Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64 (1975). · Go Syfert
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Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64 (1975). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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The Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial is engaged by a formal indictment or the actual restraints imposed by an arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge.

After a defendant was arrested and held for twenty-two months before being indicted, he moved to dismiss the indictment for violation of the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. The court considered whether the period between arrest and indictment must be counted when assessing a speedy trial claim. The Court holds that the protections of the Sixth Amendment are engaged by either a formal indictment or information, or by the actual restraints imposed by an arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge. Consequently, the invocation of the speedy trial provision need not await a formal charge.

950 citation events (231 in the last 25 years) across 87 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: State v. Dale Lee Gillliland, No. 05-16-00547-CR (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 1, 2017) · Strongest negative: People v. Staley, 41 N.Y. 789 (1977)
Treatment trajectory · 1976 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1976 2001 2026
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Cited for
At page 65 Triggering speedy trial rights upon arrest or indictment44 citing casesmeasuring delay for Sixth Amendment claim from time of arrest and noting that “[i]nvocation of the speedy trial provision . . . need not await indictment, information, or other formal charge5 citing courts put it this way · also cited as 46 L. Ed. 2d at 207 · 40 listed here
  • State v. Dale Lee Gillliland, No. 05-16-00547-CR (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 1, 2017).unpublished
    (invocation of the speedy trial provision . . . need not await indictment, information or other formal charge)
  • United States v. Morales, 501 F. Supp. 2d 848 (W.D. Tex. 2007).published 3 cites
    “it is either a formal indictment or information or else the actual restraints imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge that engage the particular protections of the speedy trial provision of the sixth a…”
  • United States v. Gaffney, No. 2025-0282 (D.D.C. Nov. 7, 2025).published 4 cites
    Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64, 65 (1975).
  • Tiffany Ann Fleming v. State of Texas, No. 03-24-00011-CR (Tex. App.—Austin May 8, 2025).unpublished
    Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 283-84 (“[I]nvocation of the speedy trial provision . . . need not await indictment, information, or other formal charge.”) (quoting Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64, 65 (1975).
  • Williams v. Mills, No. 1:21-cv-00109 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 30, 2024).
    U.S. v. Duran-Gomez, 984 F.3d 366 , 374 n.6 (5th Cir. 2020). whichever occurs first.” Robinson v. Whitley, 2 F.3d 562, 568 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64, 65 (1975)).
  • Christopher Chairez v. State of Texas, No. 05-22-00986-CR (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 6, 2023).published
    Appellant argues, however, that he asserted his speedy trial rights “promptly after he was indicted.” But “invocation of the speedy trial provision . . . need not await indictment, information, or other formal charge.” Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at…
  • People v. Buchanan, 85 Cal. App. 5th 186 (Cal. Ct. App. 2022).published 3 cites
    (Martinez, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 762 , quoting Dillingham v. United States (1975) 423 U.S. 64, 65 (Dillingham).) “Arrest is a public act that may seriously interfere with the defendant’s liberty, whether he is free on bail or not, and th…
  • Brett A. Smith v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 636 S.W.3d 421 (Ky. 2021).published
    The length of the delay “is the time between the earlier of the arrest or the indictment and the time the trial begins.” Dunaway, 60 S.W.3d at 569 (citing Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64, 65 (1975)).
  • Russell v. Denmark, 528 F. Supp. 3d 482 (S.D. Miss. 2021).published
    Whether that portion of the Sixth Amendment was violated will be discussed following the discussion of the speedy trial claim. 16 A defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial “attaches at the time of arrest or indictment, whicheve…
  • Roy Eugene Ussery v. State, 596 S.W.3d 277 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019).published
    (holding that “invocation of the speedy trial provision . . . need not await indictment, information, or other formal charge)
Show 30 more citing cases
  • United States v. Black, No. 18-496-cr (L) (2d Cir. Mar. 18, 2019).published 2 cites
    Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64, 65 (1975).
  • State of Missouri v. Ray James Juniel, 568 S.W.3d 504 (Mo. Ct. App. 2019).published
    "The federal and Missouri constitutions 'provide equivalent protection for a defendant's right to a speedy trial.'" Id. (quoting Taylor, 298 S.W.3d at 504 ). "[T]he protections of the speedy trial provisions attach when there is a 'formal…
  • Steven Parr v. State, No. 06-18-00086-CR (Tex. App.—Texarkana Feb. 8, 2019).unpublished
    Before the hearing, on 5 In Cantu, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that “invocation of the speedy trial provision . . . need not await indictment, information, or other formal charge.” Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 284 (quoting Dillinham v…
  • Sharon Denise Jackson v. State, No. 05-14-00283-CR (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 1, 2015).unpublished
    However, “invocation of the speedy trial provision . . . need not await indictment, information, or other formal charge.” Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 284 (quoting Dillingham v. United –6– States, 423 U.S. 64, 65 (1975)).
  • United States v. Jackie Richardson, 780 F.3d 812 (7th Cir. 2015).published
    See, e.g., United States v. Loud Hawk, supra, 474 U.S. at 310 (“when no indictment is outstanding, only the ‘actual re- No. 14-1901 3 straints imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge ... engage the particular protections…
  • Alfonso Carlos Tamez v. State, No. 04-14-00717-CR (Tex. App.—San Antonio Mar. 9, 2015).published 2 cites
    App. 1994) .................. 73 De la Fuente v. State, 432 S.W.3d 415, 423 (Tex. App. San Antonio 2014) ..................................................................................................... 58, 59, 62 Dillingham v. U.S., 4…
  • State v. Rogelio Trigo Jr., No. 13-11-00474-CR (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi July 5, 2012).unpublished
    Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64, 65 (1975).
  • People v. Williams, 207 Cal. App. Supp. 4th 1 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 2012).published
    In Dillingham v. United States (1975) 423 U.S. 64, 65 [ 46 L.Ed.2d 205 , 96 S.Ct. 303 ] (Dillingham), the court held that a defendant who had been arrested on a felony and released on bail became an “accused” because the government had com…
  • Alaine Denise Vorheier v. State, No. 13-09-00169-CR (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Aug. 19, 2010).published 2 cites
    “invocation of the speedy trial provision . . . need not await indictment, information, or other formal charge”
  • Marcus Anthony Lopez v. State, No. 13-07-00342-CR (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi July 2, 2009).published
    The United State's Supreme Court has held that "invocation of the speedy trial provision . . . need not await indictment, information, or other formal charge." <EM>Dillingham v. United State</EM>s, 423 U.S. 64, 65 (1975). <P><A NAME="N_27_…
  • Cantu v. State, 253 S.W.3d 273 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).published 2 cites
    This factor favors Empak.”). 48 Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64, 65 (1975).
  • People v. Horning, 102 P.3d 228 (Cal. 2004).published
    The letter did not cause the government to “arrest[] Mm and thereby commence[] its prosecution of Mm.” (Dillingham v. United States *892 (1975) 423 U.S. 64, 65 [ 46 L.Ed.2d 205 , 96 S.Ct. 303 ].) Accordingly, the federal protection attache…
  • State v. Austin, 643 A.2d 798 (R.I. 1994).published
    (clarifying United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 , 92 S.Ct. 455 , 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971))
  • State v. Borges, 467 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985).published
    Arrest itself constitutes a form of official accusation, United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 6 , 102 S.Ct. 1497, 1501 , 71 L.Ed.2d 696, 702 (1982); Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64, 65 , 96 S.Ct. 303, 303 , 46 L.Ed.2d 205, 207…
  • State v. Quinlan, 440 A.2d 13 (N.H. 1982).published
    Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64, 65 (1975).
  • State v. Hight, 274 S.E.2d 638 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980).published
    At the time of arrest, a suspect becomes an “accused” (Dillingham v. United States, 423 U. S. 64, 65 (96 SC 303, 46 LE2d 205)) and the right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment begins running.
  • State v. Roddy, 401 A.2d 23 (R.I. 1979).published
    Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64, 65 , 96 S.Ct. 303, 303-04 , 46 L.Ed.2d 205, 207 (1975).
  • United States v. Ferguson, 460 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Tenn. 1977).published
    Dillingham v. United States (1975), 423 U.S. 64, 64-65 , 96 S.Ct. 303 , 46 L.Ed.2d 205, 207 [3]; United States v. Marion (1971), 404 U.S. 307, 319 , 92 S.Ct. 455 , 30 L.Ed.2d 468, 478 [5]; United States v. Martin, C.A. 6th (1976), 543 F.2d…
  • State v. Cichetto, 365 A.2d 207 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).published
    Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64 , 96 S.Ct. 303 , 46 L.Ed. 2d 205, 207 (1975).
  • State v. Szima, 358 A.2d 773 (N.J. 1976).published 7 cites
    Ed. 2d 183, 185 (1973); Dillingham v. United States, supra, 423 U. S. at 64, 96 S. Ct. at 303, 46 L.
  • Raymond Daniels v. State, No. 04-18-00474-CR, 2019 WL 1139553 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Mar. 13, 2019).unpublished
    See Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64, 65 (1975); Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 284 .
  • State v. Thaxton, 715 S.E.2d 480 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011).published
    See Haisman, supra, 242 Ga. at 898 (2) (citing Dillingham v. United States, 423 U. S. 64, 65 (96 SC 303, 46 LE2d 205) (1975) and United States v. Marion, 404 U. S. 307, 320-325 (III) (92 SC 455, 30 LE2d 468) (1971)).
  • United States v. Brown, 498 F.3d 523 (6th Cir. 2007).published 4 cites
    (measuring delay for Sixth Amendment claim from time of arrest and noting that “[i]nvocation of the speedy trial provision . . . need not await indictment, information, or other formal charge)
  • Richard Lynn Wright v. Gary W. Deland, 986 F.2d 1432 (10th Cir. 1993).published
  • State v. Smith, 358 A.2d 782 (N.J. 1976).published
  • State v. Tarvis, 465 A.2d 164 (R.I. 1983).published
  • Kodell Valentino Foster v. State, No. 13-18-00051-CR, 2018 WL 6626728 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Dec. 19, 2018).unpublished
  • Corles Andre Giles v. State, No. 13-17-00238-CR (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Mar. 14, 2019).unpublished
  • David Stiles, Jr. v. State, 596 S.W.3d 361 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019).published
  • State v. Endres, 100 P.3d 784 (Or. Ct. App. 2004).published
At page 64 Determining when speedy trial right attaches9 citing cases“the question whether in assessing a denial of speedy trial claim, there was to be counted a delay between the end of the criminal scheme charged and the indictment of a suspect not arrested or otherwise charged previous to the indictment.”1 citing court quotes it
  • Vaughan v. Jordan, No. 2:18-cv-00203 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 22, 2019).
    Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64, 64-65 (1975).
  • State v. Azbell, 112 Ohio St. 3d 300 (2006).published
    “count[ing] a delay between the end of the criminal scheme charged and the indictment of a suspect not arrested or otherwise charged previous to the indictment”
  • Gerard Dewayne Allen v. State, No. 14-05-00223-CR (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 9, 2006).unpublished
    Dillingham v. United States , 423 U.S. 64, 64-65 (1975).
  • United States v. Mala, 7 F.3d 1058 (1st Cir. 1993).published
    See ___ United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1981); Dillingham v. _____________ _________ __________ United States, 423 U.S. 64, 64-65 (1975) (per curiam).
  • Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992).published 2 cites
    See Marion, supra, at 313-315, 320-322 ; Dillingham v. United States, 423 U. S. 64, 64-65 (1975) (per curiam) .
  • State v. Szima, 358 A.2d 773 (N.J. 1976).published 7 cites
    Ed. 2d 183, 185 (1973); Dillingham v. United States, supra, 423 U. S. at 64, 96 S. Ct. at 303, 46 L.
  • Belcher (Kevin) v. State, No. 82255 (Nev. Apr. 27, 2022).published 3 cites
    (holding that a speedy-trial right attaches upon a finding of probable cause regarding the instant charges)
  • State v. Lataben K. Patel, No. 05-13-01177-CR (Tex. App.—Dallas July 7, 2014).unpublished
    (speedy trial clock begins to run when defendant becomes accused by arrest or formal charge)
  • State v. McCoy, 277 S.E.2d 515 (N.C. 1981).published
96 S. Ct. at 303 Defining conditions constituting serious interference with liberty2 citing cases
  • State v. Szima, 358 A.2d 773 (N.J. 1976).published 7 cites
    Ed. 2d 183, 185 (1973); Dillingham v. United States, supra, 423 U. S. at 64, 96 S. Ct. at 303, 46 L.
  • State v. Ariegwe, 2007 MT 204, 167 P.3d 815.published
Other citing cases5 with no pin cite or quoted language on record
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Dillingham
v.
United States
74-6738.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Dec 1, 1975.
Published opinion
423 U.S. 64
1975 U.S. LEXIS 97
Per Curiam.
Cited by 321 opinions  |  Published
1 passages pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 85%
Citer courts: W.D. Texas (3)
Per Curiam.

