Zuchel v. State, 824 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). · Go Syfert
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Zuchel v. State, 824 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
23 citation events (23 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Treatment trajectory · 2002 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2002 2014 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 14 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) Fetzner v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
Zuchel v. State, 824 So.2d 1044, 1046 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Amsalem v. Amsalem
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
Zuchel v. State, 824 So.2d 1044, 1046 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Douglas M. Wyckoff v. Melissa K. Cavanaugh f/k/a Melissa K. Wyckoff
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
See Wade v. Wade, 123 So.3d 697, 698 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (granting petition for writ of prohibition and explaining that the judge’s refusal • to allow a mother in a timesharing proceeding to con *166 duct cross-examination “denied the Mother a most basic right of due process and reasonably caused her to fear that she would not receive a fair and impartial hearing”); Zuchel v. State, 824 So.2d 1044, 1046 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (granting petition for writ of prohibition and rejecting argument that the judge’s refusal to allow defense counsel to cross-examine the victim was merely a complai…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Ardis v. Ardis
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
Admin. 2.330(d)(1); Zuchel v. State, 824 So.2d 1044, 1046 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Keating v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
In Zuchel v. State, 824 So.2d 1044, 1046 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002), the trial court’s refusal to allow cross-examination at a bond hearing was held sufficient to merit disqualification.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ramos v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
“Allegations in a motion to disqualify are reviewed under a de novo standard as to whether the motion is legally sufficient as a matter of law.” Zuchel v. State, 824 So.2d 1044, 1046 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Williams v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
Zuchel v. State, 824 So.2d 1044, 1046 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Santisteban v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
See Livingston v. State, 441 So.2d 1083, 1087 (Fla.1983); Zuchel v. State, 824 So.2d 1044, 1046 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); Hayslip v. Douglas, 400 So.2d 553, 556 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); see also Florida Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3E(1) (providing that “[a] judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned”). 2 Accordingly, the rule states that “[a] motion to disqualify shall show ... that the party fears that he or she will not receive a fair trial or hearing because of specifically described prejudice or bias of the …
cited Cited as authority (rule) Pierce v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2004 · confidence medium
Admin. 2.160(d)(1); Zuchel v. State, 824 So.2d 1044, 1046 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) HOUSING AUTH. OF CITY OF TAMPA v. Burton
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2004 · confidence medium
Ass'n v. Antonious, 722 So.2d 247 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (disqualifying judge for instructing defendant to amend his pleadings to include additional defenses, thus creating the appearance of favoritism); Campbell Soup Co. v. Roberts, 676 So.2d 435, 436 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (judge's statement that defendant's dismissed counsel was "innocent victim" and insistence that counsel continue to represent defendant created well-grounded fear about judge's inability to be impartial); Zuchel v. State, 824 So.2d 1044, 1046 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (denial of right to cross-examination was more than adverse ruling bu…
cited Cited "see" Dendy v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high
See Zuchel v. State, 824 So.2d 1044, 1046 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).
cited Cited "see" I.K. v. Department of Children & Family Services
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2003 · signal: see · confidence high
See Zuchel v. State, 824 So.2d 1044 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).
cited Cited "see" Peterson v. Asklipious
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See Zuchel v. State, 824 So.2d 1044 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); Wargo v. Wargo, 669 So.2d 1123 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Jackson v. Leon County Elections Canvassing Board
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2016 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Zuchel v. State, 824 So.2d 1044 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (outright denial of the basic and fundamental right of cross-examination would give a reasonably prudent person a well-founded fear of judicial bias).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Daniel ZUCHEL, Petitioner,
v.
STATE of Florida, Respondent.
4D02-2579.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Sep 4, 2002.
824 So. 2d 1044
Per Curiam.
Cited by 18 opinions  |  Published

[*1045] Richard A. Asselta, Ft. Lauderdale, for petitioner.

Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Heidi L. Bettendorf, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

Petitioner, Daniel Zuchel, has filed a petition for writ of prohibition following the denial of his motion to disqualify the trial judge. We grant the petition.

Zuchel is charged with aggravated stalking and violation of a restraining order. The trial judge initially set bond at $150,000. Zuchel later filed a motion to reduce bond, which the trial court partially granted, reducing bond to $100,000. In his motion to disqualify, Zuchel alleged that at the bond reduction hearing, the trial judge refused to allow his counsel to cross-examine the key witness and that he feared he would not receive a fair trial because the judge "is not interested in hearing my side of the case."

[*1046] Allegations in a motion to disqualify are reviewed under a de novo standard as to whether the motion is legally sufficient as a matter of law. See § 38.10, Fla. Stat.; Armstrong v. Harris, 773 So.2d 7 (Fla.2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 958, 121 S.Ct. 1487, 149 L.Ed.2d 374 (2001). A motion to disqualify is governed in substance by section 38.10, Florida Statutes, and procedurally by rule 2.160, Florida Rules of Judicial Administration. The rule states that "[a] motion to disqualify shall show ... that the party fears that he or she will not receive a fair trial or hearing because of specifically described prejudice or bias of the judge." Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.160(d)(1).

Whether the motion is legally sufficient requires a determination as to whether the alleged facts would create in a reasonably prudent person a well-founded fear of not receiving a fair and impartial trial. See MacKenzie v. Super Kids Bargain Store, Inc., 565 So.2d 1332 (Fla.1990).

The term "legal sufficiency" encompasses more than mere technical compliance with the rule and the statute; the court must also determine if the facts alleged (which must be taken as true) would prompt a reasonably prudent person to fear that he could not get a fair and impartial trial.

Hayslip v. Douglas, 400 So.2d 553, 556 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). We find that petitioner met his burden in this case. Zuchel alleged that he feared bias and prejudice by the trial judge because at the bond hearing the judge would not allow his lawyer to cross-examine the victim in the pending "stalking" and "violation of restraining order" charges. The victim's testimony was used by the State, however, in its opposition to the motion to reduce bond.

We disagree with the State's contention that petitioner has only alleged his dissatisfaction with an adverse judicial ruling, which generally is not a sufficient legal ground for judicial disqualification. See Barwick v. State, 660 So.2d 685, 692 (Fla.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1097, 116 S.Ct. 823, 133 L.Ed.2d 766 (1996). Here, the challenge is not so much to the propriety of the judge's evidentiary ruling; rather, Zuchel asserts that the judge's refusal to allow defense counsel to cross-examine the victim indicates his unwillingness to hear Zuchel's side of the case. We agree that Zuchel's allegation that the outright denial of the basic and fundamental right of cross-examination, see Medina v. Sandstrom, 384 So.2d 927 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)(holding that the right to cross-examination is fundamental in a bail proceeding), would give a reasonably prudent person a well-founded fear of judicial bias.

Accordingly, we grant the petition for writ of prohibition and remand for the assignment of a new trial judge.

STEVENSON, GROSS and MAY, JJ., concur.