Goss v. State, 390 P.2d 220 (Alaska 1964). · Go Syfert
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Goss v. State, 390 P.2d 220 (Alaska 1964). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
78 citation events (4 in the last 25 years) across 10 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Hamilton v. State (alaskactapp, 2002-11-22) · Strongest negative: Rutherford v. State (alaska, 1971-07-01)
Treatment trajectory · 1966 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1966 1996 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 29 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Overruled Rutherford v. State (2×)
Alaska · 1971 · confidence high
The extent of reliance on this court's decision in Goss v. State, 390 P.2d 220 (Alaska 1964), where we held the right of an accused to speedy trial may be waived by failure to assert it, overruled by Glasgow , is somewhat difficult to analyze.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hamilton v. State (2×)
Alaska Ct. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
NOTES [1] Beauvois, 837 P.2d at 1121 n. 1. [2] Castle, 999 P.2d at 170-71 . [3] See id. at 173-74 . [4] Id. at 177 . [5] See Whren, 517 U.S. at 813-19 , 116 S.Ct. at 1774-77 . [6] AS 28.40.050(a)-(b). [7] See AS 12.25.030(a)(1) (a police officer may arrest a person without a warrant when the person commits a crime in the officer's presence); AS 12.25.180(a) (a police officer who stops or contacts a person for committing a misdemeanor may either arrest them or issue them a citation, at the officer's discretion). [8] Coleman, 553 P.2d at 46 . [9] Quoting Coleman, 553 P.2d at 46 , which in turn w…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Eldridge v. State
Alaska Ct. App. · 1993 · confidence medium
On remand, the superior court is directed to reconsider its ruling by determining whether the totality of the circumstances gave rise to articulable grounds supporting a reasonable suspicion that Eldridge was armed and dangerous *839 and that an immediate' patdown of his person was “required ... as a matter of practical necessity.” Coleman, 553 P.2d at 46 (quoting Goss v. State, 390 P.2d 220, 224 (Alaska 1964)). 8 This case is REMANDED for reconsideration. 1 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Barron v. State
Alaska Ct. App. · 1992 · confidence medium
It was necessary for Hoffman to conduct “a prompt investigation ... as a matter of practical necessity.” Coleman, 553 P.2d at 46 (quoting Goss v. State, 390 P.2d 220, 224 (Alaska 1964)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Zsupnik v. State (2×)
Alaska · 1990 · confidence medium
Copelin v. State, 676 P.2d 608, 609 (Alaska App. 1984) (on remand from Copelin ); Goss v. State, 390 P.2d 220, 224 (Alaska 1964); Ward at 88 (court assumes that a DWI suspect taken to the station and detained for the 20 minute waiting period is under arrest).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Gibson v. State
Alaska Ct. App. · 1990 · confidence medium
Coleman, 553 P.2d at 46 (quoting Goss v. State, 390 P.2d 220, 224 (Alaska 1964)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. GB (2×) also: Cited "see"
Alaska Ct. App. · 1989 · confidence medium
As indicated in Coleman , the fundamental inquiry in each case is whether "a prompt investigation [was] required ... as a matter of practical necessity." Coleman v. State, 553 P.2d at 46 (quoting Goss v. State, 390 P.2d 220, 224 (Alaska), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 859 , 85 S.Ct. 118 , 13 L.Ed.2d 62 (1964)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. G.B. (2×) also: Cited "see"
Alaska Ct. App. · 1989 · confidence medium
As indicated in Coleman , the fundamental inquiry in each case is whether “a prompt investigation [was] required ... as a matter of practical necessity.” Coleman v. State, 553 P.2d at 46 (quoting Goss v. State, 390 P.2d 220, 224 (Alaska), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 859 , 85 S.Ct. 118 , 13 L.Ed.2d 62 (1964)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hintz v. State (2×)
Alaska · 1981 · confidence medium
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 , 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 906-07 (1968); Coleman v. State, 553 P.2d 40, 43 (Alaska 1976); Goss v. State, 390 P.2d 220, 224 (Alaska 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 859 , 85 S.Ct. 118 , 13 L.Ed.2d 62 (1964).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Weltin v. State
