Lite v. State, 617 So. 2d 1058 (Fla. 1993). · Go Syfert
Search
Lite v. State, 617 So. 2d 1058 (Fla. 1993). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“qual protection is not violated where a permissible classification includes one, but not others who might have been included in the broader classifications, as long as those within the legally formed class are accorded equal treatment under the law creating the classification.”
46 citation events (29 in the last 25 years) across 8 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Casey William Hardison v. The State of Wyoming (wyo, 2022-04-06)
Treatment trajectory · 1993 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1993 2009 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 22 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Casey William Hardison v. The State of Wyoming
Wyo. · 2022 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
qual protection is not violated where a permissible classification includes one, but not others who might have been included in the broader classifications, as long as those within the legally formed class are accorded equal treatment under the law creating the classification.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Silvio Membreno v. City of Hialeah (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
Co. of Fla., 97 So.3d 204, 212 (Fla.2012) (holding that the "substantive due process rights under the Florida and United States Constitutions” are analyzed under one, single, identical rational basis test); Ilkanic v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 705 So.2d 1371 , 1372 *21 (Fla.1998) (reviewing a challenge under the "due process provisions of the United States and Florida constitutions” under the identical rational basis test); Lite v. State, 617 So.2d 1058, 1059 (Fla.1993) (holding that the rational basis test under "both substantive due process and equal protection under the Florida and U.S. …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bradsheer v. Florida Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
According to Lite v. State, 617 So.2d 1058, 1060 (Fla.1993), there is no property interest in possessing a drivers license.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Borden v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
Further, his challenge to the retroactive application of section 322.245(5)(a), Florida Statutes (2004) to his cases must fail in light of the authorities recognizing that driving is a privilege and not a right, which can be "taken away or encumbered as a means of meeting a legitimate legislative goal." See Lite v. State, 617 So.2d 1058, 1060 (Fla.1993).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Menuto
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
Therefore, under the constitutions of the United States and Florida, to "comply with the constitutional guarantee of due process, a state statute must bear a reasonable relationship to a permissible legislative objective." Lite v. State, 617 So.2d 1058, 1059 (Fla. 1993).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) B.S. v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2003 · confidence medium
Further, the statute must not be discriminatory, arbitrary, or oppressive.” Lite v. State, 617 So.2d 1058, 1059-60 (Fla.1993) (internal citations omitted); see also Ilkanic v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 705 So.2d 1371, 1372 (Fla.1998); Joseph v. Henderson, 834 So.2d 373, 375 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) BS v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2003 · confidence medium
Further, the statute must not be discriminatory, arbitrary, or oppressive." Lite v. State, 617 So.2d 1058, 1059-60 (Fla.1993) (internal citations omitted); see also Ilkanic v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 705 So.2d 1371, 1372 (Fla.1998); Joseph v. Henderson, 834 So.2d 373, 375 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Diaz
Fla. · 2003 · confidence medium
Therefore, "the requirement of obtaining a driver's license and the exercise of the privilege of driving over the public highways, together with the correlative loss of the privilege under certain conditions, is a reasonable regulation of an individual right in the interest of the public good." Lite v. State, 617 So.2d 1058, 1060 (Fla.1993).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Butler
Fla. · 2000 · confidence medium
See Lane v. Chiles, 698 So.2d 260, 263 (Fla.1997); Lite v. Slate, 617 So.2d 1058, 1059 (Fla.1993); Belk-James, Inc. v. Nuzum, 358 So.2d 174, 175 (Fla.1978); Lasky v. State Farm Ins.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Bell (2×)
Iowa · 1997 · confidence medium
See, e.g., People v. Zinn, 843 P.2d 1351, 1354 (Colo.1993) (revocation sanction reasonable in view of governmental objective to prevent possession, use, or sale of controlled substances); Lite v. State, 617 So.2d 1058, 1060 (Fla.1993) (penalty rationally related to deterrence goal); Quiller v. Bowman, 262 Ga. 769 , 425 S.E.2d 641, 642-43 (1993) (license suspension furthers state's goal of deterring illegal drug use and transportation of illegal drugs); Mitchell v. State, 659 N.E.2d 112, 116 (Ind. 1995) (statute bears rational relationship to legitimate state interest in punishing and deterring…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lane v. Chiles
Fla. · 1997 · confidence medium
NOTES [1] Lite v. State, 617 So.2d 1058, 1059-60 (Fla. 1993). [2] LaBauve v. Louisiana Wildlife & Fisheries Comm'n, 444 F.Supp. 1370, 1382 (E.D.La.1978)(holding that the property interest in confiscated fishing nets and the property and liberty interests in the pursuit of a livelihood are not fundamental interests requiring strict scrutiny); Sisk v. Texas Parks & Wildlife Dep't, 644 F.2d 1056 , 1058 n. 5 (5th Cir.1981)(holding that fishing is not a fundamental right). [3] Sisk, 644 F.2d at 1058 n. 5 (holding that the class of commercial fishermen is not a suspect class which would subject the …
discussed Cited "see" Persaud Properties FL Investments, LLC v. Town of Fort Myers Beach, Florida
M.D. Fla. · 2023 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lite v. State, 617 So.2d 1058, 1060 (Fla. 1993) (explaining in the context of driver’s licenses that “there is no property interest in possessing a driver’s license.
cited Cited "see" Lescher v. FLORIDA DEPT. OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES
Fla. · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lite v. State, 617 So.2d 1058, 1060 (Fla.1993) ("[T]here is no property interest in possessing a driver's license.
cited Cited "see" Level 3 Communications, LLC v. Jacobs
Fla. · 2003 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lite v. State, 617 So.2d 1058 , 1061 n. 2 (Fla.1993).
discussed Cited "see" Westerheide v. State (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Fla. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lite v. State, 617 So.2d 1058, 1060 (Fla. 1993).
discussed Cited "see" Westerheide v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lite v. State, 617 So.2d 1058 (Fla.1993); Florida High School Activities Ass'n, Inc. v. Thomas, 434 So.2d 306 (Fla.1983); Rice v. State, 754 So.2d 881 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (citing Hershkowitz v. State, 744 So.2d 1268 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)); Barr v. State, 731 So.2d 126 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).
cited Cited "see" D.P. v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1997 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lite v. State, 617 So.2d 1058, 1059 (Fla.1993); Saiez, 489 So.2d at 1128 ; see also L.
cited Cited "see" DP v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1997 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lite v. State, 617 So.2d 1058, 1059 (Fla.1993); Saiez, 489 So.2d at 1128 ; see also L.
cited Cited "see" Lee v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lite v. State, 617 So.2d 1058 (Fla.1993).
cited Cited "see" Larrinaga v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lite v. State, 617 So.2d 1058 (Fla.1993).
discussed Cited "see" Williams v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 11901 (West 1992). 2 See also Brown v. State, 610 So.2d 1356, 1358 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (“[T]he statute at issue protects children and other tenants of public housing projects from drug-related crime that is, by all accounts, rampant in such areas.”), and Lite v. State, 617 So.2d 1058 (Fla.1993) (statute that requires revocation of driver’s license of person convicted of possession or sale of, trafficking in, or conspiracy to possess, sell, or traffic in a controlled substance bears rational relationship to legitimate state purpose and therefore does not violate constit…
cited Cited "see, e.g." Com. v. Ascenzi, M.
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2016 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also Lite v. State, 617 So. 2d 1058, 1060 (Fla. 1993) -8- J.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Terry LITE, Petitioner,
v.
STATE of Florida, Respondent.
79636.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Apr 15, 1993.
617 So. 2d 1058
McDonald.
Cited by 35 opinions  |  Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 68%
Citer courts: Wyoming Supreme Court (1)

