State v. Tuttle, 713 P.2d 703 (Utah 1985). · Go Syfert
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State v. Tuttle, 713 P.2d 703 (Utah 1985). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“criminal appeal 18 dismissed after escape may be reinstated unless the state can show that it has been 19 prejudiced by the defendant's absence and the consequent lapse of time.”
75 citation events (51 in the last 25 years) across 10 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: State v. Moss (or, 2012-06-07)
Treatment trajectory · 1985 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1985 2005 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 22 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) State v. Moss (2×)
Or. · 2012 · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence high
criminal appeal 18 dismissed after escape may be reinstated unless the state can show that it has been 19 prejudiced by the defendant's absence and the consequent lapse of time.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Ralphs v. McClellan
Utah · 2014 · confidence medium
We have characterized that right as "essential to a fair criminal proceeding," and thus a matter that cannot be "lightly forfeited." State v. Tuttle, 713 P.2d 703, 704 (Utah 1985).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Hentges
Minn. · 2014 · confidence medium
Fund Corp. v. Billman, 321 Md. 3 , 580 A.2d 1044, 1046 (1990); Commonwealth v. Andrews, 97 Mass. 543, 544 (1867); Derrick v. State, 406 So.2d 48, 48 (Miss.1981); State v. Crump, 128 S.W.3d 642, 642-43 (Mo.Ct.App.2004); State v. Dempsey, 26 Mont. 504 , 68 P. 1114, 1114-15 (1902); State v. Goree, 11 Neb.App. 685 , 659 N.W.2d 344, 349 (2003); Arvey v. State, 94 Nev. 566 , 583 P.2d 1086, 1087 (1978) (per curiam); State v. Patten, 134 N.H. 319 , 591 A.2d 1329, 1330 (1991); State v. Rogers, 90 N.J. 187 , 447 A.2d 537, 539 (1982); People v. Genet, 59 N.Y. 80, 82 (1874); State v. Jacobs, 107 N.C. 772 …
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Collins
Utah Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that “the right of appeal [is] essential to a fair criminal proceeding” and cannot be “lightly forfeited.” State v. Tuttle, 713 P.2d 703, 704 (Utah 1985).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Bolding
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
See Mascarenas v. State, 94 N.M. 506 , 612 P.2d 1317, 1318 (1980); State v. Tuttle, 713 P.2d 703, 704-05 (Utah 1985); accord Evolga, 519 N.E.2d at 534 (act of escape, by itself, not proof of knowing and voluntary relinquishment of right to appeal). ¶ 18 Like most constitutional rights, the right to appeal may be waived, but only if the waiver is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Gordon v. Maughan (3×) also: Cited "see"
Utah Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
The court reinstated Tuttle's appeal because it determined "that a rule automatically denying reinstatement of an escapee's appeal upon a return to custody really amounts to imposition by thle appellate clourt of a punishment for escape." Id. at 704-05 (emphasis added).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) City of Seattle v. Klein
Wash. · 2007 · confidence medium
E.g., Mascarenas v. State, 94 N.M. 506 , 612 P.2d 1317, 1318 (1980); [12] State v. Tuttle, 713 P.2d 703, 705 (Utah 1985). [13] In conclusion, any conflict between waiver and the right to appeal must be decided in favor of the express constitutional right. ¶ 22 We recognize that Washington courts have dismissed appeals where the criminal appellant fled the jurisdiction, escaped from jail, or violated the conditions of release pending appeal.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) City of Seattle v. Klein
Wash. · 2007 · confidence medium
E.g., Mascarenas v. State, 94 N.M. 506 , 612 P.2d 1317, 1318 (1980); 12 State v. Tuttle, 713 P.2d 703, 705 (Utah 1985). 13 In conclusion, any conflict between waiver and the right to appeal must be decided in favor of the express constitutional right. ¶22 We recognize that Washington courts have dismissed appeals where the criminal appellant fled the jurisdiction, escaped from jail, or violated the conditions of release pending appeal.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Lara
Utah · 2005 · confidence medium
Manning v. State, *248 2005 UT 61 , 122 P.3d 628 ; State v. Tuttle, 713 P.2d 703, 704 (Utah 1985). ¶ 23 Our recently decided ease, Manning , illustrates the difficulties and complications that accompany the task of matching jurisdictional rationale to workable procedure where appellate jurisdiction appears to have been forfeited.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Manning v. State (2×) also: Cited "see"
Utah Ct. App. · 2004 · confidence medium
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that “the right of appeal [is] essential to a fair criminal proceeding” and it cannot be “lightly forfeited.” State v. Tuttle, 713 P.2d 703, 704 (Utah 1985).
examined Cited as authority (rule) State v. Lara (6×) also: Cited "see"
Utah Ct. App. · 2003 · confidence medium
The district court assured him that it would remove him from adult jail and place him instead in more appropriate juvenile detention, but that it could only do so if he dismissed his appeal. [ 24 Accordingly, it would not be improper to reinstate Lara's direct appeal from the juvenile court's bindover order, Because the State "has [not] been prejudiced by the ... lapse of time" resulting from this case's procedural and appellate labyrinth, "the appeal is reinstated." State v. Tuttle, 713 P.2d 703, 705 (Utah 1985).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Clark v. Clark (2×)
