Chase v. Edgar, 259 A.2d 30 (Me. 1969). · Go Syfert
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Chase v. Edgar, 259 A.2d 30 (Me. 1969). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 1979 · …where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation, and the court has no right to look for or impose another meaning. at p. 32 ✓
12 citation events (2 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: State of Maine v. Seymore (mesuperct, 2009-09-01)
Top citers, strongest first. 8 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) State of Maine v. Seymore
Me. Super. Ct · 2009 · confidence medium
State v. Millett, 392 A.2d at 525 (citing Chase v. Edgar, 259 A.2d 30, 32 (Me. 1969)). person must be sentenced to the imprisonment and required to pay the fine authorized in that law.
cited Cited as authority (rule) State of Maine v. Roper
Me. Super. Ct · 2009 · confidence medium
State v. Millett, 392 A.2d at 525 (citing Chase v. Edgar, 259 A.2d 30, 32 (Me. 1969)). person must be sentenced to the imprisonment and required to pay the fine authorized in that law.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Melanson v. Belyea (2×)
Me. · 1997 · confidence medium
See City of Lewiston v. Tri-State Rubbish, Inc., 671 A.2d 955, 956 (Me.1996) ("The first source of legislative intent is the language of the statute itself [, and we] 'will not look beyond clear and unambiguous statutory language.’ ”) (citation omitted); State v. Millett, 392 A.2d 521, 525 (Me.1978) ("we must not lose sight of the overall principle that, where the language of a statute i[s] plain and unambiguous, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation") (citation omitted); Chase v. Edgar, 259 A.2d 30, 32 (Me.1969) ("Where the language of a statute is pl…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Coates v. Maine Employment Security Commission
Me. · 1981 · confidence medium
The very same section 1044(2) that lays down that requirement of Commission approval of all attorney’s fees also is the statute upon which plaintiff as a successful appellant must rely to justify getting her counsel fees paid by the Commissioner of Manpower Affairs. 5 Reading section 1044(2) in accordance with its plain meaning, see Chase v. Edgar, Me., 259 A.2d 30,32 (1969), we can only conclude that the legislature has vested one agency, namely, the Commission, with exclusive responsibility for fixing any fees to be paid a claimant’s attorney in connection with a successful unemployment …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Moffett v. City of Portland
Me. · 1979 · confidence medium
In the first place, the language used by the legislature in Exception B itself does not contain any such ambiguity as to require or permit a court to go outside that language to seek a resolution of a problem of meaning that otherwise might remain unresolved. “‘Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation, and the court has no right to look for or impose another meaning.’ ” Chase v. Edgar, Me., 259 A.2d 30, 32 (1969).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Millett
Me. · 1978 · confidence medium
Chase v. Edgar, Me., 259 A.2d 30, 32 (1969).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Snow
Me. · 1978 · confidence medium
Chase v. Edgar, Me., 259 A.2d 30, 32 (1969).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Granville
Me. · 1975 · confidence medium
“Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation, and the court has no right to look for or impose another meaning.” Chase v. Edgar, Me., 259 A.2d 30, 32 (1969).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Janet M. CHASE
v.
Joseph T. EDGAR, Secretary of State
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.
Nov 25, 1969.
259 A.2d 30
David K. Marshall, Biddeford, for plaintiff., Leon V. Walker, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Augusta, for defendant.
Williamson, Web-Ber, Marden, Dufresne, Weath-Erbee, Pomeroy.
Cited by 12 opinions  |  Published

Lead Opinion

MARDEN, Justice.

On report upon an agreed statement of facts to determine plaintiffs rights and defendant’s duty under 29 M.R.S.A. §§ 1312[1] and 1312-A.[2]

The Statement of Facts, in abstract, determine that on April 3, 1969 plaintiff, upon a plea of guilty, was convicted of the offense of attempting to operate a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. A fine was imposed and paid.

On April 18, 1969 the defendant revoked plaintiff’s operator’s license for a period of two years based upon the conviction.

Plaintiff urges the inconsistency of sections 1312 and 1312-A of the statutes, inasmuch as Section 1312 requires the Secretary of State to impose a license sanction greater for the offense of attempting to operate than for the offense of operating, and raises three issues:

“A. Whether so much of said Section 1312 as deals with the offense of ‘Attempting to Operate While Under the Influence of Intoxicating Liquor’ was repealed by the enactment of said Section 1312-A.
“B. The constitutionality of so much of said Section 1312 as deals with the im-positon of license sanctions upon conviction of ‘Attempting to Operate While Under the Influence’, assuming the same not to have been repealed by the enactment of said Section 1312-A.
“C. The statutory duty of the Defendant in his capacity as Secretary of State to impose license sanctions following a conviction for ‘Attempting to Operate While Under the Influence of Intoxicating Liquor’.”

