Commonwealth v. Williams, 662 A.2d 658 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995). · Go Syfert
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Commonwealth v. Williams, 662 A.2d 658 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 1 distinct case, last quoted 2001 · …is limited to the validity of the revocation proceeding and the legality of the final judgment of sentence. ✓
cited 2× by 1 distinct case, last quoted 2001 · …time spent in custody prior to trial, during trial, pending sentence, and pending resolution of an appeal. ✓
134 citation events (132 in the last 25 years) across 4 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Com. v. Kocott, J. (pasuperct, 2024-09-24)
Treatment trajectory · 2000 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2000 2013 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 22 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Com. v. Kocott, J.
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2024 · confidence medium
A reviewing court’s “scope of review on appeal from the judgment of sentence imposed following a probation revocation is limited to the validity of the revocation proceedings and the legality of the final judgment of sentence.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 662 A.2d 658, 659 (Pa. Super. 1995) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) J.L. Bradley v. PBPP
Pa. Commw. Ct. · 2021 · confidence medium
Moreover, “a challenge to the legality of a sentence is nonwaivable.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 662 A.2d 658, 659 (Pa. Super. 1995), appeal denied, 674 A.2d 1071 (Pa. 1996).17 Section 6138(a)(4) of the Prisons and Parole Code, 61 Pa. C.S. § 6138(a)(4), further provides that “[t]he period of time for which the parole violator is required to serve shall be computed from and begin on the date that the parole violator is taken into custody to be returned to the institution as a parole violator.” The provisions of Section 6138(a)(4), therefore, become operative only once the Board has revo…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Com. v. Greshan, B.
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2020 · confidence medium
Commonwealth v. Williams, 662 A.2d 658, 659 (Pa. Super. 1995).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Com. v. Beer, C.
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2019 · confidence medium
Commonwealth v. Williams, 662 A.2d 658, 659 (Pa. Super. 1995).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Com. v. Beer, C.
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2019 · confidence medium
Commonwealth v. Williams, 662 A.2d 658, 659 (Pa. Super. 1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Com. v. Derogatis, R.
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2018 · confidence medium
Relevant to this appeal, our scope of review from a judgment of sentence following a probation revocation “is limited to the validity of the revocation proceedings and the legality of the final judgment of sentence.” -5- J-S46045-18 Commonwealth v. Williams, 662 A.2d 658, 659 (Pa. Super. 1995) (citation omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1033-34 (Pa. Super. 2013) (holding that this Court’s scope of review in an appeal from a revocation sentencing includes discretionary sentencing challenges).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Com. v. Brown, M.
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2017 · confidence medium
Nevertheless, “a defendant who had previously served time on a split sentence and was subsequently sentenced to the maximum term after revocation of his probation was entitled to credit for time served for his original period of 2 See 18 Pa.C.S. § 1103(1). -4- J-S71037-16 incarceration.” Id. at 1284-85 (citing Commonwealth v. Williams, 662 A.2d 658, 659 (Pa. Super. 1995)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Com. v. Blank, J.
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2017 · confidence medium
Commonwealth v. Williams, 662 A.2d 658, 659 (Pa.Super. 1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Com. v. Rygalski, R.
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2017 · confidence medium
Further, this Court has long held that a challenge to the legality of a sentence “is nonwaivable and may be considered sua sponte by our Court.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 662 A.2d 658, 659 (Pa. Super. 1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) W. Williams v. DOC (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Pa. Commw. Ct. · 2016 · confidence medium
Commonwealth v. Fish, 752 A.2d 921, 923 (Pa. Super. 2000), appeal denied, 771 A.2d 1279 (Pa. 2001), cited by Commonwealth v. Wallace, 870 A.2d 838, 844 (Pa. 2005) (“upon sentencing following a revocation of probation, the trial court is limited only by the maximum sentence that it could have imposed originally”); Commonwealth v. Williams, 662 A.2d 658, 659 (Pa. Super. 1995), appeal denied, 674 A.2d 1071 (Pa. 1996) (following probation violation, the court should give a defendant credit for the cumulative time served in custody on the original offense if the court resentences the defendant …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Com. v. Alston, W.