Alaska · 1978 · confidence medium
This court, in an unbroken line of decisions commencing with Goss v. State, 390 P.2d 220, 223 (Alaska 1964), has recognized the warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest exception to the warrant requirement. 8 In Merrill v. State, 423 P.2d 686, 698-700 (Alaska 1967), appellant was apprehended at a remote highway location.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Coleman v. State (2×)
Alaska · 1976 · confidence medium
Goss v. State, 390 P.2d 220, 224 (Alaska 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 859 , 85 S.Ct. 118 , 13 L.Ed.2d 62 (1964). .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Schraff v. State (2×)
Alaska · 1975 · confidence medium
We have held that a search incident to arrest may precede the arrest, Goss v. State, 390 P.2d 220, 223-224 (Alaska 1964), but have required a substantial contemporaneity of search and arrest. [14] In Goss , we found a search which preceded an arrest to be lawful where the search occurred after probable cause for the arrest had arisen, and the arrest followed almost immediately thereafter.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Layland v. State
Alaska · 1975 · confidence medium
Other cases pertaining to the lawfulness of nonconsensual searches and seizures without a warrant prior to arrest may be found in Annot., 89 A.L.R.2d 715 (1963). 26 .Goss v. State, 390 P.2d 220, 223-24 (Alaska 1964) (footnotes omitted). 27 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mattern v. State (2×)
Alaska · 1972 · confidence medium
However, Sergeant Edwardson not only did not have to use a running board to aid his view of the van's interior, he testified that the van did not have a running board. [9] Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 161 , 45 S.Ct. 280, 288 , 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925); see also Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313 , 79 S.Ct. 329 , 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 , 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1310 , 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949); Goss v. State, 390 P.2d 220, 223-224 (Alaska), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 859 , 85 S.Ct. 118 , 13 L.Ed.2d 62 (1964). [10] Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 31…
examined Cited as authority (rule) Fresneda v. State (4×)
Alaska · 1969 · confidence medium
For a third or subsequent offense, or if the offender has previously been convicted two or more times of a violation of the laws of the United States or of any other state, territory or district relating to narcotic drugs, the offender is punishable by a fine of not more than $10,000 and by imprisonment for not less than 20 nor more than 40 years. * * * * * (c) A person convicted of illegally selling, giving or supplying narcotic drugs to a person under the age of 21 years is punishable * * * * * (3) if the offense is a third violation or if the offense is a first or second violation and the o…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rubey v. City of Fairbanks (2×)
Alaska · 1969 · confidence medium
Goss v. State, 390 P.2d 220, 223 (Alaska 1964) ; Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 , 84 S.Ct. 881 , 11 L.Ed.2d 777, 780 (1964). .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sleziak v. State (2×)
Alaska · 1969 · confidence medium
No warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 6 . 390 P.2d 220, 223 (Alaska 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 859 , 85 S.Ct. 118 , 13 L.Ed.2d 62 (1964).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Soolook v. State (2×)
Alaska · 1968 · confidence medium
Crim.R. 4(a) (1) provides: If it appears from the complaint that there is probable cause to believe that an offense lias been committed and that the defendant has committed it, a ■warrant for the arrest of the defendant shall issue to any officer authorized by law to execute it. 38 . 423 P.2d 686, 698-699 (Alaska 1967) (footnotes omitted). 39 . 390 P.2d 220, 223 (Alaska 1964) (footnote omitted). 40 .
examined Cited as authority (rule) Stevens v. State (4×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Alaska · 1968 · confidence medium
