At page 11 Holding prosecutors to meticulous standards of promise and performance15 citing cases“because plea bargaining requires defendants to waive fundamental constitutional rights, we hold prosecutors engaging in plea bargaining to 'the most meticulous standards of both promise and performance.”
- United States v. Melendez-Rivera, 139 F.4th 83 (1st Cir. 2025).published"Pleading guilty requires a defendant to waive fundamental constitutional rights associated with a trial," United States v. Castillo, 126 F.4th 791, 795 (1st Cir. 2025), and doing so is "a weighty decision for a defendant, who typically ag…
- United States v. Feliciano-Candelario, 128 F.4th 5 (1st Cir. 2025).published(agreement breached when government promised in writing to recommend that no adjustment under sentencing guidelines be made but then stated at sentencing that government would "make no suggestion to the court" regarding…)
- United States v. Acevedo-Osorio, 118 F.4th 117 (1st Cir. 2024).published United States v. Velez Carrero, 77 F.3d 11, 11-12 (1st Cir. 1996) (emphasis omitted).
- United States v. Cortes-Lopez, 101 F.4th 120 (1st Cir. 2024).published Stated differently, "[t]he quid pro quo from the defendant's point of view . . . [is] the prestige of the government and its potential to influence the district court." United States v. Velez Carrero, 77 F.3d 11, 11-12 (1st Cir. 1996).
- United States v. Rivera-Rodriguez, 489 F.3d 48 (1st Cir. 2007).publishedBecause defendants must ultimately waive fundamental rights as a result of entering into any plea agreement, “we hold prosecutors engaging in plea bargaining to ‘the most meticulous standards of both promise and performance.’” Riggs, 287 F…
- United States v. Cosimi, 368 F. Supp. 2d 345 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).publishedAs the Second Circuit has indicated, courts must not “hesitate to scrutinize the government’s conduct [related to plea agreements] to ensure that it comports with the highest standard of fairness.” United States v. Lawlor, 168 F.3d 633, 63…
- United States v. Frazier, 340 F.3d 5 (1st Cir. 2003).publishedHence, “we hold prosecutors engaging in plea bargaining to ‘the most meticulous standards of both promise and performance,’” United States v. Riggs, 287 F.3d 221, 224 (1st Cir.2002) (quoting United States v. Velez Carrero, 77 F.3d 11, 11 (…
- United States v. Riggs, 287 F.3d 221 (1st Cir. 2002).published“Because plea bargaining requires defendants to waive fundamental constitutional rights, we hold prosecutors engaging in plea bargaining to ‘the most meticulous standards of both promise and performance.’ ” United States v. Vélez Carrero,…
- United States v. Bernard F. Bradstreet, 207 F.3d 76 (1st Cir. 2000).publishedSee Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262-63 , 92 S.Ct. 495 , 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971) (“[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a prom- ise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or c…
- United States v. Richard Lawlor, 168 F.3d 633 (2d Cir. 1999).publishedMoreover, “[bjecause plea bargaining requires defendants to waive fundamental constitutional rights, we hold prosecutors engaging in plea bargaining to the most meticulous standards of both promise and performance.” United States v. Velez…
Show 3 more citing cases
- United States v. Burns, 160 F.3d 82 (1st Cir. 1998).published As we repeatedly have made clear, moreover, "[b]ecause plea bargaining requires defendants to waive fundamental constitutional rights, we hold prosecutors engaging in plea bargaining to 'the most meticulous standards of both promise and pe…
- United States v. Tous, No. 96-2270 (1st Cir. July 29, 1997).unpublishedThe facts in United States v. Velez Carrero , 77 F.3d 11, 11-12 (1st Cir. 1996), are distinguishable.
- United States v. Cardona-Diaz, 524 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2008).publishedSee United States v. Velez Carrero, 77 F.3d 11, 11-12 (1st Cir.1996).
At page 12 “We conclude that the government’s conduct amounted to non-performance of the Agreement.”2 citing cases
- United States v. Mojica-Ramos, 103 F.4th 844 (1st Cir. 2024).publishedUnited States v. Mercedes-Amparo, 980 F.2d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 1992); accord Clark, 55 F.3d at 15 ; United States v. Velez Carrero, 77 F.3d 11, 12 (1st Cir. 1996); Canada, 960 F.2d at 271 .
- United States v. Sevilla-Oyola, 770 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2014).published See also United States v. Craven, 239 F.3d 91, 103-04 (1st Cir. 2001) (remanding for resentencing before a different judge); United States v. Vélez Carrero, 77 F.3d 11, 12 (1st Cir. 1996) (same); United States v. Mercedes-Amparo, 980 F.2d…
Other citing cases
- United States v. Davis, 923 F.3d 228 (1st Cir. 2019).published
- United States v. Velez-Carrero, 140 F.3d 327 (1st Cir. 1998).published
- State v. Bracht, 1997 S.D. 136, 573 N.W.2d 176.published
- United States v. Sanchez Barreto, No. 95-1297 (1st Cir. Aug. 21, 1996).published
v.
Moises Luis VELEZ CARRERO, Defendant, Appellant
Defendant-appellant Moisés Velez Carrero (“Velez”) appeals his sentence on the ground that the government breached its plea agreement (“the Agreement”) by failing to recommend that there be no adjustment pursuant to § 3B1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. We agree.
“Because plea bargaining requires defendants to waive fundamental constitutional rights, we hold prosecutors engaging in plea bargaining to ‘the most meticulous standards of both promise and performance.’ ” United States v. Clark, 55 F.3d 9, 12 (1st Cir.1995) (citation omitted). In the Agreement, the government promised “to recommend that no adjustment pursuant to § 3B1.1 of the sentencing guidelines be made.” At sentencing, however, the government informed the court that it had “agreed to make no suggestion to the court as to the role of the defendant in the offense.” What the government bargained to do was to oppose any § 3B1.1 adjustment. What it delivered was its neutrality. This is no mere terminological distinction. The quid pro quo [*12] from the defendant’s point of view in this case was the prestige of the government and its potential to influence the district court. We conclude that the government’s conduct amounted to non-performance of the Agreement.
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262, 92 S.Ct. 495, 499, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971), requires that the breach of a plea agreement be remedied by either “specific performance of the agreement on the plea, in which case petitioner should be resentenced by a different judge, or ... the opportunity to withdraw the plea of guilty.” In this case, Velez seeks and we grant the former mode of relief. See United States v. Canada, 960 F.2d 263, 271 (1st Cir.1992).
Accordingly, we vacate the sentence and remand with orders that Velez be resen-tenced by a different judge. See Loc.R. 27.1. [1]
. In light of our decision to vacate the sentence for breach of the Agreement, we need not address Velez's contention that the district court violated 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) by failing to recite its reasons for the sentence it imposed.