Quick Summary
Salaries are taxable to the person who earns them regardless of any anticipatory arrangements or contracts designed to avoid taxation.
A taxpayer enters into a marriage contract stipulating that all property and earnings acquired during the marriage are held as joint tenants by the spouses. The taxpayer seeks to be taxed only on half of his professional fees and salary, arguing the income belongs to both spouses under the contract. The court considers whether the taxing statute allows for such an arrangement. The court holds that the statute imposes a tax on income derived from personal services and that no distinction can be made based on the motives behind an arrangement where the fruits of labor are attributed to a different tree from that on which they grew. The court reverses the lower court decision.
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cited 5× by 5 distinct cases, 1949–2014 · 3 courts↓ Fading ·
…arrangement by which the fruits are attributed to a different tree from that on which they grew.
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cited 5× by 4 distinct cases, last quoted 1991 · 2 courts↓ Fading ·
…the fruits are attributed to a different tree from that on which they grew.
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cited 4× by 4 distinct cases, 1934–2023 · 3 courts↓ Fading ·
…no distinction can be taken according to the motives leading to the arrangement by which the fruits are attributed to a different tree from that on which they grew.
at p. 115
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Treatment trajectory · 1930 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1930
1978
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Luminita Roman
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
no distinction can be taken according to the motives leading to the arrangement by which the fruits are attributed to a different tree from that on which they grew.
examined
Cited as authority (quoted)
Hill v. United States
(2×)
there is no doubt that the statute could tax salaries to those who earned them .
discussed
Cited as authority (quoted)
P. R. Farms, Inc. v. Commissioner
no distinction can be taken according to the motives leading to the arrangement by which the fruits are attributed to a different tree from that on which they grew.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Dewberry Group, Inc. v. Dewberry Engineers Inc.
That precedent may provide guidance in calculating a “defendant’s profits” under the Lanham Act when courts are faced with similar arrangements, “ ‘how- ever skillfully devised[,] to prevent [income] . . . from vest- ing even for a second in the man who earned it.’ ” Banks, 543 U. S., at 434 (quoting Lucas, 281 U. S., at 115 (second alteration in original)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Estate of Scott M. Hoensheid, Anne M. Hoensheid, Personal Representative and Anne M. Hoensheid
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
The doctrine recognizes that income is taxed “to those who earn or otherwise create the right to receive it,” Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 119 (1940), and that tax cannot be avoided “by anticipatory arrangements and contracts however skillfully devised,” Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 115 (1930).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
3M Company and Subsidiaries
Bank, 405 U.S. at 403 -404 & n.17; Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579, 581 (1941) (section 22(a) of the Revenue Act of 1928, 45 Stat. at 797); Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 114 (1940) (section 22 of the Revenue Act of 1934, 48 Stat. at 686); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. at 114 (1930) (section 213(a) of the Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, 40 Stat. at 1065).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Keefer v. United States
“Ultimately, the question - 13 - is whether the taxpayer himself ever earned income, or whether it was earned instead by the assignee,” or, in the terms of Justice Holmes’s famous metaphor for this doctrine (set out in Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 115 (1930)), “whether the fruit has been attributed to a different tree, or whether instead the entire tree has been transplanted.” Id. at 649.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Ernest S. Ryder & Patricia A. Ryder
The problem is one of the oldest in tax law, and every last - 88 - [*88] student in Intro Tax learns that it was solved long ago by Justice Holmes in Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114-15 (1930):43 There is no doubt that the statute could tax salaries to those who earned them and provide that the tax could not be escaped by anticipatory arrangements and contracts however skilfully devised to prevent the salary when paid from vesting even for a second in the man who earned it.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Ernest S. Ryder & Associates, Inc., APLC
The problem is one of the oldest in tax law, and every last - 88 - [*88] student in Intro Tax learns that it was solved long ago by Justice Holmes in Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114-15 (1930):43 There is no doubt that the statute could tax salaries to those who earned them and provide that the tax could not be escaped by anticipatory arrangements and contracts however skilfully devised to prevent the salary when paid from vesting even for a second in the man who earned it.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Ernest S. Ryder & Patricia A. Ryder
