Cnty. of Monterey v. Madolora, 341 P.2d 333 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959). · Go Syfert
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Cnty. of Monterey v. Madolora, 341 P.2d 333 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
13 citation events across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: Wilson v. County of Santa Clara (calctapp, 1977-03-15)
Top citers, strongest first. 5 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wilson v. County of Santa Clara
Cal. Ct. App. · 1977 · confidence medium
A review of the authorities is of little value, except to illustrate the fact just stated that, in order to arrive at the intent with which it was used in the particular case, the word is to be construed in the light of all attending circumstances.” (Meyers v. The Texas Co. (1936) 6 Cal.2d 610, 619-620 [59 P.2d *84 132].) “Construction of a statute is a question of law for the court. [Citations.]” (County of Monterey v. Madolora (1959) 171 Cal.App.2d 840, 841 [ 341 P.2d 333 ].) We are mindful it is apparent from the statute itself, and has been noted, that the Legislature recognized that…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sand v. Mahnan
Cal. Ct. App. · 1967 · confidence medium
Proc., § 2102] ; Estate of Madison, 26 Cal.2d 453, 456-457 [ 159 P.2d 630 ]; County of Monterey v. Madolora, 171 Cal.App.2d 840, 841 [ 341 P.2d 333 ].) Consequently, the court properly refused the instruction inasmuch as the matter of interpretation or construction of the guest statute was purely a legal question.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sand v. Mahnan
Cal. Ct. App. · 1967 · confidence medium
Proc., 2102]; Estate of Madison, 26 Cal.2d 453, 456-457 [ 159 P.2d 630 ]; County of Monterey v. Madolora, 171 Cal.App.2d 840, 841 [ 341 P.2d 333 ].) Consequently, the court properly refused the instruction inasmuch as the matter of interpretation or construction of the guest statute was purely a legal question. [6] Plaintiff next urges that the following instruction should have been given: "Where the transportation is provided for a consideration or benefit accruing to the driver, liability is imposed for ordinary negligence proximately causing the injury," and relies on Conway v. Gurney, 181 …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hom v. Clark
Cal. Ct. App. · 1963 · confidence medium
The construction of a statute and its applicability to a given situation are matters *637 of law to be determined by the court. {Estate of Madison, 26 Cal.2d 453, 456 [ 159 P.2d 630 ]; Neal v. State of California, 55 Cal.2d 11, 17 [ 9 Cal.Rptr. 607 , 357 P.2d 839 ]; County of Monterey v. Madolora, 171 Cal.App.2d 840, 841 [ 341 P.2d 333 ]; Chiappe v. Eichenbaum, 169 Cal.App.2d 46, 53 [ 336 P.2d 1045 ]; Code Civ.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) City of Norwalk v. Auction City, Inc.
Cal. Ct. App. · 1960 · confidence medium
(See Reid & Sibell v. Gilmore & Edwards Co., 134 Cal.App.2d 60, 72 [ 285 P.2d 364 ] ; County of Monterey v. Madolora, 171 Cal.App.2d 840, 841 [ 341 P.2d 333 ].) “In construing a zoning ordinance the same rules are normally applicable as in construing statutes in general (City of Yuba City v. Cherniavsky, 117 Cal.App. 568, 571 [ 4 P.2d 299 ]) and accordingly a zoning ordinance must be construed reasonably considering the objects sought to be attained and the general structure of the ordinance as a whole (Yokley Zoning Law and Practice, p. 318; Petros v. Superintendent & Inspector of Buildings…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
COUNTY OF MONTEREY, Appellant,
v.
A. C. MADOLORA Et Al., Respondents; GEORGE NAKAGAWA Et Al., Respondents, v. COUNTY OF MONTEREY, Appellant
Civ. 18468; Civ. 18469.
California Court of Appeal.
Jul 10, 1959.
341 P.2d 333
1959 Cal. App. LEXIS 1905
William H. Stoffers, County Counsel, and John 0. Thorn-berry, Chief Deputy County Counsel, for Appellant., J. R. Lamoreaux for Respondents.
Draper.
Cited by 6 opinions  |  Published
DRAPER, J.

Is a strawberry plant a vine? That is the question presented in these consolidated eases.

One action is by the county to collect taxes levied upon strawberry plants, and the other is by taxpayers to recover like taxes paid under protest. Judgment was in favor of both groups of taxpayers, and the county appeals.

Land and the improvements thereon are to be separately assessed for taxation (Cal. Const., art. XIII, §2). Under constitutional authorization (art. XIII, §13), the Legislature has defined “improvements” as including “fruit, nut bearing, or ornamental trees and vines ...” (Rev. & Tax. Code, §105). On the assumption that strawberry plants are vines, the county here assessed commercially grown plants separately from the lands upon which the plants grew. Concededly, strawberry plants come within the quoted code section only if they are vines. If not within this section, they cannot be separately assessed. (Miller v. County of Kern, 137 Cal. 516 [70 P. 549].)

Construction of a statute is a question of law for the court. (Hall v. City of Taft, 47 Cal.2d 177, 188 [302 P.2d 574]; Sheehy v. Shinn, 103 Cal. 325, 328-329 [37 P. 393] ; California M. Express v. State Board of Equalization, 133 Cal.App.2d 237, 241 [283 P.2d 1063].)

By dictionary definition, a vine is a plant having a stem (Webster’s New International Dictionary [2d ed.] ; Funk & Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary). General usage seems clearly to regard the stem, by which a plant climbs or extends, as the principal distinguishing characteristic of a vine. But a strawberry plant is stemless (Funk & Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary; The Oxford-English Dictionary). In other respects, the dictionary definitions of the strawberry, whether called by that common term or by its botanical name “fragaria,” contain elements which seem to negate vineal characteristics. Appellant finds comfort only in the Webster definition of “strawberry vine” as “the plant which yields the strawberry.” In view of the contrary indications of the many definitions of the strawberry, we cannot deem this single statement controlling. Thus we conclude- that in the general and ordinary understanding, a[*842] strawberry plant is not a vine. Such usage is the normal guide in statutory construction. (McMillan v. Siemon, 36 Cal.App.2d 721, 726 [98 P.2d 790].)

If, however, the word “vine” be deemed used in its technical sense, we may look to the testimony of the botanist witness. (Civ. Code, § 1645; Sheehy v. Shinn, supra, 103 Cal. 325, 329.) His testimony establishes that a stem and tendrils, characteristics of a vine, are not found in the strawberry plant. He points out that the runner of a strawberry plant is not a stem, but merely a means of propagation which disintegrates when a new plant roots from a node of the runner.

The strawberry plants here involved are not vines within the meaning of the code section. Thus they may not be assessed separately from the land.

Judgment affirmed.

Kaufman, P. J., and Dooling, J., concurred.