191 Ga. App. at 566 dismissing appeal and 8 concluding that, in strictly construing OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) against the State, appeal not authorized “because the State is not appealing from the trial court’s order granting appellee’s motion to suppress the seized evidence and is not challenging that ruling, but instead is ap…5 citing cases
- State v. Thomas G. Petty, 870 S.E.2d 241 (Ga. Ct. App. 2022).published(dismissing appeal and 8 concluding that, in strictly construing OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) against the State, appeal not authorized “because the State is not appealing from the trial court’s order granting appellee’s motion to su…)
- State v. Smith, 707 S.E.2d 560 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011).publishedAs its source, Land-O-Sun cites State v. McIntyre, 191 Ga. App. 565, 566 ( 382 SE2d 669 ) (1989), which cites to identical language in State v. Gribble, 169 Ga. App. 446, 446 ( 313 SE2d 720 ) (1984).
- King v. State, 432 S.E.2d 109 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993).publishedThe trial court’s jurisdiction, which was removed when the State filed its notice of appeal, is not retroactively supplied by the fact that the appeal was later dismissed by order of the Supreme Court “for lack of a right of appeal in the…
- State v. Phillips, 425 S.E.2d 412 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992).publishedState v. Clark, 191 Ga. App. 708, 709 ( 382 SE2d 670 ) (1989); State v. McIntyre, 191 Ga. App. 565, 566 ( 382 SE2d 669 ) (1989).
- State v. Land-O-Sun Dairies, Inc., 419 S.E.2d 743 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992).publishedSee Id.; State v. McIntyre, 191 Ga. App. 565, 566 ( 382 SE2d 669 ) (1989).
191 Ga. App. at 565 Sognier, Judge. The State appeals from the trial court’s order granting the motion of Clarence McIntyre, Jr. for return of property pursuant to OCGA § 17-5-30.…2 citing cases
- State v. Islam, 912 S.E.2d 632 (Ga. 2025).published First, the Court of Appeals pointed to its decision in State v. McIntyre, 191 Ga. App. 565, 565-566 (382 SE2d 669) (1989), which also concerned the State’s appeal from the grant of a motion brought under OCGA § 17-5-30.
- State v. Md Nazmul Islam, No. A23A1702 (Ga. Ct. App. Jan. 17, 2024).publishedThis Court has previously held that OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (4) did not authorize an appeal by the State of an order granting the defendant’s motion for return of property, “because the State [was] not appealing from the trial court’s order grant…
v.
McINTYRE
The State appeals from the trial court’s order granting the motion of Clarence McIntyre, Jr. for return of property pursuant to OCGA § 17-5-30.
The State contends this appeal is authorized by OCGA § 5-7-1 (3) as an appeal from an order “sustaining a plea or motion in bar,[*566] when the defendant has not been put in jeopardy.” We do not agree. As the record reveals that the State has stipulated it will not use the property at issue in the trial of the charges pending against appellee, the order on appeal does not operate to bar appellee’s prosecution. Compare State v. Benton, 246 Ga. 132 (269 SE2d 470) (1980); State v. Rowe, 138 Ga. App. 904-905 (1) (228 SE2d 3) (1976), overruled in part on other grounds, Cleary v. State, 258 Ga. 203, 205 (366 SE2d 677) (1988). Nor is this appeal permissible under OCGA § 5-7-1 (4), which authorizes appeals by the State from orders sustaining motions to suppress, because the State is not appealing from the trial court’s order granting appellee’s motion to suppress the seized evidence and is not challenging that ruling, but instead is appealing from the subsequent order compelling the return of the seized property to appellee. Construing OCGA § 5-7-1 strictly against the State as we are bound to do, State v. Gribble, 169 Ga. App. 446 (313 SE2d 720) (1984), we conclude the instant appeal does not fall within any of the circumstances in which the State is authorized to appeal, and accordingly the appeal is dismissed. See id.
Decided May 16, 1989. Robert E. Keller, District Attorney, Clifford A. Sticker, Assistant District Attorney, for appellant. Jerome J. Froelich, Jr., for appellee.Appeal dismissed.
Banke, P. J., and Pope, J., concur.