Utah · 2001 · confidence medium
This court has "not hesitated ... to reverse case law when we are firmly convinced that we have erred earlier." - Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417 , 424 n. 5 (Utah 1990); see, eg., State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399 (Utah 1994); State v. Tuttle, 713 P.2d 703, 704 (Utah 1985).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Anderson
Utah · 1996 · confidence medium
When the defendant was finally brought before the court for sentencing, he argued that the circumstances made a meaningful appeal impossible and that therefore he was entitled to the grant of a new trial. 1 The trial court denied the grant, and we affirmed, observing that the denial was “not a sanction or punishment for his flight but [was] an unavoidable result of his long absence from the jurisdiction.” We quoted State v. Tuttle, 713 P.2d 703, 705 (Utah 1985), for the proposition that in some circumstances, a defendant’s absence from the jurisdiction can occasion the loss of a criminal…
examined Cited as authority (rule) White v. Deseelhorst (4×)
Utah · 1994 · confidence medium
In keeping with this rule, this court has "not hesitated ... to reverse cas.e law when we are firmly convinced that we have erred earlier.” Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417 , 424 n. 5 (Utah 1990); see, e.g., Menzies, 235 Utah Adv.Rep. at 25; - P.2d at - State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 427 (Utah 1986); State v. Tuttle, 713 P.2d 703, 704 (Utah 1985).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Moya (2×)
Utah Ct. App. · 1991 · confidence medium
In State v. Tuttle, 713 P.2d 703, 704 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court stated that “under the settled rule of Hardy v. Morris, Utah, 636 P.2d 473 (1981) [,] ... one who escapes places himself beyond the reach of the judicial system and any ruling cannot be enforced against him; therefore, he should not be allowed to pursue an appeal while out of custody.” It is undisputed that Moya is presently a fugitive from the criminal justice system.
cited Cited as authority (rule) D'Aston v. D'Aston
Utah Ct. App. · 1990 · confidence medium
State v. Tuttle, 713 P.2d 703, 704 (Utah 1985); see also Hardy v. Morris, 636 P.2d 473, 474 (Utah 1981) (court dismissed an escapee’s appeal from a dismissal of a writ of habeas corpus).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Matter of SH
D.C. · 1990 · confidence medium
Additional resources have been consumed in the briefing of the escape issue and preparation of this opinion. [9] For recent instances where courts have decided an appeal on the merits after the recapture of a fugitive appellant, see State v. Byrd, 448 N.W.2d 29, 30-31 (Iowa 1989) (refusing to dismiss fugitive's appeal after his recapture); Hurley, supra, 391 Mass. at 78-82 , 461 N.E.2d at 756-57 (reinstating recaptured fugitive's appeal provided that the trial court finds no prejudice to the government because of delay caused by appellant's flight); State v. Tuttle, 713 P.2d 703, 705 (Utah 198…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re S.H.
D.C. · 1990 · confidence medium
For recent instances where courts have decided an appeal on the merits after the recapture of a fugitive appellant, see State v. Byrd, 448 N.W.2d 29, 30-31 (Iowa 1989) (refusing to dismiss fugitive’s appeal after his recapture); Hurley, supra, 391 Mass, at 78-82, 461 N.E.2d at 756-57 (reinstating recaptured fugitive’s appeal provided that the trial court finds no prejudice to the government because of delay caused by appellant’s flight); State v. Tuttle, 713 P.2d 703, 705 (Utah 1985) (reinstating recaptured fugitive’s appeal). .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Staker v. Ainsworth (2×)
Utah · 1990 · confidence medium
See, e.g., State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 427 (Utah 1986), overruling State v. Norton, 675 P.2d 577 (Utah 1983); State v. Tuttle, 713 P.2d 703, 704 (Utah 1985), overruling State v. Brady, 655 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1982); American Fork City v. Crosgrove, 701 P.2d 1069, 1075 (Utah 1985), overruling Hansen v. Owens, 619 P.2d 315 (Utah 1980).
examined Cited "see" State v. Bradford (4×)
Utah Ct. App. · 2011 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Tuttle, 713 P.2d 703, 704 (Utah 1985).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Commonwealth v. Adams, F., Aplt.
Pa. · 2019 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See , e.g. , State v. Tuttle , 713 P.2d 703 (Utah 1985) ; Mascarenas v. State , 94 N.M. 506 , 612 P.2d 1317 (1980). 6 We also note that a trial in absentia is qualitatively distinct from the appeals process, and simply because trials can be conducted without a defendant does not suggest the appellate process is similarly required to proceed in a defendant's absence.
cited Cited "see, e.g." Bargo v. State
Ark. · 2005 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., State v. Tuttle, supra. Bargo argues that his absence and the resultant lapse of time .have created no negative effect on the appeals process.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Wesley Allen TUTTLE, Defendant and Appellant
20068.
Utah Supreme Court.
Oct 18, 1985.
713 P.2d 703
Kenneth R. Brown, Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellant., David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent.
Zimmerman, Stewart, Durham, Howe, Hall.
Cited by 35 opinions  |  Published

