Bitter v. United States, 389 U.S. 15 (1967). · Go Syfert
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Bitter v. United States, 389 U.S. 15 (1967). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 1 distinct case, last quoted 1979 · …a trial judge indisputably has broad powers to ensure the orderly and expeditious progress of a trial. at p. 7 ✓
cited 2× by 1 distinct case, last quoted 1981 · …abuses, oppression and injustice. ⚠ not in text
cited 2× by 1 distinct case, last quoted 2000 · …appearance and effect of punishment. ✓
244 citation events (38 in the last 25 years) across 32 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: United States v. Meinster (flsd, 1979-12-28)
Treatment trajectory · 1969 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1969 1997 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 19 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) United States v. Meinster (6×) also: Cited "see", Cited "see, e.g."
S.D. Fla. · 1979 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
a trial judge indisputably has broad powers to ensure the orderly and expeditious progress of a trial.
examined Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Evans Santos Diaz (3×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
3rd Cir. · 2023 · confidence medium
Relatedly, it is well established that “[a] trial judge indisputably has broad powers to ensure the orderly and expeditious progress of trial.” Bitter v. United States, 389 U.S. 15, 16 (1967).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Martinez CA3
Cal. Ct. App. · 2022 · confidence medium
(See Bitter v. United States (1967) 389 U.S. 15, 16 [a court’s inherent power “must be exercised with circumspection”; it cannot be invoked without a sufficient showing of need].) Our conclusion that the trial court lacked inherent authority for its actions finds support in People v. Ponce (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 378 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hicks v. State
Alaska Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
Thus, Alaska trial courts retain their inherent authority to issue such no-contact orders to protect 6 Id. 7 State v. Dobrova, 694 P.2d 157, 158 (Alaska 1985). 8 Wheeler v. United States, 640 F.2d 1116, 1122-25 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting Bitter v. United States, 389 U.S. 15, 16 (1967)). 9 See Hosier v. State, 957 P.2d 1360, 1363 (Alaska App. 1998); see also Titus v. State, 305 P.3d 1271, 1282 (Alaska 2013); Dominguez v. State, 181 P.3d 1111, 1114 (Alaska App. 2008); Lonis v. State, 998 P.2d 441, 445 (Alaska App. 2000); Stiegele v. State, 685 P.2d 1255, 1261 (Alaska App. 1984). 10 Lonis, 998 P.2d…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Perez
Cal. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
(Bitter v. United States (1967) 389 U.S. 15, 16 [ 19 L.Ed.2d 15 , 88 S.Ct. 6 ]; People v. Ponce, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 384 .) Here the prosecution did not provide a rationale for the 500-foot court access restriction.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Ponce
Cal. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
(Bitter v. United States (1967) 389 U.S. 15, 16 [ 19 L.Ed.2d 15 , 88 S.Ct. 6 ].) The Attorney General relies on Townsel where our Supreme Court held that a trial court in a criminal case had inherent authority to order the defendant’s appellate counsel not to contact trial jurors without first obtaining its approval.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Schall v. Martin (2×)
SCOTUS · 1984 · confidence medium
But even the majority does not suggest that persons who could not be convicted of any crimes may nevertheless be imprisoned for the protection of themselves and the public. [24] See testimony of Steven Hiltz, App. 130-134 (describing the detrimental effects of pretrial detention of a juvenile upon the preparation and presentation of his defense); cf. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514, 533 (1972); Bitter v. United States, 389 U. S. 15, 16-17 (1967) (per curiam) ; Stack v. Boyle, 342 U. S., at 8 ; Miller, Preventive Detention — A Guide to the Eradication of Individual Rights, 16 How.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Beverly v. State
Wis. · 1970 · confidence medium
See also: Whitty v. State, supra, footnote 3. 5 (2d Cir. 1961), 288 Fed. 2d 442. 6 Id. at page 444. 7 (1967), 389 U. S. 15 , 88 Sup. Ct. 6, 19 L.
