Doe v. Rd & Ed, 417 S.E.2d 541 (S.C. 1992). · Go Syfert
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Doe v. Rd & Ed, 417 S.E.2d 541 (S.C. 1992). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 1 distinct case, last quoted 1994 · ... we are without authority to amend our statute. an exception to the plain and unambiguous language of the statute of limitations must come from our legislature. at p. 543 ✓
80 citation events (9 in the last 25 years) across 13 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Jane Roe v. Jane Doe John Doe (ca4, 1994-06-29)
Treatment trajectory · 1992 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1992 2009 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 18 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Jane Roe v. Jane Doe John Doe (2×)
4th Cir. · 1994 · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence high
... we are without authority to amend our statute. an exception to the plain and unambiguous language of the statute of limitations must come from our legislature.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Reid v. Mckelvey
S.D.N.Y. · 2024 · confidence medium
In Doe v. R.D., the South Carolina supreme court held that a statute that stated that actions for personal injury “shall be commenced within six years after the person knew or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known that he had a cause of action” was not “tolled when the plaintiff action has accrued, yet the plaintiff does not realize the full extent of his injuries.” 308 S.C. 139, 141 (1992); see also Doe v. Crooks, 364 S.C. 349, 352 (2005) (cleaned up) (“Under the discovery rule, the limitations period commences when the plaintiff knows or by the exercise of reaso…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jane Doe-2 v. Sheriff of Richland County
4th Cir. · 2023 · confidence medium
As Jane Doe-2 was still a minor during this period, the limitations period was tolled until she turned eighteen in July 2016. 3 Regardless of Jane Doe-2’s minority, section 15- 3-40 “does not provide that it is tolled when the plaintiff[’s] action has accrued, yet the plaintiff does not realize the full extent of his injuries.” Doe v. R.D., 417 S.E.2d 541, 542 (S.C. 1992) (emphasis added) (holding that a plaintiff who was objectively aware of sexual abuse when it was occurring should have known at that time that he had a cause of action); see also Doe v. Crooks, 613 S.E.2d 536, 538 (S.…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Books-A-Million, Inc. v. South Carolina Department of Revenue
unknown court · 2022 · confidence medium
Doe v. R.D., 308 S.C. 139, 142 , 417 S.E.2d 541, 543 (1992). 1.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Singleton v. Clash
S.D.N.Y. · 2013 · confidence medium
Stephen’s Episcopal Sch., 382 Fed.Appx 386, 388 (5th Cir.2010) (per curiam) (“To bring a suit, it is not necessary for the victim to connect the abuse to any subsequent psychological injuries or understand the full extent of his injuries.”); S.V. v. R.V., 933 S.W.2d 1, 20 (Tex.1996) (“A few states have refused to apply the discovery rule when the plaintiff did not repress memories of the abuse when it occurred, but did not realize that the abuse was injurious, or did not appreciate the extent of injury, or could not take action because of the psychological effects of the abuse, or simp…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Moriarty v. Garden Sanctuary Church of God (2×)
S.C. Ct. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
Doe, 308 S.C. at 141 , 417 S.E.2d at 542 (citations omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Nolde v. Frankie
Ariz. · 1998 · confidence medium
No. 1, 143 Or.App. 527 , 923 P.2d 1328, 1332 (1996); E.J.M. v. Archdiocese of Philadelphia, 424 Pa.Super. 449 , 622 A.2d 1388, 1394 (1993); Doe v. R.D., 308 S.C. 139 , 417 S.E.2d 541, 542 (1992); Doe v. Coffee County Bd. of Educ., 852 S.W.2d 899, 904 (Tenn.Ct.App.1992); Pritzlaffv.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Doe v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee (4×)
Wis. · 1997 · confidence medium
App. Ct. 1991) (holding that a plaintiff need not know all of the facts or circumstances before the statute of limitations begins to run); Doe v. R.D., 417 S.E.2d 541, 542 (S.C. 1992) (interpreting statutory term of "reasonable diligence" to mean that injured party must act with promptness where the facts and circumstances of an injury put him on notice that a right has been invaded or that some claim might exist); Doe v. Roe, 931 P.2d 1115, 1120 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996), review granted, (holding that, for the limitations statute to run, all that is required is knowledge of enough facts to prompt…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sv v. Rv
Tex. · 1996 · confidence medium
