Gallison v. Bristol Sch. Comm., 493 A.2d 164 (R.I. 1985). · Go Syfert
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Gallison v. Bristol Sch. Comm., 493 A.2d 164 (R.I. 1985). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 4× by 4 distinct cases, last quoted 2011 · …where the provisions of a statute are unclear or subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, the construction given by the agency charged with its enforcement is entitled to weight and deference as long as that construction is not clearly erroneous or unauthorized ✓ Topic ↗
66 citation events (43 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Shore Line Rty. Co. v. Rhode Island Dept. (risuperct, 2011-06-29)
Treatment trajectory · 1989 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1989 2007 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 27 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Shore Line Rty. Co. v. Rhode Island Dept.
Sup. Ct. R.I. · 2011 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
here the provisions of a statute are unclear or subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, the construction given by the agency charged with its enforcement is entitled to weight and deference as long as that construction is not clearly erroneous or unauthorized.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Hazard v. East Hills, Inc.
Sup. Ct. R.I. · 2011 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
where the provisions of a statute are unclear or subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, the construction given by the agency charged with its enforcement is entitled to weight and deference as long as that construction is not clearly erroneous or unauthorized
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Heath Management v. R.I. Dept. of Envtl. Mgmt., 05-3232 (r.I.super. 2006)
Sup. Ct. R.I. · 2006 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
where the provisions of a statute are unclear or subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, the construction given by the agency charged with its enforcement is entitled to weight and deference as long as that construction is not clearly erroneous or unauthorized
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Laporte v. Dhs, 05-0077 (r.I.super. 2005)
Sup. Ct. R.I. · 2005 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
here the provisions of a statute are unclear or subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, the construction given by the agency charged with its enforcement is entitled to weight and deference as long as that construction is not clearly erroneous or unauthorized.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Metropolitan Property v. Hittner, 97-0302 (1998)
Sup. Ct. R.I. · 1998 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
where the provisions of a statute are unclear or subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, the construction given by the agency charged with its enforcement is entitled to weight and deference as long as that construction is not clearly erroneous or unauthorized
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Metropolitan Property v. Hittner, 97-0302 (1998)
Sup. Ct. R.I. · 1998 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
where the provisions of a statute are unclear or subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, the construction given by the agency charged with its enforcement is entitled to weight and deference as long as that construction is not clearly erroneous or unauthorized
discussed Cited as authority (rule) David J. Alba v. Cranston School Committee
R.I. · 2014 · confidence medium
Athough we afford deference when a statute is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation and the agency charged with its enforcement has given an interpretation that is not clearly erroneous or unauthorized, we retain “final responsibility for statutory construction^]” Asadoorian v. Warwick School Committee, 691 A.2d 573, 577 (R.I.1997) (quoting Gallison v. Bristol School Committee, 493 A.2d 164, 166 (R.I.1985)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kingston Hill Academy v. Chariho Regional School District
R.I. · 2011 · confidence medium
However, although “we are ‘vested with final responsibility for statutory construction,’ * * * ‘where the provisions of a statute are unclear or subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, the construction given by the agency charged with its enforcement is entitled to weight and deference as long as that construction is not clearly erroneous or unauthorized.’ ” Asadoorian, 691 A.2d at 577 (quoting Gallison v. Bristol School Committee, 493 A.2d 164, 166 (R.I.1985)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) West v. McDonald
R.I. · 2011 · confidence medium
“This is true even when other reasonable constructions of the statute are possible.” Pawtucket Transfer Operations, 944 A.2d at 860 ; accord In re Lallo, 768 A.2d 921, 926 (R.I.2001); Gallison v. Bristol School Committee, 493 A.2d 164, 166 (R.I.1985). *533 III Analysis A Conforming Zoning Ordinances to the Comprehensive Plan Within Eighteen Months The Rhode Island Comprehensive Planning and Land Use Regulation Act (CPLURA), chapter 22.2 of title 45, requires that every municipality in the state adopt a comprehensive plan to guide “rational decision making regarding the long term physical…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Auto Body Ass'n of Rhode Island v. State, Department of Business Regulation
R.I. · 2010 · confidence medium
The hearing justice concluded that, since (in her view) those specific phrases were not ambiguous, the statute as a whole was not ambiguous; she further stated that the statute’s words should be given what she characterized as their “plain and obvious meaning.” The hearing justice thus concluded that “every insurer governed by § 27-29-4.4 must conduct a labor rate survey as provided in the statute and use that survey as the sole determinant of the prevailing auto body labor rate.” (Emphasis added.) It is our opinion that, in rendering her decision, the hearing justice failed to reco…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Pawtucket Transfer Operations, LLC v. City of Pawtucket
R.I. · 2008 · confidence medium
In re Lallo, 768 A.2d 921, 926 (R.I.2001) (citing Gallison v. Bristol School Committee, 493 A.2d 164, 166 (R.I.1985)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Labor Ready Northeast, Inc. v. McConaghy
R.I. · 2004 · confidence medium
Nevertheless, when an administrative agency interprets a regulatory statute that the General Assembly empowered the agency to enforce, a court reviewing the agency’s interpretation of the statute as applied to a particular factual situation must accord that interpretation “weight and deference as long as that construction is not clearly erroneous or unauthorized.” In re Lallo, *345 768 A.2d 921, 926 (R.I.2001) (quoting Gallison v. Bristol School Committee, 493 A.2d 164, 166 (R.I.1985)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Cluley