examined Cited "see" Dorsey v. Commonwealth (4×)
Va. Ct. App. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See id. at 15-16 , 88 S.Ct. at 6-7 .
examined Cited "see" United States v. Marvin J. Zylstra (3×)
7th Cir. · 1983 · signal: see · confidence high
See Bitter v. United States, 389 U.S. 15,16 , 88 S.Ct. 6, 7 , 19 L.Ed.2d 15 (1967); 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (b); United States v. Bentvena, 288 F.2d 442 (2d Cir.1961); United States v. Allison, 414 F.2d 407 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 968 , 90 S.Ct. 449 , 24 L.Ed.2d 433 (1969); and United States v. Meinster, 481 F.Supp. 1117 (S.D.Fla.1979), aff’d sub nom., United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1136 , 102 S.Ct. 2965 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1354 (1982).
cited Cited "see" Consalvi
Mass. · 1978 · signal: see · confidence high
See Bitter v. United States, 389 U.S. 15, 16 (1967); Commesso v. Commonwealth, 369 Mass. 368, 376 (1975).
examined Cited "see" United States ex rel. Scott v. LaVallee (3×)
S.D.N.Y. · 1974 · signal: see · confidence high
See Bitter v. United States, 389 U.S. 15, 17 , 88 S.Ct. 6 , 19 L.Ed.2d 15 (1967) ; Dorman v. United States, 140 U.S.App.D.C. 313 , 435 F.2d 385, 398 (1970).
examined Cited "see" United States v. Anthony Carlo Cozzetti, United States of America v. Michael Miller, Also Known as Michael Rosenthal, United States of America v. Ronald Ernest Gilmour (3×)
9th Cir. · 1971 · signal: see · confidence high
See * * * Carbo v. United States, 288 F.2d 282 (C.A.9th Cir. 1961) * * *.' Bitter v. United States, 389 U.S. 15, 16-17 , 88 S.Ct. 6, 7 , 19 L.Ed.2d 15 . 32 In the Carbo decision cited by the Supreme Court and in a later appeal of that case, Carbo v. United States (9 Cir. 1961) 288 F.2d 686, 690 , this court held that interference with Government witnesses by a defendant is a sufficient basis for the exercise of the trial court's power to revoke bail during trial. 33 Nor was there sufficient showing that the revocation of bail legally prejudiced Cozzetti or denied him a fair trial.
examined Cited "see" United States v. Cozzetti (3×)
9th Cir. · 1971 · signal: see · confidence high
See * * * Carbo v. United States, 288 F.2d 282 (C.A. 9th Cir. 1961) * * Bitter v. United States, 389 U.S. 15, 16-17 , 88 S.Ct. 6, 7 , 19 L.Ed.2d 15 .
examined Cited "see" United States v. Martin Sternback (3×)
7th Cir. · 1969 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Bitter (7th Cir. 1967), 374 F.2d 744, 748 , rev’d on other points, 389 U.S. 15 , 88 S.Ct. 6 , 19 L.Ed. 2d 15 .
examined Cited "see, e.g." Commonwealth v. Hamborsky (3×)
pactcomplfayett · 2005 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also, Bitter v. United States, 389 U.S. 15, 16 , 88 S.Ct. 6 , 19 L.Ed.2d 15 (1967); Rehman v. California, 85 S.Ct. 8 , 13 L.Ed.2d 17 , 18-19 (1964) (Douglas, Cir. J.); Carbo v. United States, 82 S.Ct. 662 , 7 L.Ed.2d 769 , 774 (1962) (Douglas, Cir. J.); Fernandez v. United States, 81 S.Ct. 642 , 5 L.Ed.2d 683 , 686 (1961) (Harlan, Cir. J.).
examined Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Malia (3×)
usarmymilrev · 1976 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Bitter v. United States, 389 U.S. 15 , 88 S.Ct. 6 , 19 L.Ed.2d 15 (1967) and Russell v. United States, 131 U.S.App.D.C. 44 , 402 F.2d 185 (1968).
examined Cited "see, e.g." United States Ex Rel. Covington v. Coparo (3×)
S.D.N.Y. · 1969 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Bitter v. United States, 389 U.S. 15, 16 , 88 S.Ct. 6 , 19 L.Ed.2d 15 (1967); Rehman v. California, 85 S.Ct. 8 , 13 L.
examined Cited "see, e.g." United States ex rel. Covington v. Coparo (3×)
S.D.N.Y. · 1969 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Bitter v. United States, 389 U.S. 15, 16 , 88 S.Ct. 6 , 19 L.Ed.2d 15 (1967); Rehman v. California, 85 S.Ct. 8 , 13 L.Ed.2d 17 , 18-19 (1964) (Douglas, Cir. J.); Carbo v. United States, 82 S.Ct. 662 , 7 L.Ed.2d 769 , 774 (1962) (Douglas, Cir. J.); Fernandez v. United States, 81 S.Ct. 642 , 5 L.Ed.2d 683 , 686 (1961) (Harlan, Cir. J.). .
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Bitter
v.
United States
201.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Oct 16, 1967.
389 U.S. 15
1967 U.S. LEXIS 500
Ray T. McCann for petitioner., Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Vinson, Beatrice Rosenberg and Kirby W. Patterson for the United States.
Marshall.
Cited by 65 opinions  |  Published
Per Curiam.