The problem is one of the oldest in tax law, and every last - 88 - [*88] student in Intro Tax learns that it was solved long ago by Justice Holmes in Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114-15 (1930):43 There is no doubt that the statute could tax salaries to those who earned them and provide that the tax could not be escaped by anticipatory arrangements and contracts however skilfully devised to prevent the salary when paid from vesting even for a second in the man who earned it.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Ernest S. Ryder & Patricia A. Ryder
The problem is one of the oldest in tax law, and every last - 88 - [*88] student in Intro Tax learns that it was solved long ago by Justice Holmes in Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114-15 (1930):43 There is no doubt that the statute could tax salaries to those who earned them and provide that the tax could not be escaped by anticipatory arrangements and contracts however skilfully devised to prevent the salary when paid from vesting even for a second in the man who earned it.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Ryder Ranches, LLC, F.K.A. Ryder Ranch Company, LLC, Ernest S. Ryder, Tax Matters Partner
The problem is one of the oldest in tax law, and every last - 88 - [*88] student in Intro Tax learns that it was solved long ago by Justice Holmes in Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114-15 (1930):43 There is no doubt that the statute could tax salaries to those who earned them and provide that the tax could not be escaped by anticipatory arrangements and contracts however skilfully devised to prevent the salary when paid from vesting even for a second in the man who earned it.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
First Counsel Capital, Inc.
The problem is one of the oldest in tax law, and every last - 88 - [*88] student in Intro Tax learns that it was solved long ago by Justice Holmes in Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114-15 (1930):43 There is no doubt that the statute could tax salaries to those who earned them and provide that the tax could not be escaped by anticipatory arrangements and contracts however skilfully devised to prevent the salary when paid from vesting even for a second in the man who earned it.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Ernest S. Ryder & Patricia A. Ryder
The problem is one of the oldest in tax law, and every last - 88 - [*88] student in Intro Tax learns that it was solved long ago by Justice Holmes in Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114-15 (1930):43 There is no doubt that the statute could tax salaries to those who earned them and provide that the tax could not be escaped by anticipatory arrangements and contracts however skilfully devised to prevent the salary when paid from vesting even for a second in the man who earned it.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Ernest S. Ryder & Associates, Inc., APLC
The problem is one of the oldest in tax law, and every last - 88 - [*88] student in Intro Tax learns that it was solved long ago by Justice Holmes in Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114-15 (1930):43 There is no doubt that the statute could tax salaries to those who earned them and provide that the tax could not be escaped by anticipatory arrangements and contracts however skilfully devised to prevent the salary when paid from vesting even for a second in the man who earned it.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Randy Jenkins
Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114-15 (1930); Trousdale v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 1056 , 1065 (1951), aff’d, 219 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1955).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Ira W. Gentry, Jr. & Lynn M. Gentry
Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114-15 (1930); Trousdale v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 1056 , 1065 (1951), aff’d, 219 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1955).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
H. Garrett Frey & Mary K. Frey v. Commissioner
Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114-115 (1930).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Marc Chrem & Esther Chrem v. Commissioner
Thus, a person anticipating receipt of income “cannot avoid taxation by entering into a contractual arrangement whereby that income is diverted to some other person.” Id. at 449 (citing Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 115 (1930)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Brian D. Ray & Betsy Ray v. Commissioner
Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114-115 (1930).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Pacific Management Group, BSC Leasing, Inc., Tax Matters Partner v. Commissioner
United States v. Basye, 410 U.S. 441, 450 (1973) (“[H]e who earns income may not avoid taxation through anticipatory arrangements no matter how - 73 - [*73] clever or subtle[.]” (citing Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 115 (1930))).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Amas Canzoni v. Commissioner
Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114-115 (1930).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Gateway Hotel Partners, LLC, Gateway Interest Acquisition Corp., Tax Matters Partner v. Commissioner
See United States v. Basye, 410 U.S. 441 , - 69 - [*69] 447, 449-450 (1973); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114, 115 (1930).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Stanley L. & Ruth A. Alexander v. Commissioner
Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 115 (1930).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Elmo Hollie Thibodeaux, Jr. v. Commissioner
Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114-115 (1930).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
John Michael Dunkin v. Commissioner
Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 111-112 (1930); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114 (1930).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Lisle v. CIR
Rather, the court refers to them collectively as the “petitioners.” This common brush of the individual actions 20 See Srivastava v. Comm’r, 220 F.3d 353, 358-59 (5th Cir. 2000); Caruth Corp. v. United States, 865 F.2d 644, 648 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Buttorff, 761 F.2d 1056, 1060-61 (5th Cir. 1985). 21 Buttorff, 761 F.2d at 1060 -61 (quoting Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 115 (1930)) (citation omitted). of the taxpayers bleeds the court’s analysis, as it presupposes the question to be answered in charging that the actions of Kanter and Ballard are attributable to Lisle.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Lisle v. CIR
Rather, the court refers to them collectively as the “petitioners.” This common brush of the individual actions 20 See Srivastava v. Comm’r, 220 F.3d 353, 358-59 (5th Cir. 2000); Caruth Corp. v. United States, 865 F.2d 644, 648 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Buttorff, 761 F.2d 1056, 1060-61 (5th Cir. 1985). 21 Buttorff, 761 F.2d at 1060 -61 (quoting Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 115 (1930)) (citation omitted). of the taxpayers bleeds the court’s analysis, as it presupposes the question to be answered in charging that the actions of Kanter and Ballard are attributable to Lisle.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Lisle v. CIR
Rather, the court refers to them collectively as the “petitioners.” This common brush of the individual actions 20 See Srivastava v. Comm’r, 220 F.3d 353, 358-59 (5th Cir. 2000); Caruth Corp. v. United States, 865 F.2d 644, 648 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Buttorff, 761 F.2d 1056, 1060-61 (5th Cir. 1985). 21 Buttorff, 761 F.2d at 1060 -61 (quoting Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 115 (1930)) (citation omitted). of the taxpayers bleeds the court’s analysis, as it presupposes the question to be answered in charging that the actions of Kanter and Ballard are attributable to Lisle.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Kenseth, Eldon R. v. CIR
Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114-15 (1930); United States v. Newell, 239 F.3d 917, 919-20 (7th Cir. 2001).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Young v. Commissioner IRS
(4×)
also: Cited "see"
And Justice Holmes teaches us that a taxpayer cannot escape taxation by "prevent[ing] the [income] when paid from vesting even for a second in the man who earned it." Earl, 281 U.S. at 115 (emphasis added).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Louise F. Young, A/K/A Louise Y. Ausman James R. Ausman v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, John B. Young Martha H. Young v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
And Justice Holmes teaches us that a taxpayer cannot escape taxation by "prevent[ing] the [income] when paid from vesting even for a second in the man who earned it." Earl, 281 U.S. at 115 (emphasis added).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Srivastava v. Commissioner
(5×)
also: Cited "see"
Significantly, this Court has, for nearly 40 years, not followed Cotnam . . . .") (collecting cases). 14 See 26 U.S.C. § 7482 (a),(b). 15 See Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742, 756-57 (1970), aff'd, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir.) (noting that "better judicial administration requires us to follow a Court of Appeals decision which is squarely in point where appeal from our decision lies to that Court of Appeals and to that court alone."); Kenseth, 2000 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 32, at *29 ("With the exception of situations where . . . we feel compelled to follow the holding of a Court of Appeals, we have …
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Jennifer L. Meisner v. United States
This distinction between income and income-producing assets is generally discussed in terms of “fruits” and “trees,” and the rule is that fruits may not, for tax purposes, be attributed “to a different tree from that on which they grew.” Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 115 (1930).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Michael Ferguson and Valene Ferguson v. Commissioner
E.g., Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114-115 (1930).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Ferguson v. Commissioner
E.g., Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114-115 (1930).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Sam B. Jones and Louanna Jones v. United States
Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114-15 (1930); Parker v. Routzahn, 56 F.2d 730, 733 (6th Cir.1932), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 606 (1932).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Leavell v. Commissioner
(3×)
Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114-115 (1930).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Leonard Greene and Joyce Greene v. United States
(3×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
