64 Alabama opinions name it 2 courts 1972–2026 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alabama courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Barker v. Wingogreen2 sentences2026I, § 6, of the Alabama Constitution, 1901.4 … [A]n evaluation of an accused's speedy-trial claim requires us to balance the four factors the United States Supreme Court set forth in Barker [v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S. Ct. 2182 , 33 L. 2026I, § 6, of the Alabama Constitution, 1901.4 … [A]n evaluation of an accused's speedy-trial claim requires us to balance the four factors the United States Supreme Court set forth in Barker [v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S. Ct. 2182 , 33 L. | 8 | 43 |
Ex Parte Walkergreen2 sentences2024It is well settled that, for purposes of a speedy-trial claim, " '[t]he length of delay is measured from the date of the indictment or the date of the issuance of an arrest warrant -- whichever is earlier -- to the date of the trial.' " Wilson, 329 So. 3d at 77 (quoting Ex parte Walker, 928 So. 2d 259, 264 (Ala. 2005)) (other citation omitted). 2006I , § 6 , of the Alabama Constitution, 1901. . . . [A]n evaluation of an accused's speedy-trial claim requires us to balance the four factors the United States Supreme Court set forth in Barker [v. Wingo , 407 U.S. 514 (1972)]: `[l]ength of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of [her] right, and prejudice to the defendant.' 407 U.S. at 530 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 (footnote omitted)." Walker , 928 So.2d at 263 (footnotes omitted). | 4 | 9 |
Nickerson v. Stategreen2 sentences2007At various times, this court has held that the issuance of an arrest warrant before the return of an indictment would trigger a speedy trial analysis, see, e.g., Jackson v. State, 650 So.2d 593 (Ala.Crim.App. 1994); O'Barr v. State, 639 So.2d 533 (Ala. Crim.App.1993); State v. Woods, 600 So.2d 425 (Ala.Crim.App.1992), and that the date of arrest, or execution of an arrest warrant, before the return of an indictment would trigger a speedy trial analysis, see, e.g., State v. Johnson, 900 So.2d 482 (Ala.Crim.App.2004); Bishop v. State, 656 So.2d 394 (Ala.Crim.App.1994); Nickerson v. State, 629 So 2003For purposes of this opinion, we will assume, without deciding, that the State is correct and that the date the delinquency petitions were filed, which is the date most favorable to the appellant’s claim, is the starting point for our analysis. 3 To trigger a speedy-trial analysis, the delay in bringing an accused to trial must be so excessive as to be “presumptively prejudicial.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 ; “Unless the delay is presumptively prejudicial, there is no need to inquire into the other Barker factors.” Roberson v. State, 864 So.2d 379 (Ala.Crim.App.2002). “[Wjhether t | 2 | 3 |
Ex Parte Carrellgreen2 sentences2005See also Ex parte Carrell , 565 So.2d at 105 . 2005See also Ex parte Carrell, 565 So.2d at 105 . | 2 | 3 |
Ex Parte Archergreen2 sentences2003See Ex parte Archer, 643 So.2d 601 (Ala.1992)(noting that adverse effects on parole consideration, eligibility for work release and other prison programs, and place of confinement can be sufficient to establish prejudice); Ex parte Slaughter, 377 So.2d 632 (Ala.1979)(same); and Austin v. State, 562 So.2d 630 (Ala.Crim.App.1989)(same). 2003See Ex parte Archer, 643 So.2d 601 (Ala.1992)(noting that adverse effects on parole consideration, eligibility for work release and other prison programs, and place of confinement can be sufficient to establish prejudice); Ex parte Slaughter, 377 So.2d 632 (Ala.1979)(same); and Austin v. State, 562 So.2d 630 (Ala. Crim.App.1989)(same). | 2 | 2 |
Roberson v. Stategreen2 sentences2024Once again, however, Williams does not argue that the analysis of his speedy-trial claim would be different under the two constitutions. 6 CR-2024-0124 no need to inquire into the other Barker factors.' Roberson v. State, 864 So. 2d 379 (Ala. Crim. 2003For purposes of this opinion, we will assume, without deciding, that the State is correct and that the date the delinquency petitions were filed, which is the date most favorable to the appellant’s claim, is the starting point for our analysis. 3 To trigger a speedy-trial analysis, the delay in bringing an accused to trial must be so excessive as to be “presumptively prejudicial.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 ; “Unless the delay is presumptively prejudicial, there is no need to inquire into the other Barker factors.” Roberson v. State, 864 So.2d 379 (Ala.Crim.App.2002). “[Wjhether t | 1 | 6 |
