bond hearing in Florida

2007See also Chiusolo v. Kennedy, 614 So.2d 491, 493 (Fla.1993)(explaining that the bond requirement, whenever appropriate, is a vehicle for protecting the property holders just as the lis pendens protects the plaintiff and third parties).

2000Chiusolo, 614 So.2d at 493 (footnote omitted).

2011See United Farm Workers of Am., AFL-CIO v. Quincy Corp., 681 So.2d 773, 777 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (holding that where the temporary injunction prohibited actions broader than those required “solely to prevent physical injury,” waiver of the bond requirement was error).

1999Even if the failure of the trial court to require a bond was error, see rale 1.610(b), Florida Rule of Civil Procedure; see, e.g., United Farm Workers of America, AFL-CIO v. Quincy Corp., 681 So.2d 773, 777 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996), because the record on appeal does not reflect whether appellants requested or submitted evidence to support a bond at the initial hearing, the record before us is not sufficient for appellate review at this point.

2016Cf. Petit, 92 So.3d at 913 (holding that testimony from a bond hearing was admissible because the defendant had a sufficient opportunity to cross-examine the witness); Thompson v. State, 995 So.2d 532, 534 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (stating that testimony from a preliminary hearing was admissible because “the ■ defendant was present and represented by counsel who cross-examined the witness”).

2012In Petit v. State, 92 So.3d 906 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012), involving the trial of a codefendant, we held that the admission of the 911 calls and Joseph’s testimony from the bond hearing did not violate the Confrontation Clause.

2012When the court fails to do so, the remedy is generally to remand for a new bond hearing.” Advantage Digital Sys., Inc. v. Digital Imaging Servs., Inc., 870 So.2d 111, 116-17 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (internal citations omitted).

2012Accordingly, the trial court’s decision to forgo the bond is reversed and the matter is remanded to the trial court for a new bond hearing. 6 See Advantage Digital Sys., Inc. v. Digital Imaging Servs., Inc., 870 So.2d 111, 117 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003).

2005Even if this statutory language subjects the additional, broader coverage of a common law bond to the requirements of subsection (2), as was suggested by the Fifth District in Martin Paving [v. United Pacific Insurance Co., 646 So.2d 268, 270 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)], this language does not permit American Home to issue a bond in violation of subsection (6).

1997Co., 646 So.2d 268 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994), the Fifth District Court of Appeal determined that section 255.05 had not abolished such a thing as a “common law bond” on a public construction project and, after reviewing the legislative history of the various subsections in section 255.05, held that in order for a surety to require a claimant’s compliance with the notice provisions set forth in section 255.05(2), the bond under which the claim was being made had to have been recorded in the public records of the county where the improvement was located in accordance with subsection section 255.05(1).

2019Nor did it change (at least expressly) the existing law that a defendant could be detained pending the bond hearing on the issue of "proof evident, presumption great." Id.

2019Nor did it change (at least expressly) the existing law that a defendant could be detained pending the bond hearing on the issue of "proof evident, presumption great." Id.

2024Corp., 210 So. 3d 175, 181 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016)).

2018Id.

2015Garcia, 816 So.2d 554 .

2011Garcia, 816 So.2d 554 .

2026See Williams, 198 So. 3d at 826 ("We must also note that Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.610(b) requires that a bond be set for the issuance of a temporary injunction.

2023See id.

2023Indus., Inc., 855 So. 2d 212, 215 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003), the court cannot waive the bond requirement of rule 1.610(b), nor can it comply by setting a nominal amount.

2023See Concept, L.C. v. Gesten, 662 So. 2d 970 , 973 n.3 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).

2023See Forrest v. Citi Residential Lending, Inc., 73 So. 3d 269, 279 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011).

2022See Hernandez v. State, 56 So. 3d 752, 758 (Fla. 2010) (“When reviewing the sufficiency of evidence presented to a trier of fact, our task is not to . . . reweigh the evidence.”).

2018See Petit v. State, 92 So. 3d 906, 912-13 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012); Roussonicolos v. State, 59 So. 3d 238, 241-43 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011).

2018Florida Rule of Evidence 90.804(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2013), permits the use of former testimony “if the party against whom the testimony is now offered . . . had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination.” As we noted in Roussonicolos, at a bond hearing, “the purpose of the hearing [is] for the court to consider whether [the defendant] should be released and, if so, what conditions should be imposed pending his final [] trial.” 59 So. 3d at 242 ; see also Petit.

2017We granted the petition because “Arthur contemplates a full hearing where ‘the accused may still come forward with a showing addressed to the court’s discretion to grant or deny bail,’ ... and the trial court improperly declined to consider any testimony.” Brackett, 773 So.2d at 565 (quoting Arthur, 390 So.2d at 719 ); see also Rosa v. State, 21 So.3d 115 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009).

2016Cf. Petit, 92 So.3d at 913 (holding that testimony from a bond hearing was admissible because the defendant had a sufficient opportunity to cross-examine the witness); Thompson v. State, 995 So.2d 532, 534 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (stating that testimony from a preliminary hearing was admissible because “the ■ defendant was present and represented by counsel who cross-examined the witness”).

2014Mander, 932 So.2d 314, 315-16 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (holding that a trial court cannot waive the bond requirement nor can the bond amount be nominal); Cushman & Wakefield, Inc. v. Cozart, 561 So.2d 368, 370 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) ("A trial court must require the movant to post an injunction bond before it enters a temporary injunction.”).

2014Mander, 932 So.2d 314, 315-16 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (holding that a trial court cannot waive the bond requirement nor can the bond amount be nominal); Cushman & Wakefield, Inc. v. Cozart, 561 So.2d 368, 370 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) ("A trial court must require the movant to post an injunction bond before it enters a temporary injunction.”).

2014Seymour v. State, 132 So.3d 300, 303 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (holding that the State is held to a degree of proof greater than that required to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt). - [3] According to testimony at the bond hearing, Petitioner entered the victim’s home demanding money for cleaning supplies.