[*1059] Richard Jorandby, Public Defender, and Robert Friedman, Asst. Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for petitioner.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen.; Joan Fowler, Senior Asst. Atty. Gen., James J. Carney and Douglas J. Glaid, Asst. Attys. Gen., West Palm Beach, for respondent.

McDONALD, Judge.

We have for review State v. Lite, 592 So.2d 1202 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992), in which the district court upheld the constitutionality of subsection 322.055(1), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1990). We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution. We approve the decision of the district court.

Terry Lite pled guilty to possession of cocaine in violation of subsection 893.03(2)(a)(4), Florida Statutes (1989). Subsection 322.055(1) provides in pertinent part that

upon the conviction of a person 18 years of age or older for possession or sale of trafficking in, or conspiracy to possess, sell, or traffic in a controlled substance, the court shall direct the department to revoke the driver's license or driving privilege of the person. The period of such revocation shall be 2 years or until the person is evaluated for and, if deemed necessary by the evaluating agency, completes a drug treatment and rehabilitation program approved or regulated by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. However, the court may, in its sound discretion, direct the department to issue a license for driving privileges restricted to business or employment purposes only, as defined by s. 322.271, if the person is otherwise qualified for such license.

(Emphasis added.) At Lite's sentencing hearing, the trial court found subsection 322.055(1) unconstitutional and refused to enforce the statute. The trial court held that the statute violated both substantive due process and equal protection under the Florida and U.S. Constitutions. On appeal the district court reversed the trial court's ruling and concluded that the statute was constitutional. We agree.

