Rios v. Junco, 487 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). · Go Syfert
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Rios v. Junco, 487 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
5 citation events (1 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: Hialeah Hotel, Inc. v. Talley (fladistctapp, 2001-05-23)
Top citers, strongest first. 4 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited "see" Hialeah Hotel, Inc. v. Talley
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See Rios v. Junco, 487 So.2d 331 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), review denied, 494 So.2d 1152 (Fla.1986); Iber v. R.P.A., Int'l Corp., 585 So.2d 367 , 368 n. 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991); see also Anicet v. Gant, 580 So.2d 273 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991), review denied, 591 So.2d 181 (Fla.1991). [2] The trial court should quickly put an end to this travesty.
cited Cited "see" Love v. Metro Waste Services, Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
Zipkin v. Rubin Construction Co., 418 So.2d 1040 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); see Rios v. Junco, 487 So.2d 331 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), review denied, 494 So.2d 1152 (Fla.1986).
discussed Cited "see" Roberts v. Shop & Go, Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
We recognize that the "foreseeability" of an intervening causation is frequently a question to be determined by the trier of fact, Vining v. Avis Rent-A-Car Systems Inc., 354 So.2d 54 (Fla. 1977), but it may also be determined as a matter of law in the circumstance where, as here, the intervening act is merely "possible" rather than "probable." Guice v. Enfinger, 389 So.2d 270 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); see Rios v. Junco, 487 So.2d 331 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986).
cited Cited "see" Aguinsky v. Spring Lakes Village Condominium Ass'n
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See Rois v. Junco, 487 So.2d 331 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); Vermont Mutual Insurance Co. v. Conway, 358 So.2d 123 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Esilda RIOS, Etc., et al., Appellants,
v.
Teresa JUNCO, Aldalberto A. Mastos, et al., Appellees.
85-1336, 85-1565.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Apr 1, 1986.
487 So. 2d 331
Schwartz, C.J., and Hendry and Nesbitt.
Cited by 4 opinions  |  Published

[*332] Horton, Perse & Ginsberg and Edward Perse, Lawrence Rodgers, Miami, for appellants.

Joe N. Unger, Welsh & Telander and David Forbes, Miami, for appellees.

Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and HENDRY and NESBITT, JJ.

SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.

The appellants are a former Federal Drug Enforcement Agency officer and the estate of another who were shot and respectively injured and killed by narcotics offenders when an undercover operation went sour. They sued the present appellees, the owner and operator of the Miami motel where the shoot-out occurred, alleging that they had actual knowledge that numerous illegal drug transactions were taking place on their premises but negligently failed to prevent them. For numerous — independently dispositive — reasons, including the threshold absence of any actionable premises liability at all, see Vermont Mutual Insurance Co. v. Conway, 358 So.2d 123 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) (no liability when plaintiff and landowner have equal knowledge of danger), the lack of any proximate relationship between the alleged negligence and the incident in question, e.g., Cone v. Inter County Telephone & Telegraph Co., 40 So.2d 148 (Fla. 1949); Pinkerton-Hays Lumber Co. v. Pope, 127 So.2d 441 (Fla. 1961), and the application of the fireman's rule, Smith v. Markowitz, 486 So.2d 11 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) and cases cited,[1] it is self-evident that no cause of action existed under the circumstances as a matter of law and that the trial court therefore properly dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice.

Affirmed.

1 There would be no liability under these facts even in those jurisdictions which do not apply the fireman's rule as strictly as does Florida. W. Prosser & W. Keeton, The Law of Torts, § 61 nn. 44-45 & 53 (5th ed. 1984).