Tucker v. Fianson, 484 So. 2d 1370 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). · Go Syfert
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Tucker v. Fianson, 484 So. 2d 1370 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 1993 · …is deemed to have accrued where the last event necessary to make the defendant liable for the tort took place. at p. 1371 ✓
cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 2006 · …where the last event necessary to make the defendant liable for the tort took place, at p. 1371 ✓
cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 2010 · …where the last event necessary to make the defendant liable for the tort took place. at p. 1371 ✓
52 citation events (21 in the last 25 years) across 4 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 1986 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1986 2006 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 31 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Hudson Protection Group, Inc. v. PCG Security Int'l LLC
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2011 · signal: see also · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
while lawyer tucker negligently shot his arrow into the air of broward county, it did no harm and had no effect until it fell to earth in dade. it is therefore here that he must answer for his asserted error.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) BROWN & BROWN OF FLORIDA, INC., etc. v. TZADIK ACQUISITIONS, LLC, etc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
Thus, a claim for tort arose where the harmful force first took effect, or where the plaintiff suffered injury.” Fontana v. Hugo Intern., Inc., 781 So. 2d 433, 435 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (quoting Tucker v. Fianson, 484 So. 2d 1370, 1371 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) LEE MEMORIAL HEALTH SYSTEM, etc. v. IGNACIO MARTINEZ, etc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2022 · confidence medium
In [Tucker v. Fianson, 484 So. 2d 1370, 1371 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)], the Court held that for purposes of venue, a cause of action based on a tort accrues: “where the last event necessary to make the defendant liable for the tort took place.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) KNAUF DE COLOMBIA, S.A.S., etc. v. CARLOS HAKIM-DACCACH
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2022 · confidence medium
In this context, this court has held that “a tort claim ‘is deemed to have accrued where the 9 last event necessary to make the defendant liable for the tort took place.’” Envases Venezolanos, S.A. v. Collazo, 559 So. 2d 651, 652 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (quoting Tucker v. Fianson, 484 So. 2d 1370, 1371 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) JAMES CULLEN LOWERY, III v. SHANE MCBEE
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
Stated another way, a tort accrues where the plaintiff first suffers injury.” Weinberg, 936 So. 2d at 709 (emphasis in original) (quoting Tucker v. Fianson, 484 So. 2d 1370, 1371 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Woodson Electric Solutions v. Port Royal Property
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
“For purposes of venue, a tort claim is deemed to have accrued ‘where the last event necessary to make the defendant liable for the tort took place.’” McDaniel Reserve, 39 So. 3d 504, 509 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (quoting Tucker v. Fianson, 484 So. 2d 1370, 1371 (Fla. 3d DCA1986)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) King & Akca v. Raborg, Jr.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
Consultants, Inc., 39 So.3d 504, 509 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (quoting Tucker v. Fianson, 484 So.2d 1370, 1371 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) ].
discussed Cited as authority (rule) McDaniel Reserve Realty Holdings, LLC v. B.S.E. Consultants, Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
For purposes of venue, a tort claim is deemed to have accrued “where the last event necessary to make the defendant liable for the tort took place.” Tucker v. Fianson, 484 So.2d 1370, 1371 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rocco v. Glenn, Rasmussen, Fogarty & Hooker, P.A. (2×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
For the purpose of determining venue, “a tort claim is deemed to have accrued where the last event necessary to make the defendant liable for the tort took place.” Tucker v. Fianson, 484 So.2d 1370, 1371 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Weinberg v. Weinberg
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
In *709 Tucker v. Fianson, 484 So.2d 1370, 1371 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), the Third District explained that a tort claim accrues for venue purposes "where the last event necessary to make the defendant liable for the tort took place," or where the harmful effect of the defendant's acts first took effect. (citation omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Merkin v. PCA Health Plans of Florida, Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2003 · confidence medium
Section 48.193(1)(b) provides long-arm jurisdiction over a non-resident who commits a tortious act within this state. "[A] tort claim `is deemed to have accrued where the last event necessary to make the defendant liable for the tort took place.' As to the tort of conversion, that act constitutes the exercise of wrongful dominion and control over the property to the detriment of the rights of its actual owner." Envases Venezolanos, S.A. v. Collazo, 559 So.2d 651, 652 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)(quoting Tucker v. Fianson, 484 So.2d 1370, 1371 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 494 So.2d 1153 (Fla.1986)) (cit…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Allen v. Walker
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
Thus, a claim for tort arose where the harmful force took effect, or where the plaintiff suffered injury. 695 So.2d 924, 925 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (quoting Tucker v. Fianson, 484 So.2d 1370, 1371 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lane v. HEMOPHILIA OF THE SUNSHINE STATE INC.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
In a more recent case addressing venue in the context of torts in general, this court opined that "for venue purposes, a tort claim `is deemed to have accrued where the last event necessary to make the defendant liable for the tort took place.'" PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP v. Cedar Resources, Inc., 761 So.2d 1131, 1134 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (quoting Tucker v. Fianson, 484 So.2d 1370, 1371 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Langan Engineering v. Harris Constructors
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
Section 47.051, Florida Statutes (1997), allows plaintiffs to bring actions against foreign corporations doing business in Florida "in a county where such corporation has an agent or other representative, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located." Pursuant to the statute, venue in this case should lie in Dade County, where Langan has its Florida offices, unless the court determines the cause of action accrued elsewhere. "[F]or venue purposes, a tort claim is deemed to have accrued where the last event necessary to *1178 make the defendant liable for the…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP v. Cedar Resources, Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
