Brooks v. Florida, 389 U.S. 413 (1967). · Go Syfert
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Brooks v. Florida, 389 U.S. 413 (1967). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 1969 · …a shocking display of barbarism, ✓
cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 1972 · …some fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism ⚠ not in text
191 citation events (28 in the last 25 years) across 33 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: United States v. Braxton (ca4, 1997-06-03)
Treatment trajectory · 1968 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1968 1997 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 15 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Braxton
4th Cir. · 1997 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 403, 406-07 (1945) (statement obtained after forcing suspect to remain naked); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 441 (1961) (statement obtained after depriving suspect of adequate food, sleep, and contact with family); Brooks v. Florida, 389 U.S. 413, 414-15 (1967) (statement obtained after depriving suspect of food and keep- ing suspect naked in a small cell).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Elie
4th Cir. · 1997 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 403, 406-07 (1945) (statement obtained after forcing sus- pect to remain naked); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 441 (1961) (state- ment obtained after depriving suspect of adequate food, sleep, and contact with family); Brooks v. Florida, 389 U.S. 413, 414-15 (1967) (statement obtained after depriving suspect of food and keeping sus- pect naked in a small cell).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Martinez (2×)
Cal. · 1970 · confidence medium
In holding that the Adult Authority could properly consider the illegally obtained evidence in this case, we specifically note that we are not faced with a situation in which it has been alleged that the circumstances surrounding the interrogation are of a nature to render the confession “involuntary” or “coerced” (see, e.g., Brooks v. Florida (1967) 389 U.S. 413, 414-415 [ 19 L.Ed.2d 643, 645-646 , 88 S.Ct. 541 ]; Beecher v. Alabama (1967) 389 U.S. 35, 36-38 [ 19 L.Ed.2d 35, 37-38 , 88 S.Ct. 189 ]; Sims v. Georgia (1967) 389 U.S. 404, 406-407 [ 19 L.Ed.2d 634, 636-637 , 88 S.Ct. 523 ]…
discussed Cited "see" Oubre, Warden v. Woldemichael (2×)
Ga. · 2017 · signal: see · confidence high
See Brooks v. Florida, 389 U.S. 413, 415 ( 88 SCt 541 , 19 LE2d 643) (1967); OCGA § 24-8-824; former OCGA § 24-3-50.6 In determining whether a juvenile has given a statement voluntarily, a court considers nine factors set forth in Riley v. 6 The new Evidence Code carried forward former OCGA § 24-3-50, as the new OCGA § 24-8-824.
discussed Cited "see" Oubre v. Woldemichael (2×)
Ga. · 2017 · signal: see · confidence high
See Brooks v. Florida, 389 U.S. 413, 415 ( 88 SCt 541 , 19 LE2d 643) (1967); OCGA § 24-8-824; former OCGA § 24-3-50. 6 In determining whether a juvenile has given a statement voluntarily, a court considers nine factors set forth in Riley v. State, 237 Ga. 124 ( 226 SE2d 922 ) (1976): (1) the age of the accused; (2) the education of the accused; (3) the knowledge of the accused as to the substance of the charge and nature of his rights to consult with an attorney; (4) whether the accused was held incommunicado or allowed to consult with relatives or an attorney; (5) whether the accused was in…
examined Cited "see" United States v. Rivera (3×)
unknown court · 2015 · signal: see · confidence high
See Brooks v. Florida, 389 U.S. 413, 414-15 , 88 S.Ct. 541 , 19 L.Ed.2d 643 (1967) (defendant’s confession was deemed involuntary where the defendant was confined naked in a “windowless sweatbox” that had no furnishings or facilities except for a hole in the floor, and was fed only twelve ounces of thin soup and eight ounces of water each day for 35 days).
examined Cited "see" James William Stidham v. Harold R. Swenson, Warden (6×)
8th Cir. · 1971 · signal: see · confidence high
See, Brooks v. Florida, 389 U.S. 413 , 88 S.Ct. 541 , 19 L.Ed.2d 643 (1967); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 , 69 S.Ct. 1347 , 93 L.Ed. 1801 (1949); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 , 56 S.Ct. 461 , 80 L.Ed. 682 (1936).
