fair and impartial hearing in Florida

2009The trial court has a duty to determine whether the factual allegations are “reasonably sufficient to create a well founded fear that the moving party would not receive a fair trial.” Kowalski v. Boyles, 557 So.2d 885, 886 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990); see Rodriguez, 919 So.2d at 1274 ; MacKenzie, 565 So.2d at 1335 ; Paletti v. Corbin, 717 So.2d 1056, 1056 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (concluding that allegations of bias in motion for disqualification “were sufficient to establish that a reasonably prudent person would fear that he would not receive a fair and impartial hearing before the judge”).

2009The trial court has a duty to determine whether the factual allegations are "reasonably sufficient to create a well founded fear that the moving party would not receive a fair trial." Kowalski v. Boyles, 557 So.2d 885, 886 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990); see Rodriguez, 919 So.2d at 1274 ; MacKenzie, 565 So.2d at 1335 ; Paletti v. Corbin, 717 So.2d 1056, 1056 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (concluding that allegations of bias in motion for disqualification "were sufficient to establish that a reasonably prudent person would fear that he would not receive a fair and impartial hearing before the judge").

2015IMC-Phosphates Co., 824 So.2d at 300 (explaining that because “an impartial decision-maker is a basic component of minimum due process in an administrative proceeding,” “in any motion to recuse the head of an administrative agency, the practical recognition of the numerous roles played by the agency as well as the agency head (investigator, prosecutor, adjudicator, and political spokesman) must be weighed against a reasonable fear on the part of the movant that it will not receive a fair and impartial hearing”); see also Biscayne Bay Pilots, Inc., 160 So.3d at 562 n. 5 (noting that the test fo

2015See also id. at 301 (explaining that "in any motion to recuse the head of an administrative agency, the practical recognition of the numerous roles played by the agency as well as the agency head (investigator, prosecutor, adjudicator, and political spokesman) must be weighed against a reasonable fear on the part of the movant that it will not receive a fair and impartial hearing.”). .

2017See Shapiro v. Craig, 210 So.3d 782, 782 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017); see also Mangina v. Cornelius, 462 So.2d 602, 602 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985) (“Where the trial judge refuses to disqualify himself, prohibition is the proper remedy .... ” (citing Bundy v. Rudd, 366 So.2d 440 (Fla. 1978))).

2017See Shapiro v. Craig, 210 So.3d 782, 782 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017); see also Mangina v. Cornelius, 462 So.2d 602, 602 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985) (“Where the trial judge refuses to disqualify himself, prohibition is the proper remedy .... ” (citing Bundy v. Rudd, 366 So.2d 440 (Fla. 1978))).

2017See Shapiro v. Craig, 210 So.3d 782, 782 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017); see also Mangina v. Cornelius, 462 So.2d 602, 602 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985) (“Where the trial judge refuses to disqualify himself, prohibition is the proper remedy .... ” (citing Bundy v. Rudd, 366 So.2d 440 (Fla. 1978))).

2017See Shapiro v. Craig, 210 So.3d 782, 782 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017); see also Mangina v. Cornelius, 462 So.2d 602, 602 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985) (“Where the trial judge refuses to disqualify himself, prohibition is the proper remedy .... ” (citing Bundy v. Rudd, 366 So.2d 440 (Fla. 1978))).

2017See Shapiro v. Craig, 210 So.3d 782, 782 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017); see also Mangina v. Cornelius, 462 So.2d 602, 602 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985) (“Where the trial judge refuses to disqualify himself, prohibition is the proper remedy .... ” (citing Bundy v. Rudd, 366 So.2d 440 (Fla. 1978))).

2017See Shapiro v. Craig, 210 So.3d 782, 782 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017); see also Mangina v. Cornelius, 462 So.2d 602, 602 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985) (“Where the trial judge refuses to disqualify himself, prohibition is the proper remedy .... ” (citing Bundy v. Rudd, 366 So.2d 440 (Fla. 1978))).

2016See MacKenzie, 565 So.2d at 1335 ; Livingston v. State, 441 So.2d 1083, 1087 (Fla. 1983).

2001In MacKenzie and Livingston v. State, 441 So.2d 1083 (Fla.1983), the supreme court made clear that the legal sufficiency of a motion to disqualify a trial judge turns on whether the facts alleged would place a reasonably prudent person in fear of not receiving a fair and impartial hearing.