See E.W. v. D.C.H., 231 Mont. 481 , 754 P.2d 817, 819-820 (1988) (superseded by statute as noted in Cosgriffe v. Cosgriffe, 262 Mont. 175 , 864 P.2d 776, 780 (1993); Lovelace v. Keohane, 831 P.2d 624, 632 (Okla.1992); Doe v. R.D., 308 S.C. 139 , 417 S.E.2d 541, 542 (1992); O'Neal v. Division of Family Servs., 821 P.2d 1139, 1145 (Utah 1991); Cassidy v. Smith, 817 P.2d 555, 558 (Colo.Ct.App.1991); Franke v. Geyer, 209 Ill.App.3d 1009 , 154 Ill.Dec. 710, 712 , 568 N.E.2d 931, 933 (1991); E.J.M. v. Archdiocese of Philadelphia, 424 Pa.Super. 449 , 622 A.2d 1388, 1394 (1993); Schmidt v. Bishop, 779…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Florez v. Sargeant (2×)
Ariz. · 1996 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Doe v. Coffee County Bd. of Educ., 852 S.W.2d 899, 905 (Tenn.Ct.App.1992) (post-traumatic stress disorder did not constitute “unsound mind” which is the incapability of attending to any business or taking care of oneself); Doe v. R.D., 308 S.C. 139 , 417 S.E.2d 541, 543 (1992) (plaintiff knew of sexual assault but did not realize the extent of his injuries until diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) S.V. v. R.V.
Tex. · 1996 · confidence medium
See E.W. v. D.C.H., 231 Mont. 481 , 754 P.2d 817, 819-820 (1988) (superseded by statute as noted in Cosgriffe v. Cosgriffe, 262 Mont. 175 , 864 P.2d 776, 780 (1993); Lovelace v. Keohane, 831 P.2d 624, 632 (Okla.1992); Doe v. R.D., 308 S.C. 139 , 417 S.E.2d 541, 542 (1992); O’Neal v. Division of Family Servs., 821 P.2d 1139, 1145 (Utah 1991); Cassidy v. Smith, 817 P.2d 555, 558 (Colo.Ct.App.1991); Franke v. Geyer, 209 Ill.App.3d 1009 , 154 Ill.Dec. 710, 712 , 568 N.E.2d 931, 933 (1991); E.J.M. v. Archdiocese of Philadelphia, 424 Pa.Super. 449 , 622 A.2d 1388, 1394 (1993); Schmidt v. Bishop, 7…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee (2×)
Wis. · 1995 · confidence medium
See Wis. JI-Civil 2005; Wis. JI-Civil 2010 (approved 1960); see also Marsha V. v. Gardner, 231 Cal. App. 3d 265, 272-73 (Cal. App., 1991); Doe v. R.D., 417 S.E.2d 541, 542 (S.C. 1992).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Farris v. Compton
D.C. · 1994 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Doe v. First United Methodist Church, 68 Ohio St.3d 531 , 629 N.E.2d 402, 408 (1994); Doe v. R.D., 308 S.C. 139 , 417 S.E.2d 541, 542 (1992); Lovelace v. Keohane, 831 P.2d 624, 630 (Okl.1992) (multiple personalities case); E.W. v. D.C.H., 231 Mont. 481 , 754 P.2d 817, 820 (1988); ABC v. Archdiocese of St.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Martinez-Sandoval v. Kirsch
N.M. Ct. App. · 1994 · confidence medium
See DeRose v. Carswell, 196 Cal.App.3d 1011 , 242 Cal.Rptr. 368, 371 (1987) (in sexual abuse case, assault causes serious harm as a matter of law), review denied (Mar. 17, 1988), superseded by Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 340.1 (Deering 1990); Doe v. R.D., 308 S.C. 139 , 417 S.E.2d 541, 542 (1992); Whatcott v. Whatcott, 790 P.2d 578, 580 (Utah Ct.App.1990) (awareness of sexual abuse is enough, without knowing full extent of injury).
discussed Cited "see" Doe v. Crooks (2×)
S.C. · 2005 · signal: see · confidence high
See Doe v. R.D., 308 S.C. 139 , 417 S.E.2d 541 (1992) (holding that a plaintiff who was aware of sexual abuse when it was occurring should have known at that time that he had a cause of action).
cited Cited "see" State v. Breech
S.C. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See Doe v. R.D., — S.C.,—, 417 S.E. (2d) 541 (1992).
examined Cited "see, e.g." Doe v. First United Methodist Church (4×)
Ohio · 1994 · signal: see also · confidence low
See, also, Doe v. R.D. (1992), 308 S.C. 139 , 417 S.E.2d 541 ; Lovelace v. Keohane (Okla.1992), 831 P.2d 624 ; Callahan v. State (Iowa 1990), 464 N.W.2d 268 ; Daly v. Derrick (1991), (deleted from official publication at 230 Cal.App.3d 1349 ), 281 Cal.Rptr. 709 ; Evans v. Eckelman (1990), 216 Cal.App.3d 1609 , 265 Cal.Rptr. 605 ; Jones v. Jones (1990), 242 N.J.Super. 195 , 576 A.2d 316 ; Franke v. Geyer (1991), 209 Ill.App.3d 1009 , 154 Ill.Dec. 710 , 568 N.E.2d 931 ; Hewczuk v. Sambor (E.D.Pa. 1992), 803 F.Supp. 1063 ; and Johnson v. Johnson (N.D.Ill.1988), 701 F.Supp. 1363 . 5 Some of the ca…
examined Cited "see, e.g." Doe v. First United Methodist Church (4×)
Ohio · 1994 · signal: see also · confidence low
See, also, Doe v. R.D. (1992), 308 S.C. 139 , 417 S.E.2d 541 ; Lovelace v. Keohane (Okla. 1992), 831 P.2d 624 ; Callahan v. State (Iowa 1990), 464 N.W.2d 268 ; Daly v. Derrick (1991), (deleted from official publication at 230 Cal.App.3d 1349 ) 281 Cal.Rptr. 709 ; Evans v. Eckelman (1990), 216 Cal.App.3d 1609 , 265 Cal.Rptr. 605 ; Jones v. Jones (1990), 242 N.J.Super. 195 , 576 A.2d 316 ; Franke v. Geyer (1991), 209 Ill.App.3d 1009 , 568 N.E.2d 931 ; Hewczuk v. Sambor (E.D.Pa. 1992), 803 F.Supp. 1063 ; and Johnson v. Johnson (N.D.
John DOE, Appellant
v.
R.D. and E.D., Respondents
23618.
Supreme Court of South Carolina.
Apr 6, 1992.
417 S.E.2d 541
1992 S.C. LEXIS 90
Gregg Mayers, of Wise & Cole, P.A., Charleston, for appellant., Walter M. Bailey, Jr., Summerville,for respondents.
Toal, Harwell, Chandler, Finney, Gardner.
Cited by 31 opinions  |  Published
Toal, Justice:

The sole question we address on appeal is whether summary judgment was proper in an action by appellant, the son, against respondent, his parents, for injury arising from alleged sexual abuse which took place over twenty years ago. We affirm the Circuit Court’s granting of summary judgment to the parents.

FACTS

The son alleged in his complaint that between the years 1958 and 1968, he was sexually abused by his father with his mother’s knowledge. The son was between the ages of six and sixteen at the time of the alleged abuse. Thus, the son reached the age of majority in 1973. See S.C. Code Ann. Section 15-3-40(1) (Supp. 1991) (majority is twenty-one on actions accruing before March 14, 1988). The son has been aware for all these years that the father sexually abused him, however, it was not until he was diagnosed with Delayed Stress Syndrome in 1990 that he learned of the extent of his injuries. This action was filed shortly thereafter in January 1991.

LAW/ANALYSIS

This is a case of first impression for this Court. In DeRose v. Carswell, 196 Cal. App. (3d) 1011, 242 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1987) (superseded by Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Section 340.1 (Deering 1990)). The California Court addressed claims very similar to the case at bar and the application of the statute of limitations to such claims. The plaintiff in DeRose, who was sexually abused, claimed “that her cause of action did not accrue until she experienced later emotional harm and recognized its con[*141] nection with the earlier assaults.” Id. at 1090, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 371. The California Appellate Court rejected the plaintiffs argument. While the Court recognized that there are cases which may not accrue until the harm arises, assault is not one of those cases. Id. We agree.

Our own statute, S.C. Ann. Section 15-3-535 (Supp. 1991) (for actions arising or accruing prior to April 5, 1988), provides that actions for personal injury “shall be commenced within six years after the person knew or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known that he had a cause of action.”

