Tutt v. State, 472 S.E.2d 306 (Ga. 1996). · Go Syfert
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Tutt v. State, 472 S.E.2d 306 (Ga. 1996). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 1 distinct case · …did not satisfy the statutory requirement that, at some point during the first two regular terms of court following the filing of his demand, he be present in court announcing ready for trial and requesting a trial on the indictment at p. 50 ⚠ not in text
cited 2× by 1 distinct case · …provides for discharge and acquittal in capital cases if a defendant is not given a trial within two regular terms of court following the filing of a demand for trial, at p. 50 ✓
24 citation events (24 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Walker v. State (ga, 2012-03-19)
Treatment trajectory · 2001 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2001 2013 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 7 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (rule) Walker v. State (5×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Ga. · 2012 · confidence medium
This Court need not, and should not, overrule its prior case law that has directly and repeatedly interpreted OCGA § 17-7-171 (b) to “provide [ ] for discharge and acquittal in capital cases if a defendant is not given a trial within two regular terms of court following the filing of a demand for trial, assuming jury availability and the defendant’s readiness.” (Emphasis supplied.) Tutt v. State, 267 Ga. 49, 50 ( 472 SE2d 306 ) (1996); Burns v. State, 265 Ga. 763 ( 462 SE2d 622 ) (1995) (trial court properly denied motion for discharge where defendant “did not satisfy the statutory re…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Moore v. State
Ga. · 2009 · confidence medium
“An exception will only be made if the error goes to the very power of the State to bring the defendant into court. [Cits.] No such situation is presented here.” Tutt v. State, 267 Ga. 49, 50 ( 472 SE2d 306 ) (1996).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wallace v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
Phipps and Mikell, JJ., concur. 1 Tutt v. State, 267 Ga. 49, 50 ( 472 SE2d 306 ) (1996). 2 Griffin v. State, 278 Ga. 669 ( 604 SE2d 155 ) (2004); Sewell v. State, 277 Ga. App. 265, 267 (2) ( 626 SE2d 237 ) (2006). 3 See Daniels v. State, 235 Ga. App. 296, 298 (2) ( 509 SE2d 368 ) (1998); Goodwin v. State, 202 Ga. App. 655, 656 ( 415 SE2d 472 ) (1992). 4 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Goodwin, supra at 656 . 5 See Maddox v. State, 218 Ga. App. 320, 321-322 (1) ( 461 SE2d 286 ) (1995); Johnson v. State, 203 Ga. App. 896, 897 (3) ( 418 SE2d 155 ) (1992).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Matthews v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
In Tutt v. State, 267 Ga. 49, 50 ( 472 SE2d 306 ) (1996), the Supreme Court expressly held that a defendant cannot raise as a defense the right to a speedy trial after entering a guilty plea.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Umbehaum v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
Norman, Irvan A. Pearlberg, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee. 1 (Punctuation and footnotes omitted.) Smith v. State, 249 Ga. App. 666 ( 549 SE2d 487 ) (2001). 2 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Mock v. State, 218 Ga. App. 514, 517 (2) ( 462 SE2d 429 ) (1995). 3 See Smith, supra at 666-667 (1), (2); Brown v. State, 226 Ga. App. 309, 310 ( 486 SE2d 429 ) (1997). 4 OCGA § 42-6-20. 5 Tutt v. State, 267 Ga. 49, 50 ( 472 SE2d 306 ) (1996); Mason v. Banks, 242 Ga. 292, 293 (2) ( 248 SE2d 664 ) (1978). 6 Tutt, supra; Addison v. State, 239 Ga. 622, 624 ( 238 SE2d 411 ) (1977). 7 Tutt, sup…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Davis v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
Tutt v. State, 267 Ga. 49, 50 ( 472 SE2d 306 ) (1996).
discussed Cited "see" Griffin v. State (2×)
Ga. · 2004 · signal: see · confidence high
See Tutt v. State, 267 Ga. 49 ( 472 SE2d 306 ) (1996); Mason v. Banks, 242 Ga. 292 (2) ( 248 SE2d 664 ) (1978).
Tutt
v.
the State
S96A1239.
Supreme Court of Georgia.
Jul 15, 1996.
472 S.E.2d 306
1996 Ga. LEXIS 495
Darreyl L. Tutt, pro se., Daniel J. Craig, District Attorney, Charles R. Sheppard, Assistant District Attorney, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Caroline W. Donaldson, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Hunstein.
Cited by 9 opinions  |  Published
Hunstein, Justice.

Darreyl Tutt was arrested on April 23, 1991, following a series of crimes committed with Jamie Kenmont Kerien Brown. See Brown v. State, 264 Ga. 803 (450 SE2d 821) (1994). Tutt was indicted in Richmond County on July 9, 1991 for murder, armed robbery, aggravated assault, and other offenses. The State filed its notice of intent to seek the death penalty on July 11, 1991, and Tutt filed a demand for trial on July 12, 1991, in accordance with OCGA § 17-7-171 (a). Pretrial proceedings under the Unified Appeal Procedure, OCGA § 17-10-35.1, were certified as complete on October 22, 1993. On November 8, 1993, Tutt entered into a plea agreement and was sentenced to life[*50] without parole. He filed a motion for discharge and acquittal on January 25, 1996, contending that delays in the handling of his case constituted a violation of OCGA § 17-7-171, as well as due process and equal protection. Tutt now appeals the denial of that motion.

Decided July 15, 1996. Darreyl L. Tutt, pro se. Daniel J. Craig, District Attorney, Charles R. Sheppard, Assistant District Attorney, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Caroline W. Donaldson, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

OCGA § 17-7-171 (b) provides for discharge and acquittal in capital cases if a defendant is not given a trial within two regular terms of court following the filing of a demand for trial, assuming jury availability and the defendant’s readiness. OCGA § 17-7-171 (c), which applies to cases for which the death penalty is sought, provides that the counting of the two terms does not begin until the first term following the completion of pretrial proceedings pursuant to OCGA § 17-10-35.1. Thus, Tutt would not have been entitled to discharge and acquittal until March 1994, see OCGA § 15-6-3 (5) (C), the third term following completion of pretrial proceedings; he pled guilty in November 1993.

Moreover, having voluntarily entered a plea of guilty, Tutt cannot raise as a defense his right to a speedy trial. Mason v. Banks, 242 Ga. 292 (2) (248 SE2d 664) (1978). Once a defendant solemnly admits in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea. Addison v. State, 239 Ga. 622 (238 SE2d 411) (1977). An exception will only be made if the error gees, to the very power of the State to bring the defendant into court. Id. at 624. See also Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U. S. 21 (94 SC 2098, 40 LE2d 628) (1974). No such situation is presented here.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur.