Campbell v. Campbell, 635 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). · Go Syfert
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Campbell v. Campbell, 635 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 1 distinct case, last quoted 1998 · …the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award the increased child support retroactive to the date of the petition for modification, because the child's increased need for support and the former husband's ability to pay the increased child support existed at the time … at p. 46 ✓
14 citation events (5 in the last 25 years) across 4 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Caskey v. Caskey (ncctapp, 2010-09-07)
Top citers, strongest first. 10 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Caskey v. Caskey
N.C. Ct. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
The Colorado court similarly held that undistributed employer contributions to employee parents’ pension plans did not constitute income for determining child support because the employers determined the amount of their contributions “and the employees did not have the option of directly receiving the amounts as wages.” In re Marriage of Mugge, 66 P.3d 207, 211 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Campbell v. Campbell, 635 So. 2d 44, 46 (Fla. Dist.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hetherington v. Hetherington
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
The Colorado court similarly held that undistributed employer contributions to employee parents’ pension plans did not constitute income for determining child support because the employers determined the amount of their contributions “and the employees did not have the option of directly receiving the amounts as wages.” In re Marriage of Mugge, 66 P.3d 207, 211 (Colo.Ct.App.2003) (citing Campbell v. Campbell, 635 So.2d 44, 46 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1994); Ballard v. Davis, 259 A.D.2d 881 , 686 N.Y.S.2d 225 , 229 n. 3 (1999); and Jordan v. Brackin, 992 P.2d 1096, 1100 (Wyo.1999)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Miller v. Miller
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
Accord Davies v. Turner, 802 So.2d 1195, 1196 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002); Bardin v. State, Dep't of Revenue, 720 So.2d 609, 611 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); Beal v. Beal, 666 So.2d 1054, 1054 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (requiring award where "the child's need and the [father]'s ability to pay existed at the time of the filing of the petition for dissolution"); Campbell v. Campbell, 635 So.2d 44, 46 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (same where "the child's increased need for support and the former husband's ability to pay the increased child support existed at the time the former wife's petition for modification was filed."); Re…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bardin v. State, Dept. of Revenue (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1998 · confidence medium
NOTES [1] Bailey filed the paternity action fifteen months after the birth of the child. [2] Bailey, who lives several hours away from Bardin and the child, had visited the child four times in the previous two years. [3] See Campbell v. Campbell, 635 So.2d 44, 46 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)(holding that "the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award the increased child support retroactive to the date of the petition for modification, because the child's increased need for support and the former husband's ability to pay the increased child support existed at the time the former wife's petit…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Brock v. Brock
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1997 · confidence medium
Campbell v. Campbell, 635 So.2d 44, 46 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).
cited Cited "see" Beal v. Beal
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See Campbell v. Campbell, 635 So.2d 44 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).
cited Cited "see, e.g." In Re the Marriage of Mugge
Colo. Ct. App. · 2003 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Campbell v. Campbell, 635 So.2d 44 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1994); Ballard v. Davis, 259 A.D.2d 881 , 686 N.Y.S.2d 225 (1999); Jordan v. Brackin, 992 P.2d 1096 (Wyo.1999).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Sq v. Dept. of Health & Rehab. Services
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1997 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also In Interest of B.L.B., 635 So.2d 44 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); In the Interest of D.J.S., 563 So.2d 655 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Atwell v. DEPARTMENT HRS
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1996 · signal: see also · confidence low
Compare Collucci v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., 664 So.2d 1142, 1144 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); see also In Interest of B.L.B., 635 So.2d 44 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Collucci v. DEPT. OF HEALTH & REHAB. SERV.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1995 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also In the Interest of B.L.B. and J.D.H., 635 So.2d 44 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Delana J. CAMPBELL, n/k/a Delana J. Stelly, Appellant,
v.
William E. CAMPBELL, Appellee.
93-1779.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Jan 14, 1994.
635 So. 2d 44
1994 WL 7449
Barfield.
Cited by 9 opinions  |  Published

[*45] Louis K. Rosenbloum and David H. Levin, of Levin, Middlebrooks, Mabie, Thomas, Mayes & Mitchell, P.A., Pensacola, for appellant.

Laura E. Keene, of Beroset & Keene, Pensacola, for appellee.

BARFIELD, Judge.

The former wife appeals an order modifying a final judgment of dissolution of marriage to increase the former husband's child support obligation and to prohibit future relocation of the minor child without the court's permission. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

The parties' settlement agreement, incorporated into the 1988 final judgment of dissolution, requires only that the former wife, who was designated the primary residential parent, give the former husband sixty days[*46] notice of any intended relocation of the minor child now that he has reached the age of six years. When she informed him that she intended to relocate with the child outside the Pensacola area, he filed a petition for modification seeking a change in the child's primary physical residence, or alternatively, a restraining order prohibiting the former wife from relocating the child on a permanent basis. She counter-petitioned for permission to relocate with the child to Lexington, Kentucky, and also sought an increase in child support, plus attorney fees and costs. The trial court allowed her to relocate to Lexington under certain conditions which are not at issue here, but ordered that she was prohibited from further relocation, except back to Pensacola, without the court's permission. It awarded her increased child support, but denied her request for attorney fees and costs.

The trial court's order explicitly found that no change in circumstances had occurred since entry of the final judgment warranting modification of the final judgment with respect to relocation. It therefore abused its discretion in modifying the final judgment to prohibit the former wife from permanently removing the child from the vicinity of Lexington, except to the jurisdiction of the Florida court, without applying for permission to relocate the child. On remand, the trial court shall strike this provision.

Contrary to the former wife's contention, we do not find that the trial court erred in refusing to include as income, for purposes of determining the increased amount of child support, contributions made by the former husband's employer to his profit sharing plan, in light of the former husband's unrebutted testimony that he owns no stock in the company, that the profit sharing plan is not voluntary, and that the contributions to the plan are made by the employer and are not within his control. However, we find that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award the increased child support retroactive to the date of the petition for modification, because the child's increased need for support and the former husband's ability to pay the increased child support existed at the time the former wife's petition for modification was filed. Anderson v. Anderson, 609 So.2d 87 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). On remand, the trial court shall amend the order to make the award of increased child support retroactive to the date the former wife's counter-petition for modification was filed.

The trial court also abused its discretion in refusing to award the former wife reasonable attorney fees to be paid by the former husband, based on its improper consideration of the financial resources of the former wife's present husband in determining the relative financial resources of the parties. Azzarelli v. Pupello, 555 So.2d 1276 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). On remand, the trial court shall order the former husband to pay such reasonable amount of the former wife's attorney fees and costs from the proceedings below as may be found necessary because of the disparate individual economic needs and abilities of the parties.

The former wife's motion for appellate attorney fees is granted. On remand, the trial court shall order the former husband to pay such reasonable amount of the former wife's appellate attorney fees and costs as may be found necessary because of the disparate individual economic needs and abilities of the parties. Dresser v. Dresser, 350 So.2d 1152 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).

The order is AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and the cause is REMANDED for amendment of the order consistent with this opinion.

SMITH and MICKLE, JJ., concur.