State v. Conyers, 487 S.E.2d 181 (S.C. 1997). · Go Syfert
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State v. Conyers, 487 S.E.2d 181 (S.C. 1997). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
45 citation events (28 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Smith v. State (scctapp, 2014-06-30)
Treatment trajectory · 1998 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1998 2012 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 14 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Smith v. State
S.C. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
See State v. Johnston, 333 S.C. 459, 462 , 510 S.E.2d 423, 425 (1999) ("[A] challenge to sentencing must be raised at trial, or the issue will not be preserved for appellate review."); State v. Conyers, 326 S.C. 263, 266 , 487 S.E.2d 181, 183 (1997) (holding appellant's argument that his sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment was unpreserved because the issue was not raised to the trial court).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Aldridge
S.C. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v. Crouch , 355 S.C. 355, 359 , 585 S.E.2d 288, 291 (2003) (holding this court will only reverse the decision to revoke probation when the decision is based on an error of law or lacks supporting evidence); State v. Conyers , 326 S.C. 263, 266 , 487 S.E.2d 181, 183 (1997) (stating an issue must be raised and ruled upon in the circuit court in order to be preserved for appellate review); State v. White , 218 S.C. 130, 135-36 , 61 S.E.2d 754, 756 (1950) (explaining the decision to revoke probation is addressed to t…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Medina
S.C. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v. Conyers , 326 S.C. 263, 266 , 487 S.E.2d 181, 183 (1997) (explaining an issue must be raised and ruled upon in the trial court in order to be preserved for appellate review); State v. Kennerly , 331 S.C. 442, 455 , 503 S.E.2d 214, 221 (Ct. App. 1998) (stating a party cannot argue one ground at trial and then an alternative ground on appeal).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Foster
S.C. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and State v. Conyers , 326 S.C. 263, 266 , 487 S.E.2d 181, 183 (1997) (holding an issue must be raised to and ruled upon by trial judge to be preserved for appellate review).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Starr
S.C. Ct. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v. Conyers , 326 S.C. 263, 266 , 487 S.E.2d 181, 183 (1997); State v. Lee , 350 S.C. 125, 130 , 564 S.E.2d 372, 375 (Ct. App. 2002) (both finding an issue must be raised to and ruled upon by trial court to be preserved for appellate review).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Vaughn v. State
S.C. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v. Conyers , 326 S.C. 263, 266 , 487 S.E.2d 181, 183 (1997) (finding an issue must be raised to and ruled upon by trial judge to be preserved for appellate review); State v. Gaster , 349 S.C. 545, 555 , 564 S.E.2d 87, 92 (2002) (“On an appeal from the trial court’s denial of a motion for a directed verdict, the appellate court may only reverse the trial court if there is no evidence to support the trial court’s ruling.”); State v. McHoney , 344 S.C. 85, 97 , 544 S.E.2d 30, 36 (2001) (“On appeal from the d…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Means
S.C. Ct. App. · 2003 · confidence medium
Code Ann. § 24-21-460 (Supp. 1997) (“[T]he court within the venue of which the violation occurs may revoke the probation or suspension of sentence”); State v. Conyers , 326 S.C. 263, 266 , 487 S.E.2d 181, 183 (1997) (holding that an issue must be raised to and ruled upon by trial judge to be preserved for appellate review); State v. White , 218 S.C. 130, 135-36 , 61 S.E.2d 754, 756 (1950) (stating that review must be determined in accordance with principles governing exercise of judicial discretion); State v. Proctor , 345 S.C. 299, 301 , 546 S.E.2d 673, 674 (Ct. App. 2001)(finding the deci…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Hamilton
S.C. Ct. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
At the probation revocation hearing, defense counsel did not specifically raise the issue of willfulness, or lack thereof, based upon Hamilton’s medical condition. 6 See State v. Conyers, 326 S.C. 263, 266 , 487 S.E.2d 181,183 (1997) (issue must be raised to and ruled upon by trial judge to be preserved for appellate review).
discussed Cited "see" State v. Eubanks (2×)
S.C. Ct. App. · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Conyers , 326 S.C. 263, 266 , 487 S.E.2d 181, 183 (1997) (holding that an issue must be raised to and ruled upon by circuit court to be preserved for appellate review); cf. State v. Hamilton , 333 S.C. 642, 648 , 511 S.E.2d 94, 98 (Ct. App. 1999) (finding appellant’s argument that his probation violation was not willful was preserved for appeal because “the essence of defense counsel’s argument at the revocation hearing was that the violation was not willful because [appellant] believed his probationary period had terminated”).
discussed Cited "see" State v. Williams (2×)
S.C. Ct. App. · 2006 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Conyers , 326 S.C. 263, 266 , 487 S.E.2d 181, 183 (1997) (explaining that an issue must be raised to and ruled upon by the trial judge to be preserved for appellate review).
examined Cited "see" State v. Knoten (4×)
S.C. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Conyers, 326 S.C. 263 , 487 S.E.2d 181 (1997) (argument not made to trial court not preserved for review). [9] The pathologist testified the victim incurred two forceful blows to her head which caused her scalp to split.
discussed Cited "see" State v. Jihad (2×)
S.C. Ct. App. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Conyers, 326 S.C. 263 , 487 S.E.2d 181 (1997).
discussed Cited "see" State v. Jihad (2×)
S.C. Ct. App. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Conyers, 326 S.C. 263 , 487 S.E.2d 181 (1997).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Prioleau (2×)
unknown court · 2001 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., State v. Conyers, 326 S.C. 263 , 487 S.E.2d 181 (1997) (argument not made to trial court not preserved for review).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
The STATE, Respondent,
v.
Robert Lewis CONYERS, Appellant
24630.
Supreme Court of South Carolina.
Jun 9, 1997.
487 S.E.2d 181
Assistant Appellate Defender Lesley M. Coggiola, Columbia, for appellant., Attorney General Charles Molony Condon, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, Assistant Attorney General Robert F. Daley, Columbia, and Solicitor Wade S. Kolb, Jr., Sumter, for respondent.
Moore, Finney, Toal, Waller, Burnett.
Cited by 21 opinions  |  Published
MOORE, Justice:

Appellant pled guilty to murder, two counts of assault and battery with intent to kill, first degree criminal sexual conduct, and first degree burglary. After a sentencing hearing, the trial judge sentenced appellant to death. We affirm.

FACTS

On the night of November 24,1991, appellant broke into the Sims’s home through a bathroom window. When Mrs. Sims entered her bedroom with her two-year-old daughter, Kimberly, appellant attacked Mrs. Sims with a blunt instrument. He beat her breaking nearly every bone in her face. He raped her and inflicted a six-inch tear in her vagina with a foreign object. During the assault, Mrs. Sims was blinded but could hear Kimberly calling for her. Appellant beat Kimberly to death. He then went into another bedroom where the Sims’s five-year-old son, Ronnie, was sleeping and beat him severely on the head. Mr. Sims found his family when he came home from work sometime later.

At the sentencing hearing, the State introduced evidence of other crimes to which appellant had also pled guilty. On August 5, 1989, appellant raped and stabbed to death Nancy[*265] Harrington at her home. On November 29, 1991, five days after the assault on the Sims family, appellant broke into the home of Etha Mae Thompson while she was watching television. Appellant beat her in the face using a board with nails in it. Ms. Thompson was beaten to the point that her left eye came out of its socket. Appellant raped her twice and forced her to perform fellatio twice before she escaped half-naked from the house.

On February 22, 1992, appellant broke into the home of Carolyn Hilton. Ms. Hilton was not at home. That same night, he broke into the home of Michelle Merchant. He tried to rape her. In the ensuing fight, he stabbed her in the shoulder and arm and beat her in the face with an object, breaking her jaw and knocking out teeth. Appellant was finally apprehended a few days later.

All of the above crimes were committed while appellant was between the ages of fourteen and seventeen years. [1] During this entire period, he attended high school and participated in sports and church activities as usual. He was sixteen at the time he committed the capital murder now before the Court and nineteen at the time this death sentence was imposed.

ISSUE

Is South Carolina’s death penalty unconstitutional as applied to individuals under seventeen years of age?

DISCUSSION

Appellant claims a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment because South Carolina’s statutory scheme allows for a child [2] charged with murder to be tried as an adult under S.C.Code Ann. § 20-7-430(6) (Supp.1995), thereby potentially exposing a child to a death sentence.

[*266] First, this argument was not made below and is not preserved on appeal. State v. Hudgins, 319 S.C. 233, 460 S.E.2d 388 (1995).

Further, the United States Supreme Court has held the death penalty constitutional under the Eighth Amendment where it is applied to a person sixteen years or older at the time of the offense. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 109 S.Ct. 2969, 106 L.Ed.2d 306 (1989). Appellant was sixteen at the time of the offense for which he was sentenced to death and therefore the death penalty is constitutional as applied to him. It is well-settled that the constitutionality of a statute may not be questioned by one whose rights are not invaded and injuriously affected thereby. Schneider v. State, 255 S.C. 594, 180 S.E.2d 340 (1971); see also Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990) (one must establish standing to assert an Eighth Amendment challenge by showing an injury in fact in order to invoke jurisdiction of federal courts). We conclude appellant has no standing to assert this issue.

Finally, appellant relies on State v. Furman, 122 Wash.2d 440, 858 P.2d 1092 (1993). In Furman, without addressing the issue of standing, the Washington state supreme court vacated the death sentence of an eighteen-year-old because the state statutory scheme allowed a child under sixteen to be tried as an adult and potentially sentenced to death. The court concluded it must declare a death sentence for a juvenile, even one over sixteen, to be unconstitutional. 858 P.2d at 1103. We find Furman unpersuasive at best. The Furman court failed to apply the rule of statutory construction restricting a court from construing a statute to do that which is unconstitutional. See Gilstrap v. South Carolina Budget and Control Bd., 310 S.C. 210, 423 S.E.2d 101 (1992). Further, Furman conflicts with the Supreme Court’s decision in Stanford, supra, since that case also involved a state statute that allowed a juvenile under sixteen years of age to be tried as an adult. [3]

[*267] We have reviewed the record and conclude imposition of the death sentence in this case was not the result of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor. Further, the evidence supports the findings of aggravating circumstances and the death sentence is not excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases. S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-25(C) (1985); see State v. Nance, 320 S.C. 501, 466 S.E.2d 349 (1996). Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court is

AFFIRMED.

FINNEY, C.J., and TOAL, WALLER and BURNETT, JJ., concur.
1

. Appellant was bom January 6, 1975.

2

. A "child” is defined as a person under seventeen years for purposes of jurisdiction in a criminal case. See S.C.Code Ann. § 20-7-390 (1985) (subsequently amended).

3

. Stanford involved two state court decisions: one from Kentucky and one from Missouri. The Missouri statutory scheme allowed individuals between fourteen and seventeen years of age who committed felonies to[*267] be tried as adults. 492 U.S. at 366-67, 109 S.Ct. at 2973-74, 106 L.Ed.2d at 316-17.