An interval of 22 months elapsed between petitioner’s arrest and indictment, and a further period of 12 months between his indictment and trial, upon charges of automobile theft in violation of 18 U. S. C. §§ 371, 2312, and 2313. The District Court for the Northern District of Georgia denied petitioner’s motions — made immediately after arraignment and posttrial — to dismiss the indictment on the ground that petitioner had been denied a speedy trial in violation of the Sixth Amendment. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that under United States v. Marion, 404 U. S. 307 (1971), the 22-month “pre-indictment delay ... is not to be counted for the purposes of a Sixth Amendment motion absent a showing of actual prejudice.” 502 F. 2d 1233, 1235 (1974). This reading of Marion was incorrect. Marion presented the question whether in assessing a denial of speedy trial claim, there was to be counted a delay between the end of the criminal scheme charged and the indictment of a suspect not arrested or otherwise charged previous to the indictment. The Court held: “On its face, the protection of the [Sixth] Amendment is activated only when a criminal prosecution has begun and extends only to those persons[*65] who have been ‘accused’ in the course of that prosecution. These provisions would seem to afford no protection to those not yet accused, nor would they seem to require the Government to discover, investigate, and accuse any person within any particular period of time.” 404 U. S., at 313. In contrast, the Government constituted petitioner an “accused” when it arrested him and thereby commenced its prosecution of him. Marion made this clear, id., at 320-321, where the Court stated:

“To legally arrest and detain, the Government must assert probable cause to believe the arrestee has committed a crime. Arrest is a public act that may seriously interfere with the defendant’s liberty, whether he is free on bail or not, and that may disrupt his employment, drain his financial resources, curtail his associations, subject him to public obloquy, ánd create anxiety in him, his family and his friends. These considerations were substantial underpinnings for the decision in Klopfer v. North Carolina, [386 U. S. 213 (1967)]; see also Smith v. Hooey, 393 U. S. 374, 377-378 (1969). So viewed, it is readily understandable that it is either a formal indictment or information or else the actual restraints imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge that engage the particular protections of the speedy trial provision of the Sixth Amendment.
“Invocation of the speedy trial provision thus need not await indictment, information, or other formal charge.”

See also Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514, 519-520, 532-533 (1972). *

[*66] Petitioner’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for certiorari are granted. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

The Chief Justice dissents.
*

The Memorandum for the United States in Opposition, p. 4, states that “Marion appears to leave little doubt . . . that [the[*66] Court] believed that the policies that inform the right to a speedy trial reach beyond the indictment stage of criminal proceedings and that the right consequently attaches either at the point at which a person is arrested and held to answer on .a criminal charge or when he is formally charged by indictment or information, whichever occurs earlier Accord, United States v. Macino, 486 F. 2d 750 (CA7 1973); United States v. Cabral, 475 F. 2d 715 (CA1 1973); Edmaiston v. Neil, 452 F. 2d 494 (CA6 1971).