The constitutional issue (Point B) was neither argued nor briefed and is considered waived. A. E. Borden Co., Inc. v. Wurm, Me., 222 A.2d 150, [1] 152.

29 M.R.S.A. § 1312-A enacted at the second Special Session of the 1967 Legislature, which adjourned January 26, 1968, became effective April 26, 1968.[3]

State v. Bryce, Me., 243 A.2d 726 (June 25, 1968) held that Section 1312-A, when effective, impliedly repealed that portion of Section 1312 dealing with the operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.

The new section 1312-A does not deal with attempting to operate while impaired by the use of alcoholic beverage. It[*32] was pointed out in Bryce [2] at page 731 that “through what may have been legislative inadvertence, logical treatment is not afforded the offense of attempting to operate while impaired.” For us to hold that the legislature intended to say “(i)t is unlawful for any person to drive or attempt to drive any motor vehicle * * * while his mental or physical faculties are impaired * * * by the use of intoxicating liquor * * * ” would be bald judicial legislation.

“We do not feel authorized to modify the statutes by * * * interpolation * * *. It is not the province of the court to legislate.” State v. Frederickson, 101 Me. 37, 44, 63 A. 535, 537, 6 L.R.A.,N.S., 186.
“If the meaning of the (statutory) language is plain the Court will look no further; it is interpreted to mean exactly what it says. Crawford’s Statutory Construction, Sec. 164.” Sweeney v. Dahl, 140 Me. 133, 140, 34 A.2d 673, 676, 151 A.L.R. 356.

See also State v. Koliche, 143 Me. 281, 284, 61 A.2d 115.

“Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation, and the court has no right to look for or impose another meaning.” 50 Am.Jur., Statutes § 225.

There is nothing in § 1312-A to indicate a legislative intention to repeal § 1312 as it deals with attempting to operate a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicants. It was the statutory duty of the defendant to impose the sanction which he did.

So Ordered.

WILLIAMSON, C. J., and DUFRESNE, J., dissent.

1

§ 1312. “Whoever shall operate or attempt to operate a motor vehicle * * * when intoxicated or at all under the influence of intoxicating liquor * * * shall be punished by a fine of not less than $100 nor more than $1,000, or by imprisonment for not less than 10 days nor more than 11 months, or by both. * * * The license or right to operate motor vehicles of any person convicted of violating this section shall be revoked immediately by the Secretary of State upon receipt of an attested copy of the court records, without further hearing.

Jk * * * *

“No person whose license or right to operate a motor vehicle has been revoked upon conviction of violating this section shall be licensed again or permitted to operate a motor vehicle for 2 years, except that, after the expiration of one year from the date of such revocation, he may petition the Secretary of State for a license or permit, * *

2

§ 1312-A. “It is unlawful for any person to drive any motor vehicle within this State while his mental or physical faculties are impaired, however slightly, by the use of intoxicating liquors * * *.

Mi * * * *

“The license or right to operate motor vehicles of any person convicted of violating this section shall be suspended for 3 months immediately by the Secretary of State upon receipt of an attested copy of the court records, without further hear-

3

By the terms of Maine Constitution Article IY, Part 3, Section 16, “(n)o Act * * * shall take effect until ninety days after the recess of the Legislature passing it * *

Dissent

WILLIAMSON, Chief Justice

(dissenting).

In my opinion the authority of the Secretary of State was limited to the suspension of the plaintiff’s license for three months under Sec. 1312-A.

In State v. Bryce, Me., 243 A.2d 726, operating “under the influence” under Sec. 1312 gave way to driving while “impaired” under Sec. 1312-A. Likewise, as I see it, an attempt to operate “under the influence” must give way to an attempt to drive while “impaired” under Sec. 1312-A. I am unable to save the attempt of Sec. 1312 after the statutory offense itself has been repealed.

We are not here concerned with the punishment for an attempt under the “impairment” statute. See 17 M.R.S.A. Sec. 251 limiting punishment where no express provision for attempt.

It is sufficient in my opinion for suspension of the license by the Secretary of State that the defendant violated Sec. 1312-A.