MEMORANDUM OPINION No. 04-24-00691-CR

Josue Sanchez CACERES, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee

From the 63rd Judicial District Court, Kinney County, Texas Trial Court No. 3316CR Honorable Roland Andrade, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: H. Todd McCray, Justice

Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice H. Todd McCray, Justice

Delivered and Filed: May 27, 2026

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED

Appellant, Josue Sanchez Caceres, appeals his conviction for five counts of smuggling of persons with intent to flee from a peace officer or special investigator under Texas Penal Code section 20.05(a)(1)(B) 1. Following a jury trial, Caceres was convicted and sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment. In his first and second issues on appeal, Caceres argues section 20.05(a)(1)(B) is 04-24-00691-CR

Texas Penal Code section 38.04(a). See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 20.05(a)(1)(B), 38.04(a). The jury convicted Caceres on the five smuggling counts but acquitted him of evading arrest with a motor vehicle. After conviction, Caceres filed a motion for new trial. The motion was denied by operation of law and Caceres timely appealed.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We review Caceres’s constitutional challenges de novo. See Tex. Mut. Ins. Co. v. PHI Air Med., LLC, 610 S.W.3d 839, 846 (Tex. 2020) (“Preemption is a question of law reviewed de novo.”);

State v. Flores, 679 S.W.3d 232, 243 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2023, pet. ref’d) (holding the same).

AS-APPLIED PREEMPTION

Caceres argues that, as applied to his prosecution, section 20.05(a)(1)(B) is field preempted by federal law because there is a “clear and manifest purpose of Congress” to preclude the states from regulating in the field of transporting non-citizens. Caceres further argues the statute is

conflict preempted as applied to his prosecution because section 20.05(a) “reduced the amount of proof required to secure a conviction under federal law, subjected [Caceres] to harsher punishment, and frustrated the aims of the federal regulatory scheme.”

A. Applicable Law

This court analyzed a similar as-applied field and conflict preemption challenge to section

20.05(a)(1)(A) in Roberts v. State, No. 04-24-00485-CR, 2026 WL 290378, at *5–9 (Tex. App.—

San Antonio Feb. 4, 2026, pet. filed). As such, while we will address the facts specific to Caceres’s case for his as-applied challenge to section 20.05(a)(1)(B), the legal principles discussed in Roberts guide our analysis here.

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B. Analysis

Section 20.05(a)(1)(B) provides: “(a) A person commits an offense if the person knowingly:

(1) uses a motor vehicle, aircraft, watercraft, or other means of conveyance to transport an individual with the intent to: (B) flee from a person the actor knows is a peace officer or special investigator attempting to lawfully arrest or detain the actor[.]” TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. §

20.05(a)(1)(B). In Roberts we explained that “unlike the instances where courts have found state statutes to be field preempted, section 20.05(a)(1)(A) does not require prosecutors to prove a noncitizen’s illegal presence in the United States.” Id. at *7. Similarly, section 20.05(a)(1)(B) does not require that the State prove a noncitizen’s illegal presence in the United States; it requires that the State prove the defendant transported an individual with the intent to flee from law enforcement.

Here, Caceres’s conviction did not turn on immigration status. In fact, the record is absent

of any evidence that establishes the passengers’ identity or legal status in the United States, and the evidence presented at trial focused on Caceres’s intent to flee from Trooper Seymore.

Therefore, because Caceres was prosecuted under a neutral statute, and his conduct was criminal regardless of the passengers’ immigration status, we hold that Caceres’s prosecution was not as-

applied field preempted. See id. at *8; Kansas v. Garcia, 589 U.S. 191, 208–09 (2020); State v. Flores, 679 S.W.3d 232, 245 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2023, pet. ref’d); see also Gutierrez v. State, 721 S.W.3d 639, 655 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2025, pet. ref’d) (holding section 20.05(a)(1)(A) was not as-applied field preempted where the evidence showed Appellant

“was not convicted merely because of the citizenship status of the back seat passengers, but because she intended to conceal those individuals from law enforcement”).

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As to Caceres’s second point of error, as we stated in Roberts, “[w]ith an as-applied conflict preemption challenge, the application of the law must conflict with federal law’s comprehensive immigration scheme or with the federal government’s discretion over immigration-related prosecutions.” 2026 WL 290378, at *9. As in Roberts, the evidence presented at Caceres’s trial does not show that his prosecution interfered with federal law or federal discretion over immigration-related prosecutions. Id. Despite Caceres’s argument that this prosecution frustrated the aims of the federal regulatory scheme, nothing in the record suggests that federal prosecutors wanted to pursue federal charges against Caceres. Because nothing in the trial record suggests any state conduct that conflicts with federal immigration objectives, we hold that Caceres’s prosecution under section 20.05(a)(1)(B) was not as-applied conflict preempted. See Kansas, 589 U.S. at 211

(“[T]he mere fact that state laws like the Kansas provisions at issue overlap to some degree with federal criminal provisions does not even begin to make a case for conflict preemption.”).

Caceres further argues that the logically inconsistent verdicts reached in this case “confirm that

Mr. Caceres was impermissibly prosecuted for smuggling noncitizens.” However, even if we

assume the verdicts were inconsistent, the jury’s non-guilty verdict for evading arrest with a motor vehicle could have resulted through mistake, compromise, or lenity, and, consequently, the non- guilty verdict does not “confirm” an impermissible prosecution. See United States v. Powell, 469

U.S. 57, 65 (1984) (“It is equally possible that the jury, convinced of guilt, properly reached its conclusion on the compound offense, and then through mistake, compromise, or lenity arrived at an inconsistent conclusion on the lesser offense.”).

In sum, we overrule Caceres’s first and second issues.

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CLERICAL ERROR IN THE WRITTEN JUDGMENT

The trial court’s judgment identified the “Statute for Offense” as “Sec. 20.05(b)(1)(E)

Penal Code.” Caceres, however, was charged and convicted under Texas Penal Code section

20.05(a)(1)(B). We have the authority to modify incorrect judgments when the necessary information is available. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b); Minor v. State, No. 07-23-00397-CR, 2025

WL 211324, at *4 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Jan. 15, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Accordingly, we modify the judgment of conviction to state that the “Statute for Offense” is “20.05(a)(1)(B) Penal Code.”

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court as modified.

H. Todd McCray, Justice

DO NOT PUBLISH