PER CURIAM:*

Plaintiff-Appellant Juan Sanchez appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment, dismissing his claim under the Rehabilitation Act against Defendant-Appellee Marvin Runyon, Postmaster General of the United States Postal Service (the “Postal Service”).2 Concluding that Sanchez did not timely file his discrimination complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

When Sanchez returned to work, he was assigned to the DeMoss Station, also in Houston. He soon noticed that some of the DeMoss Station employees were still using horizontal sorting cases. Sanchez requested that he too be permitted to return to a horizontal case, but Mire again denied the request. In late March 1994, Sanchez requested an appointment with an EEO counselor. On April 30, 1994, Sanchez filed a complaint with the EEOC, claiming race, sex, and disability discrimination.

The Postal Service rejected Sanchez’s administrative complaint on the ground that he had failed to bring the alleged discriminatory event to the attention of an EEO counselor within the 45 day period required by 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1). Sanchez appealed the Postal Service’s decision to the EEOC, which determined that Sanchez had not become aware of the alleged discrimination in February 1994 when he returned to work at the DeMoss Station and ordered the Postal Service to process Sanchez’s administrative complaint as timely filed. When it did so, the EEOC Administrative Judge found no discrimination.

Sanchez then filed the instant action under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).4 He later amended his complaint to assert a cause of action pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act,5 which

Station because he was feeling suicidal and wanted to see his psychiatrist. No matter what the explanation, while Sanchez was absent from work, Sanchez’s orthopedic surgeon issued new restrictions on Sanchez’s work activities and determined that Sanchez had a 60% disability of the right knee. 4 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994). 5 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1994).

governs the employment discrimination claims of postal workers. The district court granted the Postal Service’s motion for summary judgment, holding that, by not filing his EEOC complaint within the specified 45-day period, Sanchez had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Sanchez timely appealed.

II.

ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the district court.^[6]

B. Applicable Law

Before an employee can bring suit under the Rehabilitation Act, he must first exhaust his administrative remedies.^[7] Under the EEOC guidelines, an employee must file his complaint with the EEOC within 45 days of the “discriminatory event.”8 Generally, an employee’s discrimination suit is barred if he fails to file his administrative claim in a timely fashion.^[9] The filing requirement, however, functions as a statute of limitations, rather than a jurisdictional prerequisite, and is thus subject to equitable modification, i.e., equitable tolling or equitable estoppel.^[10]

In Chappell v. Emco Machine Works Co.,11 we recognized three possible bases for tolling: “(1) the pendency of a suit between the same parties in the wrong forum; (2) plaintiff’s unawareness of the facts giving rise to the claim because of the defendant’s intentional concealment of them; and (3) the EEOC’s misleading the plaintiff about the nature of [his] rights.”12 In Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools Division,13 we observed that the second of the grounds enumerated in Chappell —— the grounds on which Sanchez relies —— is properly treated as an issue of equitable estoppel, rather than of equitable tolling, as it focuses on the conduct of the defendant.^[14] Whether framed as an issue of equitable estoppel or equitable tolling, however, Sanchez is not excused for failing to file his EEOC complaint within the applicable time period.

C. Equitable Estoppel or Equitable Tolling

Sanchez argues that the Postal Service is equitably estopped from arguing that he failed to file his administrative charge within the 45-day period because Mire misled him as to the reason for the Postal Service’s refusal to accommodate his disability —— that is, Mire claimed that the switch to the vertical cases was mandated for all mail sorters when actually some sorters were given the option of using horizontal cases.^[15] Sanchez contends that he was, therefore, unaware of the facts giving rise to his claim because the Postal Service intentionally concealed those facts.

