Adams v. Culver, 111 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1959). · Go Syfert
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Adams v. Culver, 111 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1959). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“it is a well settled rule of statutory construction ... that a special statute covering a particular subject matter is controlling over a general statutory provision covering the same and other subjects in general terms.”
113 citation events (38 in the last 25 years) across 9 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Shriners Hospitals for Crippled Children v. Zrillic (fla, 1990-05-31)
Treatment trajectory · 1959 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1959 1992 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Shriners Hospitals for Crippled Children v. Zrillic
Fla. · 1990 · signal: see, e.g. · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
it is a well settled rule of statutory construction ... that a special statute covering a particular subject matter is controlling over a general statutory provision covering the same and other subjects in general terms.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) JOHN G. MCGREGOR v. FOWLER WHITE BURNETT, P.A.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
It is well- established that a specific statutory provision “covering a particular subject matter is controlling over a general statutory provision covering the same and other subjects in general terms.” Adams v. Culver, 111 So. 2d 665, 667 (Fla. 1959).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) STATE OF FLORIDA v. CASEY HANSEN
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
As we have previously said: A specific statute “covering a particular subject matter is controlling over a general statutory provision covering the same and other subjects in general terms.” Adams v. Culver, 111 So. 2d 665, 667 (Fla. 1959).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Darriue Montgomery v. State (3×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
In this situation “the statute relating to the particular part of the general subject will operate as an exception to or qualification of the general terms of the more comprehensive statute to the extent only of the repugnancy, if any.” McDonald v. State, 957 So. 2d 605, 610 (Fla. 2007) (quoting Adams v. Culver, 111 So. 2d 665, 667 (Fla. 1959)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dante Martin v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
To support this claim, he relied on Adams v. Culver, 111 So.2d 665, 667 (Fla.1959) (recognizing that a specific statute covering certain subject matter controls over a general statute covering the same subject matter).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ford v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
Adams v. Culver, 111 So.2d 665, 667 (Fla.1959) (noting the “well settled rule of statutory construction ... that a special statute covering a particular subject matter is controlling over a general statutory provision covering the same and other subjects in general terms.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Andrew Thomas Giamberini v. Department of Financial Services
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
When statutes appear to conflict, however, a specific statute “covering a particular subject matter is controlling over a general statutory provision covering the same and other subjects in general terms.” Adams v. Culver, 111 So.2d 665, 667 (Fla.1959).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Lunohah Investments, LLC. v. Gaskell
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
Adams v. Culver, 111 So.2d 665, 667 (Fla.1959).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Stevens v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
A “well settled” way to harmonize laws is the canon that “a specific statute covering a particular subject area always controls over a statute covering the same and other subjects in more general terms.” See McKendry v. State, 641 So.2d 45, 46 (Fla. 1994); Adams v. Culver, 111 So.2d 665, 667 (Fla.1959); Dep’t of Revenue ex rel.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Schultz
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
He raises three grounds: (1) the rule of statutory construction that “a special statute covering a particular subject matter is controlling over a general statutory provision covering the same and other subjects in general terms,” Adams v. Culver, 111 So.2d 665, 667 (Fla.1959); (2) a certain sentence from diento which, according to the defendant, anticipates the possibility of a different decision after the enactment of section 893.13(8); and (3) the second district’s rejection of a state argument in O’Hara v. State, 964 So.2d 839 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007), that section 893.135(l)’s introdu…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Gonzalez
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
