Peters v. State, 626 So. 2d 1048 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). · Go Syfert
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Peters v. State, 626 So. 2d 1048 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 1997 · …scrupulous compliance with rule 3.830 is required because its provisions constitute the essence of due process. ✓
36 citation events (20 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: Escoto v. State (fladistctapp, 2015-11-12)
Treatment trajectory · 1993 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1993 2009 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 18 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Escoto v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
Analysis Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 8.830, “Direct Criminal Contempt,” specifies that a “judgment of guilt of contempt shall include a recital of those facts on which the adjudication of guilt is based.” “Scrupulous compliance with rule 3.830 is required_” Cook v. State, 636 So.2d 895, 896 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) (quoting Peters v. State, 626 So.2d 1048, 1048 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Michaels v. Loftus
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
Concerning the second act, the mouthed obscenity, the law is clear that while the use of an obscenity in a courtroom may be contemptuous, see Peters v. State, 626 So.2d 1048, 1049 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993), not “every profane utterance made in the courtroom is automatically contemptuous. [Indeed] [t]he challenged statements must be viewed in the context in which they were made.” Martinez v. State, 339 So.2d 1133, 1135 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jones v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
See J.A.H. v. State, 20 So.3d 425, 427 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (reversing a contempt judgment where the trial court “failed to follow steps two, three and four”); Searcy v. State, 971 So.2d 1008, 1014 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008); Montoya v. State, 695 So.2d 873, 874 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (reversing a contempt judgment entered for “disrespecting the court” because it did not contain a more detailed recital of the facts upon which the contempt was based); Fisher v. State, 638 So.2d 196, 196-97 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (“we reverse the judgment holding Fisher in direct criminal contempt ... because it faile…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) JAH v. State (2×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
See O'Neal v. State, 501 So.2d 98, 100 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (finding the trial court's brief offer to allow the defendant a chance to explain his profanity occurred after the court had communicated to the defendant that the sentence for contempt was a foregone conclusion); Peters, 626 So.2d at 1050 (reversing contempt judgment on the grounds that the trial court failed to provide the appellant with prior notice of the charge of contempt and also failed to give him an opportunity to explain before imposing sentence).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) J.A.H. v. State (2×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
See O’Neal v. State, 501 So.2d 98, 100 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (finding the trial court’s brief offer to allow the defendant a chance to explain his profanity occurred after the court had communicated to the defendant that the sentence for contempt was a foregone conclusion); Peters, 626 So.2d at 1050 (reversing contempt judgment on the grounds that the trial court failed to provide the appellant with prior notice of the charge of contempt and also failed to give him an opportunity to explain before imposing sentence).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Wiggs v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
Bauder v. State, 923 So.2d 1223 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006), quoting from Peters v. State, 626 So.2d 1048, 1050 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bauder v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
Bank, F.A., 885 So.2d 1037, 1038 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004); Kendrick v. Kendrick, 876 So.2d 730 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004); Patz v. State, 691 So.2d 66, 67 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)(stating that "[t]he case law in this area is very clear that strict adherence to the rule is absolutely imperative. `Scrupulous compliance with Rule 3.830 is required because its provisions constitute the essence of due process.'"), quoting from Peters v. State, 626 So.2d 1048, 1050 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) M.L. v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
“The provisions of rule 3.830 define the essence of due process in criminal contempt proceedings and must be scrupulously followed.” Id. (citing Peters v. State, 626 So.2d 1048, 1050 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)); see also Alvis v. State, 764 So.2d 859, 860 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rhoads v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
"The provisions of rule 3.830 define the essence of due process in criminal contempt proceedings and must be scrupulously followed." Id. (citing Peters v. State, 626 So.2d 1048, 1050 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)); see also Alvis v. State, 764 So.2d 859, 860 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) ML v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
"The provisions of rule 3.830 define the essence of due process in criminal contempt proceedings and must be scrupulously followed." Id. (citing Peters v. State, 626 So.2d 1048, 1050 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)); see also Alvis v. State, 764 So.2d 859, 860 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bouie v. State (2×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
Peters v. State, 626 So.2d 1048, 1050 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Berman v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
See Schenck v. State, 645 So.2d 71, 72 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); Peters v. State, 626 So.2d 1048, 1050 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); Kahn v. State, 447 So.2d 1048 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Schenck v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1994 · confidence medium
Peters v. State, 626 So.2d 1048, 1050 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); accord, Cook v. State, 636 So.2d 895 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994).
cited Cited "see" Sanjurjo v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See Peters v. State, 626 So.2d 1048 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); Davis v. State, 575 So.2d 288 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991).
cited Cited "see" Cook v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See Peters v. State, 626 So.2d 1048 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); State ex rel.
cited Cited "see, e.g." JORGE RAMOS v. NORTH STAR ENTERTAINMENT FIRM, LLC and 1101 S. FEDERAL HIGHWAY, LLC
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2020 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Peters v. State, 626 So. 2d 1048 (Fla 4th DCA 1993).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Swain v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2017 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See A.W. v. State, 137 So.3d 521, 522 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (holding a trial court commits fundamental error by failing to follow Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.150, the juvenile rule equivalent of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.830); see also Peters v. State, 626 So.2d 1048, 1050 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (requiring “[sjcrupulous compliance” with Rule 3.830).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Woods v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2007 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Peters v. State, 626 So.2d 1048, 1049 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (holding that defendant's conduct constituted direct criminal contempt where defendant said, "Don't need this shit," in response to the judge's pronouncement of his sentence); Saunders v. State, 319 So.2d 118, 122-25 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975) (affirming adjudication for direct criminal contempt where defendant called the judge a "son-of-a bitch" as he was being escorted out of the courtroom); see also Woodie v. Campbell, 960 So.2d 877 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Colondro PETERS, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
91-3353.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Nov 10, 1993.
626 So. 2d 1048
1993 WL 458965
Farmer.
Cited by 29 opinions  |  Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 71%
Citer courts: District Court of Appeal of Fl… (1)

[*1049] Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, Cherry Grant, Asst. Public Defender and Carlton Smith, Legal Asst., West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and John Tiedemann, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.

FARMER, Judge.

Defendant appeals both a resentencing after remand and also a criminal contempt charge imposed at the resentencing hearing. In the previous appeal, we reversed the sentence because the trial court had failed to make factual findings on the record, as required by section 39.111(7)(d), Florida Statutes (1989). Peters v. State, 585 So.2d 511 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991). At the resentencing hearing, the trial court again sentenced him as an adult without making all of the required factual findings. In response to the pronouncement of the sentence, defendant exclaimed: "Don't need this shit." Thence the following:

COURT: Come back here. What did you say to me?
PETERS: No, I ain't said nothing to you.
COURT: No, sir, that's not correct. What you said to me is something along the line of I don't need this shit. Would that be a pretty fair statement of that?
PETERS: No sir.
COURT: Are you denying that?
PETERS: Yes sir.
COURT: I do find you in direct criminal contempt, sir. And I do sentence you to an additional six months in the State prison system consecutive with any other period that you will serve.

Defendant raises two points on appeal. First, he contends that the trial court again failed to address all of the factors in section 39.111(7)(c), Florida Statutes (1989), before sentencing him as an adult and again failed to enter an order containing all of the findings required by section 39.111(7)(d). We agree.

It is not enough that the trial judge privately consider the statutory factors before sentencing a juvenile as an adult; the court must instead set down in writing its factual findings as to each of the statutory criteria. Sirmons v. State, 620 So.2d 1249 (Fla. 1993); State v. Rhoden, 448 So.2d 1013 (Fla. 1984). The failure of this judge once again to comply with this statute requires a reversal.

As to the contempt conviction, although we have no difficulty in concluding that appellant's conduct constituted direct criminal contempt, see Martinez v. State, 339 So.2d 1133 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976), approved 346 So.2d 68 (Fla. 1977), we cannot agree that the trial court complied with the applicable rule. Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.830 provides as follows:

A criminal contempt may be punished summarily if the court saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt committed in the actual presence of the court. The judgment of guilt of contempt shall include a recital of those facts on which the adjudication of guilt is based. Prior to the adjudication of guilt the judge shall inform the defendant of the accusation against the defendant and inquire as to whether the defendant has any cause to show why he or she should not be adjudged guilty of contempt by the Court and sentenced therefor. The defendant[*1050] shall be given the opportunity to present evidence of excusing or mitigating circumstances. The judgment shall be signed by the judge and entered of record. Sentence shall be pronounced in open court. [e.s.]

This rule requires that the defendant be first given notice of the charge of contempt of court and the facts on which the charge is based. Then he must be given an opportunity to explain why he should not be adjudicated guilty of contempt before punishment is imposed. Walker v. State, 559 So.2d 1164 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990).

Scrupulous compliance with rule 3.830 is required because its provisions constitute the essence of due process. Kahn v. State, 447 So.2d 1048 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); and Keezel v. State, 358 So.2d 247 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). Here the trial judge failed to provide appellant with prior notice of the charge of contempt and then failed to give him an opportunity to explain before imposing sentence.

Accordingly, we reverse the new sentence imposed after our earlier remand, and we also reverse the conviction for contempt and its consequent sentence. Upon remand, the case shall be assigned to a different judge for resentencing on the primary conviction and for an adjudication on the contempt charge.

REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.

GUNTHER, J., and MAY, MELANIE G., Associate Judge, concur.