Sanchez’s argument, however, misses the point. Even accepting as true Sanchez’s characterization of events —— as we must at this stage —— Mire did not intentionally conceal the facts giving rise to his claim.^[16] Sanchez’s discrimination claim is based on the Postal Service’s failure to accommodate his disability. The discriminatory event that triggered the 45-day filing period, therefore, was Mire’s informing Sanchez in the late summer of 1993 that the Postal Service was unwilling to permit him to continue using a horizontal sorting case after he reported to her that the horizontal case was aggravating his knee injury. The reason proffered by Mire in explaining the Postal Service’s refusal to do so is immaterial. The Postal Service certainly could not escape its obligation under the Rehabilitation Act to accommodate Sanchez’s disability by arguing that the switch to vertical cases was made pursuant to an agency-wide policy.^[17] The Postal Service’s allowing some mail sorters to continue to use horizontal cases rather than mandating a wholesale replacement of such cases with vertical cases is irrelevant to the Postal Service’s potential liability under the Rehabilitation Act. It follows that the Postal Service’s intentional concealment of those exceptions is not grounds for equitably estopping the Postal Service from relying on the 45-day filing period.18

The cases Sanchez cites in support of his argument —— Rhodes,19 Reeb v. Economic Opportunity Atlanta, Inc., 20 and Coke v. General Adjustment Bureau21 —— afford him no aid, as each is distinguishable from the instant suit. In Rhodes, a 56-year-old plaintiff, who had been discharged, did not file his administrative complaint within the applicable filing period because his employer told him that (1) he was being fired because the company was undergoing a reduction- in-force and (2) he would not be replaced.^[22] Later, the plaintiff learned that, in fact, he had been replaced by a younger worker at a lower salary.^[23] We concluded that, because the plaintiff had no reason to suspect that his employer was guilty of age discrimination until the employer hired a replacement outside the protected age group, his age discrimination suit was not barred as untimely.^[24]

Similarly, we held in Reeb that the plaintiff was entitled to equitable tolling when she delayed filing her administrative complaint beyond the filing deadline because her employer told her that the company had terminated her position because of a “limitation of funds.”25 Approximately six months later she discovered not only that her employer had not eliminated her position altogether as it had previously informed her, but that it had also hired “an allegedly less qualified male employee” to replace her, thereby providing her with the factual support needed

21 640 F.2d 584 (5th Cir. 1991).

to allege a prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of sex.^[26]

Finally, in Coke, we held that the defendant employer was not entitled to summary judgment even though the plaintiff employee had not filed his age discrimination suit within the statutory period because the plaintiff had proffered credible evidence that (1) the defendant employer had repeatedly assured the employee that he would be reinstated to his former position, and (2) the employee had reasonably relied on those assurances.^[27]

These distinguishable cases are thus inapposite. Unlike the plaintiffs in Reeb and Rhodes, Sanchez cannot claim that he learned of the facts that formed the basis of his charge of an unlawful employment practice until after the applicable filing period had passed. As explained above, as soon as Mire informed Sanchez that the Postal Service was unwilling to accommodate his disability in the late summer of 1993, he was in the position to file his administrative charge of disability discrimination, regardless of the excuse advanced for the failure to accommodate his disability. He did not do so until April 30, 1994, after approximately eight months had passed.

Similarly, in contrast to the plaintiff in Coke, Sanchez cannot assert that he justifiably delayed in filing his complaint with the EEOC because the Postal Service misled him into believing that it was on the verge of remedying its allegedly improper employment decision. To the contrary, Mire never stated or implied that an accommodation was in the offing, consistently rejecting Sanchez’s requests to use a horizontal sorting case.

In sum, Sanchez is not excused from failing to file his administrative charge within the applicable 45-day period or from his resultant failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Once the Postal Service informed him that he would not be permitted to use a horizontal case despite the problems it was allegedly causing his knee, he was aware that the accommodation would be made. This was the “essential information bearing on the existence of his claim.”28 As the Postal Service’s alleged misrepresentation of its reason for denying Sanchez’s request is irrelevant to its potential liability for failure to accommodate Sanchez’s disability, such misrepresentation cannot serve as grounds for estopping the Postal Service from asserting the untimeliness of Sanchez’s administrative complaint.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s grant of summary judgment is AFFIRMED.