Lead Opinion

ZIMMERMAN, Justice:

Defendant Wesley Allen Tuttle was convicted of first degree murder by a jury in Summit County, Utah. After a penalty hearing before the trial judge, he was sentenced to life imprisonment on May 21, 1984. Tuttle filed a notice of appeal on July 12, 1984. He escaped from the Utah State Prison on August 21, 1984, and was returned to custody on February 7, 1985. While he was free, this Court dismissed his appeal. On August 15, 1985, following Tuttle’s return to prison, we reinstated the appeal by minute order. This opinion explains the reasons for that action.

In dismissing Tuttle’s appeal, the Court acted under the settled rule of Hardy v. Morris, Utah, 636 P.2d 473 (1981). Hardy reasoned that one who escapes places himself beyond the reach of the judicial system and any ruling cannot be enforced against him; therefore, he should not be allowed to pursue an appeal while out of custody. Id. at 474. Once Tuttle was returned to custody, this Court’s power again extended to Tuttle and the rationale of Hardy no longer applies. The question is whether other grounds justify a refusal to reinstate the appeal.

The State urges that under our per curiam opinion in State v. Brady, Utah, 655 P.2d 1132 (1982), an appeal dismissed because of the appellant’s escape is not entitled to reinstatement because “[b]y escaping and remaining at large until he was involuntarily returned to custody, appellant abandoned his appeal _” Id. at 1133. Upon reflection, we find the abandonment reasoning of Brady unpersuasive and we find no other convincing reason for routinely refusing to reinstate appeals of convicts who have been returned to custody. We therefore overrule Brady to the extent that it is inconsistent with this opinion.

The Utah Constitution provides that a defendant in a criminal prosecution shall have a “right to appeal in all cases.” Utah Const, art. I, § 12. This shows that the drafters of our constitution considered the right of appeal essential to a fair criminal proceeding. Rights guaranteed by our state constitution are to be carefully protected by the courts. We will not permit them to be lightly forfeited. The stated premise of Brady — that an escape is an intentional abandonment of an appeal — is founded upon a questionable assumption, i.e., that one who escapes has actually made a decision to abandon his appeal. A far more reasonable assumption is that the escapee has not even considered how his escape will affect his appeal rights. See Note, 54 N.C.L.Rev. 224, 234 (1976).