R.I. · 2002 · confidence medium
“Where the provisions of a statute are unclear or subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, the construction given by the agency charged with its enforcement is entitled to weight and deference as long as that construction is not clearly erroneous or unauthorized.” Whitehouse v. Davis, 774 A.2d 816, 818-19 (R.I.2001) (quoting Gallison v. Bristol School Committee, 493 A.2d 164, 166 (R.I.1985)); see also Pawtucket Power Associates Limited Partnership v. City of Pawtucket, 622 A.2d 452, 457 (R.I.1993) (deferring to an administrative agency’s interpretation of a statute even when o…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Whitehouse v. Davis
R.I. · 2001 · confidence medium
We have previously determined “that an administrative agency will be accorded great deference in interpreting a statute whose administration and enforcement have been entrusted to the agency.” In re Lallo, 768 A.2d 921, 926 (R.I.2001) (citing In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 732 A.2d 55, 76 (R.I.1999); Pawtucket Power Associates Limited Partnership v. City of Pawtucket, 622 A.2d 452, 456 (R.I.1993); Defenders of Animals, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Management, 553 A.2d 541, 543 (R.I.1989)). “[Wjhere the provisions of a statute are unclear or subject to more than one reason…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Lallo
R.I. · 2001 · confidence medium
In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 732 A.2d 55, 76 (R.I.1999); Pawtucket Power Associates Limited Partnership v. City of Pawtucket, 622 A.2d 452, 456 (R.I.1993); Defenders of Animals, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Management, 553 A.2d 541, 543 (R.I.1989) (attributing great weight to an agency’s construction of a regulatory statute when the provisions of the statute were unclear); (“[IJndeed, even when the enabling provision(s) empowering an agency to adopt regulations is unclear, we still are required to accord great deference to the agency’s interpretation of its authority to…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Advisory Opinion to the Governor
R.I. · 1999 · confidence medium
See Defenders of Animals, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Management, 553 A.2d 541, 543 (R.I.1989) (“[T]his court attributes great weight to an agency’s construction of a regulatory statute when the statute’s provisions are unclear.”); Gallison v. Bristol School Committee, 493 A.2d 164, 166 (R.I.1985) (“[W]here the provisions of [the enabling law] are unclear or subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, the construction given by the agency charged with its enforcement is entitled to weight and deference as long as that construction is not clearly erroneous or unauthoriz…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Asadoorian v. Warwick School Committee (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
R.I. · 1997 · confidence medium
Preliminarily we note that even though we are “vested with final responsibility for statutory construction,” Gallison v. Bristol School Committee, 493 A.2d 164, 166 (R.I.1985); see also D'Ambra, 601 A.2d at 1374 (it is “‘the function and duty of this court to construe statutes’ ”), “where the provisions of a statute are unclear or subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, the construction given by the agency charged with its enforcement is entitled to weight and deference as long as that construction is not clearly erroneous or unauthorized.” Gallison, 493 A.2d at 166…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Parkway Towers Associates v. Godfrey
R.I. · 1997 · confidence medium
See Pawtucket Power Associates Limited Partnership v. City of *1294 Pawtucket, 622 A.2d 462, 456 (R.I.1993) (“deference will be accorded to an administrative agency when it interprets a statute whose administration and enforcement have been entrusted to the agency * * * even when the agency’s interpretation is not the only permissible interpretation that could be applied”); Defenders of Animals, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Management, 553 A.2d 541, 543 (R.I.1989) (“this court attributes great weight to an agency’s construction of a regulatory statute when the statute’s prov…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Taylor v. State of RI
1st Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
Comm., 493 A.2d 164, 166 (R.I. 1985). __________ We need not decide at this time, however, whether the Department's interpretation of the term "committed" would be material under a due process analysis.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Taylor v. Rhode Island
1st Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
Comm., 493 A.2d 164, 166 (R.I.1985).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Fireside Nissan v. Fanning, DOT RI
1st Cir. · 1994 · confidence medium
BMW Stores, 860 F.2d at 215 ; __________ Gallison v. Bristol School Comm., 493 A.2d 164, 166 (R.I. 1985). ________ ____________________ We disagree with Fireside's claim that RIDOT has not conclusively determined whether R.I.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Fireside Nissan v. Fanning, DOT RI
1st Cir. · 1994 · confidence medium
BMW Stores, 860 F.2d at 215 ; Gallison v. Bristol School Comm., 493 A.2d 164, 166 (R.I. 1985).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Fireside Nissan, Inc. v. Daniel P. Fanning, Director, Department of Transportation for State of Rhode Island
1st Cir. · 1994 · confidence medium
BMW Stores, 860 F.2d at 215 ; Gallison v. Bristol School Comm., 493 A.2d 164, 166 (R.I.1985).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Defenders of Animals, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Management
R.I. · 1989 · confidence medium
Gallison v. Bristol School Comm., 493 A.2d 164, 166 (R.I.1985).
cited Cited "see" Fransson v. State
Sup. Ct. R.I. · 2011 · signal: see · confidence high
See Gallison , 493 A.2d at 166 ; see also Citizens Sav.
cited Cited "see" Baker v. R.I. Dept. of Business Regulation, Pc
Sup. Ct. R.I. · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high
See Gallison , 493 A.2d at 166 .
cited Cited "see" Alpine Nursing Home v. Nolan, 98-3030 (1998)
Sup. Ct. R.I. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See Asadoorian v. Warwick School Committee , 691 A.2d 573 , 578 (R.I. 1997) (citing Gallison , 493 A.2d at 166 ).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Diane GALLISON Et Al.
v.
BRISTOL SCHOOL COMMITTEE
83-39-Appeal.
Supreme Court of Rhode Island.
Jun 6, 1985.
493 A.2d 164
Thomas J. Liguori, Jr./Natale L. Urso (Urso Liguori & Urso), Westerly, for plaintiff., Vincent J. Piccirilli (Palombo & Piccirilli), Providence, for defendant.
Bevilacqua.
Cited by 49 opinions  |  Published
2 passages pin-cited by 6 cases
Pinpoint authority: #27,017 of 633,719
Citer courts: Superior Court of Rhode Island (6)

