green
Positive treatment
Doctrinal family: Barker v. Wingo ↗
Issue: speedy trial claimMS ↗
Issue: speedy trial claimDC ↗
Issue: dual standardKY ↗
Issue: speedy trial claimAL ↗
Quoted verbatim 2×
33.8 score
G Cite
cited 5× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 2007 · 2 courts ·
…it is either a formal indictment or information or else the actual restraints imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge that engage the particular protections of the speedy trial provision of the sixth amendment.
✓
cited 4× by 4 distinct cases, 2006–2019 · 3 courts ·
…invocation of the speedy trial provision thus need not await indictment, information, or other formal charge.
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Treatment trajectory · 1976 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1976
2001
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited "but see"
People v. Staley
Scardino v United States, 425 US 960 ; United States v Ferrara, 458 F2d 868, 875, cert den 408 US 931 ; but see Dillingham v United States, 423 US 64, 64-65 , supra.) Society, as well as the defendant, has an important interest in assuring prompt prosecution of those suspected of criminal activity (People v Johnson, 38 NY2d 271, 276 ).
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
State v. Dale Lee Gillliland
invocation of the speedy trial provision . . . need not await indictment, information or other formal charge
examined
Cited as authority (quoted)
United States v. Morales
(3×)
it is either a formal indictment or information or else the actual restraints imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge that engage the particular protections of the speedy trial provision of the sixth amendment.
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Gaffney
(4×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64, 65 (1975).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Tiffany Ann Fleming v. the State of Texas
Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 283-84 (“[I]nvocation of the speedy trial provision . . . need not await indictment, information, or other formal charge.”) (quoting Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64, 65 (1975).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Williams v. Mills
U.S. v. Duran-Gomez, 984 F.3d 366 , 374 n.6 (5th Cir. 2020). whichever occurs first.” Robinson v. Whitley, 2 F.3d 562, 568 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64, 65 (1975)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Christopher Chairez v. the State of Texas
Appellant argues, however, that he asserted his speedy trial rights “promptly after he was indicted.” But “invocation of the speedy trial provision . . . need not await indictment, information, or other formal charge.” Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 283–84 (quoting Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64, 65 (1975) (per curiam)).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
People v. Buchanan
(3×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
(Martinez, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 762 , quoting Dillingham v. United States (1975) 423 U.S. 64, 65 (Dillingham).) “Arrest is a public act that may seriously interfere with the defendant’s liberty, whether he is free on bail or not, and that may disrupt his employment, drain his financial resources, curtail his associations, subject him to public obloquy, and create anxiety in him, his family and his friends . . . .” (Marion, supra, 404 U.S. at p. 320 .) As our Supreme Court has explained, however, an “arrest” does not render a person an “accused” under the Sixth Amendment indefi…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Brett A. Smith v. Commonwealth of Kentucky
The length of the delay “is the time between the earlier of the arrest or the indictment and the time the trial begins.” Dunaway, 60 S.W.3d at 569 (citing Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64, 65 (1975)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Russell v. Denmark
Whether that portion of the Sixth Amendment was violated will be discussed following the discussion of the speedy trial claim. 16 A defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial “at- taches at the time of arrest or indictment, whichever comes first.” Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64, 65 (1975).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Roy Eugene Ussery v. State
See id. (“Although one cannot file a motion for a speedy trial until formal charges are made, the right to one can be asserted in other ways.”); State v. Flores, 951 S.W.2d 134, 142 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1997, no pet.) (“In this case, Flores and his sister inquired about his case several times,” in the time leading up to Flores’s indictment, including making phone calls to district attorney’s office, and their actions “indicate that Flores was interested in a speedy resolution of his case, if in fact charges were going to be brought against him”); cf. Dillingham v. United…
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Vaughan v. Jordan
Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64, 64-65 (1975).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Black
(2×)
Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64, 65 (1975).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Missouri v. Ray James Juniel