He raises three grounds: (1) the rule of statutory construction that “a special statute covering a particular subject matter is controlling over a general statutory provision covering the same and other subjects in general terms,” Adams v. Culver, 111 So.2d 665, 667 (Fla.1959); (2) a certain sentence from diento which, according to the defendant, anticipates the possibility of a different decision after the enactment of section 893.13(8); and (3) the second district’s rejection of a state argument in O’Hara v. State, 964 So.2d 839 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007), that section 893.135(l)’s introdu…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rochester v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
A specific statute “covering a particular subject matter is controlling over a general statutory provision covering the same and other subjects in general terms.” Adams v. Culver, 111 So.2d 665, 667 (Fla.1959).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Read v. MFP, Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
We cannot agree with Read’s argument because it violates long-standing principles of statutory construction. “ ‘[I]t is a well settled rule of statutory construction ... that a special statute covering a particular subject matter is controlling over a general statutory provision covering the same and other subjects in general terms.’ ” McDonald v. State, 957 So.2d 605, 610 (Fla.2007) (quoting Adams v. Culver, 111 So.2d 665, 667 (Fla.1959)); see also Sch.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Geiss (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
Adams v. Culver, 111 So.2d 665, 667 (Fla.1959).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mendenhall v. State (2×)
Fla. · 2010 · confidence medium
In this situation “the statute relating to the particular part of the general subject will operate as an exception to or qualification of the general terms of the more comprehensive statute to the extent only of the repugnancy, if any.” McDonald, 957 So.2d at 610 (quoting Adams v. Culver, 111 So.2d 665, 667 (Fla.1959)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Nucci v. Nucci
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
Adams v. Culver, 111 So.2d 665, 667 (Fla.1959).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Freeman v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
As explained by the Florida Supreme Court in Adams v. Culver, 111 So.2d 665, 667 (Fla.1959): It is a well settled rule of statutory construction, however, that a special statute covering a particular subject matter is controlling over a general statutory provision covering the same and other subjects in general terms.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Darling v. State
Fla. · 2007 · confidence medium
Additionally, this Court has held that "it is well settled that habeas corpus cannot be used as a substitute for a motion to quash or for an appeal." Adams v. Culver, 111 So.2d 665, 668 (Fla.1959).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) McDonald v. State (2×)
Fla. · 2007 · confidence medium
The Fourth District further reasoned that "[t]o the extent the provision of the PRR statute and the 10-20-LIFE law could be seen as conflicting, the specific provisions of the 10-20-LIFE law should control over the general provisions of the PRR statute." Id. (citing Adams v. Culver, 111 So.2d 665, 667 (Fla. 1959), explaining that "a special statute *610 covering a particular subject matter is controlling over a general statutory provision covering the same other subjects in general terms").
discussed Cited as authority (rule) McDonald v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
Adams v. Culver, 111 So.2d 665, 667 (Fla. 1959) (explaining that "a special statute covering a particular subject matter is controlling over a general statutory provision covering the same and other subjects in general terms").
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cone v. State, Dept. of Health
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2004 · confidence medium
See Gretz v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 572 So.2d 1384, 1386 (Fla.1991); Adams v. Culver, 111 So.2d 665, 667 (Fla.1959) ("It is a well settled rule of statutory construction, ... that a special statute covering a particular subject matter is controlling over a general statutory provision covering the same and other subjects in general terms."); State, Bd. of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Day Cruise Ass'n, Inc., 794 So.2d 696, 701 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ortiz v. Department of Health
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2004 · confidence medium
See Day Cruise Ass'n, 794 So.2d at 701 (citing Gretz v. Fla. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 572 So.2d 1384, 1386 (Fla.1991) ("the more specific statute controls"); Adams v. Culver, 111 So.2d 665, 667 (Fla.1959) ("It is well settled ... that a special statute covering a particular subject matter is controlling over a general *406 statutory provision covering the same and other subjects in general terms."); Seven Seas Frozen Prods. v. Fast Frozen Foods, 43 So.2d 181, 182 (Fla.1949) (same)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) STATE, BD. OF TRUSTEES OF INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT TRUST FUND v. Day Cruise Assoc., Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
