State v. Waddell, 646 N.E.2d 821 (Ohio 1995). · Go Syfert
State v. Waddell, 646 N.E.2d 821 (Ohio 1995). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
107 citation events (63 in the last 25 years) across 5 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: State v. Padgelek (ohioctapp, 2026-03-11)
Treatment trajectory · 1994 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1994 2010 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 8 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Padgelek
Ohio Ct. App. · 2026 · confidence medium
“R.C. 2937.07[, captioned ‘Action on pleas of “guilty” and “no contest” in misdemeanor cases,’] contains two paragraphs – the first dealing with the procedure required by the court before accepting a guilty plea in misdemeanor cases, and the second detailing the necessary Case No. 25 BE 0046 –6– procedure before the court accepts a no contest plea in misdemeanor cases.” State v. Waddell, 71 Ohio St.3d 630, 631 (1995). {¶20} The paragraph relating to pleas of guilt reads in relevant part: Upon receiving a plea of guilty, the court or magistrate shall call for an explanati…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Nemec v. Morledge
Ohio Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
Pennington v. Gundler, 75 Ohio St.3d 171, 173 (1996); State v. Waddell, 71 Ohio St.3d 630, 631 (1995); R.C. 1.42. a.
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Hinds
Ohio Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
State v. Waddell, 71 Ohio St.3d 630, 631 (1995); State v. Wisler, 2019- Ohio-2363, ¶ 4 (1st Dist.).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Johnson
Ohio · 2024 · confidence medium
“When the meaning of a statute is clear and definite, it must be applied as written,” State v. Bertram, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2023-Ohio-1456, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 11, because “ ‘an unambiguous statute means what it says,’ ” State v. Waddell, 71 Ohio St.3d 630, 631, 646 N.E.2d 821 (1995), quoting Hakim v. Kosydar, 49 Ohio St.2d 161, 164, 359 N.E.2d 1371 (1977).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Garcia
Ohio Ct. App. · 2020 · confidence medium
State v. Waddell, 71 Ohio St.3d 630, 631 (1995).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Garcia
Ohio Ct. App. · 2020 · confidence medium
State v. Waddell, 71 Ohio St.3d 630, 631 (1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Homan v. Franklin Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals
Ohio Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
“When an ordinance is unambiguous and conveys a clear meaning, a court must only read and follow the words of the ordinance.” Id., citing Fairborn v. DeDomenico, 114 Ohio App.3d 590, 593 (2d Dist.1996) and State v. Waddell, 71 Ohio St.3d 630, 631 (1995).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." City of Fairborn v. DeDomenico (2×)
Ohio Ct. App. · 1996 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., State v. Waddell (1995), 71 Ohio St.3d 630, 631 , 646 N.E.2d 821, 821-822 ; State ex rel Herman v. Klopfleisch (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 581, 584 , 651 N.E.2d 995, 997-998 .
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
The State of Ohio
v.
Waddell
No. 93-265.
Ohio Supreme Court.
Mar 29, 1995.
646 N.E.2d 821
Charles A. Gerken, Hocking County Prosecuting Attorney, and Jeffrey F. Bender, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant.
Cook, Douglas, Moyer, Pfeifer, Resnick, Sweeney, Wright.
Cited by 59 opinions  |  Published
Francis E. Sweeney, Sr., J.

'In this case we are asked to determine whether a court must consider an accused’s statement before accepting a no contest plea to[*631] a misdemeanor offense. We hold R.C. 2937.07 requires that a court need only consider the explanation of circumstances by the state before it passes judgment. While a court may certainly consider a statement from the accused, it is not required to do so.

To decide this issue, we- are asked to construe R.C. 2937.07. R.C. 2937.07 contains two paragraphs — the first dealing with the procedure required by the court before accepting a guilty plea in misdemeanor cases, and the second detailing the necessary procedure before the court accepts a no contest plea in misdemeanor cases.

The first paragraph of R.C. 2937.07 provides in part:

“Upon a plea of guilty [to a misdemeanor offense] being received the court or magistrate shall call for explanation of circumstances of the offense from the affiant or complainant or his representatives, and after hearing the same, together with any statement of the accused, shall proceed to pronounce sentence * * (Emphasis added.)

The second paragraph of R.C. 2937.07 provides:

“If the plea be ‘no contest’ * * * to a misdemeanor, it shall constitute a stipulation that the judge or magistrate may make a finding of guilty or not guilty from the explanation of circumstances, and if guilt be found, impose or continue for sentence accordingly * * *.” (Emphasis added.)

To properly construe this statute, we must first look at the express wording of the statute. Provident Bank v. Wood (1973), 36 Ohio St.2d 101, 65 O.O.2d 296, 304 N.E.2d 378. Courts must give effect to the words of a statute and may not modify an unambiguous statute by deleting words used or inserting words not used. Shover v. Cordis Corp. (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 213, 218, 574 N.E.2d 457, 461. Simply stated, “an unambiguous statute means what it says.” Hakim v. Kosydar (1977), 49 Ohio St.2d 161, 164, 3 O.O.3d 211, 213, 359 N.E.2d 1371, 1373, citing Chope v. Collins (1976), 48 Ohio St.2d 297, 300, 2 O.O.3d 442, 444, 358 N.E.2d 573, 575, fn. 2.

In our view, the unambiguous language of R.C. 2937.07 clearly states that in the case of a no contest plea to a misdemeanor offense, a court may make its finding from the explanation of circumstances by the state. The court is required to consider the accused’s statement only where the plea is guilty. This is evident from the fact that the “together with any statement of accused” clause in the first paragraph of the statute is noticeably absent from the second paragraph, which deals with no contest pleas. Had the General Assembly intended for this requirement to apply to no contest pleas, then appropriate language would have been inserted in the second paragraph. Thus, according to the statute, the trial[*632] court did not have to consider the accused’s statement, and appellee received all that the statute required.[1]

The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and appellee’s conviction is reinstated.

Judgment reversed.

Moyer, C.J., Douglas, Wright, Resnick, Pfeifer and Cook, JJ., concur.
1

In fact, by allowing appellee to make a statement, appellee received more than what the statute required.