Black v. McKnight, 562 P.2d 621 (Utah 1977). · Go Syfert
Black v. McKnight, 562 P.2d 621 (Utah 1977). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
11 citation events (3 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Miller v. Utah Department of Transportation (utah, 2012-08-31)
Top citers, strongest first. 8 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Miller v. Utah Department of Transportation
Utah · 2012 · confidence medium
Black v. McKnight, 562 P.2d 621, 622 (Utah 1977) (footnotes omitted); see also, eg., McConmell v. Union Carbide Corp., 937 So.2d 148, 153 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2006) ("[Rle-fusing jury instructions is reviewed under a mixed standard of de novo and abuse of discretion.").
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding
Utah · 2001 · confidence medium
Thus, on remand, if the evidence supports the defenses of waiver and estoppel, the trial court should instruct the jury regarding them. 165 At trial below, the trial court rejected defendants' proposed instructions on waiver and estoppel, finding they incorrectly stated the law. 12 Indeed, "the trial court may properly refuse to give [a] requested instruction[ ] where it does not accurately reflect the law governing the factual situation of the case." Black v. McKnight, 562 P.2d 621, 622 (Utah 1977).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Pacific Chromalox Division, Emerson Electric Co. v. Irey
Utah Ct. App. · 1990 · confidence medium
Materials, Inc., 567 P.2d 174, 176 (Utah 1977); Black v. McKnight, 562 P.2d 621, 622 (Utah 1977); Newsom v. Gold Cross Serv., Inc., 779 P.2d 692, 694 (Utah Ct.App.1989).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Newsom v. Gold Cross Service, Inc.
Utah Ct. App. · 1989 · confidence medium
Black v. McKnight, 562 P.2d 621, 622 (Utah 1977); Hillier v. Lamborn, 740 P.2d 300, 302 (Utah Ct.App.1987).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hillier v. Lamborn
Utah Ct. App. · 1987 · confidence medium
The trial court has a duty to “cover the theories and points of law of both parties in its instructions, provided there is competent evidence to support them.” Black v. McKnight, 562 P.2d 621, 622 (Utah 1977).
cited Cited "see" Christiansen v. Utah Transit Authority
Utah · 1982 · signal: see · confidence high
See Black v. McKnight, Utah, 562 P.2d 621 (1977) which held that jury instructions must be viewed as a whole rather than in isolated segments.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Harward v. Urology Clinic of Utah Valley
Utah Ct. App. · 2023 · signal: see also · confidence medium
We identify no real concerns with preservation in this case and consider the Harwards’ arguments on their merits. 20220027-CA 9 2023 UT App 63 Harward v. Urology Clinic of Utah Valley court may”—and should—“properly refuse to give requested instructions where [they do] not accurately reflect the law governing the factual situation of the case.” See id. (quotation simplified); see also Black v. McKnight, 562 P.2d 621, 622 (Utah 1977) (upholding a court’s refusal to include statutory language in the jury instructions that had no relationship to the facts presented in the case).
cited Cited "see, e.g." State v. Ruben
Utah · 1983 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Black v. McKnight, Utah, 562 P.2d 621 (1977); Whyte v. Christensen, Utah, 550 P.2d 1289 (1976).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Dorothy BLACK, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Robert L. McKNIGHT, Defendant and Respondent
14724.
Utah Supreme Court.
Mar 29, 1977.
562 P.2d 621
1977 Utah LEXIS 1095
Donn E. Cassity and Roger T. Sharp of Romney, Nelson & Cassity, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant., L. E. Midgley, Salt Lake City, for defendant and respondent.
Ellett, Crockett, Maughan, Wilkins, Hall.
Cited by 10 opinions  |  Published
ELLETT, Chief Justice:

The appellant was involved in an automobile accident with the respondent about 12:30 a. m. on March 5, 1970. She sued for damages contending that the respondent struck her car in the rear. However, the facts, although in some dispute, tend to show that appellant suddenly swerved over into defendant’s lane of traffic without signaling her intention to do so or without checking her outside mirror. Therefore, the jury denied her claim.

She now brings this appeal contending that the trial court’s refusal to submit two of her proposed instructions to the jury constituted prejudicial error.

There are two reasons why appellant cannot prevail on this appeal: In the first instance, appellant failed to make timely objections to the trial court’s jury instruc[*622] tions. The Rules of Civil Procedure clearly provide that any objections to jury instructions must be made before the jury retires to consider its verdict; and no party may assign as error the giving or failure to give an instruction unless they object thereto. [1] The record shows the instructions were given by the court on June 4, 1976. Appellant made her objections known June 18, 1976.

It is the duty of the trial court to cover the theories and points of law of both parties in its instructions, provided there is competent evidence to support them. [2] However, in determining whether or not the court adequately discharged this duty and fairly presented the issues to the jury, the instructions must be considered as a whole. [3] Furthermore, the trial court may properly refuse to give requested instructions where it does not accurately reflect the law governing the factual situation of the case. In this case, the appellant requested instructions in the language of the statute regarding driving too fast for existing circumstances (41-6-46, U.C.A.1953) and following too closely behind another automobile (41-6-62(a), U.C.A.1953). The court told the jury that no person should drive at a rate of speed greater than was reasonable and prudent under the conditions then and there existing but did not give the other part of the section which provided:

In every event speed shall be so controlled as may be necessary to avoid colliding with any person, vehicle, or other conveyance on or entering the highway .... [41-6-46(1), U.C.A.1953]

There was no evidence to show that the respondent was following the appellant. The evidence was to the effect that the two cars were in different lanes with respondent intending to pass appellant. The jury well could find that the cause of collision was the sudden changing of lanes by appellant. The appellant claims that the change of lanes was made necessary by the presence of two horses upon the traveled portion of the highway. This claim was disputed by the respondent and by the highway patrolman who witnessed the accident.

The court further instructed the jury that it was respondent’s duty to keep a proper lookout and to keep his car under reasonably safe control.

The jury ruled against the appellant and where there is substantial evidence to support the verdict, our duty is to affirm it. [4]

After reviewing the total record, we find that the jury instructions were properly given in the light of the facts presented, and it was not prejudicial error for the court to omit two of appellant’s proposed instructions.

The judgment is affirmed with costs to respondent.

CROCKETT, MAUGHAN and WILKINS, JJ., concur. HALL, J., concurs in the result.
1

. Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

2

. People v. Cummings, 141 Cal.App.2d 193, 296 P.2d 610 (1956).

3

. Startin v. Madsen, 120 Utah 631, 237 P.2d 834 (1951); Brunson v. Strong, 17 Utah 2d 364, 412 P.2d 451 (1966); Taylor v. Johnson, 18 Utah 2d 16, 414 P.2d 575 (1966).

4

.De Vas v. Noble, 13 Utah 2d 133, 369 P.2d 290 (1962).