Petitioner was tried on 18 counts of violating the mail fraud statute, 18 U. S. C. § 1341, and one count of using an assumed name, a violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1342. On the third day of trial, the Government rested its case. This was earlier than it had announced or than petitioner had anticipated. At recess time petitioner sought leave of the court to go to his office in order to gather additional evidence for the defense. Permission for this was granted. Forty-five minutes were allotted for the recess.

[*16] Petitioner, who had previously appeared promptly at every session of the trial, was this time tardy by 37 minutes in returning to court. Without warning, hearing, or explanation, the trial judge ordered petitioner into custody for the balance of the trial. Attempts by petitioner's counsel to offer explanations for petitioner’s lateness were to no avail.

Defense counsel was then advised that petitioner would be kept in custody in a county jail located some 18 miles from the court. In fact, petitioner was taken about 40 miles distant, to a different jail. Counsel’s endeavors throughout the trial to obtain petitioner’s release proved fruitless. Petitioner remained in custody for the duration of the trial. He was convicted on seven counts of mail fraud and given a sentence of one year and one day on each count, the sentences to run concurrently. He was also fined a total of $3,500.

Petitioner contended that his incarceration was unjustified and that it materially interfered with his right to counsel and severely impeded his defense. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction. 374 F. 2d 744 (1967). We grant certiorari and reverse.

A trial judge indisputably has broad powers to ensure the orderly and expeditious progress of a trial. For this purpose, he has the power to revoke bail and to remit the defendant to custody. But this power must be exercised with circumspection. It may be invoked only when and to the extent justified by danger which the defendant’s conduct presents or by danger of significant interference with the progress or order of the trial. * See Fernandez v. United States, 81 S. Ct. 642 (1961) (memo[*17] randum of Mr. Justice Harlan in chambers); Carbo v. United States, 288 F. 2d 282 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1961); Christoffel v. United States, 89 U. S. App. D. C. 341, 196 F. 2d 560 (1951).

The record in this case shows only a single, brief incident of tardiness, resulting in commitment of the defendant to custody for the balance of the trial in a jail 40 miles distant from the courtroom. In these circumstances, the trial judge’s order of commitment, made without hearing or statement of reasons, had the appearance and effect of punishment rather than of an order designed solely to facilitate the trial. Punishment may not be so inflicted. Cf. Rule 42 of Fed. Rules Grim. Proc. (governing the contempt power). We therefore hold that the order was unjustified and that it constituted an unwarranted burden upon defendant and his counsel in the conduct of the case.

Accordingly, we grant certiorari and reverse the judgment.

Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
*

It does not appear whether defendant was at large on bail at the time of the order remitting him to custody. But the same principle would apply if he had been at liberty on his own recognizance. Cf. Bail Reform Act of 1966, 18 U. S. C. § 3146 (1964 ed., Supp. II).