Gretz v. Florida Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 572 So.2d 1384, 1386 (Fla.1991) ("the more specific statute controls"); Adams v. Culver, 111 So.2d 665, 667 (Fla.1959) ("It is well settled ... that a special statute covering a particular subject matter is controlling over a general statutory provision covering the same and other subjects in general terms."); Seven Seas Frozen Products v. Fast Frozen Foods, 43 So.2d 181, 182 (Fla. 1949) (same). 2.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Burnett v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1998 · confidence medium
"It is a well settled rule of statutory construction ... that a special statute covering a particular subject matter is controlling over a general statutory provision covering the same and other subjects in general terms." Adams v. Culver, 111 So.2d 665, 667 (Fla.1959).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hudson v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1998 · confidence medium
In keeping with precedent and with the familiar rule of statutory construction that "a specific statute covering a particular subject area always controls over a statute covering the same and other subjects in more general terms," McKendry v. State, 641 So.2d 45, 46 (Fla. 1994); Adams v. Culver, 111 So.2d 665, 667 (Fla.1959), we decline to construe the general language of subsection (1)(d) as overriding the specific provision in subsection (1)(j), which authorizes appeals only from judgments of acquittal granted "after a jury verdict." § 924.07(1)(j), Fla. Stat. (1995).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Seybel v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1997 · confidence medium
Adams v. Culver, 111 So.2d 665, 667 (Fla.1959).
cited Cited as authority (rule) McKendry v. State
Fla. · 1994 · confidence medium
Adams v. Culver, 111 So.2d 665, 667 (Fla. 1959); State v. Billie, 497 So.2d 889, 894 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986), review denied, 506 So.2d 1040 (Fla. 1987).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hamilton County Bd. of Com'rs v. State, Dept. of Env. Regulation
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1991 · confidence medium
See Peterson v. State, Department of Environmental Regulation, 350 So.2d 544, 545 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977) (inconsistencies between statutes must be resolved in favor of the last expression of legislative will); Adams v. Culver, 111 So.2d 665, 667 (Fla. 1959) (a special statute covering a particular subject matter is controlling over a general statutory provision covering the same and other subjects in general terms).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Liataud
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1991 · confidence medium
First, a specific statute covering a particular subject matter is controlling over a general statutory provision covering the same and other subsections in general terms... . *1159 Adams v. Culver, 111 So.2d 665, 667 (Fla. 1959), and cases cited therein.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Fardig v. Municipality of Anchorage
Alaska Ct. App. · 1990 · confidence medium
See, e.g., United States v. Bates, 429 F.2d 557, 559 (9th Cir.1970) (where defendant’s conviction resulted from his plan to fly a load of marijuana into the United States from Mexico, statute which prohibited conspiracy to unlawfully import marijuana applied rather than general statute which prohibited conspiracy to commit a crime); Adams v. Culver, 111 So.2d 665, 667 (Fla.1959) (where defendant showed pornographic pictures to a child, statute which precluded that very act applied rather than general provision which prohibited lewd and lascivious acts in the presence of a child); State v. Da…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Harris
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1989 · confidence medium
In this situation "`the statute relating to the particular part of the general subject will operate as an exception to or qualification of the general terms of the more comprehensive statute to the extent only of the repugnancy, if any.'" Adams v. Culver, 111 So.2d 665, 667 (Fla. 1959) (quoting Stewart v. DeLand-Lake Helen, 71 Fla. 158, 177 , 71 So. 42, 47 (1916), quoting in turn State ex rel.
cited Cited as authority (rule) PALM HARBOR SP. FIRE CONTROL D. v. Kelly
Fla. · 1987 · confidence medium
Adams v. Culver, 111 So.2d 665, 667 (Fla. 1959); Stewart v. Deland-Lake Helen Special Road & Bridge District, 71 Fla. 158 , 71 So. 42 (1916); State ex rel.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Palm Harbor Special Fire Control District v. Kelly
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1987 · confidence medium
In this situation “ ‘the statute relating to the particular part of the general subject will operate as an exception to or qualification of the general terms of the more comprehensive statute to the extent only of the repugnancy, if any.’ ” Adams v. Culver, 111 So.2d 665, 667 (Fla.1959), quoting from Stewart v. Deland-Lake Helen Special Road & Bridge Dist., 71 So. 42, 47 (1916), which quotes from State ex rel.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Parker v. Baker
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1986 · confidence medium