AS 12.65.090 provides: If the jury finds that a crime was committed in the killing, and also charges a person with the commission of the crime, the coroner, as a magistrate, shall immediately issue a warrant for the arrest of that person. [8] Maze v. State, 425 P.2d 235, 239 (Alaska 1967). [9] McIntyre v. State, 379 P.2d 615, 617 (Alaska 1963). [10] 369 P.2d 879, 881 (Alaska 1962). [1] 227 A.2d 486, 489 (Del. 1967). [2] 390 P.2d 220, 223 (Alaska 1964). [3] This exception was later utilized by this court in affirming the lower court rulings in Maze v. State, 425 P.2d 235, 238 (Alaska 1967), and…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Drahosh v. State (2×)
Alaska · 1968 · confidence medium
See Merrill v. State, 423 P.2d 686, 698-699 (Alaska), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1040 , 87 S.Ct. 1497 , 18 L.Ed.2d 607 (1967); Goss v. State, 390 P.2d 220, 223 (Alaska), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 859 , 85 S.Ct. 118 , 13 L.Ed.2d 62 (1964). [7] State v. Smith, 417 P.2d 252, 253 (Alaska 1966); People v. McGuire, 5 N.Y.2d 523 , 186 N.Y.S.2d 250, 252 , 158 N.E.2d 830, 832 (1959).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Weltz v. State
Alaska · 1967 · confidence medium
Brown v. State, 372 P.2d 785, 790 (Alaska 1962). 19 . 390 P.2d 220, 223 (Alaska 1964). 20 . 383 P.2d 716, 719 (Alaska 1963) (footnote omitted). 21 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Taggart
NY · 1967 · confidence medium
In other cases, the information did not emanate from known or unknown third persons, but the grounds for the arresting officers’ suspicions were no more indicative than those present here (Goss v. State, 390 P. 2d 220, 223-224 [Alaska], cert. den. 379 U. S. 859 [defendants drove away from side of building at night with lights off]; People v. Beverly, 200 Cal. App. 2d 119, 125 [Dist.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Weger (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 1967 · confidence medium
United States v. Bufalino, 285 P.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1960); Goss v. State, 390 P.2d 220, 224 (Alaska), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 859 [ 13 L.Ed.2d 62 , 85 S.Ct. 118 ] (1964) (‘when the officer stopped the car he was doing nothing more than conducting an investigation in response to circumstances that aroused his suspicion’); People v. Mickelson, 59 Cal.2d 448 , 30 Cal.Rptr. 18 , 380 P.2d 658 (1963); People v. Faginkrantz 21 Ill.2d 75 , 171 N.E.2d 5 (1960); People v. Henneman, 367 Ill. 151 , 10 N.E.2d 649 (1937); State v. Freeland, 255 Iowa 1334 , 125 N.W.2d 825 (1964); People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d …
cited Cited as authority (rule) Maze v. State
Alaska · 1967 · confidence medium
(Emphasis added.) 8 . 390 P.2d 220, 223-224 (Alaska), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 859 , 85 S.Ct. 118 , 13 L.Ed.2d 62 (1964). 9 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Merrill v. State
Alaska · 1967 · confidence medium
Note: Alternative grounds to legitimatize the arrests were advanced at the trial level. 56 . 390 P.2d 220, 223 (Alaska 1964). 57 .
discussed Cited "see" Haag v. State
Alaska Ct. App. · 2005 · signal: see · confidence high
See Coleman v. State, 553 P.2d 40, 42-43, 46 (Alaska 1976), Maze v. State, 425 P.2d 235, 238 (Alaska 1967), and Goss v. State, 390 P.2d 220, 224 (Alaska 1964) (upholding investigative stops under similar facts).
cited Cited "see" Metzker v. State
Alaska Ct. App. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See Coleman, 553 P.2d at 46 (quoting Goss v. State, 390 P.2d 220, 224 (Alaska 1964)).
discussed Cited "see" McCoy v. State (2×)
Alaska · 1971 · signal: see · confidence high
See Goss v. State, 390 P.2d 220, 223-224 (Alaska), cert. denied 379 U.S. 859 , 85 S.Ct. 118 , 13 L.Ed.2d 62 (1964) ; Merrill v. State, 423 P.2d 686, 698-699 (Alaska 1967).
discussed Cited "see" Commonwealth v. Friel
Pa. Super. Ct. · 1967 · signal: see · confidence high
See Goss v. State, 390 P. 2d 220 (Alaska, 1964); People v. Kuntze, 371 Mich. 419 , 124 N.W. 2d 269 (1963); People v. Simon, 45 Cal. 2d 645 , 290 P. 2d 531 (1955); 89 A.L.R. 2d 715 . *16 The question then is was there probable cause to arrest prior to the search of the car?
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Johnnie Lee GOSS, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Alaska, Appellee
235.
Alaska Supreme Court.
Mar 18, 1964.
390 P.2d 220
Joseph P. Josephson, Anchorage, for ap-' pellant., Robert C. Erwin, Dist. Atty., and Leroy J. Barker, Asst. Dist. Atty., Anchorage, for appellee.
Nesbett, Dimond, Arend.
Cited by 58 opinions  |  Published
DIMOND, Justice.

