green
Positive treatment
Doctrinal family: Larson v. Domestic and Foreign C… ↗
Issue: Young violationPA ↗
Quoted verbatim 5×
33.8 score
Quick Summary
Relief sought nominally against a federal officer is a suit against the sovereign if the decree would operate against the United States by interfering with public administration.
The State of Hawaii filed an action against the Director of the Bureau of the Budget to compel the withdrawal of an administrative opinion and to require the determination and potential conveyance of certain federal lands. The court must determine whether such a suit is maintainable against a federal officer. Because the requested relief would require affirmative official action, interfere with public administration, and involve the disposition of property belonging to the United States, the suit is actually against the sovereign. Since the relief sought nominally against an officer is in fact against the sovereign if the decree would operate against the latter, the action cannot be maintained without federal consent.
G Cite
cited 36× by 29 distinct cases, 1966–2025 · 21 courts↑ Rising ·
…the general rule is that relief sought nominally against an officer is in fact against the sovereign if the decree would operate against the latter.
at p. 58
✓
Topic ↗
cited 6× by 4 distinct cases, last quoted 1995 · 3 courts↓ Fading ·
…relief sought nominally against an officer is in fact against the sovereign if the decree would operate against the latter.
✓
Topic ↗
cited 5× by 5 distinct cases, last quoted 1979 · 4 courts ·
…the judgment sought would expend itself on the public treasury or domain, or interfere with the public administration
⚠ not in text
Treatment trajectory · 1963 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1963
1994
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Street v. Wormuth
the general rule is that relief sought nominally against an officer is in fact against the sovereign if the decree would operate against the latter.
examined
Cited as authority (quoted)
Fisher v. Federal Bureau of Prisons
(3×)
the general rule is that relief sought nominally against an officer is in fact against the sovereign if the decree would operate against the latter.
examined
Cited as authority (quoted)
Devore v. United States
(3×)
the general rule is that relief sought nominally against an officer is in fact against the sovereign if the decree would operate against the latter.
examined
Cited as authority (quoted)
Ferrel v. Brown
(3×)
the general rule is that relief sought nominally against an officer is in fact against the sovereign if the decree would operate against the latter.
examined
Cited as authority (quoted)
Serra v. United States General Services Administration
(3×)
relief sought nominally against an officer is in fact against the sovereign if the decree would operate against the latter.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
US ex rel. Sargent v. Collins
And ultimately it is "a suit against the United States," because the "relief sought nominally against" the Secretary -- double back pay, interest, and special damages -- "is in fact against the sovereign." State of Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57, 58 (1963).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Lamb v. Saguaro Trails Community Association
“The general rule is that relief sought nominally against an officer is in fact 28 against the sovereign if the decree would operate against the latter.” Hawaii v. Gordon, 1 373 U.S. 57, 58 (1963) (per curiam). “[A]s when the State itself is named as the defendant, 2 a suit against state officials that is in fact a suit against a State is barred regardless of 3 whether it seeks damages or injunctive relief.” Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 101–02 (citations 4 omitted). 5 If Plaintiff cannot point to “any federal statute that abrogated the state’s sovereign 6 immunity, [or otherwise demons…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Golbert v. Smith
See Lewis, 581 U.S. at 162 ; Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57, 58 (1963) (per curiam) (“[R]elief sought nominally against an officer is in fact against the sovereign if the decree would operate against the latter.”).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
CASHAW v. LUCIA
When “a state agency . . . is named as [a] defendant, that too is considered a suit against the state,” Everett v. Schramm, 772 F.2d 1114, 1118 (3d Cir. 1985), especially if the “relief sought . . . is in fact against the sovereign.” Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57, 58 (1963).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Cotto v. Campbell
This bar applies to suits against state agencies and departments, as well as to suits that are nominally against state officials but where the state is "the real, substantial party in interest" because the relief sought "would operate against [the state]." Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100-01 (1984) (first quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Dep't of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945); and then quoting Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57, 58 (1963) (per curiam)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Monica Drasovean v. Steven Walts
(2×)
Such immunity does not extend to an officer of the state, however, when his actions are “so negligent as to take him outside the protection of his 3 See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101 (1984) (stating that the “‘general rule is that relief sought nominally against an officer is in fact against the sovereign if the decree would operate against the latter’” (quoting Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57, 58 (1963) (per curiam))); see also Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Comm. Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949) (noting that the relief sought and against whom the relief is obtai…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Monica Drasovean v. Steven Walts
Such immunity does not extend to an officer of the state, however, when his actions are “so negligent as to take him outside the protection of his 3 See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101 (1984) (stating that the “‘general rule is that relief sought nominally against an officer is in fact against the sovereign if the decree would operate against the latter’” (quoting Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57, 58 (1963) (per curiam))); see also Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Comm. Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949) (noting that the relief sought and against whom the relief is obtai…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Hoff v. Joyce
