Howell v. Harden, 203 S.E.2d 206 (Ga. 1974). · Go Syfert
Howell v. Harden, 203 S.E.2d 206 (Ga. 1974). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
64 citation events (16 in the last 25 years) across 8 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Coastal Marshlands Protection Committee v. Altamaha Riverkeeper, Inc. (gactapp, 2010-04-13)
Treatment trajectory · 1974 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1974 2000 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 20 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Coastal Marshlands Protection Committee v. Altamaha Riverkeeper, Inc.
Ga. Ct. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
Comm. v. Southern Bell, 254 Ga. 244, 247 ( 327 SE2d 726 ) (1985). 3 Howell v. Harden, 231 Ga. 594, 595 (3) ( 203 SE2d 206 ) (1974). 4 Hughey v. Gwinnett County, 278 Ga. 740, 741 (1) ( 609 SE2d 324 ) (2004). 5 Ga. Public Svc.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Center for a Sustainable Coast v. Coastal Marshlands Protection Committee
Ga. · 2008 · confidence medium
Howell v. Harden, 231 Ga. 594, 594 ( 203 SE2d 206 ) (1974).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Misión Industrial de Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Junta de Planificación de Puerto Rico y Autoridad de Acueductos y Alcantarillados
prsupreme · 1997 · confidence medium
Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 743 (1985); Franklin County Sheriff's Office v. Sellers, 646 P.2d 113 (Wash. 1982); Methuen Retirement v. Contributory Retirement, 424 N.E.2d 242 (1981); Howell v. Harden, 203 S.E.2d 206, 207 (1974). “[T]he reviewing function is one ordinarily limited to consideration of the decision of the agency ... and of the evidence on which it was based.” United States v. Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S. 709, 714-715 (1963).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Miranda v. Comisión Estatal de Elecciones
prsupreme · 1996 · confidence medium
Fernández Quiñones, Derecho Administrativo y Ley de Procedimiento Administrativo Uniforme, 1ra ed., Bogotá, Ed. Forum, 1993, Sec. 9.4(A), pág. 525; Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 743 (1985); Rybachek v. U.S. E.P.A., 904 F.2d 1276, 1296 (9no Cir. 1990); Batch v. Town of Chapell Hill, 387 S.E.2d 655 (1990); Wadman v. City of Omaha, 438 N.W.2d 749 (1989); Love v. Thomas, 858 F.2d 1347, 1356 (9no Cir. 1988); Franklin County Sheriff’s Office v. Sellers, 646 P.2d 113 (Wash. 1982); Methuen Retirement v. Contributory Retirement, 424 N.E.2d 242 (1981); Howell v. Harden, 203 S.E.2…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) High Ridge Hinkle Joint Venture v. City of Albuquerque
N.M. Ct. App. · 1994 · confidence medium
Some courts holding that remands are not final, appealable judgments may have relied on the fact that the trial court retained jurisdiction while the matter was remanded to the agency, Howell v. Harden, 231 Ga. 594 , 203 S.E.2d 206, 208 (1974); Doyle v. City of Crystal Lake, 183 Ill.App.3d 405 , 132 Ill.Dec. 233, 237 , 539 N.E.2d 796, 800 (Ill.App.Ct.1989); cf. Sander v. Planning Bd., 140 N.J.Super. 386 , 356 A.2d 411, 413 (App.Div.1976) (raising issue but granting leave for interlocutory appeal in any event), although nonfinality under federal law does not depend on whether the district court…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) HIGH BIDGE HINKLE JT. VENT. v. Albuquerque
N.M. Ct. App. · 1994 · confidence medium
Some courts holding that remands are not final, appealable judgments may have relied on the fact that the trial court retained jurisdiction while the matter was remanded to the agency, Howell v. Harden, 231 Ga. 594 , 203 S.E.2d 206, 208 (1974); Doyle v. City of Crystal Lake, 183 Ill.App.3d 405 , 132 Ill.Dec. 233, 237 , 539 N.E.2d 796, 800 (Ill.App.Ct. 1989); cf. Sander v. Planning Bd., 140 N.J.Super. 386 , 356 A.2d 411, 413 (App.Div. 1976) (raising issue but granting leave for interlocutory appeal in any event), although nonfinality under federal law does not depend on whether the district cou…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sloan v. BOARD OF REVIEW OF INDUS. COM'N
Utah Ct. App. · 1989 · confidence medium
Newpark Shipbuilding & Repair, Inc. v. Roundtree, 723 F.2d 399 , 406 (5th Cir.1984) (Generally, a remand order to an administrative agency is not treated as a final order.); Noranda Aluminum, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 650 F.2d 934 , 935 (8th Cir. 1981) (An order reversing and remanding for proceedings including a hearing on the merits is not final.); Howell v. Harden, 231 Ga. 594 , 203 S.E.2d 206, 207 (1974) (A trial court order remanding to the agency for further consideration and receipt of additional evidence is not a final judgment.); Maryland Comm’n on Human Re…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State Health Planning Review Board v. Piedmont Hospital, Inc.
Ga. Ct. App. · 1985 · confidence medium
