Damico v. Lundberg, 379 So. 2d 964 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). · Go Syfert
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Damico v. Lundberg, 379 So. 2d 964 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 1 distinct case, last quoted 2011 · …error is reversible only when, considering all the facts peculiar to the particular case under scrutiny, it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appellant would have been reached if the error had not been committed. ✓
cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 2009 · …it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appellant would have been reached if the error had not been committed. at p. 965 ✓
cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 2008 · …it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appellants would have been reached if the error had not been committed. at p. 965 ✓
30 citation events (22 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Bellevue v. Frenchy's South Beach Café, Inc. (fladistctapp, 2013-12-04)
Treatment trajectory · 1979 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1979 2002 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 13 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) Bellevue v. Frenchy's South Beach Café, Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2013 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf. Southstar Equity, LLC v. Chau, 998 So.2d 625, 681 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (quoting Damico v. Lundberg, 379 So.2d 964, 965 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Special v. Baux (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
Ctr. v. Meeks, 560 So.2d 778, 782 (Fla. 1990) ("Considering the totality of the evidence, we conclude that the introduction of this one privileged statement did not prejudicially affect the jury's determination of negligence and that no reversible error occurred in its admission."). [18] Recently, now-Chief Justice Canady acknowledged the split in the lower courts over the test for harmless error: The requisite prejudice to support overturning the judgment based on the jury's verdict can be established neither under a harmless error standard requiring a showing of a reasonable probability of a…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Citizens Property Insurance Corp. v. Hamilton (2×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
That is my burden ... to prove to you by a preponderance of the evidence, just as it was [plaintiffs’] initial burden ... to show that the damages ... were caused by wind.” See Lundberg, 379 So.2d at 966 (requiring appellant to show that error complained of was harmful, or that “it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appellant would have been reached if the error had not been committed”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Webster v. Body Dynamics, Inc. (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
Reversal is unwarranted in a civil case unless the appellant demonstrates that “it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appellant would have been reached if the error had not been committed.” In re Commitment of DeBolt, 19 So.3d 335, 337 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (quoting Damico v. Lundberg, 379 So.2d 964, 965 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Commitment of DeBolt
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
DeBolt must establish that “it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appellant would have been reached if the error had not been committed.” Damico v. Lundberg, 379 So.2d 964, 965 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); see also Esaw v. Esaw, 965 So.2d 1261, 1264 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007); Fla. Inst. for Neurologic Rehab., Inc. v. Marshall, 943 So.2d 976, 979 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Saleeby v. Rocky Elson Construction, Inc. (2×)
Fla. · 2009 · confidence medium
The requisite prejudice to support overturning the judgment based on the jury's verdict can be established neither under a harmless error standard requiring a showing of a reasonable probability of a result more favorable to the appellant if the error had not occurred, see Damico v. Lundberg, 379 So.2d 964, 965 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979), nor under a standard requiring a showing that the appellant might have obtained a more favorable result but for the error, see National Union Fire Ins.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Southstar Equity, LLC v. Lai Chau
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
To show that the erroneous exclusion of the lease provisions requires reversal of the judgment, the defendants must establish that "it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appellant[s] would have been reached if the error had not been committed." Damico v. Lundberg, 379 So.2d 964, 965 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); see also § 59.041, Fla. Stat. (2006) (providing that judgments should not be reversed except where "the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice"); § 90.104(1), Fla. Stat (2006) (providing that erroneous evidentiary rulings are a basis for reversal o…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Esaw v. Esaw
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
It takes seriously the provision of section 59.041, Florida Statutes (2004), that "[n]o judgment shall be set aside or reversed . . . for error as to any matter of . . . procedure, unless" it is apparent "that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice." Under section 59.041, "[i]n a civil case, an error is reversible — that is, harmful error — [only] where `it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appellant would have been reached if the error had not been committed.'" Florida Institute for Neurologic Rehab., Inc. v. Marshall, 943 So.2d 976, 979 …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) FINR v. Marshall
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
In a civil case, an error is reversible—that is, harmful error—where "it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appellant would have been reached if the error had not been committed." Damico v. Lundberg, 379 So.2d 964, 965 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) General Motors Corp. v. Porritt
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2004 · confidence medium
Because the videotape was highly prejudicial "it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to [General Motors] would have been reached if the error had not been committed." Damico v. Lundberg, 379 So.2d 964, 965 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Pettigrew
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2004 · confidence medium
In other words, “considering all the facts peculiar to the particular case under scrutiny” we conclude that “it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appellants] would have been reached if the error had not been committed.” Damico v. Lundberg, 379 So.2d 964, 965 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) McIntyre v. McIntyre
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1984 · confidence medium
This may or may not be the case. [4] As our sister court has recently observed in Damico v. Lundberg, 379 So.2d 964, 965 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1979), the "cardinal principle" of appellate review is that error is reversible only when, considering all the facts peculiar to the particular case, it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appellant would have been reached if the error had not been committed.
cited Cited "see" Riggins v. Mariner Boat Works, Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1989 · signal: see · confidence high
See Damico v. Lundberg, 379 So.2d 964 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Tony DAMICO and Josephine Damico, His Wife, Appellants,
v.
Wayne William LUNDBERG, Appellee.
78-1442.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
Nov 7, 1979.
379 So. 2d 964
Per Curiam.
Cited by 20 opinions  |  Published