“The general rule is that relief sought nominally against an officer is in fact against the sovereign if the decree would operate 4 against the latter.” Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57, 58 (1963) (per curiam).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Canter v. The State Of Maryland
As such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself.” See also Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 101–02 (“And, as when the State itself is named as the defendant, a suit against state officials that is in fact a suit against a State is barred regardless of whether it seeks damages or injunctive relief.”); Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57, 58 (1963) (per curiam) (“The general rule is that relief sought nominally against an officer is in fact against the sovereign if the decree would operate against the latter.”).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Industrial Services Group, Inc. v. Josh Dobson
Courts find that “the state is the real, substantial party in interest” when the “relief sought nominally against an officer is in fact against the sovereign if the decree would operate against the latter.” Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101 (1984) (quoting Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57, 58 (1963)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Duke's Investments LLC v. Char
Thus, the “general rule is that relief sought nominally against an officer is in fact against the sovereign if the decree would operate against the latter.” Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 101 (quoting Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57, 58 (1963) (per curiam)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Robinson v. Washington County Board of Education
As such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself.” See also Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 , 101–02 (1984) (“And, as when the State itself is named as the defendant, a suit against state officials that is in fact a suit against a State is barred regardless of whether it seeks damages or injunctive relief.”); Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57, 58 (1963) (per curiam) (“The general rule is that relief sought nominally against an officer is in fact against the sovereign if the decree would operate against the latter.”). 15 Throughout their brief, d…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Jordan v. Davis
As such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself.” See also Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 101–02 (“And, as when the State itself is named as the defendant, a suit against state officials that is in fact a suit against a State is barred regardless of whether it seeks damages or injunctive relief.”); Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57, 58 (1963) (per curiam) (“The general rule is that relief sought nominally against an officer is in fact against the sovereign if the decree would operate against the latter.”).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Francis v. State of Maryland
As such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself.” See also Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 101–02 (“And, as when the State itself is named as the defendant, a suit against state officials that is in fact a suit against a State is barred regardless of whether it seeks damages or injunctive relief.”); Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57, 58 (1963) (per curiam) (“The general rule is that relief sought nominally against an officer is in fact against the sovereign if the decree would operate against the latter.”).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Francis v. State of Maryland
As such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself.” See also Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57, 58 (1963) (per curiam) (“The general rule is that relief sought nominally against an officer is in fact against the sovereign if the decree would operate against the latter.”); Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 101–02 (“And, as when the State itself is named as the defendant, a suit against state officials that is in fact a suit against a State is barred regardless of whether it seeks damages or injunctive relief.”).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Pevia v. Moyer
Additionally, “[t]he general rule is that relief sought nominally against an officer is in fact against the sovereign if the decree would operate against the latter.” Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57, 58 (1963) (per curiam).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Bouton v. State of Missouri
See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar a suit to enjoin a state official from enforcing unconstitutional state laws); Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 269 (1997) (holding that the exception in Ex Parte Young should not be universally applied to every federal court action in which injunctive relief is sought against an officer named in his individual capacity, but rather should be applied on a case-by-case basis after a careful balancing and accommodation of state interests; finding the Young exception inapplicable in the …
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Tawfiq v. Cauley
PageID.197- 98, citing Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 622 (1963); State of Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57, 58 (1963); Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643, 648 (1962).) Defendant argues that neither Larson, nor the Supreme Court cases following Larson, prohibit courts from considering “the challenged action” when determining whether a suit for injunctive relief against a federal official would operate against the sovereign.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Oregon Manufacturers and Commerce v. Oregon Occupational Safety and Health Division
“The general rule is that relief sought nominally against an officer is in fact against the sovereign if the decree would operate against the latter.” /d. at 101 (quoting Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57, 58 (1963)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Torres v. Claims Comm.