If an escape cannot honestly be said to be a knowing waiver of appeal rights, then we must look deeper for some justification for the result reached by Brady and sought by the State here. Analysis suggests that a rule automatically denying reinstatement of an escapee’s appeal upon a return to custody really amounts to imposi[*705] tion by this Court of a punishment for escape. See Note, supra, at 234-37. Neither law nor logic justifies our undertaking to impose such a sanction. First, the legislature has already proscribed escape and set penalties for that offense. U.C.A., 1953, § 76-8-309 (1978 ed.). Nothing in the law warrants this Court’s imposing an additional punishment for escape. See Mascarenas v. State, 94 N.M. 506, 507, 612 P.2d 1317, 1318 (1980).

Second, denying reinstatement of an escapee’s appeal would impose a punishment related not to the offense — the escape — but to the crime of which the escapee was originally convicted. For example, if one escapee had been erroneously convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment and another had been wrongfully convicted of theft and sentenced to one year, a refusal to reinstate either appeal would have the effect of imposing dramatically different punishments for the same offense — escape.

Finally, refusing to reinstate the appeals of escapees necessarily operates to punish only those with meritorious grounds for appeal, for those whose appeals lack merit will obtain no relief under any circumstances. The foregoing suggests that refusing to reinstate appeals of those who escape and are returned to custody raises serious due process and equal protection questions under the Utah Constitution. See Estelle v. Dorrough, 420 U.S. 534, 544-45, 95 S.Ct. 1173, 1179, 43 L.Ed.2d 377 (1975) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Note, supra, at 234.[1]

In light of the fundamental nature of the right to appellate review of a criminal conviction and the lack of any sound practical or policy justification for refusing to hear the appeals of escapees after they are returned to custody, we conclude that a criminal appeal dismissed after escape may be reinstated unless the State can show that it has been prejudiced by the defendant’s absence and the consequent lapse of time. No such showing was made here; therefore, the appeal is reinstated.[2]

STEWART and DURHAM, JJ., concur.
1

We recognize that a majority of the United States Supreme Court has found that such dismissals and refusals to reinstate do not deny federal rights to due process or equal protection. Estelle v. Dorrough, 420 U.S. 534, 95 S.Ct. 1173, 43 L.Ed.2d 377 (1975). However, that result appears based on the premise that legislatures can freely restrict appeal rights because "there is no federal constitutional right to state appellate review of state criminal convictions.” Id. at 536, 95 S.Ct. at 1175. The analytical approach presumably would be different under our state analogue to the equal protection clause, article I, section 24, because the Declaration of Rights in the Utah Constitution, unlike the federal Bill of Rights, does confer a right to appeal on a criminal defendant. Cf. Malan v. Lewis, Utah, 693 P.2d 661, 670-72 (1984) (reviewing analysis of state equal protection claims). Similarly, because we find no basis for punishing escapees by denying the right to appeal, a due process analysis under the Utah Constitution likely would also yield a different conclusion than one conducted under the federal constitution.

2

Tuttle argues that because all capital convictions are subject to "automatic review” by this Court under Utah’s death penalty statute, U.C.A., 1953, § 76-3-206(2) (1978 ed.), he is entitled to reinstatement of his appeal even if other escapees convicted of lesser offenses are not. Tuttle misreads section 76-3-206(2). It requires automatic review only in those cases where a sentence of death is imposed, not in cases where the defendant is convicted of a capital felony but receives a life sentence.

Dissent

HALL, Chief Justice

(dissenting):

I do not share the reasoning of the Court in overturning State v. Brady.1

While the Utah Constitution affords the right of appeal in all cases,[2] that right may be effectively waived or abandoned. One who escapes not only abandons his appeal, he also abandons and forsakes the judicial system as a whole. He no longer relies upon it in any respect, and to dismiss his appeal for that reason is neither to be viewed as a forfeiture of a constitutional right nor as a penalty. This is particularly demonstrated by the facts of the instant case wherein Tuttle did not voluntarily return to custody with any excuse or justifi[*706] cation for his behavior, but in fact remained at large for a considerable length of time. Had he not been tracked down, arrested, and involuntarily returned to custody, he no doubt would have remained at large. Only because of his reincarceration does he again seek relief from the system.

I would not disturb the prior dismissal of the appeal.

HOWE, J., concurs in the dissenting opinion of HALL, C.J.
1

Utah, 655 P.2d 1132 (1982).

2

Art. I, § 12.