2007See Sears v. State, 889 So.2d 956, 960 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (“The trial judge in the present case crossed the line of neutrality and impartiality, and as a result, Mr. Sears did not receive a fair and impartial violation of probation hearing.”); Cagle v. State, 821 So.2d 443, 444 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (“[While a] trial court may conduct probation revocation proceedings in an informal manner and ... question witnesses, ... it may not assume the role of the prosecutor.

2004See Cagle v. State, 821 So.2d 443 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002).

2015IMC-Phosphates Co., 824 So.2d at 300 (explaining that because “an impartial decision-maker is a basic component of minimum due process in an administrative proceeding,” “in any motion to recuse the head of an administrative agency, the practical recognition of the numerous roles played by the agency as well as the agency head (investigator, prosecutor, adjudicator, and political spokesman) must be weighed against a reasonable fear on the part of the movant that it will not receive a fair and impartial hearing”); see also Biscayne Bay Pilots, Inc., 160 So.3d at 562 n. 5 (noting that the test fo

2015The only reported cases applying section 120.665 to agency heads involve motions to disqualify an individual agency head, see Charlotte Cnty., 824 So. 2d at 299-300 (secretary of the Department of Environmental Protection); Bay Bank & Trust Co. v. Lewis, 634 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (state comptroller), or the entire collegial movant that it will not receive a fair and impartial hearing.”). 6 The Committee’s counsel stated at oral argument that written orders memorializing the commissioners’ rulings on the motion to disqualify were forthcoming. 7 body serving as the agency head, see Seid

2010Observing that while a trial judge should not be compelled to act out of confusion or a misapprehension of the facts, we found the trial judge had “crossed the line of neutrality and impartiality, and as a result, [the probationer] did not receive a fair and impartial violation of probation hearing.” Id. at 959 .

2007See Sears v. State, 889 So.2d 956, 960 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (“The trial judge in the present case crossed the line of neutrality and impartiality, and as a result, Mr. Sears did not receive a fair and impartial violation of probation hearing.”); Cagle v. State, 821 So.2d 443, 444 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (“[While a] trial court may conduct probation revocation proceedings in an informal manner and ... question witnesses, ... it may not assume the role of the prosecutor.

2023Ass’n, 153 So. 3d 384, 390 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014)). 5 Benjamin argues the trial court’s comments would create in any reasonably prudent person a well-founded fear of not receiving a fair and impartial hearing or trial.

2015See Wade v. Wade, 123 So.3d 697, 698 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (granting petition for writ of prohibition and explaining that the judge’s refusal • to allow a mother in a timesharing proceeding to con *166 duct cross-examination “denied the Mother a most basic right of due process and reasonably caused her to fear that she would not receive a fair and impartial hearing”); Zuchel v. State, 824 So.2d 1044, 1046 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (granting petition for writ of prohibition and rejecting argument that the judge’s refusal to allow defense counsel to cross-examine the victim was merely a complaint about a

2015See Wade v. Wade, 123 So.3d 697, 698 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (granting petition for writ of prohibition and explaining that the judge’s refusal • to allow a mother in a timesharing proceeding to con *166 duct cross-examination “denied the Mother a most basic right of due process and reasonably caused her to fear that she would not receive a fair and impartial hearing”); Zuchel v. State, 824 So.2d 1044, 1046 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (granting petition for writ of prohibition and rejecting argument that the judge’s refusal to allow defense counsel to cross-examine the victim was merely a complaint about a

2015IMC-Phosphates Co., 824 So.2d at 300 (explaining that because “an impartial decision-maker is a basic component of minimum due process in an administrative proceeding,” “in any motion to recuse the head of an administrative agency, the practical recognition of the numerous roles played by the agency as well as the agency head (investigator, prosecutor, adjudicator, and political spokesman) must be weighed against a reasonable fear on the part of the movant that it will not receive a fair and impartial hearing”); see also Biscayne Bay Pilots, Inc., 160 So.3d at 562 n. 5 (noting that the test fo

2015IMC-Phosphates Co., 824 So.2d at 300 (explaining that because “an impartial decision-maker is a basic component of minimum due process in an administrative proceeding,” “in any motion to recuse the head of an administrative agency, the practical recognition of the numerous roles played by the agency as well as the agency head (investigator, prosecutor, adjudicator, and political spokesman) must be weighed against a reasonable fear on the part of the movant that it will not receive a fair and impartial hearing”); see also Biscayne Bay Pilots, Inc., 160 So.3d at 562 n. 5 (noting that the test fo

2014Trade Comm’n, 425 F.2d 583, 591 (D.C.Cir.1970) (quoting Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461, 469 (2d Cir. 1959)).

