United States v. Velez Carrero, 77 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 1996). · Go Syfert
United States v. Velez Carrero, 77 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 1996). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
45 citation events (18 in the last 25 years) across 5 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 1996 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
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At page 11 Holding prosecutors to meticulous standards of promise and performance15 citing cases“because plea bargaining requires defendants to waive fundamental constitutional rights, we hold prosecutors engaging in plea bargaining to 'the most meticulous standards of both promise and performance.”3 citing courts quote it · 13 listed here
  • United States v. Melendez-Rivera, 139 F.4th 83 (1st Cir. 2025).published
    "Pleading guilty requires a defendant to waive fundamental constitutional rights associated with a trial," United States v. Castillo, 126 F.4th 791, 795 (1st Cir. 2025), and doing so is "a weighty decision for a defendant, who typically ag…
  • United States v. Feliciano-Candelario, 128 F.4th 5 (1st Cir. 2025).published
    (agreement breached when government promised in writing to recommend that no adjustment under sentencing guidelines be made but then stated at sentencing that government would "make no suggestion to the court" regarding…)
  • United States v. Acevedo-Osorio, 118 F.4th 117 (1st Cir. 2024).published 3 cites
    United States v. Velez Carrero, 77 F.3d 11, 11-12 (1st Cir. 1996) (emphasis omitted).
  • United States v. Cortes-Lopez, 101 F.4th 120 (1st Cir. 2024).published 2 cites
    Stated differently, "[t]he quid pro quo from the defendant's point of view . . . [is] the prestige of the government and its potential to influence the district court." United States v. Velez Carrero, 77 F.3d 11, 11-12 (1st Cir. 1996).
  • United States v. Rivera-Rodriguez, 489 F.3d 48 (1st Cir. 2007).published
    Because defendants must ultimately waive fundamental rights as a result of entering into any plea agreement, “we hold prosecutors engaging in plea bargaining to ‘the most meticulous standards of both promise and performance.’” Riggs, 287 F…
  • United States v. Cosimi, 368 F. Supp. 2d 345 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).published
    As the Second Circuit has indicated, courts must not “hesitate to scrutinize the government’s conduct [related to plea agreements] to ensure that it comports with the highest standard of fairness.” United States v. Lawlor, 168 F.3d 633, 63…
  • United States v. Frazier, 340 F.3d 5 (1st Cir. 2003).published
    Hence, “we hold prosecutors engaging in plea bargaining to ‘the most meticulous standards of both promise and performance,’” United States v. Riggs, 287 F.3d 221, 224 (1st Cir.2002) (quoting United States v. Velez Carrero, 77 F.3d 11, 11 (…
  • United States v. Riggs, 287 F.3d 221 (1st Cir. 2002).published
    “Because plea bargaining requires defendants to waive fundamental constitutional rights, we hold prosecutors engaging in plea bargaining to ‘the most meticulous standards of both promise and performance.’ ” United States v. Vélez Carrero,…
  • United States v. Bernard F. Bradstreet, 207 F.3d 76 (1st Cir. 2000).published
    See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262-63 , 92 S.Ct. 495 , 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971) (“[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a prom- ise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or c…
  • United States v. Richard Lawlor, 168 F.3d 633 (2d Cir. 1999).published
    Moreover, “[bjecause plea bargaining requires defendants to waive fundamental constitutional rights, we hold prosecutors engaging in plea bargaining to the most meticulous standards of both promise and performance.” United States v. Velez…
Show 3 more citing cases
  • United States v. Burns, 160 F.3d 82 (1st Cir. 1998).published 2 cites
    As we repeatedly have made clear, moreover, "[b]ecause plea bargaining requires defendants to waive fundamental constitutional rights, we hold prosecutors engaging in plea bargaining to 'the most meticulous standards of both promise and pe…
  • United States v. Tous, No. 96-2270 (1st Cir. July 29, 1997).unpublished
    The facts in United States v. Velez Carrero , 77 F.3d 11, 11-12 (1st Cir. 1996), are distinguishable.
  • United States v. Cardona-Diaz, 524 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2008).published
    See United States v. Velez Carrero, 77 F.3d 11, 11-12 (1st Cir.1996).
At page 12 “We conclude that the government’s conduct amounted to non-performance of the Agreement.”2 citing casesthe opinion's own words at *12
  • United States v. Mojica-Ramos, 103 F.4th 844 (1st Cir. 2024).published
    United States v. Mercedes-Amparo, 980 F.2d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 1992); accord Clark, 55 F.3d at 15 ; United States v. Velez Carrero, 77 F.3d 11, 12 (1st Cir. 1996); Canada, 960 F.2d at 271 .
  • United States v. Sevilla-Oyola, 770 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2014).published 2 cites
    See also United States v. Craven, 239 F.3d 91, 103-04 (1st Cir. 2001) (remanding for resentencing before a different judge); United States v. Vélez Carrero, 77 F.3d 11, 12 (1st Cir. 1996) (same); United States v. Mercedes-Amparo, 980 F.2d…
Other citing cases4 with no pin cite or quoted language on record
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,
v.
Moises Luis VELEZ CARRERO, Defendant, Appellant
95-1351.
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
Feb 27, 1996.
Published opinion
77 F.3d 11
1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 3162
1996 WL 75731
Jorge E. Rivera-Ortiz on brief, for appellant., Guillermo Gil, United States Attorney, Nelson Perez Sosa, Assistant United States Attorney, and Jose A. Quiles-Espinosa, Senior Litigation Counsel, on brief, for appellee.
Selya, Cyr, Lynch.
Cited by 28 opinions  |  Published
CYR, Circuit Judge.

Defendant-appellant Moisés Velez Carrero (“Velez”) appeals his sentence on the ground that the government breached its plea agreement (“the Agreement”) by failing to recommend that there be no adjustment pursuant to § 3B1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. We agree.

“Because plea bargaining requires defendants to waive fundamental constitutional rights, we hold prosecutors engaging in plea bargaining to ‘the most meticulous standards of both promise and performance.’ ” United States v. Clark, 55 F.3d 9, 12 (1st Cir.1995) (citation omitted). In the Agreement, the government promised “to recommend that no adjustment pursuant to § 3B1.1 of the sentencing guidelines be made.” At sentencing, however, the government informed the court that it had “agreed to make no suggestion to the court as to the role of the defendant in the offense.” What the government bargained to do was to oppose any § 3B1.1 adjustment. What it delivered was its neutrality. This is no mere terminological distinction. The quid pro quo [*12] from the defendant’s point of view in this case was the prestige of the government and its potential to influence the district court. We conclude that the government’s conduct amounted to non-performance of the Agreement.

Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262, 92 S.Ct. 495, 499, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971), requires that the breach of a plea agreement be remedied by either “specific performance of the agreement on the plea, in which case petitioner should be resentenced by a different judge, or ... the opportunity to withdraw the plea of guilty.” In this case, Velez seeks and we grant the former mode of relief. See United States v. Canada, 960 F.2d 263, 271 (1st Cir.1992).

Accordingly, we vacate the sentence and remand with orders that Velez be resen-tenced by a different judge. See Loc.R. 27.1. [1]

1

. In light of our decision to vacate the sentence for breach of the Agreement, we need not address Velez's contention that the district court violated 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) by failing to recite its reasons for the sentence it imposed.