The concept of "nexus" is not used to determine whether a tort action accrued in Pinellas County for purposes of venue under sections 47.011 or 47.051. [3] Rather, for venue purposes, a tort claim "is deemed to have accrued where the last event necessary to make the defendant liable for the tort took place." Tucker v. Fianson, 484 So.2d 1370, 1371 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Green v. North Arundel Hospital Ass'n
Md. Ct. Spec. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Ebell v. Seapac Fisheries, Inc., 692 P.2d 956, 957-58 (Alaska 1984) (interpreting statute that placed venue in "the judicial district in which the claim arose” and holding that, in tort cases, this language placed venue where the plaintiff first suffered injury); Tucker v. Fianson, 484 So.2d 1370, 1371-72 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1986) (construing venue statute allowing suit to be brought "where the cause of action accrued” and holding that, in negligence suits, “the rule is well established that a cause of action accrues where the plaintiff suffers his or her injuries ...”); Gabour…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) LIFEMARK HOSPITALS v. Roque
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
See Tanner v. Hartog, 618 So.2d 177, 181-82 (Fla.1993) (cause of action does not accrue until the injury occurs); Wincor v. Cedars Healthcare Group, Ltd., 695 So.2d 924, 925-926 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (for purposes of venue statute, tort action accrues where plaintiff first suffers injury, even where defendant's negligence occurs in another county); Tucker v. Fianson, 484 So.2d 1370, 1372 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 494 So.2d 1153 (Fla.1986) (although defendant "negligently shot his arrow into the air of Broward County, it did no harm and had no effect until it fell to the earth in Dade."). *1079…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Campo v. Tafur
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1998 · confidence medium
Since a tort claim arises "where the last event necessary to make the defendant liable for the tort took place," Tucker v. Fianson, 484 So.2d 1370, 1371 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), we find that Campo's allegations, on the face of the amended petition, are both timely and sufficient to state a cause of action for actual fraud.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wincor v. Cedars HealthCare Group, Ltd. (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1997 · confidence medium
In Tucker v. Fianson, 484 So.2d 1370, 1371 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 494 So.2d 1153 (Fla.1986), the third district held that for venue purposes, a tort claim accrues where the last event necessary to make the defendant liable for the tort took place.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sunshine Yacht Sales v. Anslow Yacht Sales
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1996 · confidence medium
Tucker v. Fianson, 484 So.2d 1370, 1371 (Fla. 3d DCA) (citing Ebell v. Seapac Fisheries, Inc., 692 P.2d 956, 957 (Alaska 1984)), rev. denied, 494 So.2d 1153 (Fla.1986) [5] That section provides, in pertinent part, that "[a]ctions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located." § 47.011, Fla.Stat. (1993) (emphasis added). [6] Indeed, if Ms. Detzer had impleaded the amount of the commission into the Brevard County court registry when she was confronted with Sunshine Yacht's demand that she pay i…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Envases Venezolanos, SA v. Collazo
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1990 · confidence medium
The general rule applicable here is that a tort claim "is deemed to have accrued where the last event necessary to make the defendant liable for the tort took place." Tucker v. Fianson, 484 So.2d 1370, 1371 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); review denied, 494 So.2d 1153 (1986); see E.J.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Air South, Inc. v. Spaziano
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1989 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
See Soowal v. Marden, 452 So.2d 625 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); cf. Tucker v. Fianson, 484 So.2d 1370 n. 3 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Oliver v. Severance
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1989 · confidence medium
Where the asserted negligence impacts the plaintiff's economic interests, the tort claim accrues "where the last event necessary to make the defendant liable for the tort took place." Tucker v. Fianson, 484 So.2d 1370, 1371 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 494 So.2d 1153 (1986) (legal malpractice action for negligent professional advice).
cited Cited "see" Trailor v. Whale Harbor Inn, Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1997 · signal: see · confidence high
See Tucker v. Fianson, 484 So.2d 1370 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 494 So.2d 1153 (Fla.1986); Gaboury v. Flagler Hospital, Inc., 316 So.2d 642 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975).
cited Cited "see" Broberg v. Barnett Banks Trust Co., N.A.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See Tucker v. Fianson, 484 So.2d 1370 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), rev. denied, 494 So.2d 1153 (Fla.1986).
discussed Cited "see" Roberts v. Cason
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See Tucker v. Fianson, 484 So.2d 1370, 1372-3 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), rev. denied, 494 So.2d 1153 (Fla.1986): In sum, it is claimed that, while lawyer Tucker negligently shot his arrow into the air in Bro-ward County, it did no harm and had no effect until it fell to earth in Dade.
discussed Cited "see" Weiner v. Prudential Mortgage Investors, Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See Tucker v. Fianson, 484 So.2d 1370 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), review denied, 494 So.2d 1153 (Fla. 1986); § 47.011, Fla. Stat. (1989) (action may be brought in county "where defendant resides [or] where the cause of action accrued ...").
discussed Cited "see" Florida Copia Restaurant, Inc. v. Boggio
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See Tucker v. Fianson, 484 So.2d 1370 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 494 So.2d 1153 (Fla.1986); Pearson v. Wallace Aviation, Inc., 400 So.2d 50 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); see also Meehan v. Celotex Corp., 466 So.2d 1100 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985).
cited Cited "see" Harp v. American Honda Motor Co.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See Tucker v. Fianson, 484 So.2d 1370 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); Hu v. Crockett, 426 So.2d 1275 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Bingham v. Manson, 363 So.2d 370 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
cited Cited "see" Bergnes v. Bergnes
Fla. Cir. Ct. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See generally Tucker v. Fianson, 484 So.2d 1370 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Saunders v. A Better Blind, Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2007 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See § 47.011, Fla. Stat. (2006); Lane v. Hemophilia of the Sunshine State, Inc., 793 So.2d 992, 995-96 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Straske v. McGillicuddy, 388 So.2d 1334, 1336 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); see also Tucker v. Fianson, 484 So.2d 1370, 1371 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
H. Allan TUCKER, Appellant,
v.
Chantal FIANSON, Appellee.
85-2474.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Mar 18, 1986.
484 So. 2d 1370
Schwartz, C.J., and Hendry and Ferguson.
Cited by 39 opinions  |  Published

Bunnell, Denman & Woulfe and Melanie G. May and David Keller, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.

Krongold & Bass and Paul Bass, Coral Gables, for appellee.

[*1371] Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and HENDRY and FERGUSON, JJ.

SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.

The defendant-appellant Tucker is an attorney who practices and resides in Broward County. Based on allegations that he had rendered negligent professional advice and services with respect to the condominium conversion of a building in Dade County owned by his client, Chantal Fianson, she sued him for legal malpractice in the Dade County Circuit Court. He now appeals from the denial of his motion to transfer the case to Broward County, asserted on the ground that the alleged negligence took place there.

On the ground that the cause of action "accrued" under section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1985)[1] in Dade County, where the defendant's asserted negligence impacted upon the plaintiff's economic interests, we affirm the order below. In so holding, we adopt and apply the rule that, for venue purposes,[2] a tort claim is deemed to have accrued

where the last event necessary to make the defendant liable for the tort took place. The last event occurred when the harmful force, set in motion by the defendant's negligence, first took effect on the body or the property of the plaintiff. Thus, a claim for tort arose where the harmful force first took effect, or where the plaintiff suffered injury.

Ebell v. Seapac Fisheries, Inc., 692 P.2d 956, 957 (Alaska 1984). In our judgment, this statement of the rule is consistent with and harmonizes the actual holdings of the Florida cases which have dealt with this issue. Thus, as to the inter-county situation in which, as here, a tortfeasor has committed a wrongful act in one place which has taken effect by causing damage in another, it was flatly stated in Pearson v. Wallace Aviation, Inc., 400 So.2d 50, 51 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), that