2014Trade Comm’n, 425 F.2d 583, 591 (D.C.Cir.1970) (quoting Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461, 469 (2d Cir. 1959)).

2009The trial court has a duty to determine whether the factual allegations are “reasonably sufficient to create a well founded fear that the moving party would not receive a fair trial.” Kowalski v. Boyles, 557 So.2d 885, 886 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990); see Rodriguez, 919 So.2d at 1274 ; MacKenzie, 565 So.2d at 1335 ; Paletti v. Corbin, 717 So.2d 1056, 1056 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (concluding that allegations of bias in motion for disqualification “were sufficient to establish that a reasonably prudent person would fear that he would not receive a fair and impartial hearing before the judge”).

2009The trial court has a duty to determine whether the factual allegations are "reasonably sufficient to create a well founded fear that the moving party would not receive a fair trial." Kowalski v. Boyles, 557 So.2d 885, 886 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990); see Rodriguez, 919 So.2d at 1274 ; MacKenzie, 565 So.2d at 1335 ; Paletti v. Corbin, 717 So.2d 1056, 1056 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (concluding that allegations of bias in motion for disqualification "were sufficient to establish that a reasonably prudent person would fear that he would not receive a fair and impartial hearing before the judge").

2009The trial court has a duty to determine whether the factual allegations are “reasonably sufficient to create a well founded fear that the moving party would not receive a fair trial.” Kowalski v. Boyles, 557 So.2d 885, 886 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990); see Rodriguez, 919 So.2d at 1274 ; MacKenzie, 565 So.2d at 1335 ; Paletti v. Corbin, 717 So.2d 1056, 1056 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (concluding that allegations of bias in motion for disqualification “were sufficient to establish that a reasonably prudent person would fear that he would not receive a fair and impartial hearing before the judge”).

2009The trial court has a duty to determine whether the factual allegations are "reasonably sufficient to create a well founded fear that the moving party would not receive a fair trial." Kowalski v. Boyles, 557 So.2d 885, 886 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990); see Rodriguez, 919 So.2d at 1274 ; MacKenzie, 565 So.2d at 1335 ; Paletti v. Corbin, 717 So.2d 1056, 1056 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (concluding that allegations of bias in motion for disqualification "were sufficient to establish that a reasonably prudent person would fear that he would not receive a fair and impartial hearing before the judge").

2009The trial court has a duty to determine whether the factual allegations are “reasonably sufficient to create a well founded fear that the moving party would not receive a fair trial.” Kowalski v. Boyles, 557 So.2d 885, 886 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990); see Rodriguez, 919 So.2d at 1274 ; MacKenzie, 565 So.2d at 1335 ; Paletti v. Corbin, 717 So.2d 1056, 1056 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (concluding that allegations of bias in motion for disqualification “were sufficient to establish that a reasonably prudent person would fear that he would not receive a fair and impartial hearing before the judge”).

2009The trial court has a duty to determine whether the factual allegations are "reasonably sufficient to create a well founded fear that the moving party would not receive a fair trial." Kowalski v. Boyles, 557 So.2d 885, 886 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990); see Rodriguez, 919 So.2d at 1274 ; MacKenzie, 565 So.2d at 1335 ; Paletti v. Corbin, 717 So.2d 1056, 1056 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (concluding that allegations of bias in motion for disqualification "were sufficient to establish that a reasonably prudent person would fear that he would not receive a fair and impartial hearing before the judge").

2004Randolph v. State, 853 So.2d 1051, 1064 (Fla.2003); MacKenzie v. Super Kids Bargain Store, Inc., 565 So.2d 1332, 1335 (Fla.1990); Livingston v. State, 441 So.2d 1083, 1087 (Fla.1983).

2002Department of Agriculture v. Broward County, 810 So.2d 1056, 1058 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).

2002By interposing objections, and severely limiting the scope of direct examination of witnesses, the hearing officer did not leave an "impression of impartiality." Love v. State, 569 So.2d 807, 810 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)("[a] judge must not only be impartial, he must leave the impression of impartiality upon all those who attend court.").

2002See Quince v. State, 592 So.2d 669, 670 (Fla.1992).

1991See Safie v. Safie, 414 So.2d 623 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).