The exercise of reasonable diligence means simply that an injured party must act with some promptness where the facts and circumstances of an injury would put a person of common knowledge and experience on notice that some right of his has been invaded or that some claim against another party might exist. The statute of limitations begins to run from this point.

Snell v. Columbia Gun Exchange, Inc., 276 S.C. 301, 278 S.E. (2d) 333 (1981).

S.C. Code Ann. Section 15-3-40(1) (Supp. 1991) tolls the statute until the plaintiff reaches majority. (Majority is twenty-one on actions accruing before March 14, 1988). Here, the son reached majority under the statute in 1973. The statute, however, does not provide that it is tolled when the plaintiff action has accrued, yet the plaintiff does not realize the full extent of his injuries. See Dillon County School District Number Two v. Lewis Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 286 S.C. 207, 332 S.E. (2d) 555 (Ct. App.), cert. granted, 287 S.C. 234, 337 S.E. (2d) 697 (1985), cert. dismissed, 288 S.C. 468, 343 S.E. (2d) 613 (1986). In the case at bar, the son does not claim a disability prevented him from timely filing suit nor does the son claim that he only recently discovered he was sexually abused by his father. Thus, under our present statute, he cannot maintain the action.

We are aware of the damage that sexual abuse can cause in the lives of the victims. We also recognize that the application of a statute of limitations can appear unjust. In Note, Adult Survivors of Childhood Sexual Abuse and Statutes of Limitations: A Call for Legislative Action, 26 Wake Forest L. Rev.[*142] 1245 (1991), the author details the rationale for statute of limitations and the application of such statutes in sexual abuse cases. A number of states have amended their statute of limitations to protect the sexually abused. [1] A few courts have allowed the plaintiff to avoid the statute of limitations because the plaintiff has successfully claimed a disability. [2] Several other states have applied the discovery rule by allowing the plaintiff to maintain an action where, as in the case at bar, the plaintiff discovered the causal connection between the injury and abuse within the statutory period. [3] While the result may be appealing, we are without authority to amend our statute. [4] An exception to the plain and unambiguous language of our statute of limitations must come from our legislature. See Crown Cork and Seal Co. v. S.C. Tax Comm’n, 302 S.C. 140, 394 S.E. (2d) 315 (1990); see also Duke Power Co. v. S.C. Tax Comm’n, 292 S.C. 64, 354 S.E. (2d) 902 (1987).

We affirm.

Harwell, C.J., Chandler and Finney, JJ., and Acting Associate Justice Gardner, concur.
1

See e.g., Alaska Stat. Section 09.10.140(b) (1990); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Section 340.1 (Deering 1990); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. Section 52-577-d, amended by 1991 Conn. Legis. Serv. Section 91-240 (West); Iowa Code Ann. Section 614.8A (West 1991); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, Section 752-C (West 1990); Minn. Stat. Ann. Section 541.073 (West 1991); Mont. Code Ann. Section 27-2-216 (1989); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, Section 522 (1990) and Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, Section 560 (Supp. 1990); Va. Code Ann. Section 8.01-249(6) (Michie 1991); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. Section 4.16.340 (West Supp. 1991).

2

See e.g., Evans v. Eckelman, 216 Cal. App. (3d) 1609, 265 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1990); Meiers-Post v. Schafer, 170 Mich. App. 174, 427 N.W. (2d) 606 (1988); Jones v. Jones, 242 N.J. Super. 195, 576 A. (2d) 316 (1990).

3

Petersen v. Bruen, 106 Nev. 271, 792 P. (2d) 18 (1990); Osland v. Osland, 442 N.W. (2d) 907 (N.D. 1989); Doe v. LaBrosse, 588 A. (2d) 605 (R.I. 1991); Hammer v. Hammer, 142 Wis. (2d) 257, 418 N.W. (2d) 23 (Wis. App. 1987).

4

We note at least three state legislatures amended the statute of limitations to accommodate adult survivors of sexual abuse in the wake of decision such as the one we issue today. See DeRose v. Carswell, 196 Cal. App. (3d) 1011, 242 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1987) (superseded by Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Section 340.1 (Deering 1990)); see also E.W. and D.W. v. D.C.H., 231 Mont. 481, 754 P. (2d) 817 (1988) (superseded by Mont. Code Ann. Section 27-2-216 (1989)); see also Tyson v. Tyson, 107 Wash. (2d) 72,727 P. (2d) 226 (1986) (superseded by Wash. Rev. Code Ann. Section 4.16.340 (West Supp. 1991).