174 N.W.2d at 133 holding collateral consequences attach to criminal conviction because “the consequent disabilities flowing from the stigma of conviction remain8 citing cases
- State v. Turnage, 729 N.W.2d 593 (Minn. 2007).published ([P]ostconviction procedures * * * do not comprehend that a petitioner may have a full evidentiary hearing on the basis of bald assertions * * *.)
- State of Minnesota v. Blair Benedict Oberton, 10 N.W.3d 64 (Minn. 2024).publishedWe presume that collateral consequences result from a judgment—and thus do not require actual evidence—where a party demonstrates that “ ‘real and substantial’ disabilities attach to a judgment.” Id. (quoting Morrissey v. State, 174 N.W.2d…
- DRB 24, LLC, on behalf of itself & other similarly situated Prop. owners in Minneapolis that have been assessed vacant Bldg. Reg. fees in 2013 v. City of Minneapolis, No. A15-1844 (Minn. Ct. App. July 18, 2016).unpublished(discussing the collateral consequences of OFP on divorce proceedings)
- In Re of the Necessity for the Hospitalization of Dakota K., 354 P.3d 1068 (Alaska 2015).publishedThe record does not reflect whether his term there was voluntary or involuntary. 16 . 603 N.W.2d 326, 329 (Minn.1999) (quoting Morrissey v. State, 286 Minn. 14 , 174 N.W.2d 131, 133 (1970)) (internal quotation marks omitted). } 17 .
- Pechovnik v. Pechovnik, 765 N.W.2d 94 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009).published(holding that collateral consequences attach to a criminal conviction because of the “the stigma of conviction)
- In Re McCaskill, 603 N.W.2d 326 (Minn. 1999).published(holding collateral consequences attach to criminal conviction because “the consequent disabilities flowing from the stigma of conviction remain)
- State v. Montano, 437 N.W.2d 772 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).published(convicted person could bring postconviction petition challenging conviction even though sentence was served and his civil rights restored)
- Berg v. State, 403 N.W.2d 316 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).publishedBeltowski v. State, 289 Minn. 215, 217 , 183 N.W.2d 563, 564 (1971); Morrissey v. State, 286 Minn. 14, 16 , 174 N.W.2d 131, 133-34 (1970); ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Postconvictions Remedies, § 4.5 Commentary, 22-47 (1986 Supp.).
286 Minn. at 16 stating that “postconviction procedures . . . do not comprehend that a petitioner may have a full evidentiary hearing on the basis of bald assertions2 citing cases
- State v. Turnage, 729 N.W.2d 593 (Minn. 2007).published “[PJostconviction procedures * * * do not comprehend that a petitioner may have a full evidentiary hearing on the basis of bald assertions * * *.”
- State of Minnesota v. Steven Francis Martinez, No. A14-903 (Minn. Ct. App. June 6, 2016).unpublished (stating that “postconviction procedures . . . do not comprehend that a petitioner may have a full evidentiary hearing on the basis of bald assertions)
Other citing cases
- Aziz v. Fabian, 791 N.W.2d 567 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010).published
- Joel Marvin Munt v. Michelle Smith, Warden, MCF-OPH, No. A16-462 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 5, 2016).unpublished
v.
State
This is an appeal from an order of the district court dismissing a petition for postconviction relief. Petitioner contends that he is entitled to a hearing pursuant to the Postconviction Remedy-Act, L. 1967, c. 336, Minn. St. c. 590, notwithstanding the fact that his petition was filed subsequent to his discharge from custody. He states this to be the issue involved:
“Is one convicted of a serious crime, who has been unconditionally and fully discharged from his sentence for that crime, entitled to a hearing pursuant to the provisions of Minn. Stat. 590.01 et seq. when his petition is filed subsequent to the discharge?”
From the record it appears that petitioner, John B. Morrissey, was charged by information on May 13, 1959, with third-degree burglary contrary to Minn. St. 1961, § 621.10. He pleaded not guilty and was tried and convicted by a jury. He was sentenced from 0 to 5 years to the Youth Conservation Commission at St. Cloud on June 4, 1959. While on parole, he was convicted of unlawful possession of narcotics, and on March 28, 1962, he was sentenced from 0 to 20 years to run consecutively with the prior sentence. On May 25, 1962, petitioner was unconditionally discharged from his June 4,1959, sentence. On May 2,1968, he filed a petition for postconviction relief alleging, among other grounds, that the evidence used against him at the burglary trial was secured by an unlawful search. The trial court felt that since petitioner was not in custody under the June 4, 1959, sentence and had been unconditionally discharged from that sentence, he was not entitled to a hearing.
Petitioner’s claim that the trial court was in error is supported by Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U. S. 234, 88 S. Ct. 1556, 20 L. ed. (2d) 554, which holds that, even though a defendant’s sentence has expired and he has been completely discharged from his parole status, he may nevertheless seek to have his conviction expunged from the record for the reason that—
[*16] “* * * [i]n consequence of his conviction, he cannot engage in certain businesses; he cannot serve as an official of a labor union for a specified period of time; * * * he cannot serve as a juror. Because of these ‘disabilities or burdens [which] may-flow from’ petitioner’s conviction, he has ‘a substantial stake in the judgment of conviction which survives the satisfaction of the sentence imposed on him.’ ” 391 U. S. 237, 88 S. Ct. 1559, 20 L. ed. (2d) 558.
We agree with petitioner that, even though his civil rights may have been restored by Minn. St. 609.165, the consequent disabilities flowing from the stigma of conviction remain. These disabilities, which are real and substantial, may seriously prejudice a wrongfully convicted person in both his social and business life and, among other things, may expose him to impeachment of his credibility should he be a witness in the trial of any action. Minn. St. 595.07; Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40, 88 S. Ct. 1889, 20 L. ed. (2d) 917.
We accordingly remand to the district court so that petitioner may have an opportunity to present a petition setting forth allegations of sufficient substance to justify the granting of a full evidentiary hearing.
The broad and generalized assertions contained in the petition before us prompt the observation that postconviction procedures under Minn. St. 590.01, which evolved from Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 83 S. Ct. 822, 9 L. ed. (2d) 837; Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293, 83 S. Ct. 745, 9 L. ed. (2d) 770; and Sanders v. United States, 373 U. S. 1, 83 S. Ct. 1068, 10 L. ed. (2d) 148, do not comprehend that a petitioner may have a full evidentiary hearing on the basis of bald assertions of denial of constitutional rights. A petitioner may not subject the judicial process to an exploratory investigation in the hope that some fortuitous reason may be discovered for expunging a conviction from the record. State ex rel. Dinneen v. Tahash, 272 Minn. 7, 136 N. W. (2d) 847; Thompson v. State, 284 Minn. 274, 170 N. W. (2d) 101. The trial court still has the discretion “to ascertain whether the claim is[*17] substantial before granting a full evidentiary hearing.” Sanders v. United States, 373 U. S. 1, 21, 83 S. Ct. 1068, 1080, 10 L. ed. (2d) 148, 164; Townsend v. Sain, supra; State ex rel. Roy v. Tahash, 277 Minn. 238, 152 N. W. (2d) 301. Under the circumstances here where the petition is brought 9 years after the conviction, it would not seem unreasonable for the trial court to require that it be supported by petitioner’s affidavit setting forth the essential facts which gave rise to the alleged denial of a constitutional right.
Reversed and remanded to the district court.