In this situation "`the statute relating to the particular part of the general subject will operate as an exception to or qualification of the general terms of the more comprehensive statute to the extent only of the repugnancy, if any.'" Adams v. Culver, 111 So.2d 665, 667 (Fla. 1959), quoting from Stewart v. DeLand-Lake Helen Special Road & Bridge Dist., 71 Fla. 158 , 71 So. 42, 47 (1916), which quotes from State ex rel.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Farrow v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1985 · confidence medium
A well-settled rule of statutory construction is that "a special statute covering a particular subject matter is controlling over a general statutory provision covering the same and other subjects in general terms." Adams v. Culver, 111 So.2d 665, 667 (Fla. 1959); Pedroso v. State, 450 So.2d 902 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Florida Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. Gross
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1982 · confidence medium
Adams v. Culver, 111 So.2d 665, 667 (Fla.1959); Tallahassee Democrat, Inc. v. Florida Board of Regents, 314 So.2d 164, 166 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975); Panzavecchia v. State, 201 So.2d 762, 764 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) FLORIDA DEPT. OF HEALTH, ETC. v. Gross
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1982 · confidence medium
Adams v. Culver, 111 So.2d 665, 667 (Fla. 1959); Tallahassee Democrat, Inc. v. Florida Board of Regents, 314 So.2d 164, 166 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975); Panzavecchia v. State, 201 So.2d 762, 764 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Martin v. United States
D.C. · 1971 · confidence medium
Adams v. Culver, 111 So.2d 665, 667 (Fla.1959); 2 J.
discussed Cited "see" BRODERICK CAMERON FURLOW v. STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
See Adams v. Culver, 111 So. 2d 665, 666 (Fla. 1959) (holding that showing a child a "lewd and pornographic picture" did not support a conviction for lewd or lascivious exhibition under section 800.04 and explaining that it would support a charge under section 847.01, Florida Statutes (1957), which prohibited showing a lewd photograph to a minor); Brady v. State, 553 So. 2d 316, 317 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) (concluding that throwing nude photographs from an automobile did not constitute lewd or lascivious exhibition under section 800.04 because the defendant "did not commit a lewd act in the presen…
cited Cited "see" State v. Maloy
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See Adams v. Culver, 111 So.2d 665 (Fla.1959); Burnett v. State, 737 So.2d 1106 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); see also State v. Croy, 813 So.2d 993 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).
cited Cited "see" State v. Croy
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See Adams, 111 So.2d at 667 .
cited Cited "see" Fontana v. Rice
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See generally Adams v. Culver, 111 So.2d 665 (Fla.1959).
cited Cited "see" Gretz v. UNEMPLOYMENT APPEALS COM'N
Fla. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See Adams v. Culver, 111 So.2d 665, 667 (Fla. 1959) (specific statute controls general statute covering same subject).
discussed Cited "see" DEPT. OF HEALTH & REHAB. v. American Healthcorp
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1985 · signal: see · confidence high
That view is supported by the rule of statutory construction applied when two statutes are inconsistent or in conflict: "[A] more specific statute covering a particular subject is controlling over a statutory provision covering the same subject in more general terms." Kiesel v. Graham, 388 So.2d 594, 595 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); see Adams v. Culver, 111 So.2d 665, 667 (Fla. 1959).
cited Cited "see" Pedroso v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1984 · signal: see · confidence high
See Adams v. Culver, 111 So.2d 665 (Fla.1959).
cited Cited "see" Ago
Fla. Att'y Gen. · 1980 · signal: see · confidence high
See Adams v. Culver, 111 So.2d 665 (Fla. 1959), and 30 Fla. Jur.
cited Cited "see" State v. Flores
Fla. Cir. Ct., Broward Cty. · 1979 · signal: see · confidence high
See Adams v. Culver, 111 So.2d 665 (Fla. 1959); Marston v. Gainesville Sun Publishing Co., 341 So.2d 783 (Fla. 1 DCA 1976); State v. Young, 357 So.2d 416 (Fla. 2 DCA 1978).
cited Cited "see" State v. Young
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1978 · signal: see · confidence high
See Adams v. Culver, supra .
cited Cited "see" Tallahassee Democrat, Inc. v. FLA. BOARD OF REGENTS
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1975 · signal: see · confidence high
See Adams v. Culver, Fla., 111 So.2d 665 and Woodley Lane, Inc. v. Nolen, Fla.App. (2d), 147 So.2d 569 .
cited Cited "see" Zide v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1969 · signal: see · confidence high
See Adams v. Culver, 111 So.2d 665 (Fla.1959) and Zide v. State, 212 So.2d 788 (Fla.App. 1968).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Kerfert Butler ADAMS, Petitioner,
v.
Richard O. CULVER, Custodian, Florida State Prison, Respondent.
Supreme Court of Florida.
May 8, 1959.
111 So. 2d 665
Roberts.
Cited by 100 opinions  |  Published

