MEMORANDUM OPINION

In their petition for mandamus, Relators RLG Universe Properties, LLC d/b/a Rockin’ Jump (RLG) and Circustrix Holdings, LLC (Circustrix) ask us to direct the Honorable M. Sue Kurita, Judge of County Court at Law No. 6 to vacate her June 7, 2024 order granting Real-Party- in-Interest Norberto Carlo Adviento’s motion for discovery sanctions. Relators argue that this order improperly compels them to produce: (1) “confidential and proprietary” customer information; (2) business information protected by a confidentiality agreement; and (3) documents not in their possession, custody, or control. Relators further argue that the order imposes an improper monetary sanction. For the reasons discussed below, we deny the petition.

I. BACKGROUND

In the underlying negligence case, Adviento filed suit as next friend of his minor child, D.J.A., who was allegedly injured at a trampoline park. Adviento’s petition identified five defendants as “possessor in control of the premises,” including RLG and Circustrix. ^[1] During the discovery process, several disputes ensued. Relators filed numerous discovery objections, a motion to quash the deposition of RLG’s owner, objections to the second notice of the deposition, and multiple motions for protective order Adviento filed multiple motions to compel and a motion for sanctions.

In disposing of these disputes, the trial court issued three orders: (1) an order compelling discovery, finding that Relators had failed to “provide sufficient initial disclosures,” failed to “respond to [Adviento’s] discovery requests in the time and manner prescribed by the rules,” and “objected to almost each and every request, and as such are overruled as to each objection” (October 13, 2023 order); (2) an order denying Relators’ second motion for protective order, finding that Relators had previously been ordered to “provide the . . . information [at issue]” (February 29, 2024 order); and (3) an order imposing sanctions, finding that the trial court had “rightfully denied [Relators]’ Motion for Protective Order, as each objection was already overruled,” that “the information and items [Relators] sought to protect were already compelled,” and thus “[Relators’] Motion for Protective Order was untimely,” thereby entitling Adviento to attorney’s fees. The sanctions order further directed that “all the documents requested by [Adviento] in the deposition notice will be provided,” and Relators must also “provide discovery as previously ordered” (June 7, 2024 order).

This mandamus proceeding followed, and we granted a temporary stay of all trial court proceedings.

II. DISCUSSION

Mandamus relief is an extraordinary remedy that requires the relator to show (1) the trial court clearly abused its discretion, and (2) the relator lacks an adequate remedy by appeal. In re Kappmeyer, 668 S.W.3d 651, 654 (Tex. 2023). “The mere fact that a trial judge may decide a matter within his discretionary authority in a different manner than an appellate judge in a similar circumstance does not demonstrate that an abuse of discretion has occurred.” Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241–42 (Tex. 1985). A trial court abuses its discretion if it reaches a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law, or if it clearly fails to analyze or apply the law correctly. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992).

Relators contend the trial court abused its discretion by: (1) compelling disclosure of (a) “confidential and proprietary [customer] information [implicating] constitutional rights of privacy,” (b) “business information in violation of a confidentiality agreement,” and (c) documents not in their “possession, custody, or control”; and (2) ordering them to pay attorney’s fees incurred by Adviento in addressing their motion for protective order. We discuss each issue in turn.

A. Confidential customer information

Relators argue that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering disclosure of “readily identifiable information concerning the customers, such as the names of minor guests, parent names, dates of birth, addresses, and phone numbers,” which would “violate[] the privacy rights of the customers, which are protected by the Due Process Clause.” However, nowhere do Relators identify which of Adviento’s discovery request(s) seek such information. In their argument on this issue, Relators refer to no specific discovery requests. And in their statement of facts, the only discovery requests Relators mention are RFP 24 (joint venture agreements), RFP 26 (surveillance footage/images), RFP 45 (product footage/images),^[2] and a deposition-notice RFP for asset- purchase-agreement documents. 3 On their face, these requests appear not to involve the type of customer information Relators seek to protect.