"The federal and Missouri constitutions 'provide equivalent protection for a defendant's right to a speedy trial.'" Id. (quoting Taylor, 298 S.W.3d at 504 ). "[T]he protections of the speedy trial provisions attach when there is a 'formal indictment or information' or when 'actual restraints [are] imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge.'" State ex. rel Garcia v. Goldman, 316 S.W.3d 907, 911 (Mo. banc 2010) (quoting Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64, 65 (1975) (other citation omitted)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Steven Parr v. State
Before the hearing, on 5 In Cantu, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that “invocation of the speedy trial provision . . . need not await indictment, information, or other formal charge.” Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 284 (quoting Dillinham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64, 65 (1975)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Sharon Denise Jackson v. State
However, “invocation of the speedy trial provision . . . need not await indictment, information, or other formal charge.” Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 284 (quoting Dillingham v. United –6– States, 423 U.S. 64, 65 (1975)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Jackie Richardson
See, e.g., United States v. Loud Hawk, supra, 474 U.S. at 310 (“when no indictment is outstanding, only the ‘actual re- No. 14-1901 3 straints imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge ... engage the particular protections of the speedy tri- al provision of the Sixth Amendment,’” quoting United States v. Marion, supra, 404 U.S. at 320 ); Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64, 65 (1975) (per curiam).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Alfonso Carlos Tamez v. State
(2×)
App. 1994) .................. 73 De la Fuente v. State, 432 S.W.3d 415, 423 (Tex. App. San Antonio 2014) ..................................................................................................... 58, 59, 62 Dillingham v. U.S., 423 U.S. 64, 65 (1975)................................................ 49 Dorsey v. State, 24 S.W.3d 921, 924 (Tex. App—Beaumont 2000, pet. ref'd)................................................................................................... 56, 59 Dragoo v. State, 96 S.W.3d 308, 313 (Tex. Crim.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Rogelio Trigo Jr.
Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64, 65 (1975).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
People v. Williams
In Dillingham v. United States (1975) 423 U.S. 64, 65 [ 46 L.Ed.2d 205 , 96 S.Ct. 303 ] (Dillingham), the court held that a defendant who had been arrested on a felony and released on bail became an “accused” because the government had commenced its prosecution of him.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Alaine Denise Vorheier v. State
The United States Supreme Court has held that "invocation of the speedy trial provision . . . need not await indictment, information, or other formal charge." Dillingham v. United State s, 423 U.S. 64, 65 (1975). 10.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Alaine Denise Vorheier v. State
The United States Suprem e Court has held that “invocation of the speedy trial provision . . . need not await indictm ent, inform ation, or other form al charge.” Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64, 65 (1975). 10 In Palmer, the Fifth Circuit noted that because the defendant “first asserted his right thirty m onths after his arrest, which was one m onth after he first received notification of his indictm ent, and he com plained at that tim e only of the 22-m onth pre-indictm ent delay,” his “silence during the entire pre-indictm ent period 19 d.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Marcus Anthony Lopez v. State
The United State’s Suprem e Court has held that “invocation of the speedy trial provision . . . need not await indictm ent, inform ation, or other form al charge.” Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64, 65 (1975). 27 In Palmer, the court noted that because the defendant “first asserted his right thirty m onths after his arrest, which was one m onth after he first received notification of his indictm ent, and he com plained at that tim e only of the 22-m onth pre-indictm ent delay,” his “silence during the entire pre-indictm ent period works 38 d.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Marcus Anthony Lopez v. State
The United State's Supreme Court has held that "invocation of the speedy trial provision . . . need not await indictment, information, or other formal charge." <EM>Dillingham v. United State</EM>s, 423 U.S. 64, 65 (1975). <P><A NAME="N_27_">27. </A>In <EM>Palmer</EM>, the court noted that because the defendant "first asserted his right thirty months after his arrest, which was one month after he first received notification of his indictment, and he complained at that time only of the 22-month pre-indictment delay," his "silence during the entire pre-indictment period works against him because …
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Cantu, Alberto
This factor favors Empak.”). 48 Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64, 65 (1975).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Cantu, Alberto
Dillingham v. United States , 423 U.S. 64, 65 (1975). 49.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Azbell
The court held that United States v. Marion (1971), 404 U.S. 307 , 92 S.Ct. 455 , 30 L.Ed.2d 468 , which had denied Sixth Amendment protections to preindictment delays, had been limited to “count[ing] a delay between the end of the criminal scheme charged and the indictment of a suspect not arrested or otherwise charged previous to the indictment.” Dillingham at 64, 96 S.Ct. 303 , 46 L.Ed.2d 205 .