OPINION

BEVILACQUA, Chief Justice.

This is a petition for a writ of common law certiorari by Diane Gallison and Ralph Gizzi (petitioners). [1] They are seeking a review of the decision by the Board of Regents for Elementary and Secondary Education, which held that they were properly suspended as teachers by the Bristol School Committee because of a decline in pupil enrollment.

The facts are not in dispute. The petitioners are certified elementary school teachers who have been employed by the Bristol School System. As a result of a decrease in pupil population, the Bristol School Committee voted to suspend three elementary school teachers including petitioners, effective August 31, 1981. [2]

The petitioners appealed their suspensions to the Commissioner of Elementary and Secondary Education (commissioner) pursuant to G.L.1956 (1981 Reenactment) § 16-39-2. They argued before the commissioner that G.L.1956 (1981 Reenactment) § 16-13-6 requires that suspensions of teachers on the basis of declining enrollment must be made on a systemwide senority basis. In the present case, they contend that the school committee was under an obligation to suspend mathematics teachers in the high, school who had less seniority than petitioners. They argue that there were elementary school teachers certified to teach mathematics in the secondary grades who, because they had more seniority should have been transferred to the high school to replace the less senior mathematics teachers. This would then have created vacancies in the elementary school for petitioners. The commissioner disagreed. He found that the school committee was not required to make involuntary transfers of teachers to the high school to provide a position for petitioners in the elementary grades.

Thereafter, petitioners appealed the decision of the commissioner to the Board of Regents for Elementary and Secondary Education (board), which confirmed the findings of the commissioner. The board was of the opinion “that suspensions within the elementary grades because of a decline in students in those grades is proper and that such suspensions need not be made on a systemwide senority system nor require a systemwide bumping of teachers.”

As a result of this decision, petitioners filed the present petition in this court, seeking a review of the board’s decision. The sole issue before this court is whether § 16-13-6 requires that the suspension of[*166] teachers be made on a systemwide basis pursuant to a systemwide bumping of teachers.

Section 16-13-6 provides:

“Suspension because of decrease in school population — Seniority—Reinstatement. — A school board may, by reason of a substantial decrease of pupil population, within its school system, suspend teachers in such numbers as are necessitated by the decrease in pupil population; provided, however, that such suspension of teachers shall be in the inverse order of their employment unless it is necessary to retain certain teachers of technical subjects whose places cannot be filled by teachers of earlier appointment; and, provided, further, that such teachers as are suspended, shall be reinstated in the inverse order of their suspension. No new appointments shall be made while there are available teachers so suspended.”

This statute was enacted to give school committees the power to suspend teachers in the event that a substantial decline in student enrollment occurs. It also provides that the teachers are to be suspended inversely to their order of employment. The statute, however, does not specifically address the question of whether a systematic bumping process is required when a school committee finds that there has been a decline in the enrollment in one segment of the school system.

In reviewing the statute to determine if it was properly applied in this case, we are guided by several principles of statutory construction. We note initially that this court is vested with final responsibility for statutory construction. Cranston Teachers’ Association v. Cranston School Committee, — R.I. -, -, 424 A.2d 648, 650 (1981); Statewide Multiple Listing Service, Inc. v. Norberg, 120 R.I. 937, 940, 392 A.2d 371, 373 (1978). However, where the provisions of a statute are unclear or subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, the construction given by the agency charged with its enforcement is entitled to weight and deference as long as that construction is not clearly erroneous or unauthorized. Flather v. Norberg, 119 R.I. 276, 283 n. 3, 377 A.2d 225, 229 n. 3 (1977); 3 Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 65.03 (4th ed., 1984 Cum Supp.). [3]

In this case the Bristol School Committee, faced with a decline in enrollment of 108 elementary students, voted to suspend the three least senior elementary school teachers. The board decided that such suspensions were appropriate and not in contravention of § 16-13-6. In the absence of more explicit language from the Legislature, we believe that the interpretation of the statute by the board was not clearly erroneous or unauthorized. The decline in the student population occurred within the elementary grades. It is therefore reasonable and within the contemplation of the Legislature that such suspensions should come from within the elementary grades.

Moreover, we believe that the Legislature, in enacting § 16-13-6, was conscious of the importance of maintaining high educational standards for students within the school system. [4] It is clear from the petitioners’ argument that the bumping procedure they advocate could result in .disrup[*167] tion throughout the school system and thereby adversely affect students’ education. We do not believe that the Legislature intended such a result.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for certiorari is denied and dismissed. The writ heretofore issued, is quashed, and the records and papers certified to this court are ordered returned to the Board of Regents for Elementary and Secondary Education with our decision endorsed therein.

1

. We review decisions of the Board of Regents pursuant to G.L.1956 (1981 Reenactment) § 16-39-3 by common-law writ of certiorari. School Committee of Providence v. Board of Regents for Education, - R.I. -, -, 429 A.2d 1297, 1301 (1981); Jacob v. Burke, 110 R.I. 661, 669-71, 296 A.2d 456, 461 (1972).

2

. The Commissioner of Elementary and Secondary Education found that there had been a decline in enrollment of 108 pupils in the elementary grades for the 1981-82 school year and that this pupil reduction was sufficient basis for the school committee to suspend three elementary school teachers. The petitioners concede the need to suspend teachers because of a substantial decrease in pupil enrollment. Their disagreement is with the method used to select the teachers to be suspended.

3

. The Board of Regents has the power “[t]o enforce the provisions of all laws relating to elementary and secondary education[;]” G.L. 1956 (1981 Reenactment) § 16-60-4(9)(g), as amended by P.L.1981, ch. 291, art. 13, § 2 and ‘‘[t]o decide and determine appeals from decisions of the commissioner,” § 16-60-4(9)(h).

4

. We construe this intent from the legislative history of the so-called Teachers’ Tenure Act, of which § 16-13-6 is one of the provisions. We note specifically the title of the legislation: "AN ACT TO GUARANTEE AND TO IMPROVE THE EDUCATION OF CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN THIS STATE BY PROVIDING CONTINUING TEACHING SERVICE." P.L.1946, ch. 1775.