Tropical Park, Inc. v. Jock, 374 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). · Go Syfert
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Tropical Park, Inc. v. Jock, 374 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
8 citation events across 4 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Ziskis v. Kowalski (ctd, 1989-12-07)
Top citers, strongest first. 2 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ziskis v. Kowalski (2×)
D. Conn. · 1989 · confidence medium
Silbert v. Ramsey, 301 Md. 96, 106 , 482 A.2d 147, 153 (1984) (regulations concerning the authority to exclude tipsters and the makers of handbooks and unauthorized persons not intended to change the common law right to exclude undesirables); James v. Churchill Downs, Inc., 620 S.W.2d 323, 325 (Ky.Ct.App.1981) (statute vesting the racing commission with authority to exclude undesirables from racetracks did not abrogate the common law right); Tropical Park, Inc. v. Jock, 374 So.2d 639, 640 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1979), cert. denied, Jock v. Tropical Park, Inc., 383 So.2d 1196 (1980) (statute requirin…
cited Cited "see" Hernandez v. State
Fla. Cir. Ct. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See, Tropical Park, Inc. v. Jock, 374 So.2d 639 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); cert. denied 383 So.2d 1196 (Fla. 1980).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
TROPICAL PARK, INC., Appellant,
v.
Frank J. JOCK, Appellee.
79-260.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Aug 21, 1979.
374 So. 2d 639
1979 Fla. App. LEXIS 15723
Barkdull and Hubbart, Jj., and Chappell, Bill G., Associate Judge.
Cited by 6 opinions  |  Published

Taylor, Brion, Buker & Greene and Arnaldo Velez, Miami, for appellant.

Allsworth, Doumar, Schuler, Padula & Laystorm and Charles L. Curtis, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.

Before BARKDULL and HUBBART, JJ., and CHAPPELL, BILL G., Associate Judge.

PER CURIAM.

The appellant, Tropical Park, Inc., excluded a patron from the premises upon[*640] which it was operating a horse racing meet, allegedly because of known underworld connections.

The patron (the appellee) brought a suit seeking a mandatory injunction and damages. The trial court entered a temporary injunction requiring the appellant to admit the appellee. This appeal ensued.

We reverse. A commercial establishment, particularly one of such a sensitive nature as a pari-mutuel operator, continues to possess the common law right to absolutely exclude a patron[1] in this State. This right has not been abrogated by any statutes in Florida, although the contrary has occurred in other states. Burrilville Racing Association v. Garabedian, 113 R.I. 134, 318 A.2d 469 (1974); Rockwell v. Pennsylvania State Horse Racing Commission, 15 Pa.Cmwlth. 348, 327 A.2d 211 (1974). Contra: Nation v. Apache Greyhound Park, 119 Ariz. 76, 579 P.2d 580 (1978). Without an abrogation by statute in a common law state, the operator of a race track facility has been held, in other jurisdictions, to continue to possess the right to exclude a patron. Madden v. Queens County Jockey Club, 296 N.Y. 249, 72 N.E.2d 697, 1 A.L.R.2d 1160 (1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761, 68 S.Ct. 63, 92 L.Ed. 346 (1947); Jacobson v. New York Racing Association, 33 N.Y.2d 144, 350 N.Y.S.2d 639, 305 N.E.2d 765 (1973); Griffin v. Southland Racing Corp., 236 Ark. 872, 370 S.W.2d 429 (1963); Tamelleo v. New Hampshire Jockey Club, 102 N.H. 547, 163 A.2d 10 (1960); Garifine v. Monmouth Park Jockey Club, 29 N.J. 47, 148 A.2d 1 (1958); Greenfield v. Maryland Jockey Club of Baltimore, 190 Md. 96, 57 A.2d 335 (1948); Presti v. New York Racing Association, 46 A.D.2d 387, 363 N.Y.S.2d 24 (1975); Vaintraub v. New York Racing Association, 28 A.D.2d 660, 280 N.Y.S.2d 758 (1967); Annot. 1 A.L.R.2d 1165 (1948). The appellee also urges that because the statutes require the operator to exclude or prevent certain persons from being patrons, e.g. Section 550.361 Florida Statutes (Supp. 1978), that this was a preemption of the common law right to exclude. We disagree. At most, it would be a preemption in the designated classes that were to be excluded and not a preemption as to the entire field of exclusion of patrons.

Therefore, finding no right to be a patron in the appellee, we find no merit in the cause of action pled and, therefore, not in the temporary injunction issued. The trial court is directed to vacate the temporary injunction forthwith and to dismiss the cause of action at the cost of the plaintiff in the trial court.

Reversed and remanded, with directions.

1 With certain exceptions based on race, religion, etc. See e.g. People v. Licata, 28 N.Y.2d 113, 320 N.Y.S.2d 53, 268 N.E.2d 787 (1971); Madden v. Queens County Jockey Club, Inc., supra; Bonomo v. Louisiana Downs, Inc., 337 So.2d 553 (La. App. 1976).