speedy trial claim in Mississippi

2022“Review of a speedy trial claim encompasses the fact question of whether the trial delay rose from good cause.” DeLoach v. State, 722 So. 2d 512, 516 (Miss. 1998).

2020“Review of a speedy trial claim encompasses a fact question of whether the trial delay rose from good cause.” DeLoach v. State, 722 So. 2d 512, 516 (¶12) (Miss. 1998).

2005"When the delay is neither intentional nor egregiously protracted, and where there is a complete absence of actual prejudice, the balance is struck in favor of rejecting the defendant's speedy trial claim." Perry v. State, 637 So.2d 871, 876 (Miss.1994).

2005"When the delay is neither intentional nor egregiously protracted, and where there is a complete absence of actual prejudice, the balance is struck in favor of rejecting the defendant's speedy trial claim." Perry v. State, 637 So.2d 871, 876 (Miss.1994). ¶ 44.

2003"Where the delay is neither intentional or egregiously protracted, and where there is no showing of actual prejudice, the balance is struck in favor of rejecting the defendant's speedy trial claim." Rhymes, 638 So.2d at 1275 . ¶ 31.

2003Where the delay is not "intentional or egregiously protracted, and where there is no showing of actual prejudice, the balance is struck in favor of rejecting the defendant's speedy trial claim." Rhymes v. State, 638 So.2d 1270, 1275 (Miss.1994).

2020“Although it is the State’s duty to ensure that the defendant receives a speedy trial, a defendant has some responsibility to assert this right.” Bateman, 125 So. 3d at 630 (¶49). “[A] defendant’s failure to demand a speedy trial between his arrest and indictment is 8 ‘critical’ to the analysis of a speedy-trial claim.” Id. (citing State v. Woodall, 801 So. 2d 678, 684 (Miss. 2001)).

2015“This Court has held that a defendant’s failure to demand a speedy trial between his arrest and indictment is ‘critical’ to the analysis of a speedy-trial claim.” Bateman, 125 So.3d at 630 (¶ 49) (citing State v. Woodall, 801 So.2d 678, 684 (Miss.2001)).

2026The Mississippi Supreme Court has held that “a defendant’s failure to demand a speedy trial between his arrest and indictment is ‘critical’ to the analysis of a speedy-trial claim.” Id.

2026The Mississippi Supreme Court has held that “a defendant’s failure to demand a speedy trial between his arrest and indictment is ‘critical’ to the analysis of a speedy-trial claim.” Id.

2014Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-17-1 (Rev.2007) states: “Unless good cause be shown, and a continuance duly granted by the court, all offenses for which indictments are presented to the court shall be tried no later than two hundred seventy (270) days after the accused has been arraigned.” The “[r]eview of a speedy trial claim involves a question of fact: whether the trial delay arose from good cause.” Bonds v. State, 938 So.2d 352, 355 (¶ 7) (Miss.Ct.App.2006) (citing Flora v. State, 925 So.2d 797, 814 (¶ 58) (Miss.2006)).

2013“The standard of review for a speedy trial claim focuses on the fact question of whether the trial delay arose from good cause.” Flora v. State, 925 So.2d 797, 814 (Miss.2006) (citing DeLoach v. State, 722 So.2d 512, 516 (Miss.1998)).

2015As this Court held in Brengettcy v. State, 794 So.2d 987, 994 (Miss.2001), “While failure or delay in raising a speedy trial claim may cost a defendant points in the Barker analysis, there is no procedural bar-solely for failing to properly pursue the- claim in open court.” See also Flores v. State, 574 So.2d 1314, 1323 (Miss.1990) (holding that defendant’s “failure to consistently badger the prosecution” to bring him to trial did not eliminate his speedy-trial claim).

2015As this Court held in Brengettcy v. State, 794 So. 2d 987, 994 (Miss. 2001), “While failure or delay in raising a speedy trial claim may cost a defendant points in the Barker analysis, there is no procedural bar solely for failing to properly pursue the claim in open court.” See also Flores v. State, 574 So. 2d 1314, 1323 (Miss. 1990) (holding that defendant’s “failure to consistently badger the prosecution” to bring him to trial did not eliminate his speedy-trial claim).