This is true because “relief sought nominally against an officer is in fact against the sovereign if the decree would operate against the latter.” Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 101 (quoting Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57, 58 (1963)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
AV2 v. MCDONOUGH
Injunctive relief that is “sought nominally against an officer” is actually “against the sovereign” when it would “operate against the latter.” Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57, 58 (1963) (per curiam); see Larson, 337 U.S. at 688 (explaining that injunctive relief, “although nominally directed against the individual officer,” may be “in substance” against the federal government).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
In Re: Baldwin
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
But, under the plain language of the Application, the order requested would “would require [HHS’s] official affirmative action, affect the public administration of government agencies and cause as well the disposition of property admittedly belonging to the United States.” State of Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57, 58 (1963).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Berka v. Cuomo
“The general rule is that relief sought nominally against [a State] officer is in fact against the sovereign if the decree would operate against the latter.” Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57, 58 (1963); accord, Pennhurst State Sch. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101 (1984).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Craig Cunningham v. Deborah Lester
(2×)
“The general rule,” the Court explained, “is that relief sought nominally against an officer is in 6 fact against the sovereign if the decree would operate against the latter.” Id. at 101 (quoting Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57, 58 (1963) (per curiam)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Family Civil Liberties Union v. New Jersey Department of Child
A “judge who acts as a neutral and impartial arbiter of a statute is not a proper defendant to a Section 1983 [claim] challenging the constitutionality of the statute.”12 9 Pa. Fed’n of Sportsmen’s Clubs, Inc. v. Hess, 297 F.3d 310 , 323 (3d Cir. 2002). 10 Everett v. Schramm, 772 F.2d 1114, 1118 (3d Cir. 1985). 11 Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57, 58 (1963). 12 Allen, 861 F.3d at 440. 4 Here, Judges Katz, Kessler, and Wilson were acting as impartial adjudicators.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Parker v. National Association of Letter Carriers
State of Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57, 58 (1963) (per curiam) (holding that “relief sought nominally against an officer is in fact against the sovereign if the decree would operate against the latter”).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Waterfront Commission of NY v. Governor of New Jersey
(2×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 101 (quoting Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57, 58 (1963) (per curiam)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Koch v. State of Ohio
Sys. of Georgia, 535 U.S. 613 (2002))). “[T]he general rule is that relief sought nominally against an officer is in fact against the sovereign if the decree would operate against the latter.” Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 101 (quoting Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57, 58 (1963) (per curiam)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Hengle v. Asner
“The general rule is that relief sought nominally against an officer is in fact against the sovereign if the decree would operate against the latter.” Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57, 58 (1963). “[A] suit against state officials that is in fact against a State is barred regardless of whether it seeks damages or injunctive relief.” Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 102 .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
LEE v. PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
Thus, based on the allegations in the Amended Complaint, Lee is seeking relief “not from the state treasury but from the officer personally” for “wrongful conduct fairly attributable to the officer 26 Martin v. Wood, 772 F.3d 192, 195 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 270 ). 27 Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 101 (quoting Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57, 58 (1963)). 28 Id. at 101 n.11 (quoting Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620 (1963)). 29 Martin, 772 F.3d at 195–96.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Davis v. Baltimore City Community College
Gordon, 373 U.S. 57, 58 (1963) (per curiam)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Locke v. Warren
Because a suit against a federal officer is construed as a suit against the United States, see Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57, 58 (1963)—and given that the United States is generally immune from suit unless it has explicitly waived that immunity2—the Court must, before it may adjudicate the merits of the Plaintiff’s claim, determine whether an explicit waiver of sovereign immunity has been established in this case.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Hunt v. South Carolina State Housing Finance and Development Authority
“The general rule is that relief sought nominally against an officer is in fact against the sovereign if the decree would operate against the latter.” Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57, 58 (1963) “And, as when the State itself is named as the defendant, a suit against state officials that is in fact a suit against a State is barred regardless of whether it seeks damages or injunctive relief.” Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 101 -02 (citing Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85, 91 (1982)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Nisi v. Brown
Brokaw v. Mercer Cty., 235 F.3d 1000, 1009 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Federal suits against state officials in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.”); Franklin v. Zaruba, 150 F.3d 682, 684 (7th Cir. 1998) (“The Eleventh Amendment, which bars suits for damages against states, therefore bars suits against state officials in their official capacities as well.”). against state officials in their official capacity . . . should be treated as suits against the State.”); Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57, 58 (1963) (per curiam ) (“The general rule is that relief sought nomina…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
NEW ORLEANS TOWING ASSOCIATION, INC. v. M J FOSTER, JR.