Held: In Howell v. Harden, 231 Ga. 594, 595 ( 203 SE2d 206 ) (1974), the Georgia Supreme Court held that the interlocutory appeal procedure set forth in former Code Ann. § 6-701 (a) (currently OCGA § 5-6-34 (b)) does not apply to cases arising under the Administrative Procedure Act, because that Act does not authorize appellate court review of such cases unless the reviewing superior court has rendered a “final judgment.” See OCGA § 50-13-20.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Majanovic v. Georgia Department of Human Resources
Ga. Ct. App. · 1982 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf. Howell v. Harden, 231 Ga. 594, 595 ( 203 SE2d 206 ) (1974); Farist v. Blue Ridge Carpet Mills, 162 Ga. App. 586 ( 291 SE2d 741 ) (1982).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Hardison v. Booth
Ga. Ct. App. · 1981 · confidence medium
Howell v. Harden, 231 Ga. 594, 595 ( 203 SE2d 206 ).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Georgia State Board of Pharmacy v. Purvis
Ga. Ct. App. · 1980 · confidence medium
Ga. L. 1964, pp. 338, 356 (Code Ann. § 3A-121) states: “An aggrieved party may obtain review of any final judgment of the superior court under this Act by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, as provided by law.” (Emphasis supplied.) In Howell v. Harden, 231 Ga. 594, 595 ( 203 SE2d 206 ) (1974), the Georgia Supreme Court held: “The Administrative Procedure Act does not authorize a review under that Act except on ‘final’ judgment by the reviewing court.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Georgia Consumer Center, Inc. v. Georgia Power Co. (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1979 · confidence medium
It is unquestionably clear that the remand order "is not such a final judgment as can be appealed to the appellate courts.” Howell v. Harden, 231 Ga. 594, 595 (2) ( 203 SE2d 206 ) (1974).
discussed Cited "see" Jarius Mann v. City of Atlanta, Ga (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2015 · signal: see · confidence high
See Howell v. Harden, 231 Ga. 594, 594-595 (2) ( 203 SE2d 206 ) (1974); Rolleston v. Glynn County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 213 Ga. App. 552 ( 445 SE2d 345 ) (1994); Smith v. Williamson & Sons, 43 Ga. App. 702 ( 159 SE 912 ) (1931) (“A judgment of the superior court sustaining a certiorari for the first time is equivalent to the first grant of a new trial”; when the final determination of such a case “does not depend upon any controlling question of law, and there are issues of fact involved, the superior court has no authority to render a final judgment therein . . . .” (punctuation omitt…
discussed Cited "see" Georgia Department of Community Health v. Fulton-DeKalb Hospital Authority (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
See generally Howell v. Harden, 231 Ga. 594 (1) ( 203 SE2d 206 ) (1974), citing OCGA § 50-13-19 (g) (judicial review of administrative agency decision by superior court confined to record made before agency).
discussed Cited "see" Children's Hospital v. Georgia Department of Medical Assistance (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See Howell v. Harden, 231 Ga. 594 (1) ( 203 SE2d 206 ) (1974).
discussed Cited "see" Earp v. Kranats (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See generally Howell v. Harden, 231 Ga. 594 (2) ( 203 SE2d 206 ) (1974).
discussed Cited "see" Iowa Bankers Ass'n v. Iowa Credit Union Department (2×)
Iowa · 1983 · signal: see · confidence high
Wisconsin’s Environmental Decade, Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 79 Wis.2d 161, 170 , 255 N.W.2d 917, 923 (1977); see Howell v. Harden, 129 Ga.App. 200, 201 , 198 S.E.2d 890, 891 (1973), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 231 Ga. 594 , 203 S.E.2d 206 (1974); Markham v. Swails, 29 N.C.App. 205, 208 , 223 S.E.2d 920, 922 , cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 290 N.C. 309 , 225 S.E.2d 829 , cert. denied, 290 N.C. 551 , 226 S.E.2d 510 , cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 , 97 S.Ct. 356 , 50 L.Ed.2d 310 (1976).
discussed Cited "see" Georgia State Board of Dental Examiners v. Daniels (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1976 · signal: see · confidence high
See Howell v. Harden, 231 Ga. 594 (1) ( 203 SE2d 206 ).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Cobb County, Georgia v. Lidl US Operations, LLC (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2019 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e. g., Howell v. Harden, 231 Ga. 594 ( 203 SE2d 206 ) (1974) (judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act is appellate in nature, and only its final rulings may be appealed).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Ex Parte Affinity Hospital, 2100614 (ala.civ.app. 12-9-2011) (2×)
Ala. Civ. App. · 2011 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Howell v. Harden, 231 Ga. 594 , 203 S.E.2d 206 (1974) (stating that a remand under a provision similar to § 41-22-20® is interlocutory).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Howell
v.
Harden
28220.
Supreme Court of Georgia.
Jan 8, 1974.
203 S.E.2d 206
Kenneth G. Levin, for appellant., ArthurK. Bolton, Attorney General, Timothy J. Sweeney, Dorothy Y. Kirkley, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.
Undercofler.
Cited by 33 opinions  |  Published
Undercofler, Justice.