examined Cited "see" People v. Sanchez (6×)
Cal. · 1969 · signal: see · confidence high
See Brooks v. Florida (1967) 389 U.S. 413, 414-415 [ 19 L.Ed.2d 643, 645-646 , 88 S.Ct. 541 ].) In the case at bench, defendant had received only a fifth or sixth grade education, with a record of failures and poor attendance, and had manifested difficulty with the English language.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Philpot v. State (2×)
Ga. · 2016 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also Brooks v. Florida, 389 U. S. 413, 415 ( 88 SCt 541 , 19 LE2d 643) (1967) (constitutional due process prohibits the prosecutorial use of an involuntary statement).
cited Cited "see, e.g." State v. BELONGA
N.H. · 2012 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Brooks v. Florida, 389 U.S. 413, 414-15 (1967); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 441 (1961).
examined Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Karake (3×)
D.D.C. · 2006 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Brooks v. Florida, 389 U.S. 413, 414-15 , 88 S.Ct. 541 , 19 L.Ed.2d 643 (1967) (confession was involuntary where the defendant was held in solitary for 14 days, “saw not one friendly face from outside the prison” and was “completely under the control and domination of his jailers”); Stidham v. Swenson, 506 F.2d 478 (8th Cir.1974) (in finding statement involuntary, court considered suspect’s imprisonment in solitary confinement for 18 months in subhuman conditions, including a bug-infested cell, lack of sufficient food, and denial of visits with family and friends); Arnett …
examined Cited "see, e.g." State v. Terrazas (6×)
Tex. Crim. App. · 1999 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See e.g., Brooks v. Florida, 389 U.S. 413 , 88 S.Ct. 541 , 19 L.Ed.2d 643 (1967) (keeping suspect naked in small cell without food and water); Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35 , 88 S.Ct. 189 , 19 L.Ed.2d 35 (1967) (holding gun to suspect’s head); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 , 83 S.Ct. 1336 , 10 L.Ed.2d 513 (1963) (slapping suspect); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 , 81 S.Ct. 1541 , 6 L.Ed.2d 948 (1961) (depriving suspect of food and sleep, moving suspect from place to place for interrogation by different people during extended, incommunicado detention); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 , 78 …
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board (2×)
SCOTUS · 1983 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e. g., Brooks v. Florida, 389 U. S. 413 (1967); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 285 (1964). [14] It should also go without saying that not every claim that a state court erred in making a unitary business finding will pose a substantial federal question in the first place. [15] ASARCO and F. W.
examined Cited "see, e.g." DeCastro v. State (3×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1978 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Brooks v. Florida, 389 U.S. 413 , 88 S.Ct. 541 , 19 L.Ed.2d 643 (1967); and Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 , 83 S.Ct. 917 , 9 L.Ed.2d 922 (1963).
examined Cited "see, e.g." People v. Summers (3×)
Mich. Ct. App. · 1968 · signal: see also · confidence low
See, also, Brooks v. Florida (1967), 389 US 413 ( 88 S Ct 541 , 19 L Ed 2d 643 ); Malinski v. New York (1945), 324 US 401 ( 65 S Ct 781 , 89 LEd 1029 ). 4 In Clewis v. Texas (1967), 386 US 707, 709 ( 87 S Ct 1338, 1339 , 18 L Ed 2d 423, 426 ), the United States Supreme Court declared: *351 “The trial of this ease was prior to the date of decision of Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 US 436 ( 86 S Ct 1602 , 16 L Ed 2d 694 , 10 ALR3d 974) the requirements of whieh, therefore, are not directly applicable, Johnson v. New Jersey (1966), 384 US 719 ( 86 S Ct 1772 , 16 L Ed 2d 882 ), although [such re…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Brooks
v.
Florida
14 M.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Dec 18, 1967.
389 U.S. 413
1967 U.S. LEXIS 4
Earl Faircloth, Attorney General of Florida, and Wallace E. Allbritton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
Black.
Cited by 64 opinions  |  Published
Per Curiam.

