Pilson v. Bordenkircher, 444 U.S. 1 (1979). · Go Syfert
Search
Pilson v. Bordenkircher, 444 U.S. 1 (1979). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“conduct by persons acting under color of state law which is 2 wrongful under 42 u.s.c. 1983 ... cannot be immunized by state law.”
111 citation events (6 in the last 25 years) across 16 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Martinez v. Nienow (casd, 2024-12-20)
Treatment trajectory · 1980 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1980 2003 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 11 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Martinez v. Nienow
S.D. Cal. · 2024 · signal: see also · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
conduct by persons acting under color of state law which is 2 wrongful under 42 u.s.c. 1983 ... cannot be immunized by state law.
cited Cited as authority (rule) M. W. Holloway v. Clay E. McElroy Warden
5th Cir. · 1981 · confidence medium
Id. at 2, 100 S.Ct. at 8 (emphasis added).
examined Cited "see" Brown v. Bravo (3×)
10th Cir. · 2013 · signal: see · confidence high
See Pilon v. Bordenkircher, 444 U.S. 1, 2 , 100 S.Ct. 7 , 62 L.Ed.2d 1 (1979) (per curiam) (sufficiency of the evidence inquiry is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt” (quotation omitted)).
cited Cited "see" Brown v. Champion
10th Cir. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See Pilon v. Bordenkircher, 444 U.S. 1, 2 (1979); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).
examined Cited "see" Dante Ferrazza v. Barry Mintzes (3×)
6th Cir. · 1984 · signal: see · confidence high
See Pilon v. Bordenkircher, 593 F.2d 264 , 267 n. 4 (6th Cir.), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 444 U.S. 1 , 100 S.Ct. 7 , 62 L.Ed.2d 1 (1979).
examined Cited "see" Watson v. Nix (3×)
S.D. Iowa · 1982 · signal: see · confidence high
See Pilon v. Bordenkircher, 444 U.S. 1 , 100 S.Ct. 7 , 62 L.Ed.2d 1 (1979) (per curiam); Moore v. Duckworth, 443 U.S. 713 , 99 S.Ct. 3088 , 61 L.Ed.2d 865 (1979) (per curiam); Lenza v. Wyrick, 665 F.2d 804, 811-812 (8th Cir.1981); Holloway v. McElroy, 632 F.2d 605, 636-39 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1028 , 101 S.Ct. 3019 , 69 L.Ed.2d 398 (1981); Knutson v. Brewer, 619 F.2d 747, 751 (8th Cir. 1980).
examined Cited "see" Richard Brewer v. R. Overberg, Superintendent, London Correctional Institution, Respondent (3×)
6th Cir. · 1980 · signal: see · confidence high
See Pilon v. Bordenkircher, 593 F.2d 264 (6th Cir.), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 444 U.S. 1 , 100 S.Ct. 7 , 62 L.Ed.2d 1 (1979).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Sanders v. Fischer
E.D.N.Y · 2021 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294 , 303 n.5 (1984). “[E]vidence is sufficient to support a conviction so long as ‘after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Cavazos v. Smith, 565 U.S. 1, 7 (2011) (per curiam) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)); see also Pilon v. Bordenkircher, 444 U.S. 1, 2 (1979) (per curiam).
examined Cited "see, e.g." Kennedy v. Shillinger (3×)
D. Wyo. · 1991 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also, Pilon v. Bordenkircher, 444 U.S. 1 , 100 S.Ct. 7 , 62 L.Ed.2d 1 (1979); Sanders/Miller v. Logan, 710 F.2d 645, 652-53 (10th Cir.1983); Soap v. Carter, 632 F.2d 872 (10th Cir.1980), cert. denied 451 U.S. 939 , 101 S.Ct. 2021 , 68 L.Ed.2d 327 (1981).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Fred D. Rohdes v. Gary Mohr
6th Cir. · 1989 · signal: see also · confidence low
"Federal courts have no supervisory authority over state judicial proceedings and may intervene only to correct wrongs of constitutional dimension." Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 221 (1982); see also Smith v. Zimmerman, 768 F.2d 69, 71 (3d Cir.1985). 8 The question before us is simply whether "state law on the matter violated due process." Pilon v. Bordenkircher, 593 F.2d 264 , 267 n. 4 (6th Cir.1978), vacated on other grounds, 444 U.S. 1 (1980); see also Wainwright v. Goode, 464 U.S. 78, 86 (1983); Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 957-58 (1983); Salanda v. New York, No. 84 Civ. 5254 (VLB)…
examined Cited "see, e.g." State v. Garcia (3×)
Or. · 1980 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also, Pilon v. Bordenkircher, 441 US 1 , 100 S Ct 7 , 62 L Ed2d 1 (1979).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Pilon
v.
Bordenkircher, Warden
78-6932.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Oct 9, 1979.
444 U.S. 1
1979 U.S. LEXIS 149
Per Curiam.
Cited by 48 opinions  |  Published
Per Curiam.

The petitioner was convicted in a Kentucky court on a charge of first-degree manslaughter, and the judgment of conviction was sustained on direct appeal. Pilon v. Common [*2] wealth, 544 S. W. 2d 228 (Ky. 1976). The petitioner then filed a habeas corpus petition in a Federal District Court, alleging that the Kentucky conviction was supported by evidence insufficient to afford him due process of law. The federal court denied relief. Applying the “no evidence” test of Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U. S. 199 (1960), the court concluded that “'[a] Ithough this was a close case on the evidence, we believe that the case was not devoid of an evidentiary basis for petitioner’s conviction.” * The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, also relying on the “no evidence” test, affirmed the denial of habeas corpus relief. 593 F. 2d 264.

Thereafter, this Court in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (1979), held that the Thompson “no evidence” test is constitutionally inadequate in a case such as this. An earlier decision had made clear that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the criminal conviction of any person except upon proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358 (1970). The Court in Jackson held that this constitutional requirement can be effectuated only if a federal habeas corpus court, in assessing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a state-court conviction, inquires “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” 443 U. S., at 319 (emphasis omitted).

It is thus beyond dispute that the District Court and Court of Appeals applied an incorrect and inadequate constitutional test in resolving the petitioner’s due process claim that his state-court conviction rested on insufficient evidence. Although it is quite possible that the evidence against the petitioner will survive a challenge under the correct constitutional standard, he is entitled to have his application for habeas corpus considered under that standard.

[*3] The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for certiorari are granted, the judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the District Court for the Western District of Kentucky so that it may consider the petitioner’s application for habeas corpus in the light of Jackson v. Virginia.

It is so ordered.

*

The opinion of the District Court is unreported.