Thomas R. Prince v. State of Alabamagreen2 sentences1993(III) Assertion of the Right "In determining this factor, we are guided by the following observations of the former Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Prince v. Alabama , 507 F.2d 693 , 702-03 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied , 423 U.S. 876 , 96 S.Ct. 147 , 46 L.Ed.2d 108 (1975): " 'While the Court [in Barker ] indicated that the absolute failure of the defendant to assert his right would "make it difficult for [him] to prove that he was denied a speedy trial," the Court emphasized that the burden was upon the prosecution to show that the failure of the defendant to assert his right was a knowing 1986The Defendant's Assertion of his Right In determining this factor, we are guided by the following observations of the former Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Prince v. Alabama, 507 F.2d 693, 702-03 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 876 , 96 S.Ct. 147 , 46 L.Ed.2d 108 (1975): [1] "While the Court [in Barker ] indicated that the absolute failure of the defendant to assert his right would `make it difficult for [him] to prove that he was denied a speedy trial,' the Court emphasized that the burden was upon the prosecution to show that the failure of the defendant to assert his right was a | 1 | 4 |
Hayes v. Stategreen2 sentences2024Hayes, as the quotation suggests, dealt with a delay that was found to be "deliberate and inexcusable, thus warranting heavy weight against the State." Hayes, 487 So. 2d at 992-93 . 1993Such an approach would be consistent both with the concept that chargeable failure to assert a constitutional right must be knowing and intelligent, Johnson v. Zerbst [ 304 U.S. 458 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)], and with the realities of a defendant's incarceration, often distant from the prosecuting state and without the effective assistance of counsel.' " Hayes , 487 So.2d at 993-94 (emphasis added). | 1 | 2 |
Pierson v. Stategreen2 sentences2003"To prevail on a speedy trial claim[, t]he accused must show purposeful and deliberate delay by the prosecuting authority." Pierson v. State, 677 So.2d 830, 831 (Ala.Crim.App.1996). 2002"To prevail on a speedy trial claim[, t]he accused must show purposeful and deliberate delay by the prosecuting authority." Pierson v. State , 677 So.2d 830 , 831 (Ala.Crim.App. 1996). "`"Delays occasioned by the defendant or on his behalf are excluded from the length of delay and are heavily counted against the defendant in applying the balancing test of Barker ."'" Zumbado v. State , 615 So.2d 1223 , 1234 (Ala.Crim.App. 1993), quoting McCallum v. State , 407 So.2d 865 , 868 (Ala.Crim.App. 1981), quoting in turn Walker v. State , 386 So.2d 762 , 763 (Ala.Crim.App.), rev'd in part and vacated | 1 | 2 |
Summerlin v. Stategreen1 sentence2024See Summerlin v. State, 594 So. 2d 235, 237 (Ala. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
RDH v. Stategreen1 sentence2024Regardless, to prevail on this type of due-process claim, the defendant has " 'a heavier burden of proof' " than that required for a speedy-trial claim and must demonstrate not only " ' "that the delay caused actual prejudice to the conduct of his defense" ' " but also " ' "that the delay was the product of deliberate action by the government designed to gain a tactical advantage." ' " R.D.H. v. State, 775 So. 2d 248, 251 (Ala. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Carruth v. Stategreen1 sentence2024See, e.g., Carruth v. State, 165 So. 3d 627, 645 (Ala. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Robertsgreen1 sentence2022It is well- settled law that in order to preserve a speedy trial argument, Defendant must properly raise it in the lower court and invoke a ruling." (emphasis added)); People v. Roberts, 321 P.3d 581, 590 (Colo. Ct. App. 2013) ("Defendant did not properly preserve his constitutional speedy trial argument for review: although he referenced it in his written motions, he provided no analysis of the constitutional issues and never sought a ruling from the trial court." (emphasis added)); State v. Hatt, 11 Wash. App. 2d 113 , 151, 452 P.3d 577, 598 (2019) (holding that the defendant's speedy-trial | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Lopezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ainsworth v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
State v. Schiernbeckgreen2 sentences2022It is well- settled law that in order to preserve a speedy trial argument, Defendant must properly raise it in the lower court and invoke a ruling." (emphasis added)); People v. Roberts, 321 P.3d 581, 590 (Colo. Ct. App. 2013) ("Defendant did not properly preserve his constitutional speedy trial argument for review: although he referenced it in his written motions, he provided no analysis of the constitutional issues and never sought a ruling from the trial court." (emphasis added)); State v. Hatt, 11 Wash. App. 2d 113 , 151, 452 P.3d 577, 598 (2019) (holding that the defendant's speedy-trial 2022As the Iowa Supreme Court aptly stated in Schiernbeck, supra: "We would violate our function as a court of review if we were to pass upon the merits of a motion without at least a showing in the record that a trial court ruling was specifically requested, after which it failed or refused to rule." Schiernbeck, 203 N.W.2d at 547 . | 1 | 1 |