This case came to this court on certiorari to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals found that an order denying a motion for judgment on the pleadings and an order denying a motion for summary judgment were inappropriate in a judicial review of an administrative decision and that the order of the reviewing superior court remanding the case to the agency was not such a final judgment from which an appeal could be taken to the Court of Appeals. Howell v. Harden, 129 Ga. App. 200 (198 SE2d 890). We granted certiorari to review these rulings. Held:

1. The first question we have for decision is whether the judicial review provided by the Administrative Procedure Act (Code Ann. § 3A-120; Ga. L. 1964, pp. 338, 354) is governed by the provisions of the Civil Practice Act of 1966 (Code Ann. Ch. 81A; Ga. L. 1966, p. 609).

Code Ann. § 3A-120 (a) provides that any person who has exhausted all administrative remedies available within the agency and who is aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case is entitled to judicial review.

Code Ann. § 3A-120 (g) provides: "The review shall be conducted by the court without a jury and confined to the record. In cases of alleged irregularities in procedure before the agency, not shown in the record, proof thereon may be taken in the court. The court, upon request, shall hear oral argument and receive written briefs.”

Code Ann. § 3A-120 (g) directs that the judicial review shall be conducted by the superior court without a jury and is confined to the record made before the agency. This section also provides for submission of proof to the reviewing court in cases of alleged irregularities in procedure before the agency. It is apparent therefore that the judicial review contemplated is appellate in nature and is not such a "pretrial, trial or post trial procedure” as is provided for by the Civil Practice Act (Ga. L. 1966, p. 609; Code Ann. Ch. 81A).

2. The trial court remanded this case to the agency for "further consideration and the reception of additional evidence by the petitioner, if she desires to submit such evidence, so that the application in consideration of her claim shall be reconsidered” and directed the agency to set forth its findings of fact and[*595] conclusions of law in accordance with the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, Code Ann. § 3A-118. Is such a judgment one which may be appealed to the appellate courts? We think not.

Argued November 13, 1973 Decided January 8, 1974 Rehearing denied January 28, 1974. Kenneth G. Levin, for appellant. ArthurK. Bolton, Attorney General, Timothy J. Sweeney, Dorothy [*596] Y. Kirkley, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.

[*595] Code Ann. § 3A-120 (f) clearly provides that the "agency may modify its findings and decision by reason of the additional evidence and shall file that evidence and any modifications, new findings, or decisions with the reviewing court.” Therefore the reviewing superior court does not lose jurisdiction of the case on remand to the agency but it retains jurisdiction under Code Ann. § 3A-120 (f). It follows that the remand order under the circumstances of this case is not such a final judgment as can be appealed to the appellate courts.

3. Code Ann. § 6-701 (a) which is a part of the Appellate Practice Act provides that appeals may be taken to the appellate courts from judgments and rulings of the superior courts "from which writs of error are authorized by the Constitution and laws, in the following instances:... 2. Where the trial judge in rendering an order, decision or judgment not otherwise subject to direct appeal, certifies within 10 days of entry thereof that such order, decision or judgment is of such importance to the case that immediate review should be had.” Ga. L. 1965, p. 18; 1968, pp. 1072, 1073.

Code Ann. § 3A-121 provides: "An aggrieved party may obtain a review of any final judgment of the superior court under this chapter by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, as provided by law.” Ga. L. 1964, pp. 338, 356.

The provisions of Code Ann. § 6-701 (a) clearly provide that review can be had to the appellate courts where the review is authorized by law. The Administrative Procedure Act does not authorize a review under that Act except on "final” judgment by the reviewing superior court. Therefore, this portion of the Court of Appeals judgment indicating that the judgment might be subject to review on a certification by the reviewing superior court is erroneous.

Judgment affirmed in part; reversed in part.

All the Justices concur.