[*666] Kerfert Butler Adams, in pro. per.

Richard W. Ervin, Atty. Gen., and George R. Georgieff, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

ROBERTS, Justice.

This cause is before the court on the respondent's return to a writ of habeas corpus heretofore issued by the court upon the showing made in the petition for the writ, and the petitioner's reply to the return.

As shown therein, an information was filed against petitioner charging that, on April 22, 1958, he "unlawfully did commit a lewd and lascivious act before * * *, a female, aged 11 years, by exhibiting a lewd and pornographic picture in the presence of said minor female, without intent to commit rape." The petitioner plead guilty to the charge, judgment was entered, and he was sentenced under our "indeterminate sentence" statute, § 921.18, Fla. Stat. 1957, F.S.A., to a term of six months to twenty-five years in the state prison. As the basis for his claim of unlawful detention the petitioner contends, in substance, that the information filed against him was insufficient to charge a crime against him under any valid law of this state; and that, even if it was sufficient, the sentence of six months to twenty-five years was excessive. In the return to the writ filed by the Attorney General on behalf of the respondent, it is asserted that the petitioner was correctly charged with a violation of § 800.04, Fla. Stat. 1957, F.S.A.; it is conceded, however, that the sentence is excessive.

Section 800.04, supra, provides that

"Any person who shall handle, fondle or make an assault upon any male or female child under the age of fourteen years in a lewd or lascivious or indecent manner, or who shall knowingly commit any lewd or lascivious act in the presence of such child, without intent to commit rape where such child is female, shall be deemed guilty of a felony and punished by imprisonment in the state prison or county jail for not more than ten years." (Italics supplied.)

It is obvious that the information in the instant case was drawn under the italicized portion of the Act. It is equally clear that, in sentencing the petitioner to a maximum of twenty-five years, the trial judge was proceeding under the Child Molester Act, Ch. 801, Fla. Stat. 1957, F.S.A. (yellow supplement), which, inter alia, applies to the offense of "lewd and lascivious behavior." § 801.02, Fla. Stat. 1957, F.S.A. It is not necessary, however, to decide whether the Child Molester Act comprehends a lewd and lascivious act proscribed by § 800.04, since it must be held that the petitioner could not legally be convicted of a violation of § 800.04 upon the charge made in the information filed against him.

As noted above, the information filed against petitioner charged that he committed a lewd and lascivious act "before" a female, aged 11, "by exhibiting a lewd and pornographic picture in the presence of said minor female * * *." By Subsection (1) of § 847.01, Fla. Stat. 1957, F.S.A., as amended by Ch. 57-779, Laws of 1957, "[i]t is declared to be unlawful to * * * show * * * any obscene, lewd, lascivious * * * photograph * * * or any other form of reproduction of any representation devoted principally to the presentation and exploitation of illicit sex, lust, passion, depravity or immorality." This subsection carries a penalty of up to three years imprisonment. Under Subsection (2) of § 847.01, supra, a person who wilfully or knowingly shows such a photograph "to any person under the age of seventeen years" may be sentenced to a maximum of five years in prison. It is apparent that the State has attempted to charge a violation of § 800.04, supra, for which a maximum of ten years imprisonment may be imposed, by the commission of an act denounced by either § 847.01(1) or § 847.01 (2), depending upon the proof, for either of which offenses a less severe penalty is imposed than that prescribed by § 800.04.[*667] It must be held, under applicable principles of law, that the State was not authorized to do so.

There are, of course, many cases in which, in committing one crime, an accused necessarily commits another. For example, rape involves fornication, and robbery involves both assault and larceny. Or two criminal statutes may each proscribe some conduct not covered by the other but may overlap in a narrow area; and it has been held that, at least where different proof is required for each offense, a single act or transaction may violate both statutes and the violator may be prosecuted under either. See United States v. Beacon Brass Co., 1952, 344 U.S. 43, 45, 73 S.Ct. 77, 97 L.Ed. 61; Rosenberg v. United States, 1953, 346 U.S. 273, 274, 73 S.Ct. 1152, 97 L.Ed. 1607; United States v. Lamb, D.C. Cal. 1957, 150 F. Supp. 310; Pereira v. United States, 1953, 347 U.S. 1, 9, 74 S.Ct. 358, 98 L.Ed.; cf. Faulkner v. State, 1941, 146 Fla. 769, 1 So.2d 857 (decided prior to the enactment of § 800.04, supra, by Ch. 21974, Laws of 1943). It is a well settled rule of statutory construction, however, that a special statute covering a particular subject matter is controlling over a general statutory provision covering the same and other subjects in general terms. In this situation "`the statute relating to the particular part of the general subject will operate as an exception to or qualification of the general terms of the more comprehensive statute to the extent only of the repugnancy, if any.'" Stewart v. DeLand-Lake Helen etc., 1916, 71 Fla. 158, 71 So. 42, 47, quoting State ex rel. Loftin v. McMillan, 55 Fla. 246, 45 So. 882; American Bakeries Co. v. City of Haines City, 1938, 131 Fla. 790, 180 So. 524. It has been said that this rule "is particularly applicable to criminal statutes in which the specific provisions relating to particular subjects carry smaller penalties than the general provision." United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., D.C.Ill., 12 F.2d 614, quoted in Robinson v. United States, 8 Cir., 1944, 142 F.2d 431, 432. See also In re Williamson, 1954, 43 Cal.2d 651, 276 P.2d 593; State ex rel. Kearns v. Rindsfoos, 1954, 161 Ohio St. 60, 118 N.E.2d 138, 43 A.L.R.2d 1316; State v. Hickman, 1910, 127 La. 442, 53 So. 680; People v. Haydon, 1951, 106 Cal. App.2d 105, 234 P.2d 720; United States v. Hess, 8 Cir., 1934, 71 F.2d 78; Price v. United States, 5 Cir., 1934, 74 F.2d 120; Iriarte v. United States, 1 Cir., 1946, 157 F.2d 105, 167 A.L.R. 494; Shelton v. United States, 1947, 83 U.S.App. D.C. 32, 165 F.2d 241; United States v. Gross, D.C.Nev. 1958, 159 F. Supp. 316.