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Gerard Dewayne Allen v. State
Dillingham v. United States , 423 U.S. 64, 64-65 (1975).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
People v. Horning
The letter did not cause the government to “arrest[] Mm and thereby commence[] its prosecution of Mm.” (Dillingham v. United States *892 (1975) 423 U.S. 64, 65 [ 46 L.Ed.2d 205 , 96 S.Ct. 303 ].) Accordingly, the federal protection attached only when he was actually restrained on these charges in May 1993.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Austin
Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64, 64-65 , 96 S.Ct. 303, 303 , 46 L.Ed.2d 205, 207 (1975) (clarifying United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 , 92 S.Ct. 455 , 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971)); see also State v. Crescenzo, 118 R.I. 662, 669 , 375 A.2d 933, 937 (1977).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Mala
See ___ United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1981); Dillingham v. _____________ _________ __________ United States, 423 U.S. 64, 64-65 (1975) (per curiam).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Doggett v. United States
(2×)
See Marion, supra, at 313-315, 320-322 ; Dillingham v. United States, 423 U. S. 64, 64-65 (1975) (per curiam).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Borges
Arrest itself constitutes a form of official accusation, United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 6 , 102 S.Ct. 1497, 1501 , 71 L.Ed.2d 696, 702 (1982); Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64, 65 , 96 S.Ct. 303, 303 , 46 L.Ed.2d 205, 207 (1975), and appellees presumably were promptly arrested as soon as probable cause arose to link them with the alleged offenses.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Gee
See United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 6-8 , 102 S.Ct. 1497, 1501-02 , 71 L.Ed.2d 696 (1982); United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 788-792 , 97 S.Ct. 2044, 2048-50 , 52 L.Ed.2d 752 , reh. den., 434 U.S. 881 , 98 S.Ct. 242 , 54 L.Ed.2d 164 (1977); Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64, 64-65 , 96 S.Ct. 303, 303 , 46 L.Ed.2d 205 *569 (1975); Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25, 26-27 , 94 S.Ct. 188, 189-90 , 38 L.Ed.2d 183 (1973); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689-690 , 92 S.Ct. 1877, 1882 , 32 L.Ed.2d 411 (1972).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Quinlan
Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64, 65 (1975).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Hight
At the time of arrest, a suspect becomes an “accused” (Dillingham v. United States, 423 U. S. 64, 65 (96 SC 303, 46 LE2d 205)) and the right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment begins running.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Roddy
Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64, 65 , 96 S.Ct. 303, 303-04 , 46 L.Ed.2d 205, 207 (1975).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Ferguson
Dillingham v. United States (1975), 423 U.S. 64, 64-65 , 96 S.Ct. 303 , 46 L.Ed.2d 205, 207 [3]; United States v. Marion (1971), 404 U.S. 307, 319 , 92 S.Ct. 455 , 30 L.Ed.2d 468, 478 [5]; United States v. Martin, C.A. 6th (1976), 543 F.2d 577, 579 [2]; Lothridge v. United States, C.A. 6th (1971), 441 F.2d 919, 922 [3]; United States v. Harris, C.A. 6th (1969), 412 F.2d 471, 473 [1]; Hoopengarner v. United States, C.A. 6th (1959), 270 F.2d 465, 469 [2]; Parker v. United States, C.A. 6th (1958), 252 F.2d 680, 681 [3], cert. den. (1958), 356 U.S. 964 , 78 S.Ct. 1003 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1071 .
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Cichetto
Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64 , 96 S.Ct. 303 , 46 L.Ed. 2d 205, 207 (1975).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Szima
(5×)
Ed. 2d 183, 185 (1973); Dillingham v. United States, supra, 423 U. S. at 64, 96 S. Ct. at 303, 46 L.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Szima
(2×)
Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64 , 96 S.Ct. 303 , 46 L.Ed. 2d 205, 207 (1975).
examined
Cited "see"
Belcher (Kevin) v. State
(3×)
See Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64, 64-65 (1975) (holding that a speedy-trial right attaches upon a finding of probable cause regarding the instant charges); Sheriff v. Berman, 99 Nev. 102, 106, 659 P.2d 298, 301 (1983).
examined
Cited "see"
State ex rel. Suwalksi v. Peeler (Slip Opinion)
(3×)
See Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64, 65 , 96 S.Ct. 303 , 46 L.Ed.2d 205 (1975).