Archie v. Stategreen1 sentence2022Bishop, 656 So. 2d at 397 . 4 CR-21-0347 v. State, 875 So. 2d 336, 339 (Ala. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
| State Of Washington, Res/cross-app. v. George Donald Hatt, Jr., App/cross-res.green | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. MacKgreen | 1 | 1 |
| MacKenzie v. Portuondogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Parmley v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Jose Avalos and Rudolfo Castrillongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Doggett v. United States
green
2 sentences2014The majority does not, however, consider as part of the fourth Barker factor the length of the pretrial delay; the United States Supreme Court in Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 , 112 S.Ct. 2686 , 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992), recognized that, in addition to looking at pretrial delay for the purposes of triggering a speedy-trial analysis, a court must also consider “the extent to which the delay stretches beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger judicial examination of the claim.” 505 U.S. at 652 . 2014The majority does not, however, consider as part of the fourth Barker factor the length of the pretrial delay; the United States Supreme Court in Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 , 112 S.Ct. 2686 , 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992), recognized that, in addition to looking at pretrial delay for the purposes of triggering a speedy-trial analysis, a court must also consider “the extent to which the delay stretches beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger judicial examination of the claim.” 505 U.S. at 652 . | 4 | 1994–2014 |
State v. Willis
neutral
2 sentences2004State v. Willis, 42 Ala. App. 414 , 166 So.2d 917 (1964); Duncan v. State, 42 Ala.App. 509 , 169 So.2d 439 (1964); 57 A.L.R.2d 302 , § 13 (1958). 2004State v. Willis, 42 Ala. App. 414 , 166 So.2d 917 (1964); Duncan v. State, 42 Ala.App. 509 , 169 So.2d 439 (1964); 57 A.L.R.2d 302 , § 13 (1958). | 4 | 1979–2004 |
Duncan v. State
green
2 sentences2004State v. Willis, 42 Ala. App. 414 , 166 So.2d 917 (1964); Duncan v. State, 42 Ala.App. 509 , 169 So.2d 439 (1964); 57 A.L.R.2d 302 , § 13 (1958). 2004State v. Willis, 42 Ala. App. 414 , 166 So.2d 917 (1964); Duncan v. State, 42 Ala.App. 509 , 169 So.2d 439 (1964); 57 A.L.R.2d 302 , § 13 (1958). | 4 | 1979–2004 |
Strunk v. United States
green
2 sentences1993(III) Assertion of the Right "In determining this factor, we are guided by the following observations of the former Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Prince v. Alabama , 507 F.2d 693 , 702-03 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied , 423 U.S. 876 , 96 S.Ct. 147 , 46 L.Ed.2d 108 (1975): " 'While the Court [in Barker ] indicated that the absolute failure of the defendant to assert his right would "make it difficult for [him] to prove that he was denied a speedy trial," the Court emphasized that the burden was upon the prosecution to show that the failure of the defendant to assert his right was a knowing 1993(III) Assertion of the Right "In determining this factor, we are guided by the following observations of the former Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Prince v. Alabama , 507 F.2d 693 , 702-03 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied , 423 U.S. 876 , 96 S.Ct. 147 , 46 L.Ed.2d 108 (1975): " 'While the Court [in Barker ] indicated that the absolute failure of the defendant to assert his right would "make it difficult for [him] to prove that he was denied a speedy trial," the Court emphasized that the burden was upon the prosecution to show that the failure of the defendant to assert his right was a knowing | 3 | 1977–1993 |
United States v. Marion
green
2 sentences1981Barker , supra, at 530 , 92 S.Ct., at 2191 . *Page 184 The protection of the speedy trial clause of the Sixth Amendment "is activated only when a criminal prosecution has begun and extends only to those persons who have been `accused' in the course of that prosecution." United States v. Marion , 404 U.S. 307 , 313 , 92 S.Ct. 455 , 459 , 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971); Prince v. Alabama , 507 F.2d 693 (5th Cir. 1975); Turner v. State , 378 So.2d 1173 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 378 So.2d 1182 (Ala. 1979). 1981Barker , supra, at 530 , 92 S.Ct., at 2191 . *Page 184 The protection of the speedy trial clause of the Sixth Amendment "is activated only when a criminal prosecution has begun and extends only to those persons who have been `accused' in the course of that prosecution." United States v. Marion , 404 U.S. 307 , 313 , 92 S.Ct. 455 , 459 , 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971); Prince v. Alabama , 507 F.2d 693 (5th Cir. 1975); Turner v. State , 378 So.2d 1173 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 378 So.2d 1182 (Ala. 1979). | 3 | 1980–1988 |
