Shaw v. State, 483 S.E.2d 646 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997). · Go Syfert
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Shaw v. State, 483 S.E.2d 646 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 2 distinct cases · …the georgia constitutional and statutory protections against double jeopardy also apply to multiple prosecutions or punishments for the 'same offense' or 'same crime,' to offenses arising from the 'same conduct' or 'same transaction,' and to 'lesser included offenses. at p. 194 ✓
12 citation events (12 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Thomas A. Hassard v. State (gactapp, 2013-02-07)
Top citers, strongest first. 5 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Thomas A. Hassard v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
“The Georgia constitutional and statutory protections against double jeopardy also apply to multiple prosecutions or punishments for the ‘same offense’ or ‘same crime,’ to offenses arising from the ‘same conduct’ or ‘same transaction,’ and to ‘lesser included offenses.’” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Shaw v. State, 225 Ga. App. 193, 194 (1) ( 483 SE2d 646 ) (1997).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hassard v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
“The Georgia constitutional and statutory protections against double jeopardy also apply to multiple prosecutions or punishments for the ‘same offense’ or ‘same crime,’ to offenses arising from the ‘same conduct’ or ‘same transaction,’ and to ‘lesser included offenses.’ ” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Shaw v. State, 225 Ga. App. 193, 194 (1) ( 483 SE2d 646 ) (1997).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bozzuto v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
Shaw v. State, 225 Ga. App. 193, 194 (1) ( 483 SE2d 646 ) (1997) (although trial court improperly revoked the defendant’s bond for intentionally delaying the beginning of the trial by hiring new counsel, defendant’s double jeopardy claim failed because the conduct leading to his bond revocation was not the conduct forming the basis for his prosecution).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Agee v. State
Ga. · 2003 · confidence medium
All the Justices concur. 1 The trial court’s order states bond is set at $195,000, but according to representations made in Agee’s appellate brief, by Agee’s counsel before the trial court, and in a motion filed by the State in the trial court, the bond was reduced to $160,000. 2 See Hood v. Carsten, 267 Ga. 579 ( 481 SE2d 525 ) (1997) (bond revocation must comply with state and federal due process requirements). 3 Mathis v. State, 273 Ga. 508, 509 ( 543 SE2d 712 ) (2001); Shaw v. State, 225 Ga. App. 193, 194 ( 483 SE2d 646 ) (1997). 4 See Shaw, 225 Ga. App. at 194 ; see also Breed v. Jo…
discussed Cited "see" Collins v. Bazan (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
“Constitutional issues not raised below are not preserved for appeal. [Cits.]” Norman v. State, 197 Ga. App. 333, 334 (3) ( 398 SE2d 395 ) (1990); see Shaw v. State, 225 Ga. App. 193, 194 (2) ( 483 SE2d 646 ) (1997); Johnson v. Hames Contracting, 208 Ga. App. 664, 666 (3) ( 431 SE2d 455 ) (1993). 2.
Shaw
v.
the State
A97A0036.
Court of Appeals of Georgia.
Mar 5, 1997.
483 S.E.2d 646
1997 Ga. App. LEXIS 306
William C. Head, for appellant., Fredric D. Bright, District Attorney, Paul L. Groth, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
Blackburn, Johnson, Pope.
Cited by 5 opinions  |  Published
Johnson, Judge.

Robert Milton Shaw was indicted for first degree vehicular homicide, serious injury by vehicle, driving while under the influence of drugs, reckless driving, improper passing in a no passing zone, and driving without proof of insurance. All the charges arose out of the same November 1994 incident.

At the call of the trial calendar on February 19, 1996, Shaw announced that he had hired a new attorney the day before, who could not be present. The court continued the case to the next day, but Shaw’s new attorney did not appear then, either. Shaw refused to give responsive answers to the court’s questions about the eleventh-hour hiring. In response to what it saw as Shaw’s deliberate and successful attempt to force a continuance, the trial court revoked[*194] Shaw’s bond, and he was incarcerated for 20 days. Shaw was released pursuant to an order from this Court finding the revocation improper, and ordering that his bond be reinstated and that he be released instanter.

Decided March 5,1997 William C. Head, for appellant. Fredric D. Bright, District Attorney, Paul L. Groth, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.

Shaw then filed a plea in bar, contending that his improper incarceration awaiting trial constituted punishment for the charges he was facing, and that any further prosecution would place him in double jeopardy for the same offense, in violation of the federal and state constitutions, and three Georgia statutes. The trial court denied the plea in bar, and Shaw appeals. We affirm.

1. The Fifth Amendment’s double jeopardy clause protects a criminal defendant against three forms of abuse: (1) a second prosecution for the same offense, following an acquittal; (2) a second prosecution for the same offense, following a conviction; (3) multiple punishments for the same offense. United States v. Halper, 490 U. S. 435, 440 (109 SC 1892, 104 LE2d 487, 496) (1989). The Georgia constitutional and statutory protections against double jeopardy also apply to multiple prosecutions or punishments for the “same offense” or “same crime,” to offenses arising from the “same conduct” or “same transaction,” and to “lesser included offenses.” See Ga. Const, of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XVIII; see OCGA §§ 16-1-6; 16-1-7; 16-1-8; see generally State v. Steien, 214 Ga. App. 345, 346 (447 SE2d 701) (1994). Shaw’s double jeopardy claim fails because his conduct in delaying his trial in February 1996, which was the basis for the bond revocation, was not the same as his conduct in operating a motor vehicle in November 1994, which is the basis for the prosecution he still faces. Obviously, the 1996 conduct was also not a lesser offense included in the 1994 conduct. The trial court therefore was correct to deny the plea in bar.

2. Shaw also contends the improper bond revocation violated his due process rights under the Georgia and United States constitutions, and that prohibiting further prosecution on the underlying charges is an appropriate remedy for such a due process violation. This argument was not presented to the trial court, and so was waived. See generally In the Interest of C. T., 197 Ga. App. 300 (1) (398 SE2d 286) (1990).

Judgment affirmed.

Pope, P. J., and Blackburn, J., concur.