2025“This Court looks at the totality of the circumstances, and no [Barker] factor alone is dispositive.” Thomas v. State, 48 So. 3d 460, 477 (¶42) (Miss. 2010) (citing Price v. State, 898 So. 2d 641, 648 (¶11) (Miss. 2005)); see also Bateman, 125 So. 3d at 633 (¶59) (“After reviewing all of the factors relevant to the 6 analysis of a speedy-trial claim, we must balance each factor along with other relevant circumstances.”).

2019Price v. State , 898 So.2d 641 , 647 (¶ 11) (Miss. 2005). 1.

2024In sum, “[w]here, as here, the delay is neither intentional nor egregiously protracted, and where there is a complete absence of actual prejudice, the balance is struck in favor of 12 rejecting the defendant’s speedy trial claim.” Lewis, 374 So. 3d at 557 (¶115) (quoting Taylor, 162 So. 3d at 787 (¶17)).

2023“Although it is the State’s duty to ensure that the defendant receives a speedy trial, a defendant has some responsibility to assert this right.” Taylor v. State, 162 So. 3d 780, 785 (¶10) (Miss. 2015) (quoting Bateman v. State, 125 So. 3d 616, 630 (¶48) (Miss. 2013)). “[A] defendant’s failure to demand a speedy trial between his arrest and indictment is ‘critical’ to the analysis of a speedy-trial claim.” Id. (quoting Bateman, 125 So. 3d at 630 (¶49)). “[F]ailure to assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy trial.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 532 . ¶

2020Moreover, he waited until after trial to request dismissal based on his claim of a speedy-trial violation. “[A] demand for a speedy trial is distinct from a demand for dismissal due to violation of the right to a speedy trial.” Brengettcy v. State, 794 So. 2d 987, 994 (¶17) (Miss. 2001) (citing Perry v. State, 637 So. 40 2d 871, 875 (Miss. 1994)).

2015As this Court held in Brengettcy v. State, 794 So.2d 987, 994 (Miss.2001), “While failure or delay in raising a speedy trial claim may cost a defendant points in the Barker analysis, there is no procedural bar-solely for failing to properly pursue the- claim in open court.” See also Flores v. State, 574 So.2d 1314, 1323 (Miss.1990) (holding that defendant’s “failure to consistently badger the prosecution” to bring him to trial did not eliminate his speedy-trial claim).

2011Perry v. State, 637 So.2d 871, 875 (Miss.1994). (citing Adams v. State, 583 So.2d 165, 169-70 (Miss.1991)).

2008Perry v. State, 637 So. 2d 871, 875 (Miss. 1994). (citing Adams v. State, 583 So. 2d 165, 169-70 (Miss. 1991)).

2023“Although it is the State’s duty to ensure that the defendant receives a speedy trial, a defendant has some responsibility to assert this right.” Taylor v. State, 162 So. 3d 780, 785 (¶10) (Miss. 2015) (quoting Bateman v. State, 125 So. 3d 616, 630 (¶48) (Miss. 2013)). “[A] defendant’s failure to demand a speedy trial between his arrest and indictment is ‘critical’ to the analysis of a speedy-trial claim.” Id. (quoting Bateman, 125 So. 3d at 630 (¶49)). “[F]ailure to assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy trial.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 532 . ¶

2021In Barker, the United States Supreme Court said that “dismissal of the indictment” is “the only possible remedy” for a speedy-trial violation, Barker, 407 U.S. at 522 , but the Court never used the phrase “the entire indictment.” More important, neither Barker nor any other case cited by the dissent even considered the argument that the dissent makes here.

2015Johnson, 68 So.3d at 1246 (quoting Stevens v. State, 808 So.2d 908, 918 (Miss.2002)) (" ‘where the delay is neither intentional nor egregiously protracted, and there is an absence of actual prejudice to the defense, the balance is struck in favor of rejecting a speedy trial claim.'"). .

2015In sum, these factors have no talismanic qualities; courts must still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process.27 23 Johnson, 68 So. 3d at 1241-46. 24 Id. at 1246 (quoting Stevens v. State, 808 So. 2d 908, 918 (Miss. 2002)). 25 Sharp v. State, 786 So. 2d 372, 381 (Miss. 2001) (citing McGee v. State, 608 So. 2d 1129, 1130 (Miss. 1992); Ross v. State, 605 So. 2d 17, 23 (Miss. 1992)). 26 Ross, 605 So. 2d at 23 . 27 Barker, 407 U.S. at 533 . 19 Stated another way, courts may not pick out one factor, such as prejudice, and hold that the defendant must win on it to prevail on a speedy-t

2026“A formal indictment or information or an arrest—whichever first occurs—triggers the constitutional right to a speedy trial.” McBride v. State, 61 So. 3d 138, 142 (¶8) (Miss. 2011).

2018In McBride v. State, 61 So. 3d 138, 144 (¶21) (Miss. 2011), the Mississippi Supreme Court recognized that “a demand for dismissal due to a speedy-trial violation is not the equivalent of a demand for a speedy trial.” See also Guice v. State, 952 So. 2d 129, 141 (¶26) (Miss. 2007).

2015In sum, these factors have no talismanic qualities; courts must still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process.27 23 Johnson, 68 So. 3d at 1241-46. 24 Id. at 1246 (quoting Stevens v. State, 808 So. 2d 908, 918 (Miss. 2002)). 25 Sharp v. State, 786 So. 2d 372, 381 (Miss. 2001) (citing McGee v. State, 608 So. 2d 1129, 1130 (Miss. 1992); Ross v. State, 605 So. 2d 17, 23 (Miss. 1992)). 26 Ross, 605 So. 2d at 23 . 27 Barker, 407 U.S. at 533 . 19 Stated another way, courts may not pick out one factor, such as prejudice, and hold that the defendant must win on it to prevail on a speedy-t

2015In sum, these factors have no talismanic qualities; courts must still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process.27 23 Johnson, 68 So. 3d at 1241-46. 24 Id. at 1246 (quoting Stevens v. State, 808 So. 2d 908, 918 (Miss. 2002)). 25 Sharp v. State, 786 So. 2d 372, 381 (Miss. 2001) (citing McGee v. State, 608 So. 2d 1129, 1130 (Miss. 1992); Ross v. State, 605 So. 2d 17, 23 (Miss. 1992)). 26 Ross, 605 So. 2d at 23 . 27 Barker, 407 U.S. at 533 . 19 Stated another way, courts may not pick out one factor, such as prejudice, and hold that the defendant must win on it to prevail on a speedy-t

2008State v. Woodall, 744 So.2d 747, 749-50 (Miss.1999).

2008Woodall provides that when a violation of the speedy-trial statute is raised for the first time on appeal, this Court " may remand for the lower court to consider the reasons for the delay." Woodall, 744 So.2d at 749-50 (emphasis added).

2006Hymes v. State, 703 So.2d 258, 260-61 (¶¶ 11-14) (Miss.1997). ¶ 7.

2003Roland v. State, 666 So.2d 747, 749 (Miss.1995); see also Hymes v. State, 703 So.2d 258, 260-61 (¶¶ 11-14) (Miss.1997) (holding that counsel’s failure to raise a speedy trial violation is grounds for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel). ¶ 12.

2015Timmons pled guilty, and when “a defendant voluntarily pleads guilty to an offense, he waives all non-jurisdictional rights incident to trial, including the constitutional right to a speedy trial.” Hill, 60 So.3d at 827 (¶ 6) (citing Anderson v. State, 577 So.2d 390, 391-92 (Miss.1991)).

1995Anderson, 577 So. 2d at 391 (holding that a valid guilty plea waives the right to complain of a speedy trial violation in addition to other rights and defects).

2018In conclusion, our supreme court has stated "that where the delay is neither intentional nor egregiously protracted, and there is an absence of actual prejudice to the defense, the balance is struck in favor of rejecting a speedy trial claim." Johnson , 68 So.3d at 1246 (¶ 22).