Bishop v. State
green
2 sentences2022Bishop, 656 So. 2d at 397 . 4 CR-21-0347 v. State, 875 So. 2d 336, 339 (Ala. Crim. 2007At various times, this court has held that the issuance of an arrest warrant before the return of an indictment would trigger a speedy trial analysis, see, e.g., Jackson v. State, 650 So.2d 593 (Ala.Crim.App. 1994); O'Barr v. State, 639 So.2d 533 (Ala. Crim.App.1993); State v. Woods, 600 So.2d 425 (Ala.Crim.App.1992), and that the date of arrest, or execution of an arrest warrant, before the return of an indictment would trigger a speedy trial analysis, see, e.g., State v. Johnson, 900 So.2d 482 (Ala.Crim.App.2004); Bishop v. State, 656 So.2d 394 (Ala.Crim.App.1994); Nickerson v. State, 629 So | 2 | 2007–2022 |
Allison v. State
green
2 sentences2006Although the trial court in Allison conducted a hearing on the defendant's speedy-trial claim, the record contained no transcript of the speedy-trial hearing because the defendant had failed to request a copy of the transcript of the speedy-trial hearing. 645 So.2d at 359 -60 . 2006Although the trial court in Allison conducted a hearing on the defendant's speedy-trial claim, the record contained no transcript of the speedy-trial hearing because the defendant had failed to request a copy of the transcript of the speedy-trial hearing. 645 So.2d at 359 -60 . | 2 | 2005–2006 |
Prince v. State
green
2 sentences2005Prince , 354 So.2d at 1190 -92 . 1978In Prince v. State, supra , Judge Tyson helpfully and accurately summarizes the factors set forth in Barker v. Wingo, supra , that are to be considered in determining whether there has been a violation of one's right to a speedy trial, by stating: "In Barker v. Wingo , 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), the United States Supreme Court delineated a four-pronged balancing test to be applied on an ad hoc basis in all cases in which a speedy trial claim is raised. | 2 | 1978–2005 |
Ex Parte Slaughter
green
2 sentences2003See Ex parte Archer, 643 So.2d 601 (Ala.1992)(noting that adverse effects on parole consideration, eligibility for work release and other prison programs, and place of confinement can be sufficient to establish prejudice); Ex parte Slaughter, 377 So.2d 632 (Ala.1979)(same); and Austin v. State, 562 So.2d 630 (Ala.Crim.App.1989)(same). 2003See Ex parte Archer, 643 So.2d 601 (Ala.1992)(noting that adverse effects on parole consideration, eligibility for work release and other prison programs, and place of confinement can be sufficient to establish prejudice); Ex parte Slaughter, 377 So.2d 632 (Ala.1979)(same); and Austin v. State, 562 So.2d 630 (Ala. Crim.App.1989)(same). | 2 | 2003–2003 |
North Carolina v. Pearce
red
2 sentences2003In other words, we need not decide exactly when the appellant's speedy-trial right was triggered in this case, which would be an issue of first impression in this State, because our conclusion with respect to the appellant's speedy-trial claim would be no different, regardless of whether the appellant's right was triggered when the delinquency petitions were filed, when he was arrested on those petitions, when the case was transferred to circuit court for criminal prosecution, when the indictment was returned, or when the certificate of judgment was issued on the appellant's appeal from the ju 2003In other words, we need not decide exactly when the appellant's speedy-trial right was triggered in this case, which would be an issue of first impression in this State, because our conclusion with respect to the appellant's speedy-trial claim would be no different, regardless of whether the appellant's right was triggered when the delinquency petitions were filed, when he was arrested on those petitions, when the case was transferred to circuit court for criminal prosecution, when the indictment was returned, or when the certificate of judgment was issued on the appellant's appeal from the ju | 2 | 2003–2003 |
Austin v. State
green
2 sentences2003See Ex parte Archer, 643 So.2d 601 (Ala.1992)(noting that adverse effects on parole consideration, eligibility for work release and other prison programs, and place of confinement can be sufficient to establish prejudice); Ex parte Slaughter, 377 So.2d 632 (Ala.1979)(same); and Austin v. State, 562 So.2d 630 (Ala.Crim.App.1989)(same). 2003See Ex parte Archer, 643 So.2d 601 (Ala.1992)(noting that adverse effects on parole consideration, eligibility for work release and other prison programs, and place of confinement can be sufficient to establish prejudice); Ex parte Slaughter, 377 So.2d 632 (Ala.1979)(same); and Austin v. State, 562 So.2d 630 (Ala. Crim.App.1989)(same). | 2 | 2003–2003 |