But even if such customer information had been requested in RFP 24, 26, or 45—or in Adviento’s other initial RFPs or interrogatories—Relators point to no timely objection asserting the confidentiality of such information. 4 Under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.2(a), an objection to written discovery must be made within the time for the response, i.e., within 30 days after service of the request. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 196.2(a) (RFPs) and 197.2(a) (interrogatories). Here, the objection/response deadline was August 17, 2023, and from Relators’ statement of facts and the record, it appears the issue of confidential customer information was first raised in Relators’ motion for protective order filed on December 5, 2023. But like objections, such a motion must be filed “within the time permitted for response to the discovery request.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.6(a). Relators neither point to an applicable exception to this deadline nor develop any argument challenging the finding in the trial court’s October 13, 2023 order that Relators “failed to respond to [Adviento’s initial] discovery requests in the time and manner prescribed by the rules.” 5

Further, even if Relators had timely objected in their discovery responses that one or more requests sought confidential customer information, the trial court’s October 13, 2023 order overruled all objections to Adviento’s initial requests based on a finding that Relators “objected to almost each and every request, and as such are overruled as to each objection.” Relators challenge neither the correctness of this finding nor the consequences imposed. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 193.2 (“An objection . . . obscured by numerous unfounded objections, is waived unless the court excuses the waiver for good cause shown.”).

Finally, even if Relators had timely filed a motion for protective order, a party seeking such an order must show a “particular, specific and demonstrable injury by facts sufficient to justify [such relief].” In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 545 S.W.3d 626, 636 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2016, no pet.) (citing In re Collins, 286 S.W.3d 911, 919 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding)).

In Wal-Mart, the movant “broadly alleged in its motion that it sought protection for confidential information,” but failed to “establish in either its motion or at the hearing the exact nature of the information,” and further failed to “present evidence establishing a particular, specific, and demonstrable injury.” 286 S.W.3d at 637. Here, Relators’ motion likewise broadly sought to protect “private information concerning [their] customers” and “materials concerning the identity of [their] customers,” but did not establish either in their motion or at the hearing the exact nature of the information/materials, and further failed to present evidence of a “particular, specific, and demonstrable injury.” In Wal-Mart, we found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for protective order. Id. We similarly find here that the trial court has not been shown to have abused its discretion in denying Relators’ motion for protective order in relation to customer information.

B. Confidential business information

Relators argue that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering disclosure of “confidential documents belonging to Sky Zone El Paso East, including the terms of the asset purchase agreement,” which RLG is “contractually prohibited from disclosing . . . without express written authorization of Sky Zone El Paso East, which RLG does not have.”

But again, as with the customer information discussed above, Relators point to no timely objection asserting the confidentiality of such information. The asset-purchase-agreement documents were initially requested in Adviento’s first notice of Richard Glassman’s deposition, served on September 26, 2023. While Relators filed a timely motion to quash and for protective order, the motion included no confidentiality objection. ^[6] The documents were next requested in Adviento’s second notice of Glassman’s deposition, served on October 26, 2023. 7 And while Relators timely objected to this notice too—including specific objections to production of the asset-purchase-agreement documents—again no confidentiality objection was included. ^[8] Thus, as with the confidentiality of customer information, it appears the confidentiality of the asset- purchase-agreement documents was first raised in Relators’ motion for protective order filed on December 5, 2023, more than 30 days after October 26, 2023, when the second notice of Glassman’s deposition was served. Relators point to no applicable exception to the 30-day deadline under Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.6(a) for filing such a motion.

Further, while the trial court denied Relators’ motion for protective order for a different reason, finding that the information at issue had already been compelled in its October 13, 2023 order—which is incorrect as to the asset-purchase-agreement documents—Adviento argues that mandamus relief should be denied if the trial court “reache[d] the right result for the wrong reason,” citing In re Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co., No. 13-17-00506-CV, 2017 WL 5616272, at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Nov. 20, 2017) (orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). Relators advance no argument as to why their failure to timely object under Rule 192.6(a) would not make the trial court’s ruling the right result.

Finally, as it did with customer information, Relators’ motion broadly sought protection for “private and sensitive business information,” but did not establish in either the motion or at the hearing the exact nature of the information, and further failed to present evidence of a “particular, specific, and demonstrable injury.” We find that the trial court has not been shown to have abused its discretion in denying Relators’ motion for protective order in relation to the asset-purchase- agreement documents.

C. Documents not in Relators’ “possession, custody, or control”

Relators argue that to prevail on his motion to compel, Adviento had to “show that Relators had a ‘right to possession of the item that is equal or superior to the person who has physical possession,’” and because it is “clear that [1] Relators have no legal right to disclose the documents compelled by the Order in unredacted form, [2] Sky Zone El Paso East has a superior right to possession of the requested documents, and [3] Relators have no legal right to access any other documents,” the trial court “clearly abused its discretion in issuing the Order.”

