In Re Farlow, 631 S.E.2d 70 (S.C. 2006). · Go Syfert
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In Re Farlow, 631 S.E.2d 70 (S.C. 2006). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“an individual asserting a brady violation must demonstrate that evidence is: (1) favorable to the accused; (2) in the possession of or known by the prosecution; (3) was suppressed by the state; and (4) was material to the accused's guilt or innocence or was impeaching.”
18 citation events (18 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: State v. McGee (scctapp, 2009-11-19)
Top citers, strongest first. 11 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) State v. McGee
S.C. Ct. App. · 2009 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
an individual asserting a brady violation must demonstrate that evidence is: (1) favorable to the accused; (2) in the possession of or known by the prosecution; (3) was suppressed by the state; and (4) was material to the accused's guilt or innocence or was impeaching.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Williams
S.C. Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
See State v. Durant, 430 S.C. 98 , 107, 844 S.E.2d 49 , 53 (2020) ("A Brady violation occurs when the evidence at issue is: 1) favorable to the accused; 2) in the possession of or known to the prosecution; 3) suppressed by the prosecution; and 4) material to the defendant's guilt or punishment."), cert denied, No. 20-6725, 2021 WL 666663 (U.S. Feb. 22, 2021); id. (stating that evidence is material "when there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different"); State v. Frazier, 394 S.C. 213, 224 , 715 S.E.2…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Johnson
S.C. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
"Evidence is material under Brady if there is a 'reasonable probability' that the result of the proceeding would have been different had the information been disclosed." Riddle v. Ozmint, 369 S.C. 39, 44-45 , 631 S.E.2d 70, 73 (2006).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Daniels v. Warden of Lee Correctional Institution
D.S.C. · 2019 · confidence medium
Riddle v. Ozmint, 631 S.E.2d 70, 73 (S.C. 2006).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mangal v. State
S.C. · 2017 · confidence medium
We relied on precedent from the Supreme Court of the United States and this Court to support the need for the “extraordinary action” we took under that circumstance to excuse the procedural bar. 416 S.C. at 591-92, 788 S.E.2d at 224 (citing Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 , 79 S.Ct. 1173, 1177 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1217, 1221 (1959) and Riddle v. Ozmint, 369 S.C. 39, 47-48 , 631 S.E.2d 70, 75 (2006)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Branham
S.C. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
Id. at 284 , 119 S.Ct. 1936 ; see also Porter v. State, 368 S.C. 378, 385 , 629 S.E.2d 353, 357 (2006) (citing to Strickler for the proposition that defense counsel may rely on an open file policy in satisfaction of the prosecution’s duty to disclose material exculpatory evidence but noting that institution of an open file policy does not mean presumed compliance with Brady); Riddle v. Ozmint, 369 S.C. 39, 46-47 , 631 S.E.2d 70, 74-75 (2006) (reversing the denial of post-conviction relief because the solicitor removed documents from the open file offered to defense counsel and the documents …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Moses (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
S.C. Ct. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
In South Carolina, an individual asserting a Brady violation must demonstrate that the evidence: (1) was favorable to the accused; (2) was in the possession of or known by the prosecution; (3) was suppressed by the State; and (4) was material to the accused’s guilt or innocence or was impeaching. 5 Riddle v. Ozmint, 369 S.C. 39, 44 , 631 S.E.2d 70, 73 (2006); State v. *516 Carlson, 363 S.C. 586, 609 , 611 S.E.2d 283, 295 (Ct.App.2005).
discussed Cited "see" State v. Wills
S.C. · 2014 · signal: see · confidence high
See Riddle v. Ozmint, 369 S.C. 39, 48 , 631 S.E.2d 70, 75 (2006) (“A ‘prosecutor’s deliberate deception of a court and jurors by the presentation of known false evidence is incompatible with rudimentary demands of justice.’ ” (quoting Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153 , 92 S.Ct. 763 , 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972))).
cited Cited "see" In Re Farlow
S.C. · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
See In the Matter of Farlow, 369 S.C. 48 , 631 S.E.2d 75 (2006).
cited Cited "see" In Re Farlow
S.C. · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high
See In the Matter of Farlow, 369 S.C. 48 , 631 S.E.2d 75 (2006).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Simmons v. State
S.C. · 2016 · signal: see also · confidence medium
The same result obtains when the State, although not *592 soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears.” Napue v. Illinois, 860 U.S. 264 , 269, 79 S.Ct. 1173 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959) (citations omitted); see also Riddle v. Ozmint, 369 S.C. 39, 47-48 , 631 S.E.2d 70, 75 (2006) (“The failure to correct false evidence is as reprehensible as its presentation.” (citing Washington v. State, 324 S.C. 232 , 235, 478 S.E.2d 833, 834-35 (1996))).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
In the Matter of Samantha D. FARLOW, Respondent
Supreme Court of South Carolina.
May 25, 2006.
631 S.E.2d 70
2006 S.C. LEXIS 180
Toal.
Cited by 3 opinions  |  Published

ORDER

Respondent pled guilty to one count of accommodation distribution- of marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D) and § 841(b)(4) and one count of possession of methylenedioxymethamphetamine hydrochloride, also known as MDMA or “ecstasy,” in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844(a).

The Office of Disciplinary Counsel petitions the Court to place respondent on interim suspension pursuant to Rule 17, RLDE, Rule 413, SCACR, and to appoint an attorney to protect respondent’s clients’ interests pursuant to Rule 31, RLDE, Rule 413, SCACR.

IT IS ORDERED that respondent’s license to practice law in this state is suspended until further order of the Court.

[*49] IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Michael P. Horger, Esquire, is hereby appointed to assume responsibility for respondent’s client files, trust account(s), escrow aceount(s), operating account(s), and any other law office account(s) respondent may maintain. Mr. Horger shall take action as required by Rule 31, RLDE, Rule 413, SCACR, to protect the interests of respondent’s clients. Mr. Horger may make disbursements from respondent’s trust account(s), escrow account(s), operating account(s), and any other law office accounts) respondent may maintain that are necessary to effectuate this appointment.

This Order, when served on any bank or other financial institution maintaining trust, escrow and/or operating accounts of respondent, shall serve as an injunction to prevent respondent from making withdrawals from the account(s) and shall further serve as notice to the bank or other financial institution that Michael P. Horger, Esquire, has been duly appointed by this Court.

Finally, this Order, when served on any office of the United States Postal Service, shall serve as notice that Michael P. Horger, Esquire, has been duly appointed by this Court and has the authority to receive respondent’s mail and the authority to direct that respondent’s mail be delivered to Mr. Horger’s office.

This appointment shall be for a period of no longer than nine months unless request is made to this Court for an extension.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Jean H. Toal, C.J.

FOR THE COURT