restored to the custody of the warden of the United States penitentiary at ‘Leavenworth, Kansas.

1

Section' 1 is to the effect that prisoners may be released on parole as provided in the act.

. Section 2 provides that the superintendent of prisons of the Department of Justice and the warden and physician of each United States penitentiary shall constitute a board of parole for such prison which shall establish rules and regulations fot its procedure subject to the approval of the Attorney General.

Section 3. That if it shall appear to said board of parole . . . that there is a reasonable probability that such applicant will live and remain at liberty without violating the laws, and if in the opinion of the board such release is not .incompatible with the welfare of society, then said board of parole may in its discretion authorize the release of such applicant on parole, and he shall be allowed to go on parole o.utside of said prison, and, in the discretion of the board, to return to his home, upon such terms and conditions, including personal reports from such paroled person, as said board of parole shall prescribe, and to remain, while on parole, in the legal custody , and under the control of the warden of such prison from which paroled, and until the expiration of the term or terms specified in his sentence, less such good time allowance as is or may hereafter be pro- ■ vided for by act of Congress; and the said board shall, in every parole, fix the limits of the residence of the person paroled, which limits may thereafter be changed in the discretion of the board. . • .

Section 4.'“ That if the warden of the prison or penitentiary from which said prisoner was paroled or said, board of parole or any member thereof shall have reliable information that the prisoner has violated his parole, then said warden, at any time within the term or[*195] terms of the prisoner’s sentence, may issue his warrant to any officer hereinafter authorized to execute the same, for the retaking of such prisoner.”

Section 5. “ That any officer of said prison of ’ any federal officer authorized to serve criminal process within the United States, to whom such warrant shall be delivered, is authorized and réquired- tó execute such w'arrant by taking such prisoner and returning him to said prison within the time specified in said warrant therefor. . . .”

Section 6. “ That at the next meeting of the’ board of parole held at such prison after the issuing of a warrant for the retaking of any paroled prisoner, said board of parole shall be notified thereof, and if said prisoner shall have been returned to said prison, he shall be given an opportunity to appear before said board of parole, and the said board may then or at’ any ’time in its discretion revoke the order and terminate such parole or modify the terms and conditions thereof. If such order of parole shall be revoked and the parole so terminated, the said prisoner shall serve the remainder of the sentence originally imposed; and the time the prisoner was out on parole shall not be taken into account to diminish the time for which he was sentenced.”

Section 7 provides for a parole officer for each penitentiary, and makes it the duty of such officer to aid paroled prisoners in securing employment and to visit and exercise supervision over them while on parole and provides that tjie supervision of paroled prisoners may also be devolved upon the United States marshals when the board of parole may deem it necessary.