cited
Cited "see"
Raymond Daniels v. State
See Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64, 65 (1975); Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 284 .
discussed
Cited "see"
State v. Lataben K. Patel
See Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64, 64-65 (1975); Emery v. State, 881 S.W.2d 702, 708 (Tex. Crim.
examined
Cited "see"
United States v. Fitch
(6×)
See Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64, 65 , 96 S.Ct. 303 , 46 L.Ed.2d 205 (1975). .
discussed
Cited "see"
State v. Thaxton
See Haisman, supra, 242 Ga. at 898 (2) (citing Dillingham v. United States, 423 U. S. 64, 65 (96 SC 303, 46 LE2d 205) (1975) and United States v. Marion, 404 U. S. 307, 320-325 (III) (92 SC 455, 30 LE2d 468) (1971)).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Brown
See Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64, 65 (1975) (measuring delay for Sixth Amendment claim from time of arrest and noting that “[i]nvocation of the speedy trial provision . . . need not await indictment, information, or other formal charge”).
examined
Cited "see"
United States v. Brown
(3×)
See Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64, 65 , 96 S.Ct. 303 , 46 L.Ed.2d 205 (1975) (measuring delay for Sixth Amendment claim from time of arrest and noting that “[i]nvoeation of the speedy trial provision ... need not await indictment, information, or other formal charge”).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Dillingham
v.
United States
v.
United States
74-6738.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Dec 1, 1975.
Per Curiam.
An interval of 22 months elapsed between petitioner’s arrest and indictment, and a further period of 12 months between his indictment and trial, upon charges of automobile theft in violation of 18 U. S. C. §§ 371, 2312, and 2313. The District Court for the Northern District of Georgia denied petitioner’s motions — made immediately after arraignment and posttrial — to dismiss the indictment on the ground that petitioner had been denied a speedy trial in violation of the Sixth Amendment. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that under United States v. Marion, 404 U. S. 307 (1971), the 22-month “pre-indictment delay ... is not to be counted for the purposes of a Sixth Amendment motion absent a showing of actual prejudice.” 502 F. 2d 1233, 1235 (1974). This reading of Marion was incorrect. Marion presented the question whether in assessing a denial of speedy trial claim, there was to be counted a delay between the end of the criminal scheme charged and the indictment of a suspect not arrested or otherwise charged previous to the indictment. The Court held: “On its face, the protection of the [Sixth] Amendment is activated only when a criminal prosecution has begun and extends only to those persons[*65] who have been ‘accused’ in the course of that prosecution. These provisions would seem to afford no protection to those not yet accused, nor would they seem to require the Government to discover, investigate, and accuse any person within any particular period of time.” 404 U. S., at 313. In contrast, the Government constituted petitioner an “accused” when it arrested him and thereby commenced its prosecution of him. Marion made this clear, id., at 320-321, where the Court stated:
“To legally arrest and detain, the Government must assert probable cause to believe the arrestee has committed a crime. Arrest is a public act that may seriously interfere with the defendant’s liberty, whether he is free on bail or not, and that may disrupt his employment, drain his financial resources, curtail his associations, subject him to public obloquy, ánd create anxiety in him, his family and his friends. These considerations were substantial underpinnings for the decision in Klopfer v. North Carolina, [386 U. S. 213 (1967)]; see also Smith v. Hooey, 393 U. S. 374, 377-378 (1969). So viewed, it is readily understandable that it is either a formal indictment or information or else the actual restraints imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge that engage the particular protections of the speedy trial provision of the Sixth Amendment.
“Invocation of the speedy trial provision thus need not await indictment, information, or other formal charge.”
See also Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514, 519-520, 532-533 (1972). *
[*66] Petitioner’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for certiorari are granted. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
The Chief Justice dissents.
*
The Memorandum for the United States in Opposition, p. 4, states that “Marion appears to leave little doubt . . . that [the[*66] Court] believed that the policies that inform the right to a speedy trial reach beyond the indictment stage of criminal proceedings and that the right consequently attaches either at the point at which a person is arrested and held to answer on .a criminal charge or when he is formally charged by indictment or information, whichever occurs earlier Accord, United States v. Macino, 486 F. 2d 750 (CA7 1973); United States v. Cabral, 475 F. 2d 715 (CA1 1973); Edmaiston v. Neil, 452 F. 2d 494 (CA6 1971).