[*965] Mac A. Greco, Jr., Tampa, for appellants.

Chris W. Altenbernd of Fowler, White, Gillen, Boggs, Villareal & Banker, Tampa, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

BOARDMAN, Acting C.J., and SCHEB and OTT, JJ., concur.

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING

OTT, Judge.

In this automobile negligence action the circuit court, acting under the authority of Section 627.7262, Florida Statutes, dismissed defendant's liability insurance carrier. The action then proceeded to trial on the merits and resulted in a defense verdict. The Florida Supreme Court has now ruled that Section 627.7262 is an unconstitutional intrusion upon that court's rule-making power. Markert v. Johnston, 367 So.2d 1003 (Fla. 1979). As appellants urged on this appeal, and now on petition for rehearing, the action of the circuit court in ordering such dismissal was undeniably erroneous.

Appellants further insist that such error was prejudicial per se, automatically requiring reversal if properly contested, and cite Godshall v. Uniguard Insurance Co., 281 So.2d 490 (Fla. 1973) as authority for that proposition.

We are not unmindful of Godshall, but we do not believe that by it our supreme court meant to abrogate the cardinal principle of appellate review: error is reversible only when, considering all the facts peculiar to the particular case under scrutiny, it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appellant would have been reached if the error had not been committed. 3 Fla.Jur.2d 499; Stecher v. Pomerory, 253 So.2d 421, 422 (Fla. 1971).

Here, no amount of emphasizing the financial responsibility of the defendant could counteract plaintiff husband's admission that he entered the intersection in which the collision occurred without knowing whether the traffic light was red or green, because he and his wife were talking and he was not paying attention to the light. Supplementing that damaging admission was the positive testimony of the defendant, the driver of the vehicle immediately behind the defendant, and the driver of a vehicle which had been stopped waiting for the light to change, that defendant entered the intersection on a green light.

That, together with the facts revealed to the jury concerning the relative economic positions of the parties (plaintiffs being elderly, retired and not in the best of health, while defendant was younger, steadily employed and was returning home from a golf match at the time of the accident), prevent us from speculating that the jury might have found liability on the part of the defendant if they had known he was insured. Even had that information been added, the state of the evidence was such that a verdict for appellants would have been incredible. We simply do not feel that reversible error was made to appear.

The order of dismissal and judgment are affirmed.

BOARDMAN, Acting C.J., and SCHEB, J., concur.