As first enunciated by the Supreme Court in 1930, the anticipatory assignment of income doctrine holds that income is taxable to the person who earns it, and that such taxes cannot be avoided through “arrangement[s] by which the fruits are attributed to a different tree from that on which they grew.” Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. at 115 , 50 S.Ct. at 241 (husband’s salary is income to him and therefore taxable to him notwithstanding a contract with his wife under which all of their earnings were to be held by both as joint tenants).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Benningfield v. Commissioner
United States v. Basye, 410 U.S. 441, 449-450 (1973); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114-115 (1930).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Johnson v. Commissioner
As with Mr. Earl, petitioner "was the only party to the contracts by which the salary * * * [was] earned.” See Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114 (1930). 21 Nor may the assignments of earnings executed by petitioner suffice to make PMSA/EST the taxable party.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Moore v. Commissioner
United States v. Basye, 410 U.S. at 447 ; Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 739-740 (1949); Interstate Transit Lines v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 590 (1943); Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 116 (1940); New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435 (1934); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114-115 (1930); Calvin v. United States, 354 F.2d 202, 204 (10th Cir. 1965).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Sheldon v. Commissioner
Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 112, 115 (1930); Kinsey v. Commissioner, 477 F. 2d 1058, 1063 (C.A. 2, 1973), affirming 58 T.C. 259 (1972); Hudspeth v. United States, 471 F. 2d 275, 279-280 (C.A. 8, 1972); Williamson v. United States, 155 Ct. Cl. 279, 283-284 , 292 F. 2d 524, 527 (1961); cf. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. at 119 and 120.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Ronan State Bank v. Commissioner
The Supreme Court, in Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114-115 (1930), stated: There is no donbt that the statute could tax salaries to those who earned them and provide that the tax could not be escaped by anticipatory arrangements and contracts However skillfully devised to prevent the salary when paid from vesting even for a second in the man who earned it.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Sol C. Siegel v. United States of America, Ethel B. Siegel v. United States
In the circumstances, since petitioner’s right to the profits had already become fully vested and since the operation of the statute in this area does not turn upon ‘attenuated subtleties,’ it would seem that petitioner could not avoid tax on such profits by any kind of ‘anticipatory arrangements and contracts however skillfully devised.’ Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114, 115 [ 50 S.Ct. 241 , 74 L.Ed. 731 ]; Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579, 581, 582, 583 [ 61 S.Ct. 759 , 85 L.Ed. 1055 ]; Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 [ 61 S.Ct. 144 , 85 L.Ed. 75 ]; Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Commissioner v. First Security Bank of Utah, N. A.
(2×)
In another case Mr. Justice Holmes said: "There is no doubt that the statute could tax salaries to those who earned them and provide that the tax could not be escaped by anticipatory arrangements and contracts however skillfully devised to prevent the salary when paid from vesting even for a second in the man who earned it. . . ." Lucas v. Earl. 281 U. S. 111, 114-115 (1930). [14] "There is a potential abuse situation in the case of the so-called captive insurance companies.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Sol C. Siegel Productions, Inc. v. Commissioner
In the circumstances, since petitioner’s right to the profits had already become fully vested and since the operation of the statute in this area does not turn upon “attenuated subtleties,” it would seem that petitioner could not avoid tax on such profits by any kind of “anticipatory arrangements and contracts however skillfully devised.” Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114, 115 ; Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579, 581, 582, 583 ; Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 ; Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122 ; Commissioner v. First State Bank of Stratford, 168 F. 2d 1004 (C.A. 5) ; Wood Harmon …
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Joseph D. Patton and Constance M. Patton v. Oscar M. Jonas, Collector
Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114, 115 , 50 S.Ct. 241 , 74 L.Ed. 731 .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
R. H. McManus Co. v. Employment Security Commission
What utter chaos would exist if, in the case of unemployment, these truckers made application for unemployment compensation insurance from every customer for whom they had worked.” The United States supreme court made the following pertinent observation in United States v. Silk, 331 US 704, 714-719 ( 67 S Ct 1463 , 91 L ed 1757): “The taxpayer must be an ‘employer’ and the man who receives wages an ‘employee.’ * * * Contracts, however ‘skilfully devised,’ Lucas v. Earl, 281 US 111, 115 ( 50 S Ct 241 , 74 L ed 731), should not be permitted to shift tax liability as definitely fi…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
McMANUS CO. v. EMPLOY. SECU. COMM.