Alabama v. Prince
green
2 sentences1993(III) Assertion of the Right "In determining this factor, we are guided by the following observations of the former Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Prince v. Alabama , 507 F.2d 693 , 702-03 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied , 423 U.S. 876 , 96 S.Ct. 147 , 46 L.Ed.2d 108 (1975): " 'While the Court [in Barker ] indicated that the absolute failure of the defendant to assert his right would "make it difficult for [him] to prove that he was denied a speedy trial," the Court emphasized that the burden was upon the prosecution to show that the failure of the defendant to assert his right was a knowing 1993(III) Assertion of the Right "In determining this factor, we are guided by the following observations of the former Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Prince v. Alabama , 507 F.2d 693 , 702-03 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied , 423 U.S. 876 , 96 S.Ct. 147 , 46 L.Ed.2d 108 (1975): " 'While the Court [in Barker ] indicated that the absolute failure of the defendant to assert his right would "make it difficult for [him] to prove that he was denied a speedy trial," the Court emphasized that the burden was upon the prosecution to show that the failure of the defendant to assert his right was a knowing | 2 | 1986–1993 |
Bailey v. State
green
2 sentences1985In Parmley v. State , 397 So.2d 183 (Ala.Cr.App. 1980), cert. denied, 397 So.2d 184 (Ala. 1981), this court, quoting Bailey v. State , 375 So.2d 519 (Ala.Cr.App. 1979), stated: "A claim of a denial of a speedy trial in violation of the Sixth Amendment is waived by an unqualified plea of guilty." Parmley , supra at 183. 1980"A claim of a denial of a speedy trial in violation of the Sixth Amendment is waived by an unqualified plea of guilty." Bailey v. State , 375 So.2d 519 (Ala.Cr.App. 1979). | 2 | 1980–1985 |
Moffett v. State
green
2 sentences2024The State argued in response that, "once Moffett was released, [a speedy-trial analysis] became inapplicable, as no charges were pending and Moffett was living as a free man." Moffett, 49 So. 3d at 1083 . 2024Citing MacDonald, supra, the Mississippi Supreme Court agreed with the State, holding that "[n]o speedy-trial rights under the Sixth Amendment [were] applicable to the period after Moffett was released following the 1995 no-bill until after he was indicted in 2002." Moffett, 49 So. 3d at 1084 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
United States v. MacDonald
green
1 sentence2024Citing MacDonald, supra, the Mississippi Supreme Court agreed with the State, holding that "[n]o speedy-trial rights under the Sixth Amendment [were] applicable to the period after Moffett was released following the 1995 no-bill until after he was indicted in 2002." Moffett, 49 So. 3d at 1084 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Guevara v. State green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| State v. Robinson green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Davis v. State green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Holtzman v. Goldman green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| State v. Johnson green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| State v. Woods green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Jackson v. State green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| O'BARR v. State green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Walker v. Davis green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Zumbado v. State green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| McCallum v. State green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Walker v. State green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Ex Parte Springer green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Turner v. State green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Smelley v. State green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Johnson v. Zerbst green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Cruse v. State green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Watkins v. State green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| McKinstry v. City of Tuscaloosa green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Shields v. State green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Dillingham v. United States green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Brantley v. State neutral | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Ex parte Brantley green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Kuczenska v. State green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Ex Parte Johnson green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.