Section 800.04, supra, does not attempt to define the conduct that would constitute a lewd and lascivious act. Thus, in order to charge an offense under the statute "it became necessary for the prosecutor to particularly and definitely allege the act committed and aver that it was a lewd and lascivious act, so that the accused would be put on notice and be advised as to the act as to which he must present his defense." State ex rel. Swanboro v. Mayo, 1944, 155 Fla. 330, 19 So.2d 883, 884. The only act alleged in the information in the instant case is the exhibition of a lewd and pornographic picture in the presence of a female, aged 11. Assuming, arguendo, that this is a "lewd or lascivious act" clearly within the intendment of § 800.04, cf. Boles v. State, 1946, 158 Fla. 220, 27 So.2d 293, the fact remains that the exhibition of a lewd and pornographic picture has been specially and explictly dealt with by Subsections (1) and (2) of § 847.01, supra. It follows that, under the principle of law referred to above, the specific statute, alone, is applicable to the offense charged against petitioner.

It does not follow, however, that the petitioner is entitled to be discharged from custody. "Defects in an information are not subject to attack in a habeas corpus proceeding unless the defects are of such magnitude that the information utterly fails to charge any crime or offense under the laws of the State of Florida." Petersen v. Mayo, Fla. 1953, 65 So.2d 48. The fact that petitioner was charged under[*668] the wrong statute does not entitle him to discharge from custody in a habeas corpus proceeding when he has, in fact, been charged with and has plead guilty to an offense denounced by another statute. See Anglin v. Mayo, Fla. 1956, 88 So.2d 918; Johnson v. Mayo, Fla. 1954, 75 So.2d 287; Hodges v. Mayo, Fla. 1953, 65 So.2d 750.

Here, the petitioner was charged with and plead guilty to an offense denounced by § 847.01, supra. It is true that the charge was inartificially and, perhaps, defectively drawn under that statute, cf. Reyes v. State, 1894, 34 Fla. 181, 15 So. 875. But it is well settled that habeas corpus cannot be used as a substitute for a motion to quash or for an appeal. Kelly v. State, Fla. 1957, 92 So.2d 172, 174. "Appellate courts are properly reluctant to strike down on habeas corpus proceedings defectively or inartific[i]ally pleaded criminal charges that, if properly and timely attacked in the trial court, would be therein subject to correction by way of the filing of a new and amended information or indictment." State ex rel. Padgett v. Windham, 1935, 120 Fla. 206, 162 So. 501, 502. The charge was sufficiently elaborate to apprise the petitioner of "the nature and cause of the accusation against him," § 11, Decl. of Rights, Fla. Const., F.S.A., and to protect him from subsequent prosecution for the same offense; and he cannot, in these proceedings, be heard to say that he is unlawfully detained under such charge.

It is clear, however, that his indeterminate sentence of from six months to twenty-five years is illegal, since it exceeds the maximum prescribed by law for a violation of § 847.01.

Accordingly, it is ordered that petitioner be and he is hereby remanded to the custody of the respondent with directions that he be presented to the Criminal Court of Record of Palm Beach County, Florida, for the imposition of judgment and the appropriate sentence pursuant to § 847.01, supra. Such judgment and sentence should be entered nunc pro tunc as of the date of his original sentence so that the petitioner will receive proper credit for the time actually served and for all gain time earned and not forfeited while imprisoned thereunder. See Hodges v. Mayo, supra, 65 So.2d 750.

It is so ordered.

TERRELL, C.J., and HOBSON, DREW and THORNAL, JJ., concur.