Long v. Giles, 472 S.E.2d 374 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996). · Go Syfert
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Long v. Giles, 472 S.E.2d 374 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
24 citation events (15 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: Green v. Howard (ncctapp, 2026-04-15)
Treatment trajectory · 1998 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1998 2012 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 8 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Green v. Howard (2×)
N.C. Ct. App. · 2026 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Green, 305 N.C. at 606 (unrelated duties of care); Long v. Giles, 123 N.C.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Cline v. James Bane Home Bldg.
N.C. Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
App. 150, 152 , 472 S.E.2d 374, 375 (1996).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Cline v. James Bane Home Bldg.
N.C. Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
App. 150, 152 , 472 S.E.2d 374, 375 (1996).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Florentz v. Gore
N.C. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
App. 150, 152 , 472 S.E.2d 374, 375 (1996), the trial court entered summary judgment for a defendant employer sued based on a respondeat superior theory, but left pending claims against the defendant employee.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hamilton v. MORTGAGE INFORMATION SERVICES, INC.
N.C. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
App. 150, 152-53 , 472 S.E.2d 374, 375-76 (1996) (holding that no substantial right is affected when a plaintiff’s claims based on derivative liability are litigated separately from the claims that the plaintiff has asserted based on a direct liability theory because no possibility of inconsistent verdicts exists).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) ALALA v. Hardie (2×) also: Cited "see"
N.C. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
App. 150, 152-53 , 472 S.E.2d 374, 375 (1996).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Simms v. Prudential Life Insurance Co. of America
N.C. Ct. App. · 2000 · confidence medium
App. 150, 152 , 472 S.E.2d 374, 375 (1996).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Florek v. Borror Realty Co. (3×) also: Cited "see"
N.C. Ct. App. · 1998 · confidence medium
App. 150, 152 , 472 S.E.2d 374, 375 (1996).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
LUTHER YOUNGS LONG and Wife, MARGARET D. LONG, Plaintiffs
v.
PATRICIA S. GILES, Executrix of the Estate of SHERRILL WARREN GILES and AEF, INC., D/B/A ECONO LODGE, Defendants
COA95-591.
Court of Appeals of North Carolina.
Jul 2, 1996.
472 S.E.2d 374
1996 N.C. App. LEXIS 578
John H. Pike for plaintiff appellants. , Maupin Taylor Ellis & Adams, P.A., by James A. Roberts, III and Richard N. Cook, for defendant appellee AEF, Inc.
Arnold, Wynn, Martin, Mark.
Cited by 7 opinions  |  Published
ARNOLD, Chief Judge.

It is well established that the entry of summary judgment for fewer than all defendants is not a final judgment and is not immediately appealable unless it affects a substantial right or is certified pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 54(b) (1990). See Johnston County v. McCormick, 65 N.C. App. 63, 308 S.E.2d 872 (1983). Because the trial court did not certify the appeal pursuant to Rule 54(b), and we conclude that there is no substantial right involved, the appeal is premature.

A finding of liability against defendant AEF, as Mr. Giles’s employer, is only possible if Mr. Giles’s estate is found liable, and the injuries arose out of and in the course of his employment. In other words, defendant AEF’s liability is derivative of Mr. Giles’s liability, and the primary claim against the estate must first be determined before any claim against AEF is possible. Only if the court determines that plaintiffs may recover from the estate can their right to recover from defendant AEF be affected by the summary judgment.

If plaintiffs do not recover against Mr. Giles’s estate, they cannot seek to recover against defendant AEF under a respondeat superior theory, and an appeal of summary judgment would be moot. Moreover, if summary judgment for defendant AEF is in error, plaintiffs can preserve their right to complain of the error by a duly entered exception, and may appeal after a successful judgment on the primary claims against Mr. Giles’s estate. See Sportcycle Co. v. Schroader, 53 N.C. App. 354, 357, 280 S.E.2d 799, 801 (1981).

We recognize that in Hooper v. C. M. Steel, Inc., 94 N.C. App. 567, 568-69, 380 S.E.2d 593, 594 (1989), this Court held that the plaintiffs, who sued both an employee and his employer for injuries received in an automobile accident, had a substantial right to have the liability of both defendants determined in the same trial to avoid the possibility of inconsistent verdicts. We did not address the issue of derivative lia[*153] bility in Hooper but instead applied the general concept that there is a substantial right to have the liability of both defendants determined in the same trial to avoid the possibility of inconsistent verdicts. We now consider more carefully the issue of derivative liability and the possibility of inconsistent verdicts in this case, and we conclude that no substantial right is involved. See generally Sportcycle, 53 N.C. App. 354, 280 S.E.2d 799.

Because the issue of defendant AEF’s liability is derivative of a finding of liability against Mr. Giles’s estate, there is no possibility of inconsistent verdicts, and no substantial right is involved that would make an appeal of summary judgment appropriate at this time.

Appeal dismissed.

Judges WYNN and MARTIN, Mark D., concur.