Petitioner, Bennie Brooks, was convicted of participating in a riot in the Florida prison where he was an inmate and was sentenced to a term of nine years and eight months to run consecutively with the sentence he was already serving. His conviction was affirmed without opinion by the Florida District Court of Appeal, First District, and his petition for writ of certiorari filed in the Florida Supreme Court was dismissed, also without opinión.

The disturbance in the prison occurred on May 27, 1965. The same day Brooks was ordered confined in a punishment cell for 35 days with two other prisoners also accused of the rioting. Brooks says the cell was 7 feet long and 6% feet wide; a witness for the State testified it was 6 feet longer. This minor difference aside, the parties agree that the punishment cell had no external window, that it contained no bed or other furnishings or facilities except a hole flush with the floor which served as a commode, and that during the first 14 days[*414] he lived in this cell Brooks’ only contact with the outside was an unspecified number of interviews with the prison’s investigating officer. It is also agreed that while so confined Brooks was fed a “restricted diet” consisting, according to the testimony of the investigating officer, of “peas and carrots in a soup form” three times daily. Brooks’ more detailed description of this concoction— “they fed us four ounces of soup three times a day and eight ounces of water” — was not controverted, nor was his testimony that he was stripped naked before being thrown into the cell. On the 15th day of confinement under these conditions, Brooks was taken from the punishment cell and again brought directly to the investigating officer. This time, shortly after questioning began, Brooks confessed and dictated his statement into a tape recorder. The recording was introduced at trial. Brooks says that he was brutally beaten by one officer while the other was taking his statement. However, we do not consider this claim because the officer denied it and the judge disbelieved Brooks’ testimony. The judge also concluded that the confession was voluntary. We disagree.

Putting to one side quibbles over the dimensions of the windowless sweatbox into which Brooks was thrown naked with two other men, we cannot accept his statement as the voluntary expression of an uncoerced will. For two weeks this man’s home was a barren cage fitted only with a hole in one corner into which he and his cell mates could defecate. For two weeks he subsisted on a daily fare of 12 ounces of thin soup and eight ounces of water. For two full weeks he saw not one friendly face from outside the prison, but was completely under the control and domination of his jailers. These stark facts belie any contention that the confession extracted from him within minutes after he was brought from the cell was not tainted by the 14 days he spent in such an[*415] oppressive hole. In a long line of cases beginning with Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 (1936), and reaffirmed last Term in Clewis v. Texas, 386 U. S. 707 (1967), we have held that the Constitution does not permit prosecu-torial use of an involuntary confession. We have also asserted repeatedly that, in adjudicating the question of voluntariness, “we cannot escape the responsibility of making our own examination of the record.” Spano v. New York, 360 U. S. 315, 316 (1959). See Haynes v. Washington, 373 U. S. 503, 515 (1963); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227, 228-229 (1940). The record in this case documents a shocking display of barbarism which should not escape the remedial action of this Court. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment below. *

The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment of the Florida District Court of Appeal, First District, must be and hereby is

Reversed.

Mr. Justice Black concurs in the result.
*

Because we hold that the use at trial of the involuntary confession requires reversal of petitioner’s conviction, we find it unnecessary to reach other issues raised by him. Thus, we express no views on petitioner’s contentions that (1) he was denied a fair trial because the residents of the rural county where venue was set were hostile toward inmates of the prison and (2) he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because his appointed attorney was forced to trial without an opportunity to prepare to represent petitioner and the 12 codefendants tried with him.