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2015 · confidence medium
In Commonwealth v. Williams, defendant was originally sentenced to 11.5 to 23 months imprisonment and a consecutive 3 year probation term, after pleading guilty to attempted theft by unlawful taking, a felony of the third degree, with a statutory maximum of 3.5 -7 years. 662 A.2d 658, 658 (Pa. Super. 1995).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Johnson (4×)
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2009 · confidence medium
Id. at 659.
discussed Cited "see" Com. v. Hoy, N., III
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2022 · signal: see · confidence high
See Commonwealth v. Williams, 662 A.2d 658, 659 (Pa.Super. 1995) (concluding that a defendant was entitled to credit for all time served on a “probation violation detainer”) (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 9760 (“Credit for time served”)).
cited Cited "see" Com. v. Marced, E.
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2022 · signal: see · confidence high
See Williams, 662 A.2d at 659 .
discussed Cited "see" Com. v. Keller v. Jr.
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2020 · signal: see · confidence high
See Commonwealth v. Williams, 662 A.2d 658, 659 (Pa. Super. 1995) (concluding that appellant was entitled to credit for time served on probation violation detainer); see also generally Gaito v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. and Parole, 412 A.2d 568, 571 (Pa. 1980) (holding that a defendant held in custody solely due to a detainer lodged by the Board is entitled to credit for time served).
examined Cited "see" Com. v. Crosby, R. (3×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2015 · signal: see · confidence high
See Williams, 662 A.2d at 659 ; see also Commonwealth v. Yakell, 876 A.2d 1040, 1042 (Pa. Super. 2005) (stating that “the maximum sentence for the probation violation when added to the original incarceration cannot exceed the statutory maximum sentence for the underlying crime.”).
discussed Cited "see" Allen v. Commonwealth, Department of Corrections (2×)
Pa. Commw. Ct. · 2014 · signal: accord · confidence high
McCray (total confinement cannot exceed the legal maximum established for the crime); accord Commonwealth v. Williams, 443 Pa.Super. 479 , 662 A.2d 658 (1995) (credit for time previously served in prison required where the failure to accord time credit would result in illegal aggregate sentence exceeding statutory maximum).
examined Cited "see" McCray v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (4×)
Pa. · 2005 · signal: see · confidence high
See Commonwealth v. Williams, 443 Pa.Super. 479 , 662 A.2d 658 (1995), allocatur denied, 544 Pa. 607 , 674 A.2d 1071 (1996) (credit for time previously served in prison required in VOP context only because VOP court imposed statutory maximum sentence; in that instance, failure to accord time credit would result in illegal aggregate sentence exceeding statutory maximum).
discussed Cited "see" McCray v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (2×)
Pa. Commw. Ct. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See Williams, 662 A.2d at 659 .
examined Cited "see" Commonwealth v. Bowser (4×)
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See Williams, 662 A.2d at 659 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Com. v. Moore, B.
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2021 · signal: see also · confidence low
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 967 A2d 1001, 1005 (Pa.Super. 2009) (quoting 42 Pa.C.S. § 9760(1)); see also Commonwealth v. Williams, 662 A.2d 658 (Pa.Super. 1995) (relying upon § 9760(1) and -4- J-A22010-21 holding that the trial court must credit time served if a sentence imposed following revocation of probation would otherwise exceed the maximum sentence allowed by law).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Com. v. Cribbs, K.
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2019 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Commonwealth v. Williams, 662 A.2d 658 (Pa. Super. 1995) (concluding that a defendant who had previously served time on a split sentence and was subsequently sentenced to the maximum term after revocation of his - 13 - J-S13006-19 probation was entitled to credit for time served for his original period of incarceration).6 Here, Appellant was originally sentenced to 8 to 16 months’ imprisonment followed by 20 months’ probation for his PWID conviction at No. CP-33-CR-626-2013.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania
v.
John WILLIAMS A/K/A Wayne Jacobs, Appellant
Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
Jun 19, 1995.
662 A.2d 658
1995 Pa. Super. LEXIS 1773
Mark D. Mungello, Blackwood, NJ, for appellant., Kathy L. Echternach, Asst. Dist. Atty., Philadelphia, for Com., appellee.
Rowley, Tamilia, Hester.
Cited by 49 opinions  |  Published
TAMILIA, Judge:

John Williams a/k/a Wayne Jacobs appeals from the July 27, 1994 judgment of sentence imposing a term of three and one-half (3/é) to seven (7) years’ imprisonment. The sentence followed a determination that appellant had violated his probation.

An annotated review of appellant’s extensive criminal history [1] reveals the following. On February 15, 1990, appellant pled guilty to attempted theft by unlawful taking and was sentenced to eleven and one-half (ll-Jé) to twenty-three (23) months’ imprisonment and to a consecutive term of three (3) years’ probation. Appellant served the minimum sentence and was released on parole. Subsequently, on April 27, 1992, appellant was adjudicated in violation of his parole as a result of convictions for new crimes. Appellant’s parole was revoked, he served the remainder of the 23 months under the original sentence, and his probation was continued. On July[*481] 27, 1994, appellant’s probation was revoked following his conviction for involuntary manslaughter. Appellant was then sentenced to 3$ to 7 years’ imprisonment, the maximum sentence allowable for appellant’s February 15, 1990 plea of guilty to attempted theft by unlawful taking, a third degree felony. 18 Pa.C.S. § 1103(3). Appellant was allowed credit only for the time served on the violation of probation detainer and not for the cumulative 23 months which he had already served for the original offense. It is the failure to credit appellant with the 23 months already served which is the basis of his appeal.

Our scope of review on appeal from the judgment of sentence imposed following a probation revocation “is limited to the validity of the revocation proceedings and the legality of the final judgment of sentence.” Commonwealth v. Beasley, 391 Pa.Super. 287, 570 A.2d 1336 (1990). Initially, we note that the trial court considered appellant’s basis of appeal waived by his failure to raise it at the July 27, 1994 hearing. However, a challenge to the legality of a sentence is nonwaivable and may be considered sua sponte by our Court. Commonwealth v. Anderson, 434 Pa.Super. 309, 643 A.2d 109 (1994); Commonwealth v. Hollawell, 413 Pa.Super. 42, 604 A.2d 723 (1992).

The Legislature has established the manner by which credit for time served is to be computed. Specifically, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9760 provides:

§ 9760. Credit for time served
After reviewing the information submitted under section 937 (relating to report of outstanding charges and sentences) the court shall give credit as follows:
(1) Credit against the maximum term and any minimum term shall be given to the defendant for all time spent in custody as a result of the criminal charge for which a prison sentence is imposed or as a result of the conduct on which such a charge is based. Credit shall include credit for time spent in custody prior to trial, during trial, pending sentence, and pending the resolution of an appeal.
[*482] (2) Credit against the maximum term and any minimum term shall be given to the defendant for all time spent in custody under a prior sentence if he is later reprosecuted and resentenced for the same offense or for another offense based on the same act or acts. This shall include credit in accordance with paragraph (1) of this section for all time spent in custody as a result of both the original charge and any subsequent charge for the same offense or for another offense based on the same act or acts.

According to appellant, this section requires that the 23 months he served on the unlawful taking sentence should be credited against the 3% to 7 year term imposed on July 27, 1994. We are constrained to agree.

Pursuant to section 9760(1), “the criminal charge for which a prison sentence [was] imposed” was the charge of attempted theft by unlawful taking, to which appellant pled guilty on February 15, 1990. Thereafter, he served lijé months pursuant to the February 15, 1990 adjudication and another lijé months, the balance of the original sentence, pursuant to the adjudication of April 27, 1992. These sentences were both served on the underlying attempted theft offense. Likewise, the 3jé to 7 year term imposed on July 27, 1994 was the maximum sentence allowed by law for that offense. Thus, if appellant is not credited with the 23 months already served, his sentence for attempted theft by unlawful taking would be 65 months (or 5 years and 5 months) to 107 months (or 8 years and 11 months). Clearly, this sentence is illegal. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 1103(3).

Therefore, appellant must be credited with the 23 months already served. Also, as noted by the trial court at the July 27, 1994 hearing, appellant must be credited with the 8 months and 23 days he served on the probation violation detainer, from November 4, 1993 until July 27, 1994. In sum, the maximum sentence imposed on July 27, 1994 will be reduced by 31 months and 23 days making the new maximum sentence 52 months and 7 days. The new sentence, therefore,[*483] based on the fact the minimum term can be no greater than half the maximum, is 26 to 52 months.

In accordance with this Opinion, the judgment of sentence is vacated and the case is remanded for imposition of the revised sentence of 26 to 52 months.

Jurisdiction relinquished.

1

. The record reveals that appellant, under various alias, has been arrested in excess of 50 times, has 25 convictions and 18 parole or probation violations.