Appellant was convicted of petty larceny. On this appeal he contends that the court below erred (1) in denying his motion to dismiss for want of a speedy trial, and (2)' in permitting the introduction of evidence which appellant claims was obtained b’y an illegal search and seizure.

Speedy Trial

Appellant’s trial did not take place until nearly fourteen months after he was indicted. He contends that his constitutional right to a speedy trial [1] was violated and, therefore, that the court ought to have granted his motion to dismiss the indictment under Criminal Rule 43(b). [2]

[*222] In guaranteeing to an accused the right to a speedy trial, the Alaska Constitu-tutional Convention adopted essentially the identical language of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. [3] Interpretation of the Sixth Amendment by the federal courts has resulted in the settled doctrine that the right to a speedy trial is the accused’s personal right which may be waived by his failure to assert it. [4] We construe art. I, § 11 in the same manner as the federal decisions construe the Sixth Amendment, and hold under the facts of this case that appellant waived his right to a speedy trial by failure to demand it.

Failure to demand a speedy trial may not amount to a waiver in every case. Exceptions to the rule are indicated by instances where an accused is in a position where he is unable to assert his right [5] , or where because of ignorance he does not assert it. [6] But circumstances which would call for making an exception have not been shown to be present in this case.

On January 19, 1961 appellant was present in the superior court at Anchorage with his court-appointed counsel representing him. He waived reading of the indictment and was given a copy, and then entered a plea of not guilty to the charge of larceny. Being unable to post $3,000 bail, he was placed in the Anchorage jail where he remained until the trial.

In November 1961, appellant wrote a letter to the presiding judge of the superior court requesting that counsel be appointed to represent him. Appellant stated that he had a couple of witnesses to be brought in and didn’t know how to go about getting them without an attorney’s advice. He expressed no concern over the fact' that nine months had passed since the indictment and that he had not yet gone'to trial.- The presiding judge acted promptly in response to appellant’s request. Four days after the letter was written, in a proceeding in' open court where appellant was present, new counsel was appointed to represent appellant. [7]

Approximately two months later, on January 28, 1962, appellant again wrote to the presiding judge stating that he had been in jail for about thirteen months, that during this time his court-appointed attorneys had done nothing to get the case to trial, and that he wanted the charges against him dismissed for lack of prosecution. About three weeks later, on February 19, 1962, appellant filed a formal motion to dismiss the indictment. On that day a hearing was held in court where appellant was present in person and also represented by court-appointed counsel. The motion to dismiss was denied. Two weeks later, on March 5, 1962, counsel for appellant filed another motion to dismiss on the ground of unnecessary delay in bringing appellant to trial. This motion was also denied, and appellant’s trial commenced two days later, on March 7, 1962.

The foregoing facts in no way suggest that appellant because of imprisonment, ignorance, or lack of legal assistance was not in a position to claim his constitutional right to a speedy trial. [8] We conclude that he waived the right by failing to assert it promptly. The court did not err in denying appellant’s motion to dismiss the indictment.

[*223] Search and Seizure

A state police officer testified that during the early morning hours of December 6, 1960 he was on patrol on Northern Lights Boulevard near Anchorage. At about 12:45 a. m. he observed a car drive away from the side of a building where the business of World Wide Distributors was located, and proceed west on the Boulevard for about one-half block without its headlights on. The officer followed the car, and after it had turned around and headed in the opposite direction, stopped it. He said that he stopped the car because of the suspicious circumstances of its being driven away from the side of the building, rather than from the parking lot in front, and because the headlights were off.

When the car stopped the driver got out and walked back toward the patrol car, the officer meeting him half way. The officer then looked through the window of the car. He observed appellant sitting in the front seat, another man sitting in the rear seat, and a number of folded shirts which looked like new merchandise. He asked the passengers to step out of the car and at that time observed on the floor of the rear of the car another pile of clothing with an automatic pistol on top of it. He then searched all three men and the car.

About this time another state trooper and a city policeman arrived on the scene and the three officers then took the appellant and his two companions to the World Wide Distributors where it was observed that the building'had been burglarized. At that time the officer who had stopped the car placed the men under arrest. He then proceeded to investigate the building. Investigation showed that the building had been burglarized, and that the clothing found in the car had come from the building. Appellant objected to the introduction of the articles of clothing into evidence on- the ground that they - were the result of an unlawful search and seizure. His obj ection was overruled.