2015Johnson, 68 So.3d at 1246 (quoting Stevens v. State, 808 So.2d 908, 918 (Miss.2002)) (" ‘where the delay is neither intentional nor egregiously protracted, and there is an absence of actual prejudice to the defense, the balance is struck in favor of rejecting a speedy trial claim.'"). .

2015Moreover, the Myers Court wrote, “While failure or delay in raising a speedy trial claim may cost a defendant points in the Barker analysis, there is no procedural bar solely for failing to properly pursue the claim in open court.” Myers, 145 So.3d at 1151 (¶ 20) (citing Brengettcy v. State, 794 So.2d 987, 994 (Miss.2001)).

2015Moreover, the Myers Court wrote, “While failure or delay in raising a speedy trial claim may cost a defendant points in the Barker analysis, there is no procedural bar solely for failing to properly pursue the claim in open court.” Myers, 145 So. 3d at 1151 (¶ 20) (citing Brengettcy v. State, 794 30 So. 2d 987 , 994 (Miss. 2001)).

2026And the Supreme Court has held that “delay attributable to obtaining a mental evaluation requested by the defense is not counted against the State.” Perry v. State, 233 So. 3d 750, 757 (¶15) (Miss. 2017). ¶65.

2019Perry v. State, 233 So. 3d 750, 756 (¶9) (Miss. 2017).

2025“To succeed on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, [the defendant] must meet both prongs of the test laid out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).” Lovett v. State, 270 So. 3d 133, 135 (¶5) (Miss.

2022To prevail on his ineffective-assistance claim, Siggers must demonstrate that (1) his “counsel’s performance was deficient[,]” and (2) “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Lovett v. State, 270 So. 3d 133, 135 (¶5) (Miss.

2023Manix v. State, 895 So. 2d 167, 175-76 (¶16) (Miss. 2005) (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972)).

2008In Atterberry v. State, 667 So.2d 622, 627 (Miss.1995), the court stated, while a defendant need not demonstrate an affirmative showing of prejudice in order to prove a speedy trial violation, “an absence of prejudice weighs against a finding of a violation.” Id. (citing Wiley, 582 So.2d at 1012 ); see also Murray, 967 So.2d at 1232 (¶ 30); Manix v. State, 895 So.2d 167, 177 (¶ 22) (Miss.2005) (quoting State v. Magnusen, 646 So.2d 1275, 1284 (Miss.1994) (“This Court has declined to infer prejudice to the defense out of the ‘clear blue’ ”)). ¶ 40.

2019In Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25, 25 (1973), a state supreme court held that a defendant must show actual prejudice to establish a speedy trial violation. 414 U.S. 25, 25 (1973).

2019In Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25, 25 (1973), a state supreme court held that a defendant must show actual prejudice to establish a speedy trial violation. 414 U.S. 25, 25 (1973).

2022“Under this Court’s standard of review, this Court will uphold a decision based on substantial, credible evidence.” Id. (citing Folk v. State, 576 So. 2d 1243, 1247 (Miss. 1991)). ¶6.

2009“If substantial credible evidence exists from which a finding of good cause may fairly have been made, we will leave the finding undisturbed.” Id. (citing Folk v. State, 576 So.2d 1243, 1247 (Miss.1991)).

2021See Murray v. State, 967 So. 2d 1222, 1229 (Miss. 2007) (Where defendant’s first indictment was dismissed by nolle prosequi, the date of the original indictment did not count towards the speedy trial analysis when he was re-indicted later.); 41 ¶98.

2008See also Murray v. State, 967 So.2d 1222, 1232 (¶ 29) (Miss.2007) (weighing this factor in favor of the State because the defendant filed a motion to dismiss for a speedy trial violation, with no demand for a speedy trial, after most of the delay period had elapsed); Hersick, 904 So.2d at 123 (¶ 17) (finding that this factor did not weigh in favor of the State or the defendant where the defendant failed to assert his right to a speedy trial until a few weeks before his trial was scheduled to begin); Stogner v. State, 627 So.2d 815, 819 (Miss.1993) (weighing this factor in favor of State when d