Adviento does not dispute that he had the burden to show discovery should be compelled. Nor could he. See In re Summersett, 438 S.W.3d 74, 81 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2013, no pet.) (party seeking to compel production in discovery has burden to prove other party has constructive possession or right to obtain possession of requested documents). Instead, Adviento contends that “[t]he trial court is indeed well within its authority to compel production of items when Relator’s counsel admits to possessing responsive evidence, represents a possessory agent who holds items responsive to discovery requests, and refuses to provide these items.” However, in his argument, Adviento identifies no such items, no such possessory agent, and no evidence of anything.

In contrast, in his procedural history, Adviento asserts that at the October 13, 2023 hearing, Relators’ counsel “inadvertently proved . . . constructive possession and accessibility [of discovery items] through agency relationships between Relators, the business which bought Relators’ facility, and how Relators’ counsel happened to represent them all,” citing four pages from the hearing transcript. But three of these pages contain argument by Adviento’s own counsel, not Relators’ counsel, and the fourth contains only the following relevant statements by Relators’ counsel:

The current owner [of the trampoline park] is a company called . . . Sky Zone El Paso East, Inc. and the individual is a gentleman named Joshua Rathweg. And, full disclosure, I represent them in a lawsuit filed by another plaintiff.

. . . .

And so the long and short of it is, we can’t produce what we don’t have. And the reason we don’t have documents is, one of them is a completely improper entity, and the other is they sold it nine months before the lawsuit occurred.

Nothing said by Relators’ counsel here establishes an “agency relationship” or other relationship that would require counsel to produce or disclose anything in another client’s possession or in counsel’s own possession by virtue of representing another client. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3(b) (items must be produced only if “within [a] person’s possession, custody, or control”); In re Shell E & P, Inc., 179 S.W.3d 125, 131 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2005, no pet.) (attorney’s “mere access” to requested documents does not establish legal possession within meaning of Rule 192.3(b)) (citing In re Kuntz, 124 S.W.3d 179, 184 (Tex. 2003)); GTE Communications Sys. Corp. v. Tanner, 856 S.W.2d 725, 729 (Tex. 1993) (corporation’s constructive possession of another corporation’s documents not established in absence of evidence that former “ever actually did exercise control of any type” over latter). 9

While Adviento has thus failed to meet his burden to show that Relators could be compelled to produce any specific documents, it is unclear exactly where, in either party’s view, the trial court ordered Relator to do so. In particular, while Relators assert they have “no access to the premises, and no legal right to access or disclose the documents compelled,” and “no legal right to disclose the documents compelled by the Order in unredacted form,” they identify neither the specific documents at issue nor any specific provision(s) in any trial court order(s) from which they seek relief. Further, they claim they “fully complied with the October 13, 2023 discovery order,” and “the record is clear that Relators provided all information compelled by the October 13, 2023 discovery order in any event.” Accordingly, we find that the trial court has not been shown to have compelled Relators to produce documents not in their possession, custody, or control, and thus has not been shown to have abused its discretion by doing so.

D. Attorney’s fees sanction

Relators argue that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering them to pay attorney’s fees in the amount of $1,500 incurred by Adviento in dealing with Relators’ motion for protective order. They contend such a sanction was “unjust, excessive, and not tied to any discovery abuse.” However, they do not argue that they lack an adequate remedy on appeal in relation to this issue.

Where, as here, a trial court imposes a monetary sanction payable before rendition of an appealable order, mandamus relief may be available if the sanctioned litigant “contends that a monetary sanction award precludes access to the court,” and the trial court fails to either (1) make the sanction payable on or after entry of a final order, or (2) make express written findings, after a hearing, as to why the sanction does not have such a preclusive effect. In re Casey, 589 S.W.3d 850, 855 (Tex. 2019). But here Relators do not argue that the $1,500 sanction at issue “precludes access to the court.” We conclude that they thus have not shown they have no adequate remedy on appeal.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above, we conclude that RLG has failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion. Accordingly, we deny mandamus relief and lift the temporary stay we imposed on proceedings in the trial court.

LISA J. SOTO, Justice October 29, 2024 Before Alley, C.J., Palafox and Soto, JJ.