A suit in which relief is sought nominally against a state official “‘is in fact against the sovereign if the decree would operate against the latter.’” Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 101 (quoting Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57, 58 (1963)); see also Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620 (1963) (“The general rule is that a suit is against the sovereign if the judgment sought would expend itself on the public treasury or domain, or interfere with the public administration, or if the effect of the judgment would 8 be to restrain the Government from acting, or to compel it to act.” (internal quotati…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
The State of Connecticut v. John Cahill
(2×)
In determining who is the real party in interest, the "general rule" is that relief sought nominally against an officer is in fact against the sovereign if "the effect of the judgment would be to restrain the Government from acting, or to compel it to act." Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 , 101 & n.11 (1984); Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57, 58 (1963) (per curiam); Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620 (1963). 49 Here, Connecticut named John Cahill and Donald Brewer, respectively New York's Commissioner of Environmental Conservation and Director of the Division of Law Enforceme…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Davis v. Scott
See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100-01 (1984); Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57, 58 (1963) (per curiam); Harris v. Angelina County, Tex., 31 F.3d 331 , 337-38 n.7 (5th Cir. 1994).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Kersting v. United States
Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57, 58, 83 S.Ct. 1052, 1052 , 10 L.Ed.2d 191 (1967).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Gettysburg Battlefield Preservation Ass'n v. Gettysburg College
Cooper, 14 Federal Practice & Procedure § 3655 at 218; Gordon, 373 U.S. at 58 , 83 S.Ct. at 1052-53 (where relief sought would require federal officer’s official action, affect public administration of government agencies and cause disposition of government property, suit was one against federal government); Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 738 , 67 S.Ct. 1009, 1012 , 91 L.Ed. 1209 (1947) (where relief sought would expend itself from public treasury or domain, or interfere with public administration, suit was one against the sovereign).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Vazquez v. Kemp
As to federal officers, in Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57, 58, 83 S.Ct. 1052, 1052 , 10 L.Ed.2d 191 (1963), the Court laid out the following guidelines.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Envirotech Sanitary Systems, Inc. v. Shoener
Thus, “[t]he general rule is *277 that relief sought nominally against an officer is in fact against the sovereign if the decree would operate against the latter.” Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57, 58 [ 83 S.Ct. 1052, 1052 , 10 L.Ed.2d 191 ] (1963) (per curiam).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Allen v. United States
Helton v. United States, 532 F.Supp. 813, 819 (S.D.Ga.1982) (citing Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57, 58 [ 83 S.Ct. 1052, 1053 , 10 L.Ed.2d 191 ] (1963)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Harley v. Carman
Thus, "[t]he general rule is that relief sought nominally against an officer is in fact against the sovereign if the decree would operate against the latter." Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57, 58 [ 83 S.Ct. 1052 , 10 L.Ed.2d 191 ] ... (1963) (per curiam). 104 S.Ct. at 908 (citations and footnote omitted).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Hawaii
v.
Gordon
v.
Gordon
12 ORIG.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Apr 29, 1963.
Bert T. Kobayashi, Attorney General of Hawaii, and Dennis G. Lyons argued the cause for plaintiff. Also on the briefs were Shiro Kashiwa, former Attorney General of Hawaii, Wilbur K. Watkins, Jr., former Deputy Attorney General of Hawaii, Thurman Arnold, Abe Fortas and Paul A. Porter., Wayne G. Barnett argued' the cause for defendant. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Cox, David R. Warner and Thos. L. McKevitt.
White.
Cited by 283 opinions | Published
Per Curiam.
Section 5 (e) of the Hawaii Statehood Act, 73 Stat. 4, 48 U. S. C. (Supp. II, 1960), pp. 1257-1261, provides that within five years from the date Hawaii is admitted to the Union federal agencies having control over land or properties retained by the United States under § 5 (c) and (d) of the Act shall report, to the President-as to the “continued need for such land or property, and if the President[*58] determines that the land or property is no' longer needed by the United States it shall be conveyed to the State of Hawaii.” The President designated the Director of the Bureau of the Budget to perform his functions thereunder. The Director thereafter, pursuant to an opinion of the Attorney General, 42 Op. Atty. Gen. (No. 4), concluded, and so advised federal agencies, that the lands referred to in ■§ 5 (e) do not include lands obtained by the United States through purchase, condemnation or gift but are limited to lands which at one time belonged to Hawaii and were ceded to the United States or acquired in exchange therefor.
Hawaii filed this original action against the Director, under Art. Ill, § 2, of the Constitution of the United States, seeking to obtain ah order requiring him to withdraw this advice to the federal agencies, determine, whether a certain 203 acres of land in Hawaii acquired by the United States through condemnation was land or properties “needed by the United States” and, if not needed, to convey this land to- Hawaii. We have concluded that this is a suit against the United States and, absent its consent, cannot be maintained by the State. The general rule is that relief sought nominally against an officer is in fact against the sovereign if the decree would operate against the latter. E. g., Dugan v. Rank, 372 U. S. 609 (1963); Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U. S. 643 (1962); Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Corp., 337 U. S. 682 (1949). Here the order requésted would require the Director’s official affirmative action, affect the public administration of government agencies and causé as well the disposition of property admittedly belonging to the United States. .The complaint' is therefore dismissed. Oregon v. Hitchcock, 202 U. S. 60 (1906).
Dismissed.
Mb. Justice White, took no part in the consideration or-decision of this case.