[i]n negligence suits, the rule is well established that a cause of action accrues where the plaintiff suffers his or her injuries; normally the site of the accident. Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 201 So.2d 743 (Fla. 1967); Majestic II, Enterprises, Inc. v. Butler, 372 So.2d 548 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Kilpatrick v. Boynton, 374 So.2d 557 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979); Kelly-Springfield Tire Co. v. Moore, 355 So.2d 451 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Perry Building Systems, Inc. v. Hayes & Bates, Inc., 361 So.2d 443 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); Walt Disney World Co. v. Leff, 323 So.2d 602 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). [emphasis original]

Similarly, although the court in Gaboury v. Flagler Hospital, Inc., 316 So.2d 642 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975), cited by the appellee, may have expressed the broad doctrine in somewhat different terms,[3] the precise determination[*1372] was that the malpractice-wrongful death action accrued where the defendant negligently treated the decedent — where, in other words, the negligence first took effect upon her body — even though she died in another county. Moreover, contrary to the defendant's assertion, the rule is not confined to personal injury or property damage cases; it applies equally to those which involve economic or intangible losses alone. E.g., Soowal v. Marden, 452 So.2d 625 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) (trademark infringement); E.J. Sales & Service, Inc. v. Southeast First National Bank of Miami, 415 So.2d 906 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (conversion); see also Firstamerica Development Corp. v. Daytona Beach News-Journal Corp., 196 So.2d 97 (Fla. 1966) (libel action accrues under prior venue statute in each county newspaper circulates, even though it is published elsewhere.)

Even more specifically, the Ebell decision, the language of which we have appropriated as a correct expression of the general rule, involved a factual-legal situation identical to the instant case. There, a lawyer negligently gave advice in one district which resulted in the seizure of his client's vessels in another. The Alaska court held, as do we, that venue in the ensuing legal malpractice action was properly laid in the latter district where the economic damage had been done. Accord Johnson v. Nelson, 275 N.W.2d 427 (Iowa 1979).

In sum, it is claimed that, while lawyer Tucker negligently shot his arrow into the air of Broward County, it did no harm and had no effect until it fell to earth in Dade. It is therefore here that he must answer for his asserted error.[4]

Affirmed.

1 This section, which controls the present issue, provides:

Actions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located. This section shall not apply to actions against nonresidents.

Since the defendant resides in Broward County and no property is "in litigation" within the meaning of the statute, Coon v. Abner, 246 So.2d 143 (Fla. 1971), venue may be sustained in Dade County only if, as we hold, the cause of action "accrued" here. In this connection, we agree with the defendant that for present purposes — although not in considering the separate question of whether a transfer for convenience under § 47.122 is appropriate, see Hu v. Crockett, 426 So.2d 1275, 1279 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) — it is irrelevant that the plaintiff resides in Dade County.

2 The test may or may not be different in the statute of limitations, see Meehan v. Celotex Corp., 466 So.2d 1100 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), or the conflicts of law context. See State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Olsen, 406 So.2d 1109 (Fla. 1981); Ebell v. Seapac Fisheries, Inc., 692 P.2d 956 (Alaska 1984).
3 The language cited by the defendant in support of his contention that the county in which the negligence takes place controls, is as follows:

In determining the proper forum in which to bring suit under the general statute fixing venue where the cause of action "arose," or "accrued," the "injury occurred," et cetera, the differences are often of importance, but generally within the meaning of statutes of this kind, a cause of action is said to arise at the place where the act creating the right to bring an action occurred, and when a tort is complete in a particular county, the cause of action is deemed to have accrued there so as to fix venue, notwithstanding that the plaintiff may have suffered damages, and even his greatest damage, in another county. 56 Am. Jur., Venue, § 34 (1947). [e.o.]

Gaboury, 316 So.2d at 644. In itself, this statement does not resolve the issue of where the "act" which created the right to bring an action may have occurred in any particular case. Thus, even under this formulation, it is clear that the critical "act" is often not the wrongful conduct of the defendant, but its adverse impact upon the plaintiff. See Soowal v. Marden, 452 So.2d 625 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) (citing Gaboury; venue for breach of settlement agreement by wrongful use of trademark proper in Broward County where trademark used, even though breach of agreement not to release trademark occurred in Dade County); see also E.J. Sales & Service, Inc. v. Southeast First National Bank of Miami, 415 So.2d 906 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (quoting Gaboury; conversion action accrues in county to which, rather than from which, money is wrongfully transferred).

4 We are unimpressed with the parade of horribles invoked by the appellant as to the consequences of a rule under which a tortfeasor may be required to defend an action for consequences his conduct has caused in an unanticipated area far from his home. Any such complaint may be remedied, if justified, under § 47.122. See supra note 1; Ebell, 652 P.2d at 958-59.