Tecca v. McCormick, 806 P.2d 11 (Mont. 1990). · Go Syfert
Tecca v. McCormick, 806 P.2d 11 (Mont. 1990). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
29 citation events (9 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Little v. Baigas (nmctapp, 2016-11-29)
Treatment trajectory · 1991 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1991 2008 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 4 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Little v. Baigas
N.M. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
Case 7 law reflects this policy mostly by disallowing unlicensed contractors to recover 8 compensation for unlicensed work, “even if the work was ‘expertly performed’ and 9 the consumer knew the contractor was unlicensed.” Gamboa, 2004-NMCA-053 , ¶ 15 10 (quoting Mascarenas v. Jaramillo, 1991-NMSC-014 , ¶ 16, 111 N.M. 410 , 806 P.2d 11 59 (noting that “[t]he public policy behind the licensing requirement of Construction 12 Industries Licensing Act is so strong that the element of consumer knowledge is of 13 no consequence”)).
discussed Cited "see" State v. Redcrow (2×)
Mont. · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
See Tecea v. McCormick (1990), 246 Mont. 317, 319 , 806 P.2d 11, 12 . ¶35 Redcrow maintains that what occurred in her case rises to the level of a fundamental miscarriage of justice because Regudon, her co-defendant, was the real killer and, had her attorney effectively represented her, the jury would have convicted him and not her.
discussed Cited "see" Don Jay Thomas v. Jack McCormick Warden Henry Burgess, Executive Director, State Board of Pardons and Parole
9th Cir. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See Tecca v. McCormick, 806 P.2d 11, 12 (Mont.1990) (construing state habeas petition as petition for postconviction relief) 3 Thomas claims that his petition is not procedurally barred because (1) the Montana Supreme Court's reliance on In re McNair did not constitute an independent and adequate state ground; and (2) the procedural bar in McNair is not strictly or consistently applied.
discussed Cited "see" J.R. Fletcher v. Jack McCormick Warden (2×)
9th Cir. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See Tecca v. McCormick, 246 Mont. 317, 318 , 806 P.2d 11, 12 (1990) (construing state habeas petition as petition for postconviction relief) 2 Furthermore, Fletcher states in his state habeas petition that he had access to a law library as of January, 1981 3 For the first time on appeal, Fletcher argues that the five-year statute of limitations is "ex post facto legislation." Because this claim was not raised in the district court, and because no extraordinary circumstances warrant review of the claim, we decline to address it.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
LEE NELS TECCA, Petitioner,
v.
JACK McCORMICK, Warden, Respondent
90-444.
Montana Supreme Court.
Oct 11, 1990.
806 P.2d 11
1990 Mont. LEXIS 345
Sheehy, Harrison, Barz, Hunt, McDonough.
Cited by 16 opinions  |  Published

ORDER

Petitioner Lee Neis Tecca, filed with this Court a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus seeking transcripts of his sentencing hearing and alleging that new evidence was not made available to him before his guilty plea was made. To this petition, the respondent Jack McCormick, through the Attorney General of the State of Montana has filed a Motion to Deny Petitioner’s Request for Transcripts and Dismiss the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

The petitioner originally plead not guilty to all charges contained in an information filed in the Eighteenth Judicial District, Gallatin[*318] County, which charged him with two counts of aggravated burglary, one count of sexual intercourse without consent, and one count of attempted sexual intercourse without consent. Later, with appointed counsel, petitioner withdrew his plea of not guilty and entered a plea of guilty to all four charges contained in the information.

Petitioner was sentenced to 40 years on Count I to run concurrently with a 40-year sentence for Count II, and 30 years on Count III, to run concurrently with a 20-year sentence on Count IV. In addition petitioner was designated a dangerous offender. The District Court further ordered that petitioner not be released on parole until he had satisfactorily completed the sexual offender treatment program at the Montana State Prison.

Petitioner did not appeal his conviction within the period provided and thus is not entitled to obtain a transcript merely by showing indigency under the authority of Rule 9(c), M.R.App.P. Further, petitioner is precluded from obtaining a transcript for collateral attack of his conviction unless he can identify a specific deprivation of rights or prejudicial error which might serve as a basis for relief. Petition of Parker (1973), 162 Mont. 330, 511 P.2d 973.

As to the grounds for relief in petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, this Court will consider such petition as a petition for post-conviction relief as the plain language of § 46-22-101(2), MCA, indicates that habeas corpus relief is not the appropriate remedy under the facts of this case.

Petitioner alleges that there is newly discovered evidence which was not available to him prior to the entry of his plea of guilty and that had he been made aware of this evidence, he would have gone to trial. There is no showing as to what constitutes this newly discovered medical evidence. Further, we note that prior to the entry of his guilty plea petitioner was the subject of several medical examinations, including a psychiatric evaluation, an examination for collection of hair, blood and saliva standards, and a neurological examination.

The petitioner here has exhausted his remedy of appeal because an appeal was afforded under § 46-20-104, MCA, but none was filed within 60 days of judgment as required by Rule 5(b), M.R.App.P.

This Court has previously invoked a procedural bar in § 46-21-105, MCA, and refused to address the merits of a post-conviction petition. See In re the Petition of Martin (Mont. 1989), [240 Mont. 419,] 787 P.2d 746, 46 St.Rep. 2213. Here, petitioner was afforded the right of appeal and did not take it.

[*319] We note that it has long been the rule that federal courts will decline review of State court decisions based upon independent and adequate State grounds, which include procedural bars. Henry v. Mississippi (1965), 379 U.S. 444, 446, 85 S.Ct. 564, 566, 13 L.Ed.2d 408. The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that State appellate decisions clearly state, as we have here, the procedural basis for dismissing post-conviction relief claims in order to preclude later review by federal courts on the merits. Harris v. Reed (1989) 489 U.S. 255, 109 S.Ct. 1038, 1043, 103 L.Ed.2d 308.

IT IS ORDERED:

1. The petition of Lee Neis Tecca is hereby dismissed.

2. The Clerk is directed to mail a true copy hereof to counsel of record for the respondent and to Petitioner personally.

DATED this 11th day of October, 1990.

s/ John C. Sheehy, Acting Chief Justice s/ John Conway Harrison, Justice s/ Diane G. Barz, Justice s/ William E. Hunt, Sr., Justice s/ R. C. McDonough, Justice