At page 53 The presumption that a final judgment disposes of all parties and issues before the court after a trial on the merits does not apply to default judgments and summary judgments.40 citing cases
- Antonio Caballero v. Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc'y, FSB, No. 05-19-01054-CV (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 17, 2021).(To be final, a summary judgment must dispose of all –7– parties and issues in a lawsuit.)
- Mirta Zorilla v. the Homeowners of Plazas Del Lago, Inc., No. 13-10-00370-CV (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Feb. 10, 2011). (If a summary judgment does not refer to or mention issues pending in a counterclaim, then those issues remain unadjudicated.)
- Rahim Muhammedi v. Barkat G. Ali, 722 S.W.3d 104 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2025). (orig. proceeding)
- In the Est. of William B. Booth v. the State of Texas, No. 02-24-00056-CV (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 17, 2025).Chase Manhattan Bank v. Lindsay, 787 S.W.2d 51, 53 (Tex. 1990); Chessher, 658 S.W.2d at 564 .
- Anh Phan v. CL Investmentst LLC, Cuc Thu Do, & Mantenon Phan, No. 01-20-00551-CV (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 20, 2022).See Newco Drilling Co. v. Weyand, 960 S.W.2d 654, 656 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam); Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Lindsay, 787 S.W.2d 51, 53 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam).
- Anh Phan v. CL Investmentst LLC, Cuc Thu Do, & Mantenon Phan, No. 01-20-00551-CV (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 2, 2021).See Newco Drilling Co. v. Weyand, 960 S.W.2d 654, 656 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam); Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Lindsay, 787 S.W.2d 51, 53 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam).
- AmeriGas Propane, LP v. Jose Francisco Aboytes-Muñiz, Andy Medina-Cardenas & Bernabe Bustillo-Rivera, No. 09-18-00122-CV (Tex. App.—Beaumont May 16, 2019).See Hyundai Motor Co. v. Alvarado, 892 S.W.2d 853, 855 (Tex. 1995); Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Lindsay, 787 S.W.2d 51, 53 (Tex. 1990).
- in the Interest of J.M., L.M., & K.M., Child., No. 10-08-00108-CV (Tex. App.—Waco Apr. 3, 2008). Lindsay , 787 S.W.2d 51, 53 (Tex. 1990).
- James Epps v. State, No. 06-07-00042-CR (Tex. App.—Texarkana Dec. 11, 2007).Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Lindsay , 787 S.W.2d 51, 53 (Tex. 1990).
- Bazan v. Canales, 200 S.W.3d 844 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2006). (The presumption that a final judgment disposes of all parties and issues before the court after a trial on the merits does not apply to default judgments and summary judgments.)
Show 30 more citing cases
- Pedro Bazan v. Diane Canales, No. 13-04-00209-CV (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Aug. 24, 2006).(The presumption that a final judgment disposes of all parties and issues before the court after a trial on the merits does not apply to default judgments and summary judgments.)
- Wells Fargo Bank Texas, N.A. v. Foulston Siefkin LLP, 348 F. Supp. 2d 772 (N.D. Tex. 2004).Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Lindsay, 787 S.W.2d 51, 53 (Tex.1990).
- McGowen v. Mau-Ping Huang, 120 S.W.3d 452 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003). Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A v. Lindsay, 787 S.W.2d 51, 53 (Tex.1990).
- Robert McGowen, Adm'r of the Est. of Ronald Cole McGowen v. Mau Ping Huang, M.D., Women's Clinic of Angleton, P.A., & Paula Lawrence, R.N., No. 06-02-00115-CV (Tex. App.—Texarkana Oct. 22, 2003).Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Lindsay , 787 S.W.2d 51, 53 (Tex. 1990).
- Shoreline, Inc. v. Hisel, 115 S.W.3d 21 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003).Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Lindsay, 787 S.W.2d 51, 53 (Tex.1990); Houston Health Clubs, Inc. v. First Ct. of Appeals, 722 S.W.2d 692, 693 (Tex.1986) (per curiam) (orig.proceeding); H.E.
- Shoreline, Inc. v. Jeri Hisel, No. 13-01-00621-CV (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi May 29, 2003).Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Lindsay , 787 S.W.2d 51, 53 (Tex. 1990); Houston Health Clubs, Inc. v. First Ct. of Appeals , 722 S.W.2d 692, 693 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding); H.E.
- Nowroozi, Michael v. Strozier, Scott, Sam Stiefel, Nancy Walker & Tom Burslem, No. 13-99-00230-CV (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi May 25, 2000).Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Lindsay , 787 S.W.2d 51, 53 (Tex. 1990); Munawar v. Cadle Co. , 2 S.W.3d 12, 15 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1999, no pet. h.).
- Munawar v. Cadle Co., 2 S.W.3d 12 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1999).Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Lindsay, 787 S.W.2d 51, 53 (Tex.1990).
- Iris Dunham v. Charles Elizondo, Sharon Elizondo, Kenneth E. Davison & Bruce Elfant, Constable, No. 03-97-00771-CV (Tex. App.—Austin July 16, 1998).(summary judgment must dispose of all parties and issues in lawsuit to be final and appealable)
- Stabilizing Tech. of Texas, Inc. v. Austin House Leveling & Soil Stabilization, Inc., No. 03-98-00202-CV (Tex. App.—Austin July 16, 1998).Chase Manhattan Bank N.A. v. Lindsay , 787 S.W.2d 51, 53 (Tex. 1990).
- Muniz v. State Farm Lloyds, 974 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998).Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Lindsay, 787 S.W.2d 51, 53 (Tex.1990).
- Gilchrist v. Bandera Elec. Coop., Inc., 924 S.W.2d 388 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996). Chase Manhattan Bank v. Lindsay, 787 S.W.2d 51, 53 (Tex. 1990); Baker v. Hansen, 679 S.W.2d 480, 481 (Tex.1984); Chessher, 658 S.W.2d at 564 ; Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d at 678 ; PHB, Inc. v. Goldsmith, 539 S.W.2d 60 (Tex. *391 19…
- Hyundai Motor Co. v. Alvarado, 892 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. 1995).Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Lindsay, 787 S.W.2d 51, 53 (Tex.1990).
- Welch v. McDougal, 876 S.W.2d 218 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1994).Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A v. Lindsay, 787 S.W.2d 51, 53 (Tex.1990); Teer v. Duddlesten, 664 S.W.2d 702, 704 (Tex.1984).
- Alvarado v. Hyundai Motor Co., 885 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1994). Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Lindsay, 787 S.W.2d 51, 53 (Tex.1990); H.B.
- Cnty. of Real v. Hafley, 873 S.W.2d 725 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1994).Chase Manhattan Bank v. Lindsay, 787 S.W.2d 51, 53 (Tex.1990). 2 .
- Hood v. Amarillo Nat'l Bank, 807 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1991).(Tex.1990, on motion for rehearing)
- Vickie Jo Perry & Ricky C. Loving v. Addie Jo Perry, No. 08-24-00367-CV (May 13, 2026).(orig. proceeding)
- Elishah Sawyers, Pax Crate & Freight, Inc. & Robin Sawyers v. Marc Carter & Sally Carter, No. 01-14-00870-CV (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 8, 2015).See Chase Manhattan [*487] OPINION Bank, N.A. v. Lindsay, 787 S.W.2d 51, 53 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam) (on mot. for reh'g).
- Adin Garcia & Cathy Garcia v. River City Fed. Credit Union & Scott M. Noel, No. 04-11-00665-CV (Tex. App.—San Antonio July 11, 2012).(summary judgment granted as to separate parties or issues within a single cause of action is partial and interlocutory until all issues are adjudicated or ordered severed by the trial court)
- Del-Ray Battery Co. v. Douglas Battery Co., 635 F.3d 725 (5th Cir. 2011).See McGowen, 120 S.W.3d at 461 -62 (citing Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Lindsay, 787 S.W.2d 51, 53 (Tex.1990)).
- Alfonso Pena, F/K/A Al Pena, Mary Alice Saam, & Elida Pena, Individually & as Successors in Interest to Epigmenio Pena v. Cooper Outdoor Advert., Inc., No. 13-05-00679-CV (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Apr. 12, 2007).See Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Lindsay , 787 S.W.2d 51, 53 (Tex. 1990). 8.
- Mosqueda v. G & H Diversified Mfg., Inc., 223 S.W.3d 571 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007). See Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Lindsay, 787 S.W.2d 51, 53 (Tex.1990).
- Jesse Ray Wilson v. Don Ritter, Jim York, Barry Boorstein, David Chan & Lucita Wilson, No. 14-03-00688-CV (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 9, 2004).See Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Lindsay , 787 S.W.2d 51, 53 (Tex. 1990).
- S. Texas Wildhorse Desert Invs., Inc. v. Texas Com. Bank-Rio Grande Valley, N.A., 314 B.R. 107 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2004).(holding that summary judgments that do not dispose of all claims and parties are interlocutory in character)
- Gilchrist v. Bandera Elec. Coop., 966 S.W.2d 716 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998).See Chase Manhattan Bank v. Lindsay, 787 S.W.2d 51, 53 (Tex.1990); Schlipf v. Exxon Corp., 644 S.W.2d 453, 454 (Tex.1982).
- Jones v. Griege, 803 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991).See Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Lindsay, 787 S.W.2d 51, 53 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam) (on mot. for reh’g).
- Avmanco, Inc. v. City of Grand Prairie, 835 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1992).(Tex.1990, orig. proceeding)
- Ross v. Arkwright Mut. Ins. Co., 834 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992). Co. v. Sanchez, 799 S.W.2d 677, 679 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam); see also, Chase Manhattan Bank v. Lindsay, 787 S.W.2d 51, 53 (Tex.1990) (orig. proceeding) (where trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s clai…
- Walker v. Sharpe, 807 S.W.2d 442 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1991).McDonald, Texas Civil Practice in District and County Courts § 17.10.5 (rev. 1984); see also Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Lindsay, 787 S.W.2d 51, 53 (Tex.1990).
At page 52 holding that “an order granting summary judgment as to one claim but not disposing of all issues presented in a counterclaim is an interlocutory judgment2 citing cases
- McClennahan v. First Gibraltar Bank, 791 S.W.2d 607 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1990). Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Lindsay, 787 S.W.2d 51, 52 (1990) (per curiam on motion for reh'g).
- Hervey v. Flores, 975 S.W.2d 21 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1998).(holding that “an order granting summary judgment as to one claim but not disposing of all issues presented in a counterclaim is an interlocutory judgment)
“Although a governmental unit is immune from claims arising out of intentional torts, petitioners’ negligent employment and entrustment claims arise out of the alleged negligence of the city employees supervising the officer, not out of the officer’s intentional tort.”
- Harris Cnty., Texas v. Juan Luis Cabazos, Jr., No. 01-03-00772-CV (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 20, 2005).“Although a governmental unit is immune from claims arising out of intentional torts, petitioners’ negligent employment and entrustment claims arise out of the alleged negligence of the city employees supervising the of…”
- Annab v. Harris Cnty., 524 S.W.3d 793 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017).“claims arise out of the alleged negligence of the city employees supervising the officer, not out of the officer’s intentional tort”
Other citing cases
- Cronen v. Cnty. Storage Lot, 831 S.W.2d 895 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992).
- Cockrell v. Cent. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 788 S.W.2d 221 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1990).
v.
the Honorable Tony LINDSAY, Judge of the 280th Court of Harris County, Texas, Et Al., Respondents
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
PER CURIAM.Respondents’ motions for rehearing are overruled. The per curiam opinion of February 28,1990 is withdrawn and the following is substituted.
The question in this original mandamus proceeding is whether a trial court’s order granting summary judgment of an initial claim also disposed of all issues pending in a counterclaim not addressed in the order. A majority of this court answers no and holds that an order granting summary judgment as to one claim but not disposing of all issues presented in a counterclaim is an interlocutory judgment.
The lawsuit underlying this mandamus proceeding arose when the real parties in interest, Greenbriar North Section II, Fred Rizk Construction Company, Peninsula Trade Corporation, N.V., Ibrahim Trade Corporation, N.V., and Fred Rizk (Greenbr-iar), defaulted on a note held by Chase Manhattan Bank (Chase). After foreclosure and sale of the property securing the note, Chase brought a deficiency action against Greenbriar. Greenbriar filed a general denial and counterclaim alleging wrongful foreclosure, breach of contract, and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. Greenbriar moved for summary judgment on Chase's deficiency claim. On December 30, 1988, the trial court granted Greenbriar’s motion and signed the summary judgment which did not mention or refer to Greenbriar’s counterclaims.
After the trial court overruled Chase’s motion to sever Greenbriar’s counterclaims, Chase filed a notice of intent to take Fred Rizk’s deposition. Rizk failed to appear. Chase filed a motion to compel appearance at the deposition and for sanctions. The trial court denied Chase’s motion to compel stating that the December 30 order had disposed of all parties and issues before the court, and that the court had lost its plenary jurisdiction. [1] The trial[*53] court’s order conflicts with Houston Health Clubs, Inc. v. First Court of Appeals, 722 S.W.2d 692 (Tex.1986), PHB, Inc., v. Goldsmith, 589 S.W.2d 60 (Tex.1976), and Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 159 Tex. 550, 324 S.W.2d 200 (1959).
To be final, a summary judgment must dispose of all parties and issues in a lawsuit. Teer v. Duddlesten, 664 S.W.2d 702, 703 (Tex.1984). The presumption that a final judgment disposes of all parties and issues before the court after a trial on the merits does not apply to default judgments and summary judgments. Houston Health Clubs, Inc. v. First Court of Appeals, 722 S.W.2d 692, 693 (Tex.1986). If a summary judgment does not refer to or mention issues pending in a counterclaim, then those issues remain unadjudicated. Baker v. Hansen, 679 S.W.2d 480, 481 (Tex.1984); PHB, Inc. v. Goldsmith, 539 S.W.2d 60 (Tex.1976). Because the present order granting summary judgment does not mention or refer to all of the issues in Greenbr-iar’s counterclaims, it is interlocutory.
Greenbriar erroneously asserts that a summary judgment disposes of all issues when pending counterclaims are not severable. A summary judgment may be granted on separate issues within a single cause of action. TEX.R.CIV.P. 166a(a). Such a summary judgment is partial and interlocutory until all of the issues are either adjudicated or ordered severed by the trial court. Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 159 Tex. 550, 324 S.W.2d 200 (1959). The finality of a summary judgment is not based on the severability of issues, parties, or causes of action. Id. In the present case, a determination that Greenbriar’s counterclaims were not severable could not transform the nature of the judgment from interlocutory to final.
Because the summary judgment is interlocutory, the trial court has jurisdiction to order Fred Rizk to appear at deposition. The trial court’s determination that its December 30, 1988 order disposed of all issues and parties is contrary to Houston Health Clubs, Inc., PHB, Inc., and Pan American Petroleum Corp. and constitutes an abuse of discretion. Without oral argument and pursuant to Tex.R.App.P. 122, a majority of this court conditionally grants the writ of mandamus.
. After the original presiding judge had resigned her office, Chase sought mandamus relief in the court of appeals. In an unpublished opinion, the court of appeals denied leave to file a petition for writ of mandamus on grounds that the December 30 order granting summary judgment disposed of all nonseverable claims, including Greenbriar's counterclaim. Based on the court[*53] of appeals unpublished opinion, the current presiding judge, Judge Lindsay, has concluded that the court has lost plenary jurisdiction over the case. References in this opinion to the trial court’s order encompass both the original judge’s order holding that the December 30, 1988 order disposed of all issues and Judge Lindsay’s subsequent refusal to take further action in the case.