To comply with the constitutional guarantee of due process, a state statute must bear a reasonable relationship to a permissible legislative objective. Department of Ins. v. Southeast Volusia Hosp. Dist., 438 So.2d 815 (Fla. 1983), appeal dismissed, 466 U.S. 901, 104 S.Ct. 1673, 80 L.Ed.2d 149 (1984). Further, the statute[*1060] must not be discriminatory, arbitrary, or oppressive. Johns v. May, 402 So.2d 1166 (Fla. 1981). In enacting subsection 322.055(1), the Florida Legislature attempted to address the state's rapidly increasing problems of substance abuse and crime. See ch. 87-243, Laws of Fla. As a means of meeting this legislative goal, the statute requires the revocation of drivers' licenses of those convicted of possession, sale, or trafficking in a controlled substance. Because such a penalty "will deter the incidence of illicit drug possession, sales and trafficking, curtail the transportation of illegal drugs, and reduce the mobility of those involved in drugs," Lite, 592 So.2d at 1204, the license revocation provision is rationally related to the legislative goal.

Lite argues that the statute is an arbitrary exercise of the state's police power because a person's driver's license can be revoked even though a motor vehicle is not used in the commission of the offense. Florida law does not require that there be a direct relationship between the type of punishment and the offense itself.[1] In forfeiture proceedings, however, we have held that the government may not take an individual's property unless it proves by clear and convincing evidence that the property being forfeited was used in the commission of a crime. Department of Law Enforcement v. Real Property, 588 So.2d 957 (Fla. 1991). In contrast to the forfeiture action where there is a distinct interest in property, there is no property interest in possessing a driver's license. Rather, driving is a privilege, and the privilege can be taken away or encumbered as a means of meeting a legitimate legislative goal. City of Miami v. Aronovitz, 114 So.2d 784 (Fla. 1959). "[T]he requirement of obtaining a driver's license and the exercise of the privilege of driving over the public highways, together with the correlative loss of the privilege under certain conditions, is a reasonable regulation of an individual right in the interest of the public good." Id. at 787. Accordingly, subsection 322.055(1) is constitutionally valid even without the requirement that a motor vehicle be used during the commission of a crime.

We also disagree with Lite's contention that subsection 322.055(1) violates equal protection principles because it does not treat all drug offenders similarly. Lite complains that the statute revokes the licenses of those convicted of possession, sale, or trafficking of controlled substances, but it does not revoke the licenses of those convicted of purchase and delivery of a controlled substance. As in the due process analysis above, the rational basis standard is applied to determine whether subsection 322.055(1) denies equal protection.[2]Florida High School Activities Ass'n, Inc. v. Thomas, 434 So.2d 306 (Fla. 1983). Under the rational basis standard, the party challenging the statute bears the burden of showing that the statutory classification does not bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. Id. Lite has failed to meet his burden on this issue. As long as those people within the legally formed class are accorded equal treatment under the statute creating the classification, equal protection is not violated. LeBlanc v. State, 382 So.2d 299 (Fla. 1980) (equal protection does not require that every statutory classification be all inclusive); State v. White, 194 So.2d 601 (Fla. 1967).

[*1061] Because subsection 322.055(1) does not violate principles of substantive due process or equal protection, we approve the district court's decision that the statute is constitutional. The district court is directed to remand this case to the trial court for action consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

BARKETT, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW, GRIMES, KOGAN and HARDING, JJ., concur.

1 Other Florida statutes provide for the revocation or suspension of a person's driver's license upon the commission or omission of an act not directly related to the use of a motor vehicle. See, e.g., §§ 324.051 and 324.121, Fla. Stat. (1989) (failure of automobile owner to have liability insurance even if owner is not involved in accident); § 322.26(5), Fla. Stat. (1989) (committing perjury related to the ownership of a motor vehicle); §§ 318.15 and 322.245, Fla. Stat. (1989) (failure to comply with traffic court's directives and civil penalties); § 322.0601, Fla. Stat. (1989) (failure to attend high school); § 322.274, Fla. Stat. (1989) (committing theft of parts or components of motor vehicle).
2 The strict scrutiny standard should be applied only to those actions by the state that abridge some fundamental right or adversely affect a suspect class. Florida High School Activities Ass'n, Inc. v. Thomas, 434 So.2d 306 (Fla. 1983). Because driving is not a fundamental right and drug offenders do not constitute a suspect class, the strict scrutiny standard is not applicable in the instant case.