What utter chaos would exist if, in the case of unemployment, these truckers made application for unemployment compensation insurance from every customer for whom they had worked." The United States supreme court made the following pertinent observation in United States v. Silk, 331 US 704, 714-719 ( 67 S Ct 1463 , 91 L ed 1757): "The taxpayer must be an `employer' and the man who receives wages an `employee.' * * * Contracts, however `skilfully devised,' Lucas v. Earl, 281 US 111, 115 ( 50 S Ct 241 , 74 L ed 731), should not be permitted to shift tax liability as definitely fixed by the statu…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Lucas, Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
v.
Earl
v.
Earl
99.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Mar 17, 1930.
281 U.S. 111
1930 U.S. LEXIS 738
Solicitor General Hughes, with whom Assistant Attorney General Youngquist and Messrs. Millar E. McGilchrist, Claude R. Branch, Sewall Key and J. Louis Monarch, Special Assistants to the Attorney General, were on the brief, for petitioner., Mr. Warren Olney, Jr., with whom Messrs. J. M. Mansion, Jr., Robert L. Lipman and Henry D. Costigan were on the brief, for respondent.
Holmes.
Cited by 1,517 opinions | Published
Citer courts: M.D. Tennessee (2) · U.S. Tax Court (1)
[*113] Mr. Justice Holmes
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether the respondent, Earl, could be taxed for the whole of the salary and attorney’s fees earned by him in the years 1920 and 1921, or should be taxed for only a half of them in view of a contract with his wife which we shall mention. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Board of Tax Appeals imposed a tax upon the whole, but their decision was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, 30 F. (2d) 898. A writ of certiorari was granted by this Court.
By the contract, made in 1901, Earl and his wife agreed “ that any property either of us now has or may hereafter[*114] acquire ... in any way, either by earnings (including salaries, fees, etc.), or any rights by contract or otherwise, during the existence of our marriage, or which we or either of us may receive by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance, and all the proceeds, issues, and profits of any and all such property shall be treated and considered and hereby is declared to be. received, held, taken, and owned by us as joint tenants, and not otherwise, with the right of survivorship.” The validity of the contract is not questioned, and we assume it to be unquestionable under the law of the State of California, in which the parties lived. ‘ Nevertheless we are of opinion that the Commissioner and Board of Tax Appeals were right.
The Revenue Act of 1918 approved February 24, 1919, c. 18, §§210, 211, 212 (a), 213 (a), 40 Stat. 1057,1062,1064, 1065, imposes a tax upon the net income of every individual including “ income derived from salaries, wages, or compensation for personal service ... of whatever kind and in whatever form paid,” § 213 (a). The provisions of the Revenue Act of 1921; c. 136, 42 Stat; 227, in sections bearing the same numbers are similar to those of the above. A very forcible argument is presented to the effect that the statute seeks to tax only income beneficially received, and that taking the question more technically the salary and fees became the joint property of Earl and his wife on the very first instant on which they were received. We well might hesitate upon the latter proposition, because however the matter might stand between husband and wife he was the only party to the contracts by which the salary and fees were earned, and it is somewhat hard to say that the last step in the performance of those contracts could be taken by anyone but himself alone. But this case is not to be decided by attenuated subtleties. It turns on the import and reasonable construction of the taxing act. There is no doubt that the statute could tax salaries to those who earned them and[*115] provide that the tax could not be escaped by anticipatory arrangements and contracts however skilfully devised to prevent the salary when paid from vesting even for a second in the man who earned it. That seems to us the import of the statute before us and we think that no distinction can be taken according to the motives leading to the arrangement by which the fruits are attributed to a different tree from that on which they grew.
Judgment reversed.
The Chief Justice took no part in this case.