The officer’s search of the vehicle -would be unlawful and the evidence seized in the search, inadmissible if the search was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. I, § 14 of the' state constitution. [9] The search would be unreasonable because made without a warrant, unless the facts were such as to bring this case within an exception to the rule that a search must rest upon •a search warrant. [10] The exception that we are concerned with here is that which recognizes the validity of a search made without a warrant where the search is made incident to a lawful arrest. [11] Since the arrest in this case was also made without a warrant, its lawfulness depends on whether it was based on probable cause, which exists if the facts and circumstances known to the officer would warrant a prudent man in believing that an offense had been or was being committed. [12]

Appellant argues that the search was not incident to a lawful arrest, and was therefore unlawful, because no arrest was made until after the search was completed and the officer had taken the three men to the World Wide Distributors building and discovered it had been broken into. There was no search until after the officer saw from outside the car the pile of clothing and the automatic pistol in the rear of the vehicle. At that point the officer had probable cause to make an arrest -without a warrant. The presence of the pistol and articles of clothing that looked like new merchandise, together with the circumstances of the car having been at the World' Wide Distributors building shortly after midnight and having been driven away without headlights on, would be enough to warrant a prudent man in believing that[*224] a felony had been committed. [13] The existence of probable cause to make an arrest without a warrant justified the officer in conducting an immediate search without a warrant. The search was incident to a lawful arrest although it preceded the arrest. [14]

The case of Henry v. United States [15] , relied upon by appellant, is distinguishable. There it was found that the arrest took place at the time when federal agents stopped the car and before they had observed contraband which they later discovered after a search of the car. The United States Supreme Court held that at the time the car was stopped and the arrest made there was no probable cause to believe a crime had been committed, and that the arrest was not justified by what the subsequent search disclosed. [16] Here, unlike the situation in Henry, the arrest was not made when the officer stopped the car. An arrest does not take place under Alaska law until a person has been taken into custody in order that he may be held to answer for the commission of a crime. [17] Neither the appellant nor his companions were taken into custody until after the pistol and clothing, which gave rise to probable cause to make an arrest, had been seen. When the officer stopped the car he was doing nothing more than conducting an investigation in response to circumstances that aroused his suspicions. Considering the lateness of the hour, the fact that the car was seen coming from the side of the building rather than from the parking lot in front, and that it was being driven without its headlights on, we believe the police officer had the right and the duty to make a prompt investigation, which required him as a matter of practical necessity to stop the car and question the occupants. This activity on the part of the police officer in the circumstances of this case was permissible and did not amount to an arrest. [18]

We conclude that the articles of clothing found in the car were not obtained through an unlawful search, and therefore were properly admitted into evidence.

The judgment is affirmed.

1

. Alaska Const. art. I, § 11 provides in part: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to a speedy and public trial * * *."

2

. Crim.it. 43(b) provides: “If there is unnecessary delay in presenting the charge to a grand jury or in filing an information against a defendant who has been held to answer to the superior court, or if there is unnecessary delay in bringing a defendant to trial, the court may dismiss the indictment, information or complaint.”

3

. Knudsen v. City of Anchorage, 358 P.2d 375, 877-379 (Alaska 1960). The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part that “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy tlie right to a speedy and public trial * * *."

4

. United States v. Lustman, 258 F.2d 475, 478 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 358 U.S. 880, 79 S.Ct. 118, 3 L.Ed.2d 109 (1958), Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d 302, 326 (1958).

5

. United States v. Chase, 135 F.Supp. 230 (N.D.Ill.1955).

6

. Taylor v. United States, 99 U.S.App.D.C. 183, 238 F.2d 259 (D.C.Cir.1956).

7

. The record does not show what happened to the attorney originally appointed to represent appellant at the time the indictment was returned.

8

. See United States v. Lustman, supra note 4, 258 F.2d at 478.

9

. Ellison v. State, Opinion No. 145, 383 P.2d 716 (Alaska 1963).

10

. Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253, 261. 80 S.Ct. 1431, 4 U.Ed.2d 1688, 1693 (1960).

11

. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 83 S.Ct. 1623, 10 L.Ed.2d 726, 739 (1963).

13

. See Busby v. United States, 296 F.2d 328, 331 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 876, 82 S.Ct. 1147, 8 L.Ed.2d 278 (1962). (Officer seeing shotgun in. back of car-probable cause to make arrest) .

14

. Busby v. United States, supra note 13, 296 F.2d at 332; Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694, 700, 51 S.Ct. 240, 75 L.Ed. 629, 632 (1931).

17

. AS 12.25.160 defines arrest as follows: “Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be held to answer for the commission of a crime.”

18

. Busby v. United States, 296 F.2d 328, 331-332 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 876, 82 S.Ct. 1147, 8 L.Ed.2d 278 (1962); United States v. Bonanno, 180 F.Supp. 71, 77-81 (S.D.N.Y.1960).