Bruce H. Lynn, Md, Pa v. Miller, 498 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). · Go Syfert
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Bruce H. Lynn, Md, Pa v. Miller, 498 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“a person cannot be imprisoned solely because of his indigency.... the sentence imposed here was equivalent to the alternate sentence of imprisonment based on financial ability to pay which was condemned in tate.”
17 citation events (8 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Noel v. State (fladistctapp, 2013-11-27)
Top citers, strongest first. 3 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Noel v. State (2×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2013 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
a person cannot be imprisoned solely because of his indigency.... the sentence imposed here was equivalent to the alternate sentence of imprisonment based on financial ability to pay which was condemned in tate.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Nezi v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
In V.H. v. State, 498 So.2d 1011 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986), the second district relied on the principle articulated in Tate to reverse an indigent juvenile’s commitment when it was clear from the record that the trial court chose commitment rather than community control only because the juvenile was unable to pay restitution. 498 So.2d at 1011.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Akridge v. Crow (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
In V.H., this court relied on the principle articulated in Tate to reverse an indigent juvenile's commitment where it was clear from the record that the trial court chose commitment rather than community control only because the juvenile was unable to pay restitution. 498 So.2d at 1011.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
BRUCE H. LYNN, M.D., P.A. Petitioner,
v.
Lucille E. MILLER and Anson F. Miller, Respondents.
86-2326.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
Dec 10, 1986.
498 So. 2d 1011
Hall.
Cited by 6 opinions  |  Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 70%
Citer courts: District Court of Appeal of Fl… (1)

[*1012] Paula M. Walsh of McClain, Saieva and Walsh, P.A., Tampa, for petitioner.

Julian L. Miller, Pinellas Park, for respondents.

HALL, Judge.

Lynn, a defendant in a pending medical malpractice suit below, petitions this court for a writ of certiorari to review an order of the trial court denying Lynn's motion to dismiss.

Respondents filed their complaint against Lynn without first complying with the "notice of intent" requirements of section 768.57, Florida Statutes (1985). Lynn moved to dismiss. The trial court found that section 768.57 was unconstitutional and denied the motion. We have previously held that the statute is constitutional, Pearlstein v. Malunney, ___ So.2d ___, No. 86-2119 (Fla. 2d DCA December 10, 1986) [11 F.L.W. —], and so find that the trial court's order represents a departure from the essential requirements of law. As in Pearlstein, we approve the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in Public Health Trust of Dade County v. Knuck, 495 So.2d 834 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), including the analogy therein to the similarly worded notice requirements of our sovereign immunity statute. Compliance with the requirements of the statute is a condition precedent to maintaining a suit and one which must be satisfied within the applicable statute of limitations (which, in the case of section 768.57, is tolled during the 90-day presuit screening period). If the limitations period has expired the trial court lacks the authority to abate a premature complaint even if, but for the prefiling notice requirements, that complaint would otherwise have been timely.

The petition for writ of certiorari is granted